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 ABSTRACT 
 
ADVANCING NATIONAL POLICY IN THE COURTS: 
THE USE OF MULTISTATE LITIGATION BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
 
Paul Brian Nolette 
 
Dissertation Advisor: R. Shep Melnick 
 
 
This dissertation examines the use of coordinated multistate lawsuits by state 
attorneys general (SAGs) as a tool to create national policy. Entrepreneurial SAGs have 
increasingly employed multistate litigation against private industry and the federal 
government, reaching numerous out-of-court settlements and favorable court 
judgments. These lawsuits have imposed new national regulatory requirements across 
several policy areas and have challenged regulatory regimes established by Congress 
and federal agencies.   
This study investigates three interrelated questions about multistate SAG 
litigation: (1) how SAGs have used this litigation to achieve national regulatory goals, (2) 
why this activity has increased over time, and (3) what the consequences are for 
American politics and policy. Employing both qualitative and quantitative analysis, I 
examine these questions through two stages. First, I present an analysis of an original 
dataset containing SAG lawsuits and legal settlements in four key policy areas covering 
1980 through 2009. Second, I examine three case studies involving pharmaceutical 
litigation, air pollution control litigation, and lawsuits against the firearms industry.  
 I find that changes in federal law instituted by Congress and the federal courts 
have created new opportunity points for SAGs, helping spur a dramatic increase of 
multistate litigation. The SAGs built upon earlier successful efforts, including their 
blockbuster settlement with the tobacco industry in 1998, to create new avenues of 
collaboration among their fellow SAGs, public interest groups, and the private bar. The 
result has been to substantially alter the regulatory landscape in areas including 
prescription drug pricing, pharmaceutical advertising, and greenhouse gas emissions. 
By shedding light on this significant form of "regulation through litigation," this 
dissertation illustrates how SAGs have seized upon the trend towards adversarial 
legalism in America by using the courts to achieve policy goals when attempts to do so 
in other venues fail. This runs contrary to a line of scholarly literature suggesting that 
litigation and courts have a limited impact on significant social change. This study also 
demonstrates how American federalism, commonly thought to serve as a restraint on 
the federal government by diffusing power, can be used by skillful political actors to 
create more energetic government and stronger national regulation. 
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Tables and Figures        ii 
Acknowledgements         v 
 
PART I: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Chapter 1 
     An Overview of the Dissertation       2 
Chapter 2 
     Litigation and Federalism in American Politics     39 
Chapter 3 
     An Empirical Look at Multistate Litigation      71 
Chapter 4 
     Multistate Litigation as National Regulation     118 
 
PART II: ACID RAIN AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE COURTROOM 
Introduction          182 
Chapter 5  
     The First Wave of Air Pollution Lawsuits: Litigating Acid Rain   200 
Chapter 6 
     The Second Wave of Air Pollution Lawsuits: Litigating Climate Change  251 
Chapter 7  
     Analysis and Conclusions        339 
 
PART III: REGULATING THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY THROUGH LITIGATION 
Introduction          378 
Chapter 8 
     Lawyers, Drugs, and Money: Litigating Prescription Drug Prices   382 
Chapter 9 
     SAGs as State-Level FTCs and FDAs: Litigating Drug Patents and Advertising 430 
Chapter 10 
     Analysis and Conclusions        489 
 
PART IV: THE REACH (AND LIMITS) OF MULTISTATE LITIGATION 
Chapter 11 
    The Abortive Attempt to Regulate Guns Through Litigation   518 
Chapter 12 
    State Attorneys General and Multistate Litigation in American Politics  574 
 
Appendices          615 
Bibliography          627 
ii 
 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1.1  Selected Multistate Litigation Campaigns     9 
by State Attorneys General 
 
Table 1.2  Types of SAG Litigation      20 
 
Table 3.1 SAG Participation Rates in Multistate Litigation (1980-2009) 92 
 
Table 3.2 SAG Lead Rates in Multistate Litigation (1980-2009)   95 
 
Table 3.3 Multiple Regression Analysis of Participation   100 
Rates in Multistate Litigation (All Cases, 1980-2009) 
 
Table 3.4 Multiple Regression Analysis of Lead     101 
Rates in Multistate Litigation (All Cases, 1980-2009) 
 
Table 3.5 Multiple Regression Analysis of Lead     102 
Rates in Multistate Litigation (Cases Since 2000) 
 
Table 4.1 Industries Targeted in Multistate Litigation (1980-2009)  121 
 
Table 4.2 Activities Targeted in Multistate     129 
Consumer Protection Litigation (1980-2009) 
 
Table 4.3 Activities Targeted in Multistate     134 
Antitrust Litigation (1980-2009) 
 
Table 4.4 Activities Targeted in Multistate     138 
Environmental Litigation (1980-2009) 
 
Table 4.5 Activities Targeted in Multistate     140 
Medicaid Fraud Litigation (1980-2009) 
 
Table 4.6 Federal Agency Enforcement Jurisdiction    143 
in Selected Policy Areas 
 
Table 4.7 A Typology of Federal/State Enforcement    157 
iii 
 
Table 5.1 Multistate Litigation Concerning Acid Rain    238 
  Prior to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
 
Table 6.1 Multistate Cases Involving Acid Rain and    332 
  Greenhouse Gases After the Clean Air Act 
  Amendments of 1990 
 
Table 7.1 SAG Partisanship and Per Capita CO2 Emissions   373 
  on SAG Participation in Massachusetts v. EPA 
 
Table 8.1 AWP-Related Medicaid Fraud Lawsuits    416 
  by State Attorneys General 
 
Table 8.2 Multistate Medicaid Fraud Litigation     422 
  by State Attorneys General (Through 2009) 
 
Table 9.1 Multistate Antitrust Litigation Against    446 
  Pharmaceutical Companies (Through 2009) 
 
Table 9.2 SAG Multistate Consumer Protection Litigation   481 
Against Pharmaceutical Firms (Through 2009) 
 
Table 12.1 Direct and Indirect Effects of Multistate Litigation   580 
 
Table B.1 Frequency of SAG Multistate Litigation Across   617 
  Four Main Policy Areas, 1980-2009 
 
Table C.1 Multiple Regression Analysis of Participation   618 
Rates in Multistate Litigation (Cases Since 2000) 
 
Table C.2 Multiple Regression Analysis of Lead and Participation Rates 618 
in Multistate Consumer Protection Litigation (1980-2009) 
 
Table C.3 Multiple Regression Analysis of Lead and Participation Rates 619 
in Multistate Environmental Litigation (1980-2009) 
 
Table C.4 Multiple Regression Analysis of Lead and Participation Rates 619 
in Multistate Antitrust Litigation (1980-2009) 
 
Table C.5 Multiple Regression Analysis of Lead and Participation Rates 620 
in Multistate Medicaid Fraud Litigation (1980-2009) 
iv 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1 Number of Resolved Multistate Cases (By Year, 1980-2009) 88 
 
Figure 3.2 Number of Resolved Multistate Cases    88 
(By Five-Year Period, 1980-2009) 
 
Figure 3.3 Number of SAGs Participating in Individual    90 
Multistate Cases (By Five-Year Period) 
 
Figure 4.1 Total State Recoveries in Multistate Settlements, Excluding  126 
Tobacco Settlements and Adjusted for Inflation (2009 Dollars) 
 
Figure 4.2 Average State Recoveries in Multistate Settlements,  126 
Adjusted for Inflation (2009 Dollars) 
 
Figure 4.3 Frequency of Case Types in      158 
SAG Multistate Litigation (1980-2009) 
 
Figure 4.4 Percentage of Cases Involving SAGs Taking Enforcement  177 
Actions Against In-State Defendants (1980-2009) 
 
Figure 5.1 Number of Articles Per Year Mentioning    214 
Acid Rain in the New York Times (1970-2000) 
 
Figure 5.2 Map of SAGs Involved in Multistate Litigation   240 
Concerning Acid Rain Prior to the 1990  
Clean Air Act Amendments 
 
Figure 6.1 Map of SAGs Involved in Multistate Litigation   338 
Concerning Acid Rain Following the 1990  
Clean Air Act Amendments 
 
Figure 7.1 A Diagram of Factors Contributing to SAG    355 
Environmental Multistate Litigation 
 
Figure 8.1 Example of Medicaid Prescription Drug    394 
Reimbursement Payments 
 
Figure 11.1 Interplay Between Congressional Support    571 
and Multistate Litigation
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
A finished product always seems more neat than the sometimes messy process 
leading up to it. I was lucky to be surrounded by many people at Boston College that 
helped channel my enthusiasm for my chosen subject all the way through the 
completion of this dissertation. 
My dissertation committee members were wonderful teachers and mentors 
both in connection with my dissertation and more generally during my time at Boston 
College. I learned an incredible amount about the interplay of courts and public policy 
from my dissertation advisor, Shep Melnick, as well as much more about many other 
aspects of academic life. Throughout this project, Shep helped me focus my ideas and 
think through the most interesting aspects of my findings. I was lucky to have him as my 
dissertation advisor. 
Michael Greve inspired my interest in state attorneys general in my very first 
semester at Boston College, and his scholarship on federalism and litigation had a great 
influence on me throughout this project. His substantive comments on my dissertation 
chapter drafts were also a great help throughout the project. 
 Ken Kersch provided several excellent comments on the draft chapters of this 
dissertation, and encouraged me to consider how the institution of the state attorney 
general developed over time. In addition to his help as part of my dissertation 
vi 
 
committee, Ken also inspired me to pursue a related parallel project concerning the 
institutional development of government-sponsored litigation over time.  
Marc Landy was an excellent teacher and mentor throughout my graduate 
school career, and a couple of critical conversations with him early on in this project 
helped steer my interest in politics of attorneys general in a productive direction.  
Numerous other people at Boston College helped make my four years go very 
smoothly. In particular, Carol Fialkosky and Shirley Gee, the graduate program secretary 
and department administrator respectively, were both a great help to me over my 
graduate school career. Carol and Shirley had to put up with dozens of my questions and 
requests over the years, always directing me to exactly where I needed to be.  
Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife and best friend Cindy. 
Cindy was a constant source of encouragement and support during my four years at 
Boston College, especially during those stressful times when upcoming deadlines were 
rapidly approaching. It is to her that I dedicate this dissertation. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I 
__________________________________________________ 
 
State Attorneys General in the  
American Political System 
 
 
2 
 
CHAPTER 1 
An Overview of the Dissertation 
 
"The best job in politics"  
– Bill Clinton, referring to the office of state attorney 
general, his first elected position1 
 
 
Many Americans describe their political system as slow and inefficient. 
Particularly when viewed in contrast to hierarchically organized European democracies, 
the American system appears highly resistant to policy change.  Many scholars have 
attributed this to the numerous "veto points" lodged throughout the American 
institutional structure.2 These veto points include specific institutional developments 
such as the Senate filibuster, as well as broad organizing principles including the  
diffusion of governmental authority established by the system of separation of powers 
and federalism. Some observers view this as a great virtue of the system, harkening back 
to James Madison's argument in Federalist 51 about how "ambition must be made to 
                                                          
1
 Clinton has made this remark on several occasions. During a political rally for Delaware Attorney General 
Beau Biden in 2009, for example, Clinton stated that "He's *Biden’s+ got the best job in politics. You know, 
I was attorney general. That was my first elected job. You don't have to appoint or disappoint, like 
governors or presidents do. If you did anything really unpopular, you could just blame it on the 
Constitution." Celia Cohen, "Bill Clinton’s ‘State of the World’ Address," WBOC News (Delaware), 
November 12, 2009, accessed July 7, 2010, http://www.wboc.com/Global/story.asp?S=11494652. He also 
told Chris Kelly, a candidate in the Democratic primary for California’s Attorney General, that state 
attorney general was "probably the best job in politics" because it is less beholden to the state legislature 
than are other offices. Kim Hart, "Facebook Executive Leverages Friends in Attorney General Bid," The Hill, 
November 5, 2009, accessed July 10, 2010, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/66411-facebook-exec-
leverages-friends-in-campaign. 
2
 See, for example, R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, "Assessing the Effects of Institutions," in Do 
Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, eds. R. Kent Weaver and 
Bert A. Rockman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), 26. 
3 
 
counteract ambition."3 To others, this is a dysfunctional state of affairs. According to this 
view, America's institutional structure too frequently prevents necessary policy change, 
except perhaps in rare policy "big bangs" witnessed during the New Deal era or in the 
work of the 89th Congress during the mid-1960s.4 However, this debate over the 
desirability of the system's many veto points too often loses sight of a key feature of the 
diffusion of power in America's fragmented constitutional system. While federalism in 
some instances may serve as a check on the regulatory ambitions of the national 
government, in important ways it also provides additional "opportunity points"5 for 
various policy actors to effectuate significant changes in national policy. Likewise, while 
America's separation of powers may sometimes serve as a roadblock to major policy 
change, the explicit rejection of a model of parliamentary sovereignty in America also 
provides additional opportunities for myriad policy actors to engage in entrepreneurial 
activity. 
This dissertation examines a set of political actors – state attorneys general 
(SAGs) – who have skillfully used the opportunity points inherent in the American 
institutional structure to achieve significant national policy change. SAGs are a 
                                                          
3
 James Madison, "Federalist #51," in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American 
Library, 1961), 322. For an example of an argument suggesting that the Constitution's establishment of 
separation of powers and federalism serve to limit deleterious government action, see John O. McGinnis, 
"The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective," Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 21 (1997). 
4
 See, for example, Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Daniel Lazare, The Frozen Republic: How the Constitution is 
Paralyzing Democracy (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1997). 
5
 R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1994): 140-141. 
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particularly good example of this phenomenon because of their unusual role at the 
crossroads of law and politics. Unlike the U.S. Attorney General, who is clearly a 
member of the executive branch, SAGs do not fit cleanly into traditional notions of the 
separation of powers.6 In addition to serving as chief legal officer in all fifty states and six 
territories, SAGs perform a number of important duties combining executive, legislative, 
and judicial functions. This includes conducting litigation concerning the state, issuing 
quasi-judicial opinions clarifying the law for government officials and private entities, 
and acting as legislative advocate and policymaker in areas concerning the public 
interest.7 
In recent years, SAGs have used their unusual institutional position and one of 
their most important tools, multistate litigation, to obtain dramatic national policy and 
regulatory changes across a diverse range of industries. A short discussion of some of 
the SAGs' recent litigation helps to illustrate this point. Perhaps most famously, SAGs 
across the country sued several of the nation's largest tobacco firms beginning in the 
mid-1990s. This effort culminated in a massive Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) 
that sent more than $200 billion to the states and created a massive new regulatory 
regime restricting the sales and marketing of tobacco products.8 Among many other 
restrictions, the MSA prohibited tobacco firms from targeting youth through the use of 
                                                          
6
 Arlen C. Christensen, "The State Attorney General," Wisconsin Law Review 1970 (1970): 298, 300. 
7
 Emily Myers and Lynne Ross, State Attorneys General: Powers and Responsibilities, 2
nd
 ed. (Washington, 
D.C.: National Association of Attorneys General, 2007), 12-14. 
8
 For an excellent analysis of the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, see Martha Derthick, Up in 
Smoke: From Legislation to Litigation in Tobacco Politics (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), also discussed 
later in this chapter. 
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cartoons in cigarette advertising, banned the advertising of cigarettes in public transit 
facilities, and prohibited the use of cigarette brand names on merchandise. The MSA 
also created a complicated structure of payments from the tobacco industry to states 
treasuries that amounted to a new uniform national tax on tobacco products.9 Through 
the settlement, the SAGs also granted themselves additional powers of regulatory 
oversight of the tobacco industry by making the SAGs the primary enforcers of the 
settlement. When the SAGs and the tobacco industry signed the MSA in 1998, it marked 
the first legal success against the tobacco industry after decades of failed private 
lawsuits against the industry. The MSA also created a massive new national regulatory 
regime covering the entire tobacco industry – and all without involvement of the federal 
government. 
The tobacco MSA was the largest but hardly the only important litigation 
campaign waged by the SAGs in recent years. Several SAGs have brought major antitrust 
litigation against national firms, including a massive lawsuit against Microsoft accusing 
the software company of using its market power to thwart competition.10 Other 
antitrust lawsuits against large national corporations have led to settlements leading to 
multi-million dollar payments to states and consumers.11 Former New York attorney 
                                                          
9
 See Michael S. Greve, "Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent," Missouri Law Review 68 (Spring 
2003), especially pgs. 346-364. 
10
 New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. 1:98CV1233 (D.D.C. May 15, 1998). 
11
 See, for example, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 391 F. 3d 812 (6th Cir. 2004) (involving allegedly 
illegal agreements between generic and brand name drug manufacturers; corporations reached $80 
million settlement with SAGs); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, MDL 
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general Eliot Spitzer made headlines throughout the 2000s for leading antitrust litigation 
against national insurance and brokerage firms based upon the firms' use of contingent 
commissions and other allegedly illegal industry practices. These efforts resulted in new 
codes of conduct applying across the national insurance industry.12 
SAGs have also used state consumer protection statutes as leverage to achieve 
high-profile settlements with corporate entities. Following concerns about predatory 
lending practices in the early 2000s, for example, SAGs used threatened state consumer 
protection litigation against several national banks as leverage to achieve major 
settlements worth hundreds of millions of dollars and establishing various new 
regulations not required under federal law.13 Even more recently, most SAGs across the 
country have been involved in negotiations with the six largest national banks to settle 
investigations into the banks' role in the mortgage crisis of the late 2000s.14 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Docket No. 1361 (D. Me. June 13, 2003) (involving advertising restrictions by music distributors on 
retailers; corporations reached $143 million settlement with SAGs). 
12
 See, for example, "Chubb Agrees to $17 Million Settlement, Ban on Contingent Commissions," 
BestWire, December 21, 2006. 
13
 An example includes a 2002 fifty-state settlement with Household Finance in which the firm agreed to 
pay $484 million to consumers nationwide and abide by various regulatory requirements, including: 
limiting prepayment penalties on home loans to the first two years of the loan and clearly disclose the 
cost of any penalties to consumers, ensuring that new loans provide a benefit to consumers before 
making them, limiting origination fees to five percent, improving disclosures to consumers, including 
whether a loan carries a balloon payment and the amount of that payment, and eliminating "piggyback" 
second mortgages. National Association of Attorneys General, "States Settle With Household Finance," 
Consumer Protection Report, November 2002. The SAGs have followed up this settlement with others 
with major lenders, including Countrywide Financial, Ameriquest Mortgage, and First Alliance Mortgage. 
14
 See, for example, Margret Cronin Fisk, "Attorneys General in 50 States Open Foreclosure Probe," 
Bloomberg Business Week, October 13, 2010, accessed May 17, 2011, 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-13/attorneys-general-in-50-states-open-foreclosure-
probe.html. 
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SAGs have sought to regulate a variety of additional activities nationwide 
through their state consumer protection lawsuits, including various billing practices by 
telephone companies,15 the listing of "adult services" on the online classified ad website 
Craigslist,16 the use of "zero-interest advertisements" by automobile manufacturers,17 
lending practices in the student loan industry,18 and the marketing and product design 
of firearms.19 A particular SAG litigation growth area in recent years has been lawsuits 
against manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, which has resulted in numerous 
settlements placing new restrictions on the sales and marketing of brand-name drugs.20 
In addition to the hundreds of SAGs lawsuits and settlements with private 
corporations, SAGs have also brought many high-profile lawsuits against the federal 
government directly, challenging various policy choices of federal agencies. Throughout 
the 2000s, several mostly Democratic SAGs challenged the Bush Administration's 
approach to global warming and the regulation of air pollution from power plants and 
automobiles. Among other successes in court, the SAGs spearheaded the litigation 
resulting in the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
which forced the Bush Administration's Environmental Protection Agency to address 
                                                          
15
 See, for example, "Vonage to Settle Investigation Involving 32 States," Associated Press, November 16, 
2009. 
16
 Christopher Leonard, "Craigslist Strikes Adult Services Under Pressure," Associated Press, September 4, 
2010. 
17
 See, for example, "Twenty Attorneys General Obtain Settlement with Mazda Motor of America," 
Consumer Protection Report, January 1997.  
18
 Jonathan D. Glater, "New York Plans to Sue Student Loan Company," New York Times, September 4, 
2008. 
19
 I discuss these lawsuits against firearms manufacturers in detail in Chapter 11. 
20
 SAG litigation against the pharmaceutical industry is the focus of Chapters 8 through 10 of this 
dissertation. 
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carbon dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act.21 Since the Obama Administration 
took office, several mainly Republican SAGs have employed multistate litigation to 
challenge various federal policy decisions. In addition to challenging new environmental 
regulations promulgated by the Lisa Jackson-led EPA,22 several SAGs have aimed to 
reverse President Obama's signature achievement – the health care legislation enacted 
in early 2010.23 
To help illustrate the sweep of SAG activities in recent decades, Table 1.1 lists a 
few of the major multistate litigation campaigns SAGs have brought in recent years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
22
 See, for example, Matthew Tresaugue, "Texas Challenges EPA's Global Warming Findings," Houston 
Chronicle, February 17, 2010. 
23
 Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 606 fn. 5 (E.D.V.A. August 2, 2010). 
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TABLE 1.1:  SELECTED MULTISTATE LITIGATION CAMPAIGNS BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
SAG Litigation Against 
Private Business 
SAG Litigation Against 
the Federal Government 
Advertising and sales of  
tobacco products (1998) 
New York v. EPA (2006)  
(vacating EPA's "New Source 
 Review" regulations) 
Pharmaceutical marketing  
and pricing (1999-present) 
New York v. Bodman (2006)  
(requiring DOE to set new energy 
efficiency standards for consumer 
appliances) 
Product design and marketing  
of firearms (1999-2000) 
Predatory lending practices  
by banks (2002-2006) Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)  
(forcing EPA to regulate carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases) Contingent commissions of insurance 
and brokerage firms (2005-present) 
Internet safety (2008-2009) 
New Jersey v. EPA (2008)  
(vacating EPA's mercury rules) 
Mortgage industry practices  
(2010-present) 
Constitutional challenges to the  
health care bill (ongoing) 
 
These examples are part of an increasing turn to the courts by SAGs over the 
past few years, and represent but a selection of the hundreds of individual lawsuits and 
settlements SAGs have initiated against corporations and federal agencies. Through 
these and other high-profile litigation campaigns, entrepreneurial SAGs have gained 
headlines in advance of subsequent runs for higher political office. Most concretely, by 
reaching out-of-court settlements with large corporations and confronting the federal 
government directly in the courtroom, SAGs have challenged the priorities of the federal 
government and expanded business regulation nationwide. 
10 
 
GOALS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation seeks to answer three interrelated questions about multistate 
litigation by the SAGs: what it is, how it came about, and how it shapes policy. As 
detailed in subsequent chapters, this unusual form of policymaking has become much 
more common in recent years, yet we still know little about it. Part of the goal of this 
dissertation is to shed more light on the underappreciated role of the state attorney 
general and convince the reader of their importance to American politics. Particularly as 
this role is likely to become increasingly important in future years, it is all the more 
important for observers of American politics to understand them. 
The SAGs are also of considerable interest to a wide range of scholarship within 
political science. As ambitious politicians with considerable leeway to set their own 
agenda, they are of interest to students of political entrepreneurship, public policy, and 
agenda setting. As government litigators, they raise important questions about the use 
of the courts and litigation as a policymaking tool. As increasingly important state 
officials, they can add to our understanding of the operation of modern-day American 
federalism. This study thus seeks to contribute to several broad areas of interest to 
scholars of American law and politics. 
a) American Federalism: Expanding, not Constraining, National Regulation  
Federalism and "states' rights" have been significant parts of the political 
dialogue for quite some time. Political conservatives in particular have frequently 
11 
 
employed rhetoric about the need to preserve federalism. In the past few decades, we 
have witnessed the "New Federalisms" of President Nixon and President Reagan, the 
push for "devolution" by House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and more recent Tea Party-
inspired calls for stronger states' rights as a bulwark against federal encroachment. Legal 
scholars spilled much ink debating the reach of the "federalism revolution" under Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, building from the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. 
Lopez24 and United States v. Morrison25 placing limits on the reach of Congress's 
Commerce Clause power. 
This aspect of American federalism focuses on the extent of federal power over 
the states and is, of course, an important area of study. A too-narrow focus on this 
aspect of federalism, however, threatens to obscure a development in American 
federalism that is a least as important as the various "New Federalisms" of the past 
several decades. At the same time observers were preoccupied with the extent of the 
limits on the federal government vis-à-vis the states, state attorneys general were 
becoming more frequent multistate litigators in a way that has raised precisely the 
opposite problem. Rather than being a case of federal power encroaching upon the 
prerogatives of the states, this state-driven litigation often encroaches upon the 
prerogatives of the federal government. In a variety of policy areas, they have brought 
agency-challenging litigation targeting federal administrative agencies, destabilized 
                                                          
24
 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
25
 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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policy compromises in Congress, and used the enforcement of state statutes as a way to 
institute nationally applicable regulations stricter than those required by the federal 
government. 
The SAGs' activity helps to recalibrate our understandings of modern American 
federalism. It indicates how this feature of America's constitutional structure is not 
simply a way to frustrate national policy development by serving as a Madisonian check 
on the powers of the federal government, but is a critical source for a more energetic 
and expansive government as well. While many scholars have recognized the 
importance of the states as alternative venues to push policy change on the state 
level,26 less appreciated is the way in which the operation of modern American 
federalism creates the opportunity for states to pursue policy objectives that create 
more aggressive national policy as well. 
b) American Litigation: Challenging the "Fly-Paper Court" 
My study also enters into the debate about the effectiveness of the courts and 
litigation in shaping national public policy. Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope spurred 
much of the modern debate on this question, suggesting that the effectiveness of courts 
and litigation in contributing to "significant social change" is vastly overstated.27 By 
contrast, my study helps illustrate how litigation, rather than serving as ineffective "fly-
                                                          
26
 See, for example, Andrew Karch, Democratic Laboratories: Policy Diffusion among the American States 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007). 
27
 Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991). 
13 
 
paper" for social reformers as Rosenberg suggests,28 can not only result in major 
national policy change but also do so in ways less constrained than assumed by 
Rosenberg. 
In short, I suggest that much of the talk of courts as "Hollow Hopes" overlook the 
importance of multistate settlements as a driver of national policy change. In several of 
the areas discussed in this dissertation, I show that multistate litigation considerably 
altered national regulatory policy along the lines desired by social reformers in 
environmental and health care policy. Because this litigation so often ends in 
settlements in lower federal or state courts, and because they often arise in the context 
of "law enforcement" rather than an explicit campaign for social change, they may be 
overlooked as court-based reform. Nevertheless, these settlements arose out of a 
conscious strategy to leverage the power of the judiciary to forge an agreement with 
the litigation targets and change – not merely "enforce" – the law. As such, they are as 
much a story about using the courts to achieve policy change as the much more 
frequently studied efforts to use constitutional litigation as a political strategy. 
By focusing on the broader political context in which SAG litigation takes place, I 
help to explain a central puzzle raised by critics of litigation's effectiveness: if the courts 
are so ineffective, why do social reformers turn to litigation? I suggest that this is 
because advocates seeking policy reform fully understand the way in which the 
American political system provides multiple opportunity points for entry. The multistate 
                                                          
28
 Ibid., chap. 14. 
14 
 
litigation I examine in this study is frequently accompanied by efforts by like-minded 
actors to achieve policy change in other venues, including in the executive and 
legislative branches. The multistate litigation I examine is one piece of a larger puzzle in 
which reformers work in multiple venues to further their policy goals, reverse policy 
gains made by their opponents, and destabilize the status quo policy equilibrium in an 
effort to place their alternative on the agenda. In all of these cases, litigation is best 
described not as mere "fly-paper" attracting naive policy advocates and distracting them 
from more fruitful efforts. Instead, it is one of the many effective tools policy advocates 
have and continue to use to further their reform agenda. 
Ultimately, this study illustrates how SAGs have become a new and powerful 
institutional actor in American politics through their use of multistate litigation. More 
broadly, it indicates how federalism and litigation, both products of America's 
separation of powers regime, can be used as opportunity points on the way to the 
creation of a stronger American regulatory state. 
MULTISTATE LITIGATION DEFINED 
Before proceeding further, I should be clear about the phenomenon at the heart 
of this study. My focus in on a particular outcome of interest: multistate litigation by the 
state attorneys general. As the name implies, "multistate litigation" occurs when two or 
more states coordinate efforts in a case or controversy with a third party. While "state 
litigation" is not always synonymous with "SAG litigation," since other state actors are 
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occasionally empowered to represent the state or particular state agencies in 
litigation,29 SAGs retain the vast bulk of the authority to bring litigation on behalf of the 
state. In this dissertation, I use the term "multistate litigation" to mean "SAG-led 
multistate litigation," which covers most state litigation. 
In multistate litigation, attorneys general "routinely share complaint data, 
conduct joint investigations, and devise coordinated litigation strategies."30 The 
cooperative element thus runs through the entire litigation process, from initial 
investigations through settlement negotiations, and, if necessary, the filing of lawsuits. 
When such efforts result in active litigation in court, it comes in two main forms. First, it 
includes lawsuits in which SAGs join in a single action in one (federal) court brought 
against private or governmental entities. Second, multistate litigation includes separate 
suits brought by individual SAGs in different (usually state) courts but which feature 
similar legal theories and involve some level of cross-state impetus and coordination. 
However, as used in this study, "multistate litigation" need not involve a filed lawsuit. 
Most cooperative investigations result in out-of-court settlements well in advance of the 
filing of a suit, so the term includes both active litigation as well as investigations carried 
out in advance of filing a suit.31 
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a) Multistate versus Single-State Litigation 
As I will detail in chapter 3, the dramatic increase in the SAGs' use of multistate 
litigation since the 1990s by marks a shift from the earlier period. Previously, SAGs 
litigated most cases separately, with only loose coordination among the states or none 
at all.32 While occasional cases of multistate litigation existed in the 1970s,33 early 
multistate collaboration generally concentrated on challenging the federal 
government’s ability to preempt state law, usually through the filing of amicus briefs in 
cases brought by a single state or led by other actors such as public interest groups. 
Modern-day multistate litigation is something different. It often involves multiple SAGs 
taking the lead in filing coordinated suits and creating policy through settlements or 
forcing the government to act in some way. 
However, while multistate litigation is now an important part of the modern-day 
SAG’s repertoire, it does not mean that these suits reflect the majority of litigation 
conducted by the typical SAG office. In fact, in terms of sheer numbers, SAGs still 
conduct a majority of their cases on an individual basis. To take one of thousands of 
typical examples, Illinois SAG Lisa Madigan recently brought a lawsuit against an oil 
refinery in Chicago to force them to clean up soil and groundwater contaminants 
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resulting from spills.34 Madigan brought this suit under state law, against a state 
industry, and it did not affect the interests of states outside of Illinois. Other examples 
of purely in-state litigation include a SAG’s settlement with an in-state clinical laboratory 
resolving allegations of Medicaid fraud35 and consumer protection litigation brought 
against the owners of a funeral home.36 
Since these types of in-state cases still represent the bulk of what SAGs do, the 
importance of multistate litigation lies not in these cases dominating the dockets of the 
SAGs. Rather, the importance of multistate litigation lies in its very effective use as a 
way to regulate corporations and to have these regulations apply nationally. By 
combining and coordinating their resources to obtain court judgments and reach out-of-
court settlements with targeted defendants, SAGs have been able to force uniform and 
widespread changes in business behavior that would be difficult to achieve through 
individual state action. As one former attorney general remarked, "corporate counsel 
need to pay attention to the new reality of multistate inquiries. They may not care if a 
state such as Maine sues them, but they’ll sure care if it’s Maine and 34 other states."37  
I should note that while multistate litigation has made it easier for SAGs to 
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achieve widespread regulation through litigation, some single-state litigation can also 
have national consequences as well. Perhaps the most prominent example is New York 
SAG Eliot Spitzer’s litigation against several large insurance and securities firms in the 
early 2000s, which had significant effects throughout the entire American financial 
sector due to the terms of the settlements negotiated between Spitzer and the firms 
involved.38 Because Spitzer was specially situated to bring these sorts of suits due to 
most national financial institutions being located in New York, his litigation was able to 
have much wider multistate effects than most single-SAG litigation could have. 
The single-state actions of the SAGs of large, populous states can likewise have 
significant influence nationally. Political scientist David Vogel highlighted the importance 
of "the California effect" in American regulation, in which that state’s relative size and 
wealth in the American economy means that its stricter regulations tend to apply 
throughout the entire nation.39 A similar phenomenon can occur in the case of SAG 
lawsuits. For example, in 2006 California SAG Bill Lockyer reached a single-state 
settlement with Pepsi regarding Mexican-made soda bottle labels allegedly containing 
an unsafe quantity of lead. The company agreed to shift to lead-free labels in California, 
but due to California’s large consumer market and the impracticality of differentiating 
product labels in and outside of the state, this change affected Pepsi’s product lines 
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nationwide.40  
Occasionally, single-state lawsuits by states smaller than California and New York 
can have a nationwide impact as well, particularly if the suits target in-state businesses 
operating nationally. In the summer of 2009, Minnesota SAG Lori Swanson reached an 
out-of-court settlement with the Minnesota-based National Arbitration Forum (NAF), 
the nation’s largest arbitration firm, following allegations that the company engaged in 
consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices, and false advertising. Under the terms of the 
settlement, NAF agreed to stop accepting new customer arbitrations of any sort, 
including arbitrations over disputed credit-card debt.41 Despite the single-state nature of 
this lawsuit, NAF agreed that the terms of the deal would apply to all of their activities 
nationally. 
To clarify the focus of this dissertation, the simple four-celled table below 
highlights the differences between the basic types of SAG litigation. SAG litigation can 
involve single states or it can involve multistate collaboration, and the regulatory effect 
of these SAG suits can focus primarily on intrastate matters or can have effects spanning 
state borders: 
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TABLE 1.2: TYPES OF SAG LITIGATION 
 Single-State Litigation Multistate Litigation 
Intrastate 
Regulatory Effects 
Example: Illinois SAG Lisa 
Madigan’s litigation against an 
oil refinery in Chicago requiring 
an environmental cleanup. 
No such cases 
Interstate 
Regulatory Effects 
Example: New York SAG Eliot 
Spitzer’s litigation against Wall 
Street firms requiring them to 
institute major changes in 
research and investment 
practices. 
Example: Several SAGs’ 
litigation against 
pharmaceutical companies 
requiring changes in 
marketing practices. 
 
My dissertation does not address all forms of SAG litigation. Rather, by focusing 
on multistate litigation, my dissertation concentrates on the sort of cases in the lower 
right-hand portion of Table 1.2. While single-state litigation has important regulatory 
effects as well, particularly those cases in the lower left-hand corner of the table, I 
decided to focus on multistate litigation for three main reasons. First, while some cases 
of single-state litigation have significant regulatory consequences beyond that one state, 
the multistate effects of most single-SAG litigation are significantly smaller than in the 
sort of larger, multistate litigation campaigns that are my focus. Examining multistate 
litigation thus captures a significant amount of SAGs’ effect on national regulatory 
policy.  
Second, multistate litigation is a particularly interesting form of SAG activity in 
itself, because while SAGs have long litigated cases individually, multistate coordination 
is becoming much more prominent as a litigation strategy than in the past. While 
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litigation such as the New York, California, and Minnesota cases noted above are 
excellent counter-examples, the SAGs now handle much of their litigation activity 
affecting multiple states in a coordinated manner. This raises the questions of why 
multistate litigation has become more prevalent, how it works, and why it is important. 
My third and final reason is a practical one. Focusing on multistate litigation 
allows for a clear distinction between those cases to be included in the study and those 
excluded, since each example of litigation features multistate coordination or it does 
not. By contrast, it is much more difficult to distinguish between litigation having 
regulatory effects across state lines as compared to litigation that does not. Thus, my 
focus on multistate litigation reduces reliance on subjective discretion in deciding which 
cases to include. 
The key focus of this dissertation is the SAGs’ increasing ability to make national 
policy through litigation and how this new regime fits within the structure of American 
federalism. While focusing exclusively on multistate litigation does not address other 
activities by attorneys general, the focus on this new form of national policymaking will 
go a long way in explaining the most important element of the SAGs’ new national role. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF SAGS AND MULTISTATE LITIGATION 
Until recently, the office of SAG drew little attention. Drew Ketterer, a former 
Attorney General of Maine, remarked that in the past, "nobody really knew who these 
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people were."42 Others had described the office as alternatively a "legal backwater"43 in 
state law and politics and "an often obscure and misunderstood legal institution."44 As 
late as the 1970s, Alabama SAG William Baxley could describe the state’s attorney as 
"generally regarded as (1) a criminal prosecutor whose primary concern was the 
protection of the public from robbers, murderers, kidnappers, and the like and (2) an 
advocate for the state and its agencies."45 
Some of the recent high-profile individuals who have held the office, including 
Eliot Spitzer, and major litigation campaigns such as the tobacco litigation in the 1990s 
have shined a brighter spotlight on the office. While our knowledge of SAGs remains 
surprisingly sparse despite their increasing importance, the office has drawn some 
scholarly attention in the past couple decades. A few of the key studies probing deeper 
into the SAGs’ collaborative activities are worth briefly discussing in some detail here. 
One of the first works to address the new prominence of SAGs is Cornell 
Clayton’s 1994 study discussing these state officials in the context of the so-called "New 
Federalism" and divided government of the 1980s.46  As many scholars have noted, the 
1980s began a devolutionary era in American government in which policy areas 
previously handled by the federal government were "devolved" to the state 
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government. Clayton suggests that this retrenchment in the Reagan era particularly 
affected the SAGs, perhaps more so than any other institution of state government. He 
notes that divided government and partisan disputes between Congress and the White 
House, which led to regularized conflict in administrative law and volatility in the federal 
government's own enforcement posture during this period, compounded the 
consequences of devolution. This allowed states to become more effective in their own 
enforcement of federal laws and to develop tougher standards themselves. Clayton also 
notes the degree to which SAGs helped forge a new sense of shared interest between 
the states’ legal policymaking and litigation. The emergence of several institutions 
aiming to integrate state and local legal policy, including the National Association of 
Attorneys General, helped mark this trend. 
Several scholars, including Clayton, have examined specific SAG activities as well. 
One area of study examines the activities of SAGs in litigation before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, where SAGs are the second most-frequently appearing party after the federal 
government.47 An early study by Richard Kearney and Reginald Sheehan found that 
states experienced greater access to the Court over the period they studied (1953-
1989), and that they won an increasingly higher proportion of cases when appearing as 
direct parties to the litigation.48 Building upon those earlier findings, Eric Waltenberg 
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and Bill Swinford also provide evidence that states became more successful litigating in 
the Supreme Court, in part because of the increased "ability of states to pursue their 
policy goals aggressively before the High Bench."49 Similar to Clayton, the authors argue 
that the Reagan Administration’s "New Federalism" thrust new responsibilities on the 
states, and helped lead to this professionalization and increased activity. Finally, Clayton 
and Jack McGuire examine the role of SAGs filing amicus curiae briefs before the 
Supreme Court, finding that the SAGs’ intervened as amici in an increasing number of 
cases from 1960 to 1994.50 
 Scholars have also examined the increasing frequency and influence of SAG 
activity outside of the context of the Supreme Court. In particular, the tobacco litigation 
of the 1990s spurred additional research of SAG activities. Martha Derthick’s substantial 
study of tobacco politics demonstrates the key role SAGs played in pushing forward 
tobacco regulation through multistate litigation.51 Her study traces the origins of 
political pressure on the tobacco industry, starting from early legislation and private 
(and unsuccessful) lawsuits and continuing to the Master Settlement Agreement in 
1998. The MSA, Derthick argues, represented a new way of regulating tobacco, and one 
that circumvented the failure of both the original settlement in Congress and the FDA’s 
attempt to regulate tobacco under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. She notes that 
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without the SAGs’ broad autonomy from other political actors and ability to proceed 
under the guise of protecting "the public interest," tobacco policymaking would not 
have taken the turn that it did toward litigation. 
A few recent studies have used the tobacco litigation to probe into the SAGs’ 
decision-making process. David Winder and James LaPlant conducted a multivariate 
regression analysis exploring the influence of political factors, socioeconomic forces, 
region, and the problem environment on the timing of a state's lawsuit against the 
tobacco industry. Their results revealed that Democratic attorneys general filed lawsuits 
sooner than did their Republican counterparts, and tobacco-producing states were least 
likely to file lawsuits against "big tobacco."52 Similarly, Rorie Spill, Michael Licari, and 
Leonard Ray measured the effect of several explanatory variables on SAGs’ decision to 
litigate in the tobacco litigation in the 1990s. They find that SAGs were "motivated by 
partisan self-interest and work within the constraints of their role," and that "crises and 
events clearly mobilized activity" among the SAGs. The authors concluded that SAGs are 
influenced both by self-interested political considerations as well as by their conception 
of the "public interest." 53 Finally, Thomas Schmeling found that the early tobacco 
lawsuits increased the likelihood of later suits, and notes the importance of the SAGs’ 
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political party affiliation in determining when each SAG filed suit against the industry.54 
While the tobacco litigation in particular generated attention to SAGs, other 
scholars have examined other examples of multistate litigation. In a series of recent 
articles, Colin Provost conducted regression analyses to determine the effect of several 
explanatory variables on the prevalence of multistate consumer protection litigation. 
Examining SAG-led consumer protection litigation from 1989 to 1998, he finds that both 
state citizen ideology and the presence of consumer groups in the states have a positive 
and significant effect on SAG case participation rates.55 In a separate article examining 
seven multistate consumer protection actions, Provost finds significant effects for the 
number of full-time office attorneys as well as a significant difference between the 
likelihood of elected and appointed SAGs joining multistate actions.56 Interestingly, he 
does not find significant differences in participation rates between Republican and 
Democratic SAGs. 
In addition to the studies examining the influence of certain explanatory 
variables on SAGs’ decisions to engage in multistate litigation in specific areas, a few 
scholars have also considered the policy ramifications of these activities, including 
situating these activities in the broader context of American federalism. Michael Greve 
has written the most extensively on the subject in a number of scholarly articles and 
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shorter pieces. In a 2005 article, for example, Greve examined trends in SAG 
involvement in antitrust litigation.57 Placing his findings in the federalism context, he 
finds that while states commonly exercise antitrust authority over purely local 
transactions, the subjects of their antitrust investigations are often located out-of-state, 
and the alleged violations often involve interstate transactions typically under the 
jurisdiction of federal enforcement authorities. SAGs thus do not view separate roles for 
themselves and federal antitrust enforcers. Rather, "their operative ideal is concurrent 
state and federal jurisdiction over the full range of private transactions,"58 a role 
tolerated and sometimes actively supported by the federal government.59 Ultimately, 
Greve suggests that the SAGs’ role in antitrust enforcement and the federal 
government’s toleration of it has led to a "cartel federalism," in which the states agree 
to exploit one another by refusing to defend the individual interests of their states 
against a sister state’s anticompetitive conduct and advocating for the broad (and 
strong) application of federal antitrust statutes across all states. By doing so, the states 
make it impossible for affected firms to relocate to states with less restrictive antitrust 
regimes.60 
In a separate article, Greve examines how SAGs attempt to attempt "to ‘reform’ 
the internal operations and business models of major American industries" through 
                                                          
57
 Michael S. Greve, "Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General," University of 
Chicago Law Review 72 (2005): 99-122. 
58
 Ibid., 109. 
59
 Ibid., 102 ("Conversely, federal agencies have consistently tolerated and sometimes supported state 
antitrust enforcement, even at considerable cost to national priorities"). 
60
 Ibid., 116. 
28 
 
multistate settlements with corporate defendants, something he terms "government by 
indictment."61 Reviewing SAG initiatives in a number of different industries, Greve 
concludes, "extraterritorial regulation is the true source of AG activism."62 Not only do 
SAGs’ settlements have a regulatory aspect, Greve argues, but through litigation SAGs 
are able to export the costs of that regulation to citizens in other states. When SAGs 
have the ability to regulate business activities across the country, the result is 
overregulation driven by the most aggressive and entrepreneurial SAGs. Through these 
activities, SAGs also violate some of the basic aspects of American federalism. Because 
they are involved in enforcement concerning business activities conducted across state 
lines, federal authorities – whose enforcement choices can be subverted by SAG 
activism – often share their jurisdiction. This, Greve says, leads to a sort of "preemption 
in reverse" in which the states force national standards on business stricter than those 
pursued (or desired) by the federal government.63 
In addition to Greve’s work, a small number of other authors have highlighted 
the relationship between SAG activities and broader issues of American federalism.  
Jason Lynch takes a sympathetic view of the interplay between SAGs’ multistate 
litigation and American federalism. He suggests that state enforcement of federal law is 
the intended operation of the statutes granting SAGs such authority, and notes that 
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Congress could at any time revoke such authority, countering accusations that SAGs are 
usurping federal authority.64 When SAGs pursue coordinated multistate litigation in 
state courts, based upon state law, they are not creating national legislation but are 
simply aggregating their power to enforce laws duly enacted by state legislatures; "in 
multistate cases, the states simply do together what they could do alone."65  
Similarly to Greve, Timothy Meyer expresses concerns about the broader 
federalism implications of SAGs’ multistate litigation.66 He notes that multistate 
litigation presents problems of democratic accountability when states engage in 
multistate "regulation by litigation," since states that do not want to join their sister 
states’ litigation efforts, or prefer different regulatory outcomes, have little power to 
stop them. Because even small groups of states can create new regulatory norms 
through settlements that apply nationally, there is "therefore no built-in check to 
preserve the integrity of decisions by voters of a single state to dissent from the 
norm."67 
Research following high-profile litigation such as the tobacco cases and Eliot 
Spitzer’s subsequent campaigns has started to shine more light on SAGs and multistate 
litigation, though much of this previous work remains limited in a number of ways. 
While several of these authors state that multistate litigation has grown more important 
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over time, the contours of this growth have not been clear in the literature. Further, 
much of the empirical work that has been done has focused in on particular policy areas 
such as tobacco and antitrust enforcement, as opposed to multistate litigation more 
generally. One of the contributions of this dissertation is to provide a more complete 
empirical picture of multistate litigation, which will benefit future studies of SAG 
activities. 
Further, many of the studies have not linked together the empirical findings with 
the broader place of these multistate suits in the American political system. Typically 
when SAGs and federalism are linked, it comes in the context of their involvement in 
"federalism cases" before the Supreme Court. However, as this dissertation stresses, the 
link between federalism and SAGs appears in the now frequent use of multistate 
litigation as a form of regulation through litigation. Martha Derthick's and Michael 
Greve’s work, as well as the shorter individual pieces by Lynch and Meyer mentioned 
above, have been some of the few to make this connection. Still, explicitly linking more 
complete empirical information with theoretical understandings of federalism and the 
SAGs’ use of litigation as a political tool will continue building our knowledge of SAGs 
and provide a richer understanding of an important part of the contemporary American 
system. 
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EXPLANATION OF METHODS AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This study proceeds in two main phases. The first phase presents an extensive 
empirical analysis of an original database of multistate litigation. After looking at this 
"big picture" of multistate litigation, I then zero in on three recent prominent case 
studies, including climate change, pharmaceuticals, and firearms. While the policy areas 
involved in these case studies are quite different, all three highlight the SAGs' role in 
forming national regulation through multistate litigation. 
a) The First Phase: Establishing the Universe of Cases 
Part I of this study establishes the theoretical orientation of the study and 
contains the first phase of my research. Chapter 2 discusses two key features of 
American politics, litigation and federalism, and how SAGs stand at the crossroads of 
both. In this chapter, I place my study in the context of scholarly literature examining 
the efficacy of litigation, as well as works exploring the purposes and operation of 
American federalism. This chapter serves to establish the theoretical framework for the 
remainder of the study. 
In chapters 3 and 4, I then move to an analysis of an original dataset containing 
SAG lawsuits and legal settlements in four key policy areas, covering from 1980 to the 
present.68 This look at the broader universe of cases involving multistate litigation helps 
to identify both key individual factors contributing to SAG involvement in multistate 
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cases as well as explain how this phenomenon meshes with enforcement activities of 
the federal government. Chapter 3 focuses on several SAG-level characteristics of this 
litigation. I examine the increase in multistate litigation over time and note wide 
discrepancies in the states’ participation in these suits. I then explore how some of the 
structural differences of the SAG offices – including the resources available to the SAGs, 
partisan differences, and the mode of selection of the SAG – contribute to SAGs’ 
participation in multistate litigation. Finally, I consider some of the broader reasons why 
multistate litigation emerged when it did. 
 Chapter 4 continues the empirical approach to SAG multistate litigation begun in 
the previous chapter, but with an emphasis on the case-level characteristics of the 
litigation. The first part of this chapter sheds additional light on the types of cases that 
attract SAGs, including which industries and activities are most frequently the targets of 
SAG multistate litigation. It also discusses in detail what these cases accomplish, from 
the monetary recoveries to the regulatory provisions that are part of the resolution of 
these multistate cases. The second part of this chapter turns to how this multistate 
litigation interacts with the priorities of the federal government. I present a typology of 
multistate litigation sorting the cases into four basic groups based upon interaction 
between the SAGs and federal enforcement authorities, and apply this to the original 
database of multistate litigation. 
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b) The Second Phase: Case Studies 
1. Summary of Cases 
The second phase of this dissertation, the bulk of which is contained in Chapters 
5 through 11, consists of three case studies of SAG multistate litigation efforts. The 
purpose of these small-N case studies is to provide a richer picture of how multistate 
cases operate than large-N analyses of the type presented in chapters 3 and 4 can do 
alone. Particularly because of the complexity of the relationships involved in the 
processes of multistate litigation – involving actions by legislatures, administrative 
agencies, interest groups, and others – the case study method is particularly useful for 
tracing the development of these interactions. 
Part II of the dissertation contains the first of these three in-depth case studies, 
involving SAGs' involvement in air pollution litigation. The story begins in Chapter 5 with 
a litigation campaign by several SAGs in the 1980s concerning the issue of acid rain. 
These campaigns sought to press a novel interpretation of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in an 
effort to require Midwestern pollution sources to stop their pollution drifting across 
state lines. While these litigation campaigns were largely unsuccessful in the courts, it 
helped to establish the precedent of multistate cooperation used in later air pollution 
litigation campaigns. The SAGs followed up this "first wave" of acid rain litigation with a 
"second wave" of litigation focusing on the next big issue in air pollution policy – climate 
change. This campaign, which involved a far larger group of SAGs on opposing sides of 
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the litigation, is the subject of Chapter 6. Beginning in the late 1990s and expanding 
rapidly during the George W. Bush Administration, this litigation campaign began with 
new efforts to tackle acid rain in the context of the New Source Review program in the 
CAA. With climate change emerging as the key air pollution concern in the 2000s, SAGs 
spearheaded additional challenges to the federal government, culminating in a Supreme 
Court victory in Massachusetts v. EPA in 2007. Chapter 7 concludes Part II by analyzing 
the factors contributing to these air pollution litigation campaigns and the effect it had 
on politics and policy overall. 
Part III of the dissertation introduces a second case study involving litigation 
against pharmaceutical firms. Chapter 8 explains how SAGs have used litigation to 
challenge the way in which drug companies price their products. As explained in this 
chapter, both industry and Congress long accepted the existing pricing mechanisms as 
standard practice. However, litigation by the SAGs and other parties helped to 
transform these practices into actionable fraud under state and federal law, 
fundamentally reshaping the way government health care programs pay for drugs. 
Chapter 9 examines two additional ways in which SAGs have challenged prescription 
drug policy.  First, through numerous lawsuits based upon state and federal antitrust 
law, SAGs have challenged actions by manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceuticals as 
anti-competitive actions blocking generic versions of brand-name drugs from the 
market. This litigation, which ended in a series of settlements involving significant 
monetary and injunctive provisions, has served to introduce a more stringent vision of 
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antitrust law applied to the pharmaceutical industry nationwide. Second, SAGs have 
sought to regulate the advertising and marketing of pharmaceutical products through 
litigation. By doing so, SAGs have effectively created a patchwork national regulatory 
regime through a variety of settlements that has not only established stricter rules for 
pharmaceutical firms to follow, but has increased their own oversight authority in the 
process. Chapter 10 concludes Part III by analyzing the factors contributing to the rise of 
pharmaceutical litigation and summarizing the effect this litigation has had on 
pharmaceutical politics and policy. 
Finally, Part IV explores the reach and limits of multistate litigation. Chapter 11 
recounts the story of a litigation campaign that ultimately failed, in contrast to much of 
the environmental and pharmaceutical litigation. This was the SAGs' litigation campaign 
against the gun industry, which failed to attract more than a handful of SAGs – only one 
of which, New York SAG Eliot Spitzer, actually filed a lawsuit. After the litigation reached 
a major victory in the form of a comprehensive settlement between Smith & Wesson 
and several government parties in 2000, the settlement triggered a backlash against this 
attempt at "regulation through litigation." In 2005, Congress took the unusual step of 
preempting most litigation against firearms manufacturers. In this chapter, I explain why 
this campaign ultimately failed even as SAGs successfully conducted multistate litigation 
campaigns in so many other areas. 
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2. Case Selection 
I selected the three particular cases explored in this study for a number of 
reasons. First, I wanted to choose cases that could illustrate a full range of common SAG 
multistate activity. As discussed at more length in chapter 3, nearly all multistate 
litigation falls into four broad policy areas: environmental policy, consumer protection, 
antitrust enforcement, and Medicaid fraud. The air pollution litigation explored in Part II 
falls into the first of these policy areas, while the pharmaceutical litigation in Part III 
includes the other three policy areas. Second, I sought to include studies that involved 
both litigation SAGs brought against the federal government directly, as well as litigation 
targeting private corporate defendants. Further, my initial exploration of my multistate 
litigation dataset revealed that these litigation campaigns involved particularly common 
litigation campaigns. For example, air pollution litigation brought against the federal 
government is by far the most common type of multistate environmental litigation. 
Likewise, SAGs initiate more litigation against the pharmaceutical industry than they do 
against any other economic sector. Third, SAGs have conducted pharmaceutical and air 
pollution litigation not only frequently but over a long period. Multistate air pollution 
litigation campaigns began at the very beginning of the emergence of regularized 
collaboration in multistate litigation in the early 1980s. Pharmaceutical litigation 
became common in the 1990s, at the same time that this phenomenon was becoming 
much more common overall. Both forms of litigation remain very common today. Thus, 
the longer timeframe involved in these two policy areas offers a chance to explore at 
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more length both the historical development of these cases as well as current 
developments. 
I included the study of litigation against gun manufacturers featured in Part IV as 
a contrast to the environmental and pharmaceutical cases in Parts II and III. Unlike air 
pollution litigation and lawsuits against drug companies, which have continued to this 
day, the SAGs failed to sustain litigation efforts to achieve nationwide policy change on 
the issue of gun safety. Also unlike the previous two policy areas, Congress explicitly 
preempted the lawsuits against gun manufacturers. This raises a secondary question in 
my study: why did this short-lived campaign fail while the others have flourished? 
3. Conclusion 
Following the exploration of the three case studies in Chapters 5 through 11, I 
conclude the dissertation in Chapter 12. I explain how SAGs represent the culmination 
of two very important trends in American politics. First, they are one of the beneficiaries 
of the turn to what Robert Kagan has termed "adversarial legalism."69 Contrary to views 
of litigation as an ineffective tool, SAGs have used their powers of law enforcement to 
effectuate major policy change. Second, they have seized upon the move towards 
"states' rights" that is today most commonly associated with the political Right, but in 
fact has regulatory effects more in tune with the political Left. Indeed, the SAGs' 
multistate litigation turns the common way we think of American federalism – as a 
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constraint on government – on its head. SAGs have skillfully used the opportunity points 
afforded by America's fragmented political structure to advance national policy towards 
greater regulation. Finally, for a number of reasons I summarize in this Chapter 12, SAGs 
and their use of multistate litigation will likely remain of increasing importance in 
American politics for the foreseeable future. There is good reason to believe that the 
state attorney general, as President Clinton remarked in reference to his tenure as 
Arkansas SAG, will continue to stake a claim to being "the best job in politics" for many 
years to come. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Litigation and Federalism in American Politics 
 
 "The question of the relation of the states to the federal government is the 
cardinal question of our constitutional system...It cannot, indeed, be settled by 
the opinion of any one generation, because it is a question of growth and every 
successive stage of our political and economic development gives it a new aspect, 
makes it a new question."  
–Woodrow Wilson1 
 
"There is almost no political question in the United States that is not resolved 
sooner or later into a judicial question."  
–Alexis de Tocqueville2 
 
 
 State attorneys general are a product of two central features of American 
politics, both reflecting peculiarly American traits. The first is the importance of 
litigation and the judiciary as part of the policymaking process. Alexis de Tocqueville 
understood the significant role of the courts early in the nation's history, noting the 
extent of judicial power in Democracy in America. In more recent years, there has been 
an increasing turn to the courts and litigation as a policymaking strategy. Following in 
the footsteps of the courtroom success of Brown v. Board of Education3 in 1954, 
numerous individuals and groups have brought lawsuits in the hopes of achieving policy 
change. The activism of the Warren Court throughout the 1960s paired with Congress's 
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encouragement of litigation appeared to usher in a new era of the courts as key policy 
actors. This new era appeared to grant skilled litigators a way to achieve policy reforms. 
As their state's chief legal counsel, SAGs interact with courts and employ litigation 
regularly. As such, they are particularly sensitive to the relative power of litigation and 
the judiciary in the American policy process. 
The second central feature is the "great American invention"4 of federalism 
dividing "the power surrendered by the people...between two distinct governments."5 
Since the time James Madison described the "compound republic" established by the 
proposed Constitution, however, the precise contours of America's federal system have 
never been clear. Woodrow Wilson's characterization of federalism as a "new question" 
for each generation reflects the unsettled nature of the relationship between the 
federal and state governments, as well as between the states themselves. This 
relationship has been a recurring theme in modern political discourse, with presidents 
and congressional leaders proposing various "New Federalisms" and recent grassroots 
campaigns proclaiming the necessity to protect "state's rights." As increasingly 
important state officials, SAGs are both a product of federalism and a key player in 
helping to answer "the cardinal question of our constitutional system" for today's 
generation. 
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 In this chapter, I take a closer look at some of the key ways in which recent 
scholars have conceptualized the operation of litigation and federalism in modern 
American politics. Scholars have taken issue with "traditional" conceptions of both in 
recent years. While some scholars have noted how "adversarial legalism" reflects 
America's particular governing style, building off prior views of the power of the courts 
in America, other prominent voices have cast doubt on the ability of courts and 
litigation to achieve social change. While the view of federalism as a constraint on 
government remains strong, recent scholars have instead argued for "polyphonic" 
conception of federalism in which all levels of government are empowered to address 
social problems. As I explain, the position of SAGs as both litigators and state officials 
makes them a particularly good lens through which to examine these various 
perspectives. 
LITIGATION AND LEGALISM IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
Litigation is the most prominent tool SAGs use as part of their policy repertoire. 
As the chief legal officer of their respective states, SAGs frequently engage with state 
and federal courts through single-state and multistate litigation, as noted in Chapter 1. 
In several cases, as with the tobacco litigation in the 1990s and the policy areas I 
examine in the upcoming case studies, SAGs explicitly seek to reform not just individual 
firms but entire nationwide industries of which their litigation targets are a part. The 
assumption on the part of these government litigators, then, is that they can use 
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litigation as a tool for significant reform. Through multistate litigation, they hope to 
promote significant national policy changes through the courts. 
a) Adversarial Legalism in American Politics 
To a large degree, this assumption does not appear to be either unusual or 
quixotic. After all, litigation and the courts have long played an important role in 
American politics. Alexis de Tocqueville's oft-cited quotation that so many political 
questions resolve into judicial questions often begins this observation. Many, ranging 
from academic scholars to popular novelists to television broadcasters, have published 
countless materials touching upon the role of law and courts in the American polity. 
Americans seem perhaps uniquely willing to turn to the courts and litigation as a 
method of dispute resolution. 
Law professor and political scientist Robert Kagan has provided one of the most 
comprehensive recent examinations of this peculiarly American phenomenon. 
According to Kagan, America relies far more than other economically advanced 
democracies on what he terms "adversarial legalism." Adversarial legalism is a form of 
policymaking characterized primarily by two main characteristics. The first is "formal 
legal contestation," in which "disputants readily invoke legal rights, duties, and 
procedural requirements, backed by recourse to formal law enforcement, strong legal 
penalties, litigation, and/or judicial review." The second is "litigant activism," in which 
"the assertion of claims, the search for controlling legal arguments, and the gathering 
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and submission of evidence" are dominated not by judges or government bureaucrats 
"but by disputing parties or interests, acting primarily through lawyers."6 This contrasts 
with more hierarchical forms of policymaking more commonly found in European 
democracies, including actions by strong bureaucratic agencies and decisions made by 
experts.  Of course, Kagan does not deny that policymaking in the United States also 
involves decision-making by bureaucracies and experts. Instead, his argument is that 
"viewed in comparative perspective, the United States...is especially inclined to 
authorize and encourage the use of adversarial litigation to implement public policies 
and resolve disputes."7 
This has been particularly true since the 1960s, when shifts in the political 
culture combined with the existing fragmented governmental structure to encourage 
adversarial legalism. Kagan notes that America's basic governmental structures have 
long reflected a mistrust of concentrated power.8 The model of separation of powers 
and federalism enshrined by the U.S. and state constitutions are testament to this 
mistrust. Beginning in the 1960s, however, Americans expressed a rising demand for 
what Lawrence Friedman has termed "total justice."9 Underlying this demand is "the 
notion that because rich societies now have insurance and other ways of compensating 
victims of unfair treatment, personal injury, and unexpected health care costs, they 
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should be required by law to do so." Whereas their counterparts in the past did not 
expect as much from their government, twentieth-century Americans now are more 
likely to deem "unjust" the government's failure to use techniques "to prevent 
misfortune and mistreatment."10 Kagan explains that the tension between this rising 
demand for "total justice" and the existence of America's fragmented governmental 
structure has led to the growth of adversarial legalism. 
b) Courts as "Hollow Hopes" and Litigation as "Fly-Paper" 
Even if it is true that Americans have a particular penchant for using adversarial 
litigation to attempt to shape and implement public policy, however, it does not 
necessarily follow that this policymaking strategy is effective. While acknowledging that 
Americans do seem peculiarly likely to turn to litigation, several scholars have 
nevertheless suggested that the role the courts and litigation play in American politics is 
considerably overstated. This view draws upon Alexander Hamilton's classic argument 
that the courts "will always be the least dangerous" branch of government because they 
have "no influence over either the sword or the purse...[and] have neither FORCE nor 
WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive 
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."11 According to this view, Hamilton's 
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statement rings particularly true in the context of modern "reform litigation" aiming for 
large-scale policy changes. 
Stuart Scheingold, in his classic The Politics of Rights, provides an argument along 
these lines. Scheingold counsels against the too-optimistic view common at the time he 
was originally writing in 1974, which suggested that reform litigation can advance the 
goals of disadvantaged and disenfranchised groups. This view, he claimed, rested upon a 
"myth of rights" erroneously "premised on a direct linking of litigation, rights, and 
remedies with social change."12 Americans too often hold "exaggerated expectations 
about the political impact of judicial decisions" and assume that litigation is "an effective 
way to redress the mistakes and deal with the shortcomings of American politics that 
result in denial of rights and neglect of constitutional values." This approach to change, 
Scheingold argues, runs into a series of difficulties. For example, "Judges cannot 
necessarily be counted upon to formulate a right to fit all worthwhile social goals. Even 
when a right exists, it can hardly be taken for granted that a remedy is close behind."13 
Nevertheless, Scheingold also suggests that while the direct political impact of litigation 
may be overstated, litigation can be useful in somewhat more indirect ways. Most 
importantly, "Litigation can be useful for political mobilization and can in this way affect 
the balance of forces." Litigation, in other words, can bring upon policy change by 
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serving to "cue the hopes and expectations so important to successful mobilization" in a 
broader political struggle.14 
1. Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope 
The academic skepticism about the efficacy of litigation-driven reform took a 
new turn following the publication of Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope in 1991. This 
work sought to answer the central question of whether courts and litigation can 
produce "significant social reform," which Rosenberg specifies as "policy change with 
nationwide impact."15 Rosenberg provides a clear answer: "U.S. courts can almost never 
be effective producers of significant social reform. At best, they can second the social 
reform acts of the other branches of government."16 He further argues that the ability of 
courts to produce significant reform is overstated in terms of not only its "direct" 
effects, involving the coercive powers of the courts to enforce their rules, but their 
"indirect" effects as well. Such indirect effects might arise when courts invoke "powers 
of persuasion, legitimacy, and the ability to give salience to issues" in such a way as to 
change the behavior of citizens or to "politicize issues that otherwise might have 
remained unattended."17 By arguing that courts rarely produce even these indirect 
effects on significant social change, such as encouraging political mobilization, 
Rosenberg extends Scheingold's argument about the ineffectiveness of litigation. 
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This argument, Rosenberg suggests, speaks directly against what he calls the 
"dynamic court" perspective popular among both scholars and the public. This view 
assumes that courts are political actors capable of advancing significant social reform. 
Rosenberg instead adopts something closer to what he identifies as a "constrained 
court" model, which holds that courts are unable to produce significant social change 
because of their many institutional constraints. These constraints include the existence 
of binding precedent, the courts' lack of independence from other branches of 
government, and the limits of the judiciary's own institutional capacity.18  
Rosenberg recognizes that under some very limited conditions courts may have 
an effect on significant social reform, but only when all three of these constraints are 
overcome. To do so requires several specific conditions, including the existence of: (1) 
"ample legal precedent for change," (2) "support for change from substantial numbers 
in Congress and from the executive," and (3) either citizen support for the courts or at 
least low levels of opposition from all citizens combined with ways for courts to 
implement their actions. This implementation can occur when the courts offer positive 
incentives or direct costs to other actors to induce compliance, allow for market 
implementation, or when officials crucial to implementation "are willing to act and see 
court orders as a tool for leveraging additional resources or for hiding behind." 
Rosenberg makes clear throughout The Hollow Hope that overcoming these constraints 
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is a rare enough occurrence that it suggests courts are "neither necessary nor sufficient 
for producing significant social reform."19 
Rosenberg applies his model to several litigation campaigns, including those 
leading to Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade. Marshaling a wealth of 
empirical data, he claims that the impact on social change in both cases is far less than 
commonly assumed. For example, he reports the counter-intuitive finding "that before 
Congress and the executive branch acted, courts had virtually no direct effect on ending 
discrimination" against black Americans. Further, the courts failed to have even indirect 
effects such as to "give the [civil rights] issue salience, press political elites to act, prick 
the consciences of whites, legitimate the grievances of blacks, [or] fire blacks up to 
act."20 According to Rosenberg, "Examining the broader picture shows that 
desegregation occurred principally because Congress acted, supplying incentives for 
desegregation and imposing costs for maintaining segregation."21 Rosenberg extends his 
analysis to other areas involving attempts at significant social reform, including 
environmental protection, reapportionment, and criminal law. In these areas as well, 
Rosenberg fails to find evidence for the efficacy of the litigation campaigns. In 
environmental litigation, for example, he argues that environmental litigators were 
"mostly unsuccessful" in their efforts to "use the courts to enforce compliance and 
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broaden agency interpretations" of statutes in part because "courts tend not to strike 
out in ways that are likely to raise political ire." In this area and others, "[w]hat court 
decisions could do best was to preserve victories achieved in the political realm from 
attack," but had little effect producing new social change themselves.22 
One of the practical implications of Rosenberg's argument, and one that 
Rosenberg cites throughout, is that reformers are wasting valuable resources on 
litigation. In his words, "courts act as 'fly-paper' for social reformers who succumb to the 
'lure of litigation.'" Pursuing litigation may thus actually work against the interests of the 
reformers. Not only "does litigation steer activists to an institution that is constrained 
from helping them, but it also siphons off crucial resources and talent, and runs the risk 
of weakening political efforts."23 Rosenberg thus suggests that activists would be better 
off pursuing other strategies, such as legislative or grassroots avenues, rather than 
relying on litigation. Civil rights activists at the time of Brown, for example, "might have 
been better off registering voters outside the South [and] pressuring non-southern 
corporations to stay out of the South" than pursuing a legal strategy through the 
courts.24 
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2. Criticism of The Hollow Hope 
The Hollow Hope helped to spur a new conversation among scholars regarding 
the efficacy of courts. While the work helped to shift the terms of the debate, it has not 
gone without significant challenges from other scholars over the past twenty years. 
Some of these criticisms focused on the particular empirical evidence Rosenberg 
presents, suggesting that The Hollow Hope understated the significance of the cases he 
explores. Others have made broader points about the role of courts and litigation. 
Michael McCann, for example, focuses on the "constitutive" role that courts play. In his 
study of the pay equity movement, Rights at Work, McCann argues that even though 
pay equity activists largely failed to achieve major court decisions bolstering their 
position, the litigation campaign nevertheless advanced their cause in more subtle ways. 
Their legal mobilization served as a resource for these activists in future "movement 
development, articulation of new rights claims, alliance with other groups, policy reform 
advances, and social struggle generally."25 In a review of The Hollow Hope, McCann also 
notes that court actions provide various "endowments" to disputing parties throughout 
society. Such endowments supply "bargaining chips" for negotiation "that flow from 
predictions about what each party would get if they went to trial."26 In short, McCann 
suggests that litigation can have at least powerful indirect effects on advancing 
significant social reform. 
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Other scholars suggest that courts can indeed produce significant social change, 
though often in highly problematic ways. Peter Schuck helpfully distinguishes three 
scholarly views concerning the effectiveness of courts and litigation in producing 
significant social change. "Strong-court" scholars, similar to Rosenberg's description of 
supporters of the "Dynamic Court" model, hold that courts' unique institutional features 
allow them to become effective reformers. "Court fatalists," like Rosenberg and 
devotees of the "Constrained Court" view, maintain that courts are generally irrelevant 
to social change. However, Schuck suggests a third group of scholars he terms "court 
skeptics," who suggest that courts can and frequently do produce policy change, but 
often in ways resulting in "unanticipated and often perverse" results.27  
This is often true in social change litigation based upon statutes, which Schuck 
charges Rosenberg too often conflates with constitutional litigation in The Hollow Hope.  
As Schuck notes, "social reform through statutory interpretation has a distinctive 
dynamic that produces its own patterns of cause and consequence." Key to this 
different dynamic is that administrative agencies play central roles in effectuating 
statutory regimes and their relationships to courts "are pivotal in determining how 
judicial doctrines are both shaped and implemented." By focusing primarily on big 
constitutional cases such as Brown and Roe, Rosenberg's theory risks missing the 
dynamic between courts and agencies unleashed by litigation. Schuck notes that when 
Rosenberg moves to other areas, including environmental protection, he fails to 
                                                          
27
 Peter H. Schuck, "Public Law Litigation and Social Reform," Yale Law Journal 102 (1993): 1769. 
52 
 
"consider that the court's role in interpreting environmental statutes is altogether 
different, and far more consequential, than its failure to constitutionalize environmental 
rights."28 
R. Shep Melnick's Regulation and the Courts, written several years before The 
Hollow Hope, helps illustrate this point and highlights the "court skeptic" view. Melnick 
provides a detailed study of several areas in which federal courts have interpreted key 
sections of the Clean Air Act. He finds that the courts have had a dramatic effect in 
shaping America's air pollution regime through the use of statutory interpretation. One 
prominent example included a D.C. District Court decision in 1972 requiring the EPA to 
administer a "prevention of significant deterioration" (PSD) program, a program existing 
nowhere in the original Clean Air Act and which was only later ratified by Congress.29 
This program became a substantial part of America's air pollution control regime, 
though its effects were far from beneficial. Through decisions requiring agencies to 
address the ill-defined problem of "significant deterioration," the courts "discouraged 
the EPA from taking into account the economic effect or administrative feasibility of 
various regulatory schemes."30 In a series of other case studies, Melnick illustrates how 
court action under the Clean Air Act was significant but often detrimental. In his 
subsequent work on welfare rights in the courts, Between the Lines, Melnick notes that 
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activists representing the poor and disabled "consciously used litigation to force, delay, 
and focus legislative and administrative action." Because much of this activity was based 
upon court battles over statutory interpretation, it illustrates "that in order to 
understand the ways in which he federal courts have affected public policy and the 
operation of government institutions, one must look outside the confines of 
constitutional law as conventionally defined."31 
Kagan's argument in Adversarial Legalism falls along the court-skeptical line as 
well. One of the features of adversarial legalism, Kagan argues, is that it "is a markedly 
inefficient, complex, costly, punitive, and unpredictable method of governance and 
dispute resolution."32 One of his prominent examples features the Port of Oakland's 
struggle to dredge its harbor in San Francisco Bay. In this case, years of costly litigation 
and seemingly endless debates about the adequacy of decision-making procedures, the 
reliability of environmental impact models, and many other disputes "produced only a 
legal mess." While adversarial legalism is "Janus-faced" in that it sometimes results in 
positive as well as negative outcomes,33 Kagan argues that the social costs of adversarial 
legalism are prominent and too often overlooked. 
The criticisms of the arguments contained in The Hollow Hope have not 
displaced the work as a centerpiece in the scholarly debate about the efficacy of courts 
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and litigation. Rosenberg has since stood behind his original arguments in a second 
edition of the book. In responding to some of the criticism, he maintains that litigation 
sometimes has an effect on policy, though often not in ways reformers intend. Indeed, 
"In terms of social reform litigation, one of the claims of The Hollow Hope is that courts 
affect society in a powerful ideological way by drawing resources to litigation and away 
from political mobilization."34 He also suggests that litigation can be successful when 
"protecting the status quo." So, for example, when pro-choice litigants brought litigation 
to prevent the use of abortion clinic blockades by anti-abortion activists, they were 
successful largely because "[t]heir aim was not to produce significant social reform as I 
defined it in The Hollow Hope, but rather to allow the pre-blockade status quo to 
continue." Courts can be effective in preserving the status quo, Rosenberg states, 
because "upholding status quo arrangements require little change in existing 
institutions and practices."35 He also cites the Supreme Court’s "gutting" campaign 
finance reform in Buckley v. Valeo and the Court’s pre-New Deal invalidation of 
congressional legislation banning child labor in Hammer v. Dagenhart and Bailey v. 
Drexel Furniture Co. as further examples of successful uses of the law to defend the 
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status quo.36 Apart from these instances, Rosenberg reiterates that litigation can 
achieve significant social reform in limited situations, but only when the conditions 
previously mentioned are present. He stresses, "The Hollow Hope does not criticize 
courts. It does criticize litigators seeking significant social reform for litigating when the 
Court is constrained from helping them and when conditions for overcoming those 
constraints are not present." He reiterates that "my question is whether it makes sense 
for reformers to litigate," and his answer is no.37 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: OLD AND NEW 
In addition to their role as litigators, SAGs are increasingly important actors on 
the state level. America's federal structure makes their institutional position possible. As 
previously stated, the precise contours of American this federal structure, both in theory 
and in practice, have never been entirely clear. As a product of federalism, SAGs and 
their activities can help us understand the contours of the relationship between the 
various players in the federalist regime. 
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a) American Federalism Over Time 
The Constitution itself never mentions the word "federalism" or (in James 
Madison's terminology) "compound republic," but it does provide a basic structuring of 
the novel arrangement of the powers of the state and federal governments. 
Descriptions of this arrangement have commonly employed the analogy of "spheres" of 
authority. On the one hand, the Supremacy Clause makes clear that the federal 
government's authority is supreme within its sphere. On the other, the Constitution 
provides certain protections for the states. The federal government's power is limited to 
certain enumerated objects, with all remaining power not prohibited to the states, as 
the Tenth Amendment describes, flowing to the states and the people. As James 
Madison described the operation of governmental powers in Federalist 39, "the 
proposed [central] government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction 
extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several states, a residuary 
and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects."38 The nature of how this works in 
practice, and how it ought to work, has been the source of much conflict throughout 
American history. The difficultly of resolving these conflicts is what led Woodrow Wilson 
to remark that the "federal-state relationship is the cardinal question of our 
constitutional system." 
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Exploring this question requires some consideration of the purported benefits 
America's federal structure confers. A common view in scholarly works and public 
discourse alike is that federalism serves as a constraint on governmental power. This 
view of federalism holds the system up as a way to protect essential liberties against the 
encroaching power of the central government. Protecting states' rights in this manner 
thus serves as a fundamental part of the Constitution's establishment of a limited 
government. As Madison put it in Federalist 51, the "power surrendered by the people" 
is first "divided between two distinct governments" (federalism) and then divided again 
"among distinct and separate departments" within these two distinct governments 
(separation of powers). Diffusing power in this way acts to provide a "double security" 
to the rights of the people.39 
 Another related benefit of federalism is that it is a way to promote democratic 
accountability and control. Decentralizing power allows important policymaking 
decisions to occur closer to problems they are meant to solve, helping ensure that 
policies are tailored to local concerns and preferences of their citizens. When policy 
decisions emanate from the center, by contrast, it lessens the possibility of regional 
variation and ultimately fails to represent adequately the needs of differently situated 
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citizens. Thus, federalism serves as a democratic check on a federal government seeking 
"one size fits all" solution to every problem.40  
This view of federalism as a constraint on the power of the center in favor of 
"states' rights" has resonated throughout American history. The theory of the federal-
state relationship as "dual federalism," in which the states and federal government act 
"separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres," as Chief 
Justice Roger Taney wrote in 1858,41 held a good deal of power until the New Deal era. 
However, the rapid expansion in federal power during this period and again in the 1960s 
led some to proclaim the death of federalism. As constitutional scholar Phillip Kurland 
declared in 1969, "Federalism is dead and the Supreme Court has made its contributions 
to its demise."42 As federalism and its apparent compatriot "state's rights" became 
linked in the public mind with the discredited doctrines of Jim Crow, it was reasonable 
to wonder whether federalism had already drawn its last gasp. 
 However, the essential truth of Woodrow Wilson's statement about federalism 
persisting but meaning something different to each successive generation has not 
faded. As Richard Nathan put it, "There was a time when it was stylish among political 
scientists to write about the death of federalism. That it will wither away...it won’t 
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happen. There will always be a New Federalism."43 Indeed, since Kurland's Nietzschean 
declaration of the death of federalism, many have sought to revive the notion of 
federalism-as-constraint by arguing for a new "state's rights" agenda. 
b) The Reports of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated: The Revival of Federalism-
as-Constraint 
The rise of the New Right in 1970s and 80s helped to reinvigorate a particular 
vision of American federalism. In the past few decades, the rhetoric and action of 
presidents, grassroots social movements, and the Supreme Court have suggested that 
federalism, far from being "dead," is very much alive and particularly wedded to the 
idea of restraint of the federal government. President Nixon's "New Federalism" sought 
to bring states back in to the management of government programs, in part as a way to 
loosen Democratic Party dominance of the national bureaucracy. President Reagan took 
this a step further, arguing for a shift of governmental functions to the states because 
"the Federal Government is overloaded...having assumed more responsibilities than it 
can properly manage."44 By the 1990s, conservative Republicans in particular had seized 
the mantle of "state's rights." House Speaker Newt Gingrich articulated an agenda of 
"devolution" of governmental functions to the states, arguing, "We have to decentralize 
                                                          
43
 Richard P. Nathan, "There Will Always Be a New Federalism", Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 16 (2006): 499. 
44
 Timothy Conlan, From New Federalism to Devolution: Twenty-Five Years of Intergovernmental Reform 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 8. 
60 
 
power out of Washington D.C., and disperse power."45 Bob Dole frequently reminded 
voters that he always carried a copy of the Tenth Amendment with him on the 
presidential campaign trail in 1996.46 
 As this push for devolution and a new state's rights agenda arose in Congress, 
the Supreme Court sent a seeming thunderbolt through the legal community when it 
decided United States v. Lopez47 in 1995. For the first time since the New Deal, the Court 
found that Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. The Court 
followed up Lopez with a number of other cases extending limits on congressional 
power and bolstering the sovereign immunity protections of the states.48  Justice 
Antonin Scalia invoked the dual federalism of eras past when he wrote for the majority 
in Printz v. United States that "It is incontestable that the Constitution established a 
system of "'dual sovereignty.'"49 These controversial Supreme Court cases seemed to fit 
nicely with the broader efforts of political conservatives seeking to limit governmental 
power against liberals defending strong national power, leading journalist Linda 
Greenhouse to remark, "These days, federalism means war."50 
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 Since that time, the Court has indicated at least a slight pullback from its Lopez-
inspired conception as federalism as a constraint on the federal government's power.51 
The post-September 11th Administration of George W. Bush established a stronger role 
for the federal government in protecting domestic security. Yet the even more recent 
calls for "state's rights" and a reinvigorated Tenth Amendment among grassroots 
conservatives during the Obama Administration only seems to confirm the general trend 
of federalism as a generally right-wing call for limits on government. Theodore Lowi 
concisely articulated this link when he remarked that as American federalism 
developed, "American national government became the home of liberalism; state 
governments became the home of conservatism….most state policies have been deeply, 
often radically conservative"  (emphasis in original).52  
c) The States Unshackled: Federalism as "Cooperative" and "Polyphonic" 
1. Cooperative Federalism and "Federalism without Washington" 
While the focus in recent years has been on federalism as a constraint on the 
federal government, a number of scholars since at least the time of the New Deal have 
nevertheless outlined a different conception of the federal-state relationship. Departing 
from the "dual federalism" view, many federalism scholars have described a more 
cooperative federal-state relationship. Morton Grodzins, for example, argued, "the 
                                                          
51
 Most prominently, the Court upheld Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to criminalize the 
use of marijuana even in those states where such use was decriminalized under state law. Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
52
 Theodore J. Lowi, "Think Globally, Lose Locally," Boston Review (1998): 4. 
62 
 
American federal system is principally characterized by a Federal-state-local sharing of 
responsibilities for virtually all functions" in which officials at all levels "are not 
adversaries. They are colleagues." In short, "The American system is best conceived as 
one government serving one people."53 Daniel Elazar became the scholar most closely 
linked to the notion of cooperative federalism, arguing that cooperative federalism and 
not dual federalism better captured the operative reality of American federalism even 
before the New Deal. Cooperative federalism, as Elazar put it, consists of a "partnership" 
between "several [power] centers that must negotiate cooperative arrangements with 
one another in other to achieve common goals."54 Subsequent scholars have described 
the federal system in similar ways, often employing a variety of gastronomic analogies 
building upon Grodzins's picture of American federalism as a "marble cake" in the way it 
blends power between state and federal governments.55  
While noting the cooperative nature of federal and state governments within the 
American federalist structure, Elazar also pointed to the importance of cooperative 
relationships between the states independent of the federal government. This 
"Federalism without Washington" involves the states' engagement in "interstate 
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relationships not routed through Washington and that act as a counterbalance to 
federal activity."56 Elazar identified three basic forms of "routinized interstate 
relationships," including the establishment of professional associations linking together 
state actors such as the National Governors Association, the development of uniform 
state laws including the Uniform Commercial Code, and interstate compacts like the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.57 All of these relationships involve policy 
development outside of the direct influence of the federal government.  
The existence of this "Federalism without Washington" further illustrates the 
notion that federalism is far from "dead" even after a century in which the federal 
government's power has grown enormously. Stephen Gardbaum in fact argues that one 
of the purposes of the New Deal was to "unshackle" the regulatory power of the states 
at the same time that it built up national power.58 Rather than representing a zero-sum 
game in which the federal government gained power at the expense of the states, after 
the New Deal "both federal and state governments were constitutionally enabled to 
regulate a large number of areas of social and economic life that previously they had 
both been prohibited from regulating."59 Far from killing off federalism, the New Deal 
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revolution fortified state power even as the reach of the central government 
expanded.60 
2. Polyphonic Federalism 
More recent scholarly writings also reflect this notion of federalism not as a 
constraint but as state empowerment. In partial response both to the "federalism 
revolution" in the Supreme Court and the "Big Government Conservatism" of the 
George W. Bush Administration, these scholars suggest a model of federalism amenable 
to regulatory expansion. 
Robert Schapiro, for example, describes a perspective of "polyphonic 
federalism." Under this polyphonic perspective, "federalism consists of independent 
state and federal voices that interact together...[and] does not require separating the 
world into areas of exclusive state and exclusive federal control."61 In explicit distinction 
to dual federalism, polyphonic federalism views state and federal powers "exist[ing] in 
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the same space but remain[ing] distinct voices of authority."62 These "multiple, 
overlapping layers of authority" both bring their powers to bear on common 
problems.63 Robert Ahdieh's notion of "intersystemic governance" proceeds along 
similar lines, noting the "jurisdictional overlap" occurring in a federalist structure with 
the growing number of social, economic, and political problems that have a cross-
jurisdictional character.64 
Variations on Schapiro's "polyphonic federalism" have taken a bewildering array 
of additional monikers from other authors, such as "dynamic federalism,"65 
"empowerment federalism,"66 "interactive federalism"67 "collaborative federalism,"68 
"iterative federalism,"69 and "adaptive federalism."70 Uniting all of them is the basic idea 
that "[t]he Constitution tends not to create exclusive federal and state zones but to 
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tolerate overlapping federal and state regulation."71 For the ease of discussion here, and 
because Schapiro's work is perhaps the clearest and most complete account of this 
perspective on federalism, I use Schapiro's term "polyphonic federalism" in reference to 
this perspective throughout. 
3. The Benefits of Polyphonic Federalism 
Much of the discussion of "polyphonic federalism" in this recent literature is 
explicitly normative.72 Many, if not all, of these authors view polyphonic federalism not 
simply as a fact of modern governance but also a positive development. Schapiro 
summarizes the core of these purported benefits by noting that polyphonic federalism 
promotes the values of "plurality, dialogue, [and] redundancy."73 The value of "plurality" 
suggests that the different geographical scope of the states and the federal government 
may give them varying perspectives on common problems and allows"differing 
approaches to address particular issues."74 This is similar to J.B. Ruhl and James 
Salzman's notion of bringing various policy instruments to a single problem that crosses 
boundaries and Erwin Chemerinsky's call for "empowering government" at all levels to 
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meet diverse needs.75 In short, one benefit of polyphonic federalism is that "complex 
problems can benefit from a variety of approaches."76 
This value of "plurality" brings to mind the older view of federalism as fostering a 
healthy regulatory experimentation. The most famous statement along these lines is 
Justice Louis Brandeis's observation that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."77 
Brandeis's conception of federalism as a "laboratory" fits cleanly with the more recent 
polyphonic literature's focus on "regulatory experimentalism."78 Schapiro notes that this 
experimentation and variation allows more citizen choice, both in terms of how states 
enact new laws and enforce existing laws. "By giving the states a role in enforcing the 
law," Schapiro writes, "states have the opportunity to offer varying packages of policies 
to their citizens. Citizens may favor or disfavor states that vigorously enforce federal law 
or vigorously prosecute federal agents."79 
In addition to bringing different perspectives to bear on a common problem, 
"the concurrence of federal and state authority provides a valuable opportunity for 
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dialogue."80 Regulators on the state and federal levels can learn from one another 
through the informal "feedback loops" developed between different institutions 
working on the same problem.81 This process of dialogue "facilitates regulatory 
innovation" and promises to develop "the optimal regulatory scheme" over time.82 As 
David Adelman and Kirsten Engel argued, it is "implausible that a single government 
entity, including the federal government, could identify the efficient regulatory solution" 
as multiple regulators are more likely to get it right.83 This process of "dialogue" is a 
fundamental part of the federalist regime. As David Shapiro put it, "the true genius of 
American federalism lies in the continuing and constitutionally assured basis for 
dialogue—for moral, political, economic and social debate over the merits of the 
allocation of power."84 The dialogue spurred by one level of government may also serve 
to prompt regulation at another.85  
Furthermore, the "redundancy" created by multiple, overlapping sources of 
authority allows states to provide "important symbols of opposition" to the federal 
policy.86 Even if a state policy cannot become legally binding, "state law can provide an 
important protest, a powerful criticism of the federal approach."87 In a similar vein, 
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Judith Resnick suggests that "these multiple sites for conflicts about social norms" 
allows the opportunity "to permit problems to be argued in more than one forum and 
more than once."88  
This redundancy also "constitutes a fail-safe mechanism, an additional source of 
protection if one or the other government should fail to offer adequate safeguards."89 
This purported benefit fits with the notion that the existence of multiple sources of 
authority can help ensure the "filling of regulatory gaps." As Erwin Chemerinsky put it, 
"The genius of having multiple levels of government is that if one fails to act, another 
can step in to solve the problem."90 This gap-filling role is all the more important 
because federal agencies "are often confronted with information gaps, bureaucratic 
inertia, intransigent companies, resource constraints, political interference, and other 
handicaps that limit the capacity of the agency to act in the public interest."91 This 
notion might implicitly find support in James Madison's remark in Federalist 46 that "the 
federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the 
people, constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes."92 Thus, 
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if one level of government is not adequately representing the public interest on a 
particular issue, then the people can go to the other level for relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Federalism and litigation are central parts of the American system of separation 
of powers. Because of their position as government litigators at the state level, SAGs 
and their activities are at the heart of both. Given that the SAGs' main policy tool is 
litigation, the question of the efficacy of litigation is particularly important in the context 
of these actors' activity. How and to what extent have SAGs emerged as national 
policymakers through their use of multistate litigation? Has multistate litigation 
achieved significant policy change, and if so, how? Since SAGs are state actors, they also 
raise the question about just how comfortably multistate litigation fits into our 
understanding of federalism. What can the activities of these state litigators tell us 
about the operation of a "multiple, overlapping" federalism with various sources of 
authority? Does this activity help to secure the promises of federalism? What does all of 
this mean for democratic governance? The pages that follow examine SAGs and 
multistate litigation in light of these questions, seeking to shed light on two of the 
enduring features of the American constitutional regime. 
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CHAPTER 3 
An Empirical Look at the Multistate Litigation 
of the State Attorneys General 
 
"Who do these people think they are?" 
–Senator John McCain, referring to state attorneys 
general during the tobacco debate in Congress1 
 
 
 The answer to Sen. McCain’s question above has changed considerably over the 
past couple decades. SAGs have litigated multistate cases concerning policy areas from 
consumer protection to Medicaid fraud, increasingly coordinating this litigation across 
state lines. A number of questions remain, however. Just how much has the use of 
multistate litigation increased over time? To what extent are certain SAGs participating 
in and driving these multistate efforts? And if these officials have long had substantial 
discretion and independence to conduct state litigation, then why did SAG litigation 
emerge when it did? 
 This chapter seeks to explore these questions by presenting an analysis of an 
original dataset of SAG multistate litigation. After identifying the key areas of multistate 
litigation and explaining the dataset, I examine the increase in multistate litigation over 
time and note wide discrepancies in the states’ participation in these suits. I then 
explore how some of the structural differences of the SAG offices – including the 
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resources available to the SAGs, partisan differences, and the mode of selection of the 
SAG – contribute to SAGs’ participation in multistate litigation. Finally, I consider some 
of the broader reasons why multistate litigation emerged when it did. 
PROMINENT POLICY AREAS INVOLVED IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION 
Subsequent chapters will detail the SAGs’ modern use of multistate litigation, 
but I note here that SAGs have employed multistate litigation in four main policy areas: 
consumer protection, antitrust enforcement, environmental policy, and Medicaid fraud. 
In each of these areas, most SAGs have exclusive authority over their states’ litigation 
posture and have been increasingly empowered with additional legal authority. The 
following briefly describes these four areas and the SAGs’ roles in each of them. 
a) Consumer Protection 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a major expansion in the number of consumer 
safety and health measures on both the federal and state levels. New York enacted the 
first consumer protection statute in 1957,2 and all of the states have since followed with 
some form of a general consumer protection law.3 The federal government has also 
enacted consumer protection legislation covering myriad topics as well. A number of 
factors contributed to the dramatic increase in consumer protection regulation over this 
period, including increased knowledge of risks to consumer health and safety, as well as 
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a much higher intolerance of risk over the same period.4 
These consumer protection statutes differ in content, often in important ways, 
but they generally seek to prohibit practices that are "unfair and deceptive" or 
otherwise injurious to the consumer. The number of issues classified under "consumer 
protection" is very broad, ranging from garden-variety frauds and pyramid schemes to 
deceptive advertising, predatory lending, and price gouging. Laws targeting specific 
practices or industries seen to be especially problematic, such as telemarketing, auto 
repair, and sweepstakes promotions, supplement many of the general statutes aimed at 
preventing these types of consumer fraud.5 
Nearly all of the states grant primary civil enforcement authority of the state 
consumer protection statutes to the Attorney General.6 Many of these statutes also 
grant criminal enforcement authority to the SAG, which they often share with local 
prosecutors. The ability to bring civil litigation is the most important, however, largely 
because civil cases are easier to prove than criminal cases. Rather than requiring any 
specific intent to mislead or deceive on the part of the defendant, civil suits concentrate 
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Consumer Protection Law Developments (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2009), 380, n. 58. In many cases of 
multistate consumer protection litigation involving these three states, these agencies, and not the SAGs, 
represent the state in any lawsuits and settlements. See, for example, Assurance of Voluntary 
Compliance, In the Matter of Blockbuster, Inc. (2005) (settlement agreement between several SAGs and 
Blockbuster). 
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on the effect of the defendant’s conduct on consumers.7 In such cases, the SAG 
represents the "public interest" and consumers generally, rather than individual 
consumers.8 The statutes allow SAGs to pursue a wide variety of remedies, including 
civil fines, consumer restitution, injunctions, and, at least in extreme cases, revocation 
of a company’s authority to do business in the state.9 
Many federal consumer protection statutes exist as well, and several grant SAGs 
additional authority to bring civil litigation in federal court for specific practices. For 
example, the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994 
grants SAGs the ability to bring civil suits alleging telemarketing fraud in federal district 
court.10 In such areas, the SAGs share enforcement jurisdiction with the primary federal 
enforcement agencies, including most importantly the Federal Trade Commission, as 
well as other agencies having jurisdiction over consumer protection issues in particular 
industries.11 However, no general consumer protection statute confers authority to the 
SAGs to bring actions in federal court, despite an attempt to enact such a statute in the 
1980s.12 In part for that reason, many of the contemporary multistate consumer 
                                                          
7
 Myers and Ross, State Attorneys General, 2
nd
 ed., 236. 
8
 Only the SAGs of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and the Northern Mariana Islands are authorized to 
represent individual consumers in more than an advisory capacity. Ibid., 237. 
9
 Ibid., 235-236. 
10
 Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. 87, §6103(a). 
11
 The FTC has jurisdiction to investigate a wide variety of marketing practices, for example, though this 
authority is often shared with other agencies. For instances, the Food and Drug Administration retains 
authority to regulate certain advertising for prescription drugs, medical devices, and (as of 2009) tobacco 
products. Federal Trade Commission, "Facts for Business,” April 2001, accessed July 10, 2010, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/adv/bus35.shtm. 
12
 The National Association of Attorneys General supported an effort to amend Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
which prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices, to allow SAGs to bring consumer protection actions 
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protection actions brought by SAGs are based upon state law. 
b) Antitrust 
The role of SAGs in antitrust issues date back to the late 19th century, when 
several attorneys general brought cases against "trusts" that were allegedly engaged in 
price-fixing and other monopolistic practices.13 Many of their activities were followed by 
other state and federal efforts seeking to encourage market competition and prevent 
anticompetitive business practices, including the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890 
and many similar state statutes. Today, all fifty states have antitrust statutes, and other 
federal laws have supplemented the original Sherman Act, including the Clayton Act of 
1914.  
Under federal statutes, primary enforcement of the federal antitrust laws falls 
under the jurisdiction of both the Federal Trade Commission (in civil cases) as well as 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (in both civil and criminal cases). All 
of the state statutes designate the SAG as the official responsible for antitrust 
enforcement, and federal statutes confer additional authority on SAGs to sue in federal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in federal court under federal law. See, for example, National Association of Attorneys General, 
"Attorneys General Focus on the Role of State Consumer Protection Enforcement,” August 1987, 4. 
13
 Paul Nolette, "State Attorneys General, Business Regulation, and the Development of the ‘Public 
Interest’" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association, 
Portland, Maine, May 7-9, 2009): 15-17; Robert Abrams, "Developments in State Antitrust Enforcement,” 
New York University Law Review 62 (1987): 989. 
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court.14 Collectively, these statutes give government enforcers the ability to target a 
range of anti-competitive behavior. For example, enforcers can review proposed 
mergers to analyze their effects on consumers and competition, examine price-fixing 
agreements among competitors, and can act to prevent one company’s monopolistic 
control of a product or service in the marketplace.15 
The result in successful antitrust cases brought by SAGs or federal enforcement 
authorities is typically some form of injunctive relief, including requiring defendants to 
take specific steps to refrain from the allegedly injurious conduct. In merger cases, 
government enforcers can require divestiture of assets to remedy any harm to the 
competitive marketplace before allowing the merger to proceed. SAGs, however, can 
choose from among a broader array of remedies than can federal enforcement 
authorities. State antitrust statutes typically have more expansive remedies than the 
federal laws, including the voiding of contracts in violation of state antitrust laws, 
debarment from state contracting opportunities, and even forfeiture of a company’s 
corporate charter.16 Most importantly, SAGs can pursue damages under most state and 
federal statutes, a remedy that is not available to the DOJ or the FTC. Damages obtained 
from such actions are typically distributed to state residents, though in many instances 
                                                          
14
 For example, the Congress amended the Clayton Act in 1976 with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976, which among other important changes authorized SAGs to sue in federal court 
on the basis of alleged antitrust violations. 
15
 Federal Trade Commission, "Competition Counts: How Consumers Win When Businesses Compete,” 
accessed July 2, 2010, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/edu/pubs/consumer/general/zgen01.pdf. 
16
 Myers and Ross, State Attorneys General, 2
nd
 ed., 275. 
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SAGs are able to use money in "cy pres" to distribute to charities of their choosing.17 
These expansive remedies, as well as the expanded authority of SAGs to bring antitrust 
suits under federal as well as state law, have given SAGs significant authority to bring 
multistate antitrust suits. 
c) Environmental Policy 
Public concern about environmental protection, like attention to general 
consumer protection issues, skyrocketed in the 1960s and 70s. The federal government 
and the states alike enacted many new environmental statutes in this period. On the 
federal level, this included the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, and 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, among several other key enactments. Efforts in the 
states, often led by California, resulted in still stricter regulatory requirements.18  
From the start, many of these new laws anticipated dual federal and state 
enforcement. The Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970 to administer 
the burgeoning statutory field, and the EPA has worked closely with state counterparts 
in the prevention and control of pollution. In many of these federal statutes, Congress 
expressed the fundamental role of the states in regulating environmental matters 
explicitly. The Clean Air Act, for example, states that while “*f+ederal financial assistance 
and leadership is essential for the development of cooperative Federal, State, regional, 
                                                          
17
 Susan Beth Farmer, "More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae 
Antitrust Actions Brought by State attorneys General,” Fordham Law Review 68 (1999): 361-406. 
18
 As noted in Chapters 5-7, this includes California’s stricter regulation of automobile emissions. 
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and local programs to prevent and control air pollution,” ultimately “air pollution 
control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local government.”19 This 
includes the responsibility of each state to establish a State Implementation Plan to 
meet the standards set by the Clean Air Act – something that will be explored in more 
detail in Part II of this dissertation. 
The prominent role reserved for the states in the enforcement of environmental 
protection statutes meant another important area in which SAGs would become 
involved. Since the rise of environmental issues in the public consciousness, the states 
have created numerous environmental and natural resource agencies to regulate 
environmental issues. In most states, however, the SAG also plays a prominent role as 
they have the statutory authority to enforce and prosecute civil and criminal violations 
of state environmental laws.20 They also provide legal counsel to state agencies when 
developing new environmental regulations, and defend those agencies in actions 
brought against them.21 In addition to the statutory authority that most SAGs enjoy, 
many have often used their common law authority to tackle environmental issues, a 
trend that dates back to the 19th century.22 
Most of the SAGs’ environmental enforcement, as noted above, involves 
problems of in-state pollution. Because SAGs represent the general legal interests of the 
                                                          
19
 §7401(a)(4). 
20
 Myers and Ross, State Attorneys General, 2
nd
 ed., 124. 
21
 Ibid., 124. 
22
 For example, SAGs’ use of common law public nuisance theories to address what we would now 
recognize as environmental law dates back to at least the late 19
th
 century. Nolette, "Business 
Regulation,” 8-12. 
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states in state and federal court, however, they have also become very important 
players in broader issues involving the federal environmental statutes, in addition to in-
state enforcement.  Subsequent chapters will discuss this in detail, but it suffices to say 
here that the broad impact of federal environmental law on nearly all aspects of 
contemporary life has frequently resulted in disputes between the states and the 
federal government, and among the states themselves.23 Virtually all new regulatory 
changes adopted by the federal Environmental Protection Agency invite legal 
challenges, and SAGs are often involved in these suits. For example, the Clean Air Act’s 
requirement that each state implement policies to meet certain air quality standards 
frequently leads to disputes between "upwind" states generating pollution that crosses 
state lines and results in higher pollution levels in the "downwind" states. SAGs have 
also been increasingly involved in challenging many of the EPA’s other decisions, such as 
how to deal with the issue of climate change. 
d) Medicaid Fraud 
The establishment of Medicaid and Medicare represented two of the most 
significant new policies among the many legislative achievements of the 89th Congress in 
the mid-1960s. Both programs today represent a significant portion of government 
budgets as well as overall health care provision in the United States. The federal 
government and the states jointly finance Medicaid, which provides health care to the 
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 Myers and Ross, State Attorneys General, 2
nd
 ed., 125. 
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poor, but states retain the responsibility of administering the program. The particular 
prominence of the state governments in the funding and administration of the program 
has led SAGs to be particularly involved in Medicaid issues, particularly those concerning 
alleged fraud. 
The original Medicaid program as enacted in 1965 had few controls in place to 
combat fraud.24 As the costs of the program rapidly expanded, so did concern about the 
costs generated by fraudulent behavior. As a result, Congress enacted the Medicare-
Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, which granted the states 
additional resources to establish a Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) to investigate 
fraud.25 This began as a voluntary program, though later federal changes requires each 
state to either establish a MFCU or receive a waiver from the federal Department of 
Health and Human services. To date, every state but North Dakota has created a MFCU, 
and forty-three of these states have placed the unit under the purview of the SAG.26 The 
federal government continues to fund the majority (typically 75%) of each state’s MFCU. 
Most MFCUs retain a number of experienced attorneys and investigators on 
staff. For example, New York’s MFCU, the largest in the nation, retained 325 attorneys 
                                                          
24
 Ibid., 323. 
25
 Ibid., 324. 
26
 The six states with a Medicaid Fraud Unit but not placed in the AG’s office are: Connecticut (Chief 
State’s Attorney Office), Illinois (State Police), Iowa (Department of Inspections and Appeals), Montana 
(Division of Criminal Investigation), Tennessee (Bureau of Investigation), and West Virginia (Inspector 
General). Website of the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Units, "NAMFCU Participating States,” 
accessed July 10, 2010, http://www.namfcu.net/states. 
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and other staff as of 2009.27 These MFCUs have a great deal of discretion to pursue 
cases independently from the state Medicaid agency. In fact, federal requirements 
prohibit state Medicaid agencies from reviewing or overruling any activities of the 
MFCU, a requirement instituted to prevent conflicts of interests that could occur if the 
same agencies tasked with administrating the program also investigated waste, fraud, 
and abuse within those same programs.28 
 Typically, Medicaid fraud suits feature a good deal of cooperation among the 
states and between the states and the federal government. Helping coordinate the 
activities of the states is the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units 
(NAMFCU), established in 1978. The NAMFCU typically gets involved with multistate 
investigations, and helps to coordinate state actions with the many federal agencies 
involved in combating Medicaid fraud, including chiefly the Office of Inspector General 
within the Department of Health and Human Services, but also including the 
Department of Justice, the FBI, the IRS, the Post Office, and others.29 
Over the course of the past few years, federal and state enforcement authorities 
have identified several different types of fraud. This runs the gamut from health care 
providers double billing for services provided, billing for unnecessary services or tests, or 
charging Medicaid the brand-label price for drugs when in fact a generic substitute was 
                                                          
27
 New York State Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, "2009 Annual Report,” accessed July 10, 2010, 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/apr/mfcu_2009.pdf, 3. 
28
 Myers and Ross, State Attorneys General, 2
nd
 ed., 328. 
29
 Myers and Ross, State Attorneys General, 2
nd
 ed., 331. 
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supplied.30 Additionally, it has become increasingly common for the federal and state 
governments to investigate allegedly fraudulent behavior by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in addition to health care providers. This typically comes in the form of 
manufacturers allegedly inflating the “average wholesale price,” which is the average 
price charged by wholesalers to pharmacies or other dispensaries and eventually paid 
by Medicaid,31 or marketing drugs for purposes not approved by the FDA, which under 
law Medicaid does not pay for. These and similar issues will be the focus of Chapter 8. 
The number and breath of statutes aimed at reducing health care fraud have 
increased in recent years, as has the expansion of states’ jurisdiction to address the 
issue. While state investigations of health care fraud must primarily relate to Medicaid, 
Congress has since 1999 allowed MFCUs to investigate fraud in any federally funded 
health care program, including Medicare and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.32 
While the traditional responsibility of the MFCUs has been criminal enforcement, the 
MFCUs have been encouraged to pursue civil remedies in recent years, an invitation the 
MFCUs have accepted. Civil enforcement allows the MFCUs to recover the state share of 
Medicaid payments, allocated on the state’s actual damages, while the federal 
government typically collects the federal share. 
                                                          
30
 Ibid., 333 (providing a short rundown of fraudulent schemes). 
31
 Ibid., 338-339. 
32
 Ibid., 325. 
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THE  MULTISTATE LITIGATION DATASET 
a) Overview of the Dataset and Sources Used 
To help provide a more complete empirical picture of SAGs’ multistate litigation, 
I have compiled an original dataset detailing multistate litigation efforts by SAGs 
beginning in 1980 and continuing through 2009.33 To be included in the dataset, the 
case had to meet each of the following elements derived from the definition of 
"multistate litigation" discussed in Chapter 1: (1) it must be "litigation," broadly defined 
as including both filed lawsuits or pre-litigation investigations, that (2) involves 
coordinated activities by at least two SAGs, (3) shares the same defendants and at least 
one common issue of fact, and (4) concludes either in a judicial decision, an out-of court 
settlement, or another similar agreement. Therefore, it does not include other 
coordinated SAG activities, such as filing amicus briefs in existing cases or writing letters 
to congressional committees.  
Further, this dataset focuses on those multistate litigation efforts within the four 
key policy areas in which most SAG multistate litigation occurs, as indentified above: 
consumer protection, antitrust, environmental, and Medicaid fraud litigation. These four 
are particularly useful to examine multistate litigation because most multistate litigation 
                                                          
33
 A few isolated examples of coordinated multistate litigation occurred before 1980, but I chose this 
period to cover all, or nearly all, of the "modern" period of SAG multistate litigation. 
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falls into one of these four general categories.34 
Because neither the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) nor 
individual SAGs keep systematic track of this information, with the recent exception of 
antitrust cases,35 constructing this dataset required intensive searches of a variety of 
sources. One of the most helpful resources was the "United States News Verdicts, 
Settlements, and Decisions" dataset available in Lexis-Nexis, which compiles press 
reports concerning litigation activity from dozens of major newspapers and wire 
services. I supplemented this with searches of several NAAG publications including the 
AG Bulletin, the Consumer Protection Report, the Antitrust Report, the Telemarketing 
Fraud Bulletin, and the Medicaid Fraud Report, as well as NAAG’s compilation of 
antitrust litigation available online. A complete listing of all the publications and the 
search terms used is available in Appendix A.  
In total, this search resulted in 511 unique cases of SAG multistate litigation 
across this thirty-year period. 
                                                          
34
 A fifth potential policy area in which SAGs have been active in multistate litigation, securities litigation, 
was purposefully omitted because only five state SAGs have full jurisdiction over their state’s securities 
laws: Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and South Carolina. In most states, multistate securities 
litigation is handled by the state insurance commissioner or the heads of whichever state agency handles 
business certification, typically the Secretaries of State. See Emily Myers and Lynne Ross, State Attorneys 
General: Powers and Responsibilities, 2
nd
 ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Attorneys 
General, 2007), 265-268. Further, much of the securities litigation that was prominent in the past few 
years involved only a single SAG – New York – due to the concentrated presence of the financial industry 
in the Empire State. 
35
 This exception is the new NAAG multistate litigation database, which I found to be very useful but 
includes only antitrust cases. 
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b) Limitations 
This dataset is subject to a few limitations, some self-imposed and some that 
inevitably come with the subject matter. As described in Chapter 1, focusing on 
multistate litigation means that single-state cases that may have a national regulatory 
impact – such as Eliot Spitzer’s litigation against the securities industry – are not 
included in this dataset. Further, this dataset includes only those cases concluded with a 
coordinated result, meaning either a court decision in a multistate case, or a multistate 
out-of-court settlement.  
Because of this, two forms of difficult-to-identify multistate litigation are not 
included in this dataset. First, this dataset does not include investigations or suits 
involving initial cross-state collaboration but that do not end in either a court judgment 
or settlement. Multistate investigations ultimately ending in no finding of wrongdoing, 
or that the SAGs otherwise dropped, are not included. The main reason I excluded these 
suits is that these early-stage investigations are particularly difficult to discover, since 
SAGs generally keep the details of an investigation outside the public eye until the SAGs 
either file a suit or reach a settlement. Further, exclusion of these cases is partially 
justified by the fact that unresolved cases are still "open"; SAGs could theoretically 
continue a dropped investigation in the future. 
Second, this dataset does not include cases in which multiple SAGs file similar 
suits, but which involve separate investigations and resolutions rather than coordinated 
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activity.36 These suits may include a minimal level of coordination among the SAGs; for 
example, discussions of similar cases at a NAAG-sponsored consumer protection 
meeting may inspire SAGs to litigate cases individually.37 Nevertheless, because SAGs 
investigate and prosecute these cases individually rather than collectively, they are 
closer to single-state cases rather than the multistate litigation that remains the focus of 
this dissertation. 
With these caveats, this dataset represents the most complete effort to track 
multistate litigation by SAGs to date. By focusing on those cases ending in a settlement 
or court decision, the litigation activities described here are the ones that typically have 
the most impact, given the legally binding nature of a court judgment or signed legal 
settlement. Further, as noted in Chapter 1, the focus on multistate litigation also directs 
attention to those cases most likely to have an impact nationally. 
                                                          
36
 For example, in 2007 a number of SAGs expressed concern about the marketing of an energy drink 
named "Cocaine," claiming that the producer was illegally marketing the drink as a street drug alternative 
and a dietary supplement. Ultimately, SAGs from Connecticut, Illinois, and Texas reached settlements or 
court judgments prohibiting Cocaine from being marketed in those states, though all each SAG reached 
the settlements separately. See, for example, Alfonso Serrano, "’Cocaine’ Pulled from Shelves 
Nationwide," CBS News, May 7, 2007, accessed July 19, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/07/health/main2772524.shtml. 
37
 For example, in an early article describing the state’s action taken against alleged automobile odometer 
fraud, a member of Iowa’s SAG office noted that such regional NAAG-sponsored meetings allowed the 
office to "learn new investigative techniques and legal theories and share [its] experience with others." 
Terrence M. Tobin, "Odometer Law Enforcement Fund – Iowa’s Experience," Consumer Protection Report, 
November 1984, 1-3. Many of these early odometer cases thus involved some cooperative elements, 
though there were generally investigated and prosecuted as separate states. 
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THE PICTURE OF MULTISTATE LITIGATION 
a) The Increase in Multistate Litigation 
Many of the journalistic and scholarly sources discussing the activities of SAGs 
note that these officials generally became more active over the past couple of decades, 
beginning in the 1980s. However, just how common has their use of multistate litigation 
been over this time? Figure 3.1 displays the answer, indicating the number of multistate 
cases resolved in each year either by court order or most commonly through a 
negotiated settlement.38  
It is clear from Figure 3.1 that SAGs’ use of multistate litigation has increased 
dramatically over time. A couple of key pivot points stand out in particular.  The number 
of resolved multistate cases jumped from a consistently low one to four cases a year 
throughout the 1980s to the double-digits from 1989 to 1993. After a decrease in both 
1994 and 1995,39 the number of multistate cases gradually increased, reaching 20 for 
the first time in 1996, 30 in 2002, and 40 in 2008. Fully 60% of the multistate litigation 
has occurred since 2000. 
                                                          
38
 The year associated with each case in the dataset is the year that the case is resolved with either a final 
court judgment or settlement, not when it was begun. Many cases are resolved relatively quickly, typically 
in a matter of months. Some litigation spans several years, however, such as long and complex antitrust 
cases and environmental cases that slowly wind their way through court. Therefore, note that a number 
of the cases were actually initiated earlier than the year they were resolved. 
39
 The reason for this decrease is not entirely clear. The most plausible explanation is that the number of 
multistate cases initiated by SAGs decreased as a result of the new Clinton Administration entering office 
in 1993 and taking a stronger enforcement posture than either the previous Reagan or Bush 
Administrations, a dynamic that will be discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. After settling a then-
record 17 multistate cases in 1993, SAGs may have been more satisfied at the federal response to 
consumer fraud in the early years of the Clinton Administration, and thus initiated fewer multistate cases. 
In any case, the drop-off was short-lived. 
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FIGURE 3.1: NUMBER OF RESOLVED MULTISTATE CASES (BY YEAR, 1980-2009) 
 
The increase in multistate cases is not a smooth upward trend, as the number of cases 
varies a bit from year to year. However, viewed in five-year periods, the consistent and 
dramatic increase in these cases is even more apparent: 
FIGURE 3.2: NUMBER OF RESOLVED MULTISTATE CASES (BY FIVE-YEAR PERIOD) 
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As indicated in Figure 3.1, consumer protection cases represent the bulk of the 
cases in the dataset (about 57%). This is followed by multistate antitrust litigation (20%), 
environmental litigation (14%) and Medicaid fraud (9%).40 All four areas have seen a 
consistent upward trend in the five-year periods since 1980. Multistate Medicaid fraud 
cases have been the largest growth area in recent years, from 0 cases in the 1980s and 
only 8 in the 1990s, to 14 and 22 cases in each of the most recent two five-year periods 
alone, respectively. Multistate environmental cases follow with the largest increase over 
this period, followed by consumer protection and antitrust cases, both of which have 
increased slightly since the mid-1990s. 
In addition to the secular increase in multistate litigation overall, the number of 
multistate cases involving large groups of SAGs has also increased. Figure 3.3 lists the 
size of the groups involved in multistate cases over each five-year period, broken down 
in small- (2 to 5 and 6 to 15 SAGs), medium- (16-39 SAGs) and large-sized groups (40-49 
and 50 SAGs): 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 A table detailing the increase within each of the four main types of multistate litigation is available in 
Appendix B (Table B.1). 
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FIGURE 3.3: NUMBER OF SAGS PARTICIPATING IN 
INDIVIDUAL MULTISTATE CASES (BY FIVE-YEAR PERIOD) 
 
 
 
While a substantial majority of early multistate cases involved smaller groups of 
SAGs working together, often fifteen or fewer, larger suits and settlements have 
become more common. Litigation involving all or nearly all the SAGs (40 or more), once 
a rare event, now represents over a quarter of all the multistate cases.  
The trends captured in the above figures indicate that while multistate litigation 
indeed increased in the 1980s, the SAGs did not really hit their collaborative stride until 
the 1990s. This was particularly true of consumer protection cases, which witnessed a 
significant jump at the tail end of the 1980s. Since the mid-1990s, the number of 
multistate consumer protection and antitrust cases has continued to grow, while SAG 
collaboration in Medicaid fraud and environmental cases has soared. 
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b) Characteristics of the States Involved 
Of course, referring to "the state attorneys general" as a single group obscures 
the fact that there are in fact 56 attorneys general in the states and jurisdictions. To 
what extent, then, are the SAGs of some states more willing to participate in multistate 
cases than others are? Table 3.1 provides an answer to this question by listing the 
participation rate of all 56 states and jurisdictions in the multistate cases in the 
dataset:41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41
 In 13 of the 511 cases in the dataset, I was unable to find a full list of the states involved. The 
percentages next to each state in Table 3.3 represent the participation rate of each state in all the 
multistate cases in the dataset, with these 13 subtracted from the total.  
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TABLE 3.1: SAG PARTICIPATION RATES IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
State # of Cases % of Total State # of Cases % of Total 
New York 300 60.24% Rhode Island 171 34.34% 
Illinois 292 58.63% West Virginia 170 34.14% 
Massachusetts 279 56.02% Delaware 168 33.73% 
California 274 55.02% Kentucky 164 32.93% 
Connecticut 273 54.82% Louisiana 163 32.73% 
Texas 256 51.41% Virginia 160 32.13% 
Pennsylvania 248 49.80% Hawaii 151 30.32% 
Washington 237 47.59% Oklahoma 148 29.72% 
Florida 234 46.99% District of Columbia 148 29.72% 
Ohio 233 46.79% New Hampshire 146 29.32% 
Wisconsin 232 46.59% Montana 143 28.71% 
Michigan 228 45.78% Nebraska 142 28.51% 
Maryland 228 45.78% Alabama 142 28.51% 
Oregon 223 44.78% Colorado 141 28.31% 
New Jersey 219 43.98% Mississippi 141 28.31% 
Arizona 218 43.78% South Carolina 135 27.11% 
Vermont 213 42.77% Indiana 135 27.11% 
Missouri 211 42.37% Utah 133 26.71% 
New Mexico 202 40.56% South Dakota 133 26.71% 
Iowa 202 40.56% Georgia 132 26.51% 
Tennessee 202 40.56% North Dakota 126 25.30% 
Minnesota 201 40.36% Alaska 118 23.69% 
North Carolina 201 40.36% Wyoming 114 22.89% 
Arkansas 186 37.35% Puerto Rico 38 7.63% 
Nevada 183 36.75% Virgin Islands 24 4.82% 
Idaho 182 36.55% N. Marianas Islands 23 4.62% 
Maine 179 35.94% Guam 19 3.82% 
Kansas 176 35.34% American Samoa 15 3.01% 
 
As Table 3.1 indicates, only six states participated in at least 50% of the cases, 
with New York leading the way. Twenty states, along with the six jurisdictions, are 
involved in less than a third of the cases. Several of the largest states are the most active 
in multistate litigation, though a few smaller states are relatively active as well, such as 
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Connecticut and Vermont. This generally comports with separate earlier findings on 
state participation in the smaller groups of multistate legal actions examined by Colin 
Provost42 and Ann O’M. Bowman.43 
 The rates of participation among the states vary considerably based upon the 
general subject matter involved. For example, environmental cases involve by far the 
widest discrepancy between relatively active and inactive states. The seven most active 
SAGs in environmental cases are, in order, those representing New York, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, and Rhode Island – all northeastern 
states. All have much higher participation rates than the least active SAGs, many of 
whom represent states in the South and the Mountain West. Participation rates in 
consumer and antitrust cases also involve wide discrepancies, with the least active 
states with rates in the low 20s, and the most active states participating in well over half 
the cases. Medicaid fraud litigation tends to see the most participation, with the 
substantial majority of the states participating in a typical case. 
There is a difference, however, between passive participation in a case and more 
active leadership in multistate litigation. Most multistate cases include a large group of 
states signing on the agreement but providing little litigation support, while one state or 
small groups of states take the lead in coordinating the initial investigations, settlement 
                                                          
42
 Colin Provost, "The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Participation in 
Multi-State Lawsuits," Political Research Quarterly 59 (2006): 613. 
43
 Ann O’M. Bowman, "Horizontal Federalism: Exploring Interstate Interactions," Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 14 (4) (2004): 535-546. 
94 
 
negotiations, and other litigation activities. While it is not always possible to determine 
which state or states are leading these cases, I have been able to determine the lead 
litigators, investigators, and settlement negotiators for about two-thirds of the cases in 
the dataset.44 I list the results in Table 3.2. 
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 Specifically, I was able to discover the lead states for 343 of the 511 cases in the dataset. The 
percentages in Table 3.2 represent the percentage of each state’s total of these 343 cases. Note that the 
number of leading states is greater than the total number of cases because some cases feature more than 
one state leading the effort. 
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TABLE 3.2: SAG LEAD RATES IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
State # of Cases % of Total State # of Cases % of Total 
New York 123 35.86% Virginia 5 1.46% 
California 59 17.20% Kansas 4 1.17% 
Massachusetts 43 12.54% Delaware 4 1.17% 
Texas 41 11.95% New Hampshire 4 1.17% 
Illinois 38 11.08% Colorado 4 1.17% 
Ohio 37 10.79% South Carolina 4 1.17% 
Florida 32 9.33% District of Columbia 4 1.17% 
Oregon 32 9.33% Nebraska 3 0.87% 
Washington 30 8.75% Kentucky 2 0.58% 
Connecticut 29 8.45% Mississippi 2 0.58% 
Pennsylvania 29 8.45% Georgia 2 0.58% 
Minnesota 27 7.87% West Virginia 1 0.29% 
Maryland 26 7.58% Louisiana 1 0.29% 
New Jersey 21 6.12% Hawaii 1 0.29% 
Missouri 21 6.12% Oklahoma 1 0.29% 
North Carolina 15 4.37% Montana 1 0.29% 
Iowa 15 4.37% Utah 1 0.29% 
Vermont 11 3.21% North Dakota 1 0.29% 
Michigan 10 2.92% Alaska 1 0.29% 
Tennessee 10 2.92% Alabama 0 0.00% 
Arizona 9 2.62% Indiana 0 0.00% 
Maine 8 2.33% South Dakota 0 0.00% 
Wisconsin 6 1.75% Wyoming 0 0.00% 
New Mexico 5 1.46% Puerto Rico 0 0.00% 
Idaho 5 1.46% Virgin Islands 0 0.00% 
Arkansas 5 1.46% N. Marianas Islands 0 0.00% 
Nevada 5 1.46% Guam 0 0.00% 
Rhode Island 5 1.46% American Samoa 0 0.00% 
 
As Table 3.2 illustrates, many states participate in multistate litigation but only a 
few states typically lead these efforts. Most striking is how dominant of a leading role 
the New York Attorney General’s office has taken in multistate cases. The New York SAG 
has taken a leading role in nearly 36% of all of the multistate cases from 1980 to 2009, 
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more than doubling the percentage of the SAG of the second-place state, California. The 
New York SAG’s strong leadership role is consistent across all four policy areas included 
in the study. New York leads a greater percentage of the cases than any other state in 
each policy area, with the exception of Medicaid fraud investigations, where it places 
third behind Ohio and Massachusetts. 
Also notable is how many states rarely if ever take a leading role in multistate 
litigation. Fully 33 of the 56 jurisdictions have taken the lead role in five or fewer 
multistate cases from 1980 to 2009, and the SAGs from Alabama, Indiana, South Dakota, 
and Wyoming (along with the five U.S. territories) have never led a resolved multistate 
case, at least in the two-thirds of the cases where the identities of the lead states are 
clear. 
c) Why the Differential Rates in Involvement? 
The few previous studies on multistate litigation have suggested that the size of 
the SAG office is an important variable explaining SAG participation in multistate cases, 
and a glance at Tables 3.1 and 3.2 above appear to reflect this. Many of the states 
appearing as participants and leaders of multistate litigation are large states featuring 
SAGs with significant resources and large staffs. For example, the offices of the New 
York and California Attorneys General each have several hundreds of attorneys on staff, 
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rivaling the size of America’s largest private law firms.45 Many other states, on the other 
hand, have far fewer resources at their disposal. The South Dakota Attorney General’s 
office, for example, has only nine attorneys working in its entire civil litigation division, 
and maintains a consumer protection division consisting entirely of six staff members 
and a single Assistant Attorney General.46 
 Of course, not just resources reside in an attorney general’s office. Individual 
SAGs, most of whom are elected and all of whom have political party affiliations, head 
these offices. Not surprisingly, most SAGs and their staff maintain that politics does not 
enter their decisions to litigate. For example, the Chair of NAAG’s Multistate Antitrust 
Task Force suggests "politics is not one of the elements" that enters the process and 
that "the ultimate decision in bringing a case is whether it is the right thing to do."47 
 Even so, the past few years have illustrated that partisanship among SAGs is alive 
and well. Democrats have been considerably more successful at winning SAG races at 
least over the past thirty years, as Democrats have controlled between 56% and 76% of 
the 50 state offices during this period. Because of this electoral dominance, as well as 
the perception that Democratic SAGs were more likely to engage in the sort of 
"regulation through litigation" that resulted in the 1998 tobacco settlement, dissenting 
Republican Alabama SAG Bill Pryor spearheaded a drive to establish the Republican 
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Attorneys General Association (RAGA) in 2000.48 The Democrats followed shortly after 
with the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA).49 The primary missions of 
RAGA and DAGA are to raise money and elect members of their respective parties, but 
both organizations also meet regularly to discuss various issues and ongoing litigation.50 
The establishment of these organizations was controversial even among the SAGs, who 
had traditionally met only under the auspices of NAAG and regional non-partisan 
groups.51 Nevertheless, RAGA and DAGA actively persist to this day. 
 Given these developments, which have occurred alongside the general trend of 
increased polarization of the two parties in recent years,52 one might expect party 
identification, along with SAG resources, to be an important factor in whether SAGs 
participate in multistate litigation. To help explain the extent to which these factors 
matter to SAGs’ participation in multistate litigation, I conducted a regression analysis 
indicating the relationship between the dependent variable of participation in 
multistate lawsuits and three explanatory variables – the SAGs’ political party, the 
number of attorneys available to the SAG, and whether the SAG is appointed or elected. 
Information regarding the number of attorneys in SAG offices derives from data 
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collected by Rorie Spill Solberg and Leonard Ray as part of an article examining state 
success in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.53 I independently collected the information used 
on political party affiliation and mode of selection from a variety of sources.54 The party 
affiliation variable is coded 0 for Republicans and 1 for Democrats in this analysis. The 
mode of selection variable is coded as 0 for appointed SAGs and 1 for elected SAGs. 
Unfortunately, this exercise is limited due to the difficulty of finding information 
regarding individual SAG budgets and staff. NAAG maintained this information until the 
late 1990s, but no longer publishes the data. Because of this, I have used the number of 
attorneys reported by Solberg and Ray from 1980 to 1999, but then used the 1999 
numbers for each year from 2000 to the present. While imperfect,55 using the 1999 data 
in subsequent years at least reflects the wide discrepancies in attorney resources 
between the various SAG offices still existing today. 
 With this limitation in mind, the results from Table 3.3 suggest that participation 
in multistate suits is more closely related to the resources available to the SAG, as 
opposed to partisanship or a SAG’s mode of selection. In this regression analysis, the 
"number of attorneys" variable was the only of the three that reached statistical 
significance. More importantly, the effect of this variable is substantial; for every 100 
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additional attorneys in a SAG’s office, the SAG’s participation increased an average of 
1.255 cases per year. Over the thirty years in the dataset, this translates to participation 
in an average of nearly 38 additional cases for every 100 additional attorneys available 
to the SAG. 
Taken together, these three variables explain only a small amount of the 
variation in participation rates (R2=.094), and most of that is due to the substantial 
effect of office resources. 
TABLE 3.3: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION RATES 
IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION (ALL CASES, 1980-2009) 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t Sig. 
Mode of Selection .668 .447 1.493 .136 
Party of SAG .104 .323 .321 .748 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) 1.255 .103 12.163 .000 
Constant 3.824 .469 8.159 .000 
N = 1500 
Groups (States) = 50 
Observations Per Group (Years) = 30 
R2 = .094 
 
 However, the picture changes considerably when we look at the SAGs leading 
the multistate cases, as opposed to simply participating in the cases. Table 3.4 displays 
the regression results for the same three independent variables, this time with the 
number of cases led as the dependent variable. Now all three variables reach statistical 
significance, indicating that, controlling for the other factors, Democratic SAGs are more 
likely than Republicans to lead multistate cases, and elected SAGs are more likely to lead 
these cases than appointed SAGs. The number of attorneys, however, still bears the 
101 
 
closest relation to leading multistate cases.  
 
Table 3.4: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LEAD RATES 
IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION (ALL CASES, 1980-2009) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t Sig. 
Mode of Selection .163 .078 2.084 .037 
Party of SAG .181 .056 3.204 .001 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .410 .018 22.743 .000 
Constant -.339 .082 -4.139 .000 
N = 1500 
Groups (States) = 50 
Observations Per Group (Years) = 30 
R2 = .268 
 
Since 2000, however, it appears that partisan identification has become a more 
important factor, particularly in relation to which states take the lead in multistate 
cases. On average, Democratic SAGs participated in almost eight more multistate cases 
and led nearly five more cases over the past decade than did Republican SAGs, 
controlling for both mode of selection and number of attorneys. While the number of 
attorneys remains a statistically significant factor, the mode of selection no longer is. 
Table 3.5 presents the results of this regression for lead rates in multistate cases since 
2000.56 
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102 
 
TABLE 3.5: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LEAD RATES 
IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION (CASES SINCE 2000) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t Sig. 
Mode of Selection .287 .179 1.602 .110 
Party of SAG .490 .127 3.857 .000 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .544 .035 15.382 .000 
Constant -.515 .185 -2.787 .006 
N = 500 
Groups (States) = 50 
Observations Per Group (Years) = 10 
R2 = .353 
 
Looking at all of the multistate cases as a whole, however, may obscure 
important differences between consumer, antitrust, environmental, and Medicaid fraud 
cases. Further regression analyses separating out the four types of cases suggest that 
consumer protection and environmental cases tend to see the most partisan differences 
(Democratic SAGs being more willing to participate in and lead these cases), with the 
antitrust and Medicaid fraud cases having a more non-partisan character. In fact, party 
appears to be the single strongest factor in environmental cases, the only area of the 
four in which this is true. In all four areas, the number of attorneys correlates with 
higher levels of participation and leading multistate cases.57 
The importance of office resources to a SAG’s role in participating and leading 
multistate cases found in these analyses should not be terribly surprising. As any new 
law firm associate knows, litigating complex cases often involves intensive discovery, 
review of reams of documents, and writing page after page of legal memoranda. 
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Attorney General offices with more attorneys willing (or at least able) to do this work 
are much better positioned to assist and especially to lead the coordinating efforts.  
More interesting is that greater partisan differences between the SAGs have 
appeared over the past decade, particularly in consumer protection and environmental 
cases, with Democratic SAGs are more willing to both participate in and lead these two 
types of cases. This comports with the fact that these issues often generate similar 
partisan splits in other institutional contexts, including in Congress, with Democrats 
typically taking a more pro-regulatory stance on these issues. Since Medicaid fraud 
cases tend to involve all or nearly all the states, as all of the states participate in the 
Medicaid program, it is little surprise that these cases have a more non-partisan 
character. The lack of partisan differences in antitrust cases is somewhat surprising, 
though this might be explained in part by antitrust settlements containing fewer broad 
regulatory requirements than consumer and environmental cases, as explained in the 
following chapter. 
WHY MULTISTATE LITIGATION? 
The previous section examined a few of the SAG-level explanations why SAGs 
might join or lead multistate suits, but what of the larger picture? After all, differences 
in political party affiliation and modes of selection have existed nearly as long as the 
offices have existed themselves, yet the phenomenon of multistate litigation itself is 
relatively recent. What larger trends have contributed to the rise of multistate 
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litigation? 
a) Multistate Litigation as an Efficient Tool 
One part of the story is that beginning in the 1980s, SAGs realized that multistate 
litigation was considerably more efficient and effective than prosecuting cases 
individually, particularly when the same issues appeared in multiple states. The increase 
in the multistate operations of national corporations gave SAGs additional reason to 
collaborate on a multistate basis. As former Maine AG James Tierney put it, "When I 
sued a pharmacy 25 years ago for price-posting violations, that pharmacy didn't have 
stores in 30 states, and it didn't have an on-line sales presence. That's no longer true."58 
The activities targeted by SAGs tend to affect numerous states at the time, 
raising similar issues from state to state. Writing in 1985, for example, Iowa Attorney 
General Tom Miller noted, "the perpetrators of consumer frauds victimize consumers in 
many states at the same time, and often move freely from state to state…interstate and 
multistate frauds cannot be effectively stopped by any one state." When states bring 
separate, uncoordinated actions, "the duplication of effort constitutes a shameful waste 
of resources."59 By engaging in multistate litigation, on the other hand, the states could 
pool their staff resources, time, and expertise. This illustrates the importance of office 
resources to multistate litigation, as this pooling of resources allowed more sustained 
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litigation efforts as well as the ability to handle more complex cases. 
SAGs also found that banding together gave a larger group of litigating states 
more negotiating leverage over the defendant businesses. One small state suing a large 
corporation might be but a "flea on an elephant,"60 but corporate defendants facing 
multiple state litigators found it increasingly difficult to fight state actions via a lengthy 
war of attrition. By pooling resources, states could give more sustained support to their 
litigation efforts, and in so doing force industry to deplete their resources.61  
Further, by virtue of involving several states, many of these multistate suits were 
able to gain significantly more national media attention than would individual state 
litigation efforts. For the industries targeted in the multistate suits, this meant more 
potentially negative publicity extended over a long period. In an early multistate suit 
against Sears arising from an undercover investigation by the California SAG, for 
example, several SAGs alleged that the retailer’s auto repair centers had systematically 
overcharged customers for routine repairs. The accusations received substantial media 
coverage, and the company estimated that its sales dropped off fifteen percent 
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nationwide because of the negative attention.62 The blow to Sears’s corporate image led 
the company to negotiate a significant settlement with 43 SAGs, which included 
agreements to give $8 million worth of coupons to customers and to help develop a 
national program standardizing auto repair "best practices" together with the attorneys 
general.63 
The experience of Sears and other companies subject to litigation led them to 
realize quickly that settlements addressing the SAGs’ concerns while preserving the 
ability of corporations to continue to operate "are often preferable to years of litigation, 
bad publicity, and regulatory attention."64 Most multistate settlements contain a clause 
specifying that the signing party does not admit wrongdoing, and that the company 
chose to settle "in order to cooperate with the States, to ensure that its customers are 
treated fairly, and to avoid expensive and potentially protracted litigation."65 Settling 
litigation in such a way, even if it imposes regulatory requirements and monetary 
payments, reduces the sort of uncertainty that makes shareholders nervous. 
Further, when sued, corporate defendants typically want "a single, 
comprehensive, predictable settlement" resolving the cases.66 As SAGs became more 
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frequent and successful litigators, the targets of this litigation have pushed for global 
settlements including as many states as possible. Even if they deny the allegations 
underlying the litigation, they see this "as an efficient and effective way to deal with a 
matter comprehensively."67 In certain cases, the terms and reach of a global settlement 
may even advantage the involved firms at the expense of their competitors, a dynamic 
explained at length by Michael Greve and other authors in the context of the tobacco 
settlement.68  
That both SAGs and corporate defendants alike have well understood the 
efficiencies of multistate litigation is an important reason why the use of this tool has 
increased. It is also likely one of the reasons why a greater number of states have joined 
such settlements over time, as indicated by Figure 3.3 earlier in this chapter. 
b) New Forums for Multistate Collaboration 
In addition to the greater efficiencies afforded by multistate litigation, 
technological advances over the past couple decades have undoubtedly enhanced the 
ability of SAGs to work together. One weekly publication noted the usefulness of a new 
teletypewriter network SAGs developed in the 1970s in helping to "speed the flow of 
information on legal and investigative strategies" among the SAGs, for example.69 The 
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subsequent development of fax machines and email has certainly made the work of 
information exchange and discovery in litigation easier.70 
 Technology alone is only part of the story, however, as the increased activities of 
SAGs’ national organizations have also been key in providing a forum for multistate 
litigation. Particularly critical in this effort was the expanded role of the National 
Association of Attorneys General. Founded in 1907, NAAG has served as an information 
exchange among the SAGs for many years, typically holding at least one annual national 
meeting attracting representatives of the various state offices. Beginning in the early 
1980s, however, NAAG began to take a much more active role in assisting its members’ 
litigation efforts. It began providing litigation training for its members, promulgating 
national guidelines in various policy areas, and actively coordinating multistate litigation 
efforts.  
Part of the impetus for NAAG’s new role was the poor reputation SAGs had as 
litigators, particularly in arguments in front of the Supreme Court. "Even state attorneys 
general had a perception that ‘there was a gap in performance quality between what 
the federal government achieved and what the states did, both of them representing 
the public.’"71 NAAG responded by establishing both the State and Local Legal Center 
and the Supreme Court Project in the early 1980s.72 The Supreme Court Project 
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provided several elements of litigation support to SAGs, including organizing moot court 
sessions and encouraging and coordinating state amicus curiae participation.73 
Since that time, NAAG has set up groups within the organization that help not 
only with Supreme Court practice, but also help facilitate investigations and litigation 
concerning particular industries. Such NAAG-sponsored task forces were key resources 
in both the prominent Microsoft antitrust litigation as well as the tobacco cases, for 
example.74 Other more recently created groups include, among several others, a 
Craigslist Working Group, an Internet Safety Task Force, a Committee on Financial 
Practices, and a State-Federal Task Force on Mortgage Enforcement.75 A number of the 
working groups are industry-specific and permanent (such as the Petroleum Products 
Working Group), while others are temporary and focus on specific investigations 
(including the Contact Lens Working Group, whose work led to an antitrust settlement 
with three major manufacturers of contact lenses).76 The purpose of all of these task 
forces and working groups is to help facilitate the distribution of information relevant to 
litigation to assist coordination in discovery. 
In addition to NAAG’s efforts to build forums for multistate collaboration, other 
related national organizations have contributed as well. For example, the National 
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Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units (NAMFCU) has successfully encouraged 
greater interstate cooperation in Medicaid related investigations and litigation. In 
addition to providing an additional forum for SAGs to discuss relevant issues and plan 
strategies, there is often close collaboration between NAMFCU and NAAG, highlighted 
by the fact that they share the same building in Washington D.C.77 
c) Building SAG Capacity 
Earlier in this chapter, I noted that there is a significant and substantial 
relationship between the resources available to individual SAGs and the likelihood that 
they will participate in and lead multistate litigation campaigns. This in turn suggests, as 
other authors have as well, that the substantial increase in resources available to SAGs 
over the past few decades have played a major role in the overall increase in multistate 
litigation. 
Along with the substantial increase in consumer and environmental protection 
laws during the 1960s and 70s came substantial increases in resources available for 
SAGs to enforce those laws. State legislatures appropriated additional funds to the 
SAGs, allowing them to add more attorneys and hire additional personnel. In fact, 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the growth in the budget of SAGs outpaced the 
growth of general government spending in every state.78 The federal government also 
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contributed in key ways to this growth. The Crime Control Act of 1976, for example, 
provided about $25 million in grants for state antitrust enforcement through the new 
State Antitrust Grant Program,79 which enabled twenty-five states to create Antitrust 
Divisions in the attorneys’ general offices for the first time.80 According to an assistant 
attorney general in Virginia, this federal seed money represented "the most important 
shot in the arm that state antitrust enforcement has ever received."81 The establishment 
of Medicaid fraud divisions in most SAG offices, required by federal law and funded with 
a combination of state and federal money, gave SAGs additional resources to conduct 
multistate litigation. 
SAGs have also managed to build their own capacities in innovative ways. Many 
of the settlements in the dataset require the corporate signatories to pay for the 
litigation expenses incurred by the SAGs as part of the investigation and lawsuits, often 
reaching into the hundreds of thousands and even millions of dollars. Many of these 
cases thus pay for themselves, and funds received from previous settlements can help 
fund future investigations. For example, the Florida legislature established a "Legal 
Affairs Revolving Trust Fund" funded by monies recovered from SAG settlements, "for 
the purpose of funding investigation, prosecution, and enforcement by the Attorney 
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General" of various state and federal statutes.82 
SAGs have also engaged in the controversial practice of hiring private attorneys 
to assist their investigations. Generally, these private attorneys work on a contingency 
fee basis, receiving a substantial portion of any successful court judgments achieved or 
settlements reached at the conclusion of a lawsuit. Contingency fee attorneys were a 
large part of the tobacco litigation in the 1990s, helping investigate various elements of 
the litigation at the behest of the SAGs that hired them, and eventually collecting 
billions of dollars in fees following the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.83 More 
recently, SAGs have hired contingency fee attorneys in litigation brought against the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
Several observers have criticized the SAGs’ use of contingency fee attorneys, 
arguing that the use of private attorneys violates separation of powers and the standard 
of neutrality required of government prosecutors, and presents severe ethical conflicts 
of interest when the SAGs hire campaign contributors to work on the particular cases.84 
SAGs respond that the use of private attorneys saves taxpayer money, and allows them 
to tap into different sources of litigation expertise.85 Whatever the merits of this 
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June 4, 2007 (noting that SAGs have turned to private counsel because they have "developed expertise in 
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practice, the combination of contingency fee attorneys and settlements requiring 
payment of costs and fees has helped to increase the SAGs’ capacity to conduct 
litigation. 
d) Success Breeding Success 
Former Maine AG James Tierney remarked, "once the attorneys general have 
entered a field, they don’t go out."86 A big part of the reason for this is quite simple: the 
SAGs’ multistate litigation has been remarkably successful. Subsequent chapters will 
provide further detail, but SAGs have won key court victories and signed important 
settlements altering the regulatory landscape in several fields. The immense success of 
the SAGs’ tobacco litigation, after decades of failure by private litigants, particularly 
helped SAGs realize the potential of the tool of multistate litigation. "This victory is a 
culmination of 30 years of asking two or three states to join together, the culmination of 
collective efforts on consumer protection and antitrust and other issues," as one SAG 
put it.87 
As public policy and organizational scholars have noted for some time, 
organizations learn from past experiences, and positive feedback reinforces later 
                                                                                                                                                                             
prescription drug-pricing lawsuits by researching the emerging case law and investigating the impact on 
consumers and state Medicaid plans"). 
86
 James Traub, "The Attorney General Goes to War," New York Times Magazine, June 16, 2002, 40. 
87
 Eric Freedman, "Pioneer of AG-as-Activist to Retire After 37 Years," National Law Journal, December 28, 
1998, A6. 
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activity.88 It is thus of little surprise that after the tobacco litigation and other successful 
litigation, James Tierney could predict that "multistate prosecutions are going to be at 
the core of the AGs responsibility" in future years.89 As SAGs won more victories, they 
continued to search for new opportunities, and it became clear that defendants that 
"rolled the dice" and fought claims brought by SAGs would be placed in a very difficult 
position. Not only does this cost a lot of money, but SAGs also increasingly had the 
upper hand in negotiations. The more the SAGs were able to maintain this dominant 
bargaining position, the more able they were to act as regulators rather than 
negotiators in more typical settlement negotiations.90 
Successful lawsuits not only frequently result in cash payments to the SAGs that 
can be rolled over into future investigations, but the success of certain multistate efforts 
can themselves assist future litigation. The tobacco Master Settlement Agreement was 
foreshadowed by a 22-state settlement in 1997 with the Liggett Corporation, one of the 
smaller of the major tobacco manufacturers. In the settlement, Liggett agreed to "fully 
cooperate with the Attorneys General…in their lawsuits against the other tobacco 
companies" by making available "all relevant documents and information, including 
documents subject to Liggett's own attorney-client privileges and work product 
protections" that might assist the Attorney General’s efforts against other tobacco 
                                                          
88
 See, e.g., J. G. March & J. P. Olsen (eds.), Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen, Norway: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1979); Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Policy Dynamics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
89
 Rovella, "State AGs Look for New Targets," 22. 
90
 Donald G. Gifford, "Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae Product 
Litigation," Boston College Law Review 49 (2008): 944. 
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manufacturers.91 Similarly, following the Western energy crisis in 2000-2001, three AGs’ 
market price investigations of several energy companies reached its first success with a 
settlement with Williams Energy, which agreed to open its internal records to the SAGs. 
These documents were critical in assisting the investigation, which resulted in several 
other settlements with energy companies involved in the crisis.92 A similar dynamic 
emerges in other investigations as well, ranging from investigations of the 
pharmaceutical industry to the widespread inquiry into the activities of the financial 
sector. Former New York SAG Eliot Spitzer perhaps summed this process up best when 
he colorfully remarked, "[y]ou squeeze one person, they give you someone else. That’s 
how we do it."93 
Finally, the political benefit of successfully settling important cases or achieving 
victory in court is not lost on SAGs. As soon as a case is resolved, participating SAGs 
typically send out coordinated press releases touting their success.94 For SAGs 
interested in higher office, this can be a fine way to raise one’s political profile and to 
string together a record of accomplishments. Participation in the successful resolution 
of a case gives a SAG the ability to tout him or herself as a "consumer" or 
"environmental" advocate, and can be phrased in such a way to appeal to particular 
constituencies in a primary or general election. Bringing money into the state coffers 
                                                          
91
 Class Settlement Agreement in the Matter of Liggett Group, Inc., Civil Action No. 97-913, March 20, 
1997. Also see Derthick, Up in Smoke, 80-82. 
92
 "State, Consumers May See Justice," Seattle-Post Intelligencer, November 14, 2002, B6. 
93
 Columbia University, "Corporate Governance Panel," Symposium on the Newest Federalism, 19. 
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 Indeed, these press releases were very helpful in collecting information for the multistate litigation 
dataset.  
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can also be a way for a SAG to tout herself as "fiscally responsible" and willing to "fight 
for the taxpayers." While SAGs have not had a great track record of success when 
running for other state and federal offices in recent years,95 one can see why multistate 
litigation would be useful for an ambitious SAG eyeing higher office. 
CONCLUSION 
A look at the trends in multistate litigation over the past three decades reveals 
the state attorney general as an actor increasingly willing to act in collaboration with his 
or her associates in other states. States vary widely in their willingness to participate 
and lead these campaigns, however, as SAGs with ample litigation resources at their 
disposal (most strikingly New York’s SAG) being the most likely to engage in multistate 
litigation. While Republican and Democratic SAGs alike are heavily involved in multistate 
efforts, Democratic SAGs appear to be slightly more likely to participate in multistate 
litigation, at least in consumer protection and environmental cases, and are more likely 
to initiate and lead these campaigns. More generally, several factors contributed to the 
rise of the use of multistate litigation overall. This included the efficiencies of multistate 
action for both the SAGs and the targets of the litigation, the emergence of new forums 
for multistate collaboration, more resources available to SAGs over time, and the very 
success of the multistate litigation itself. 
                                                          
95
 See Larry Sabato, "The Attorney General as Aspiring Governor; Hint: It’s Twice as Good to be Lieutenant 
Governor," Sabato’s Crystal Ball (Blog Post), April 22, 2010, accessed July 29, 2010, 
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/ljs2010042201/. 
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We now know the extent to which multistate litigation has increased, and some 
of the reasons contributing to this rise, but what does it matter? How does this litigation 
represent "regulation through litigation"? Which industries and business activities 
receive the focus of the SAGs’ attention? Since SAG litigation increasingly involves 
national issues, how does this litigation mesh with the regulatory activities of the federal 
government? I turn to these questions in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Multistate Litigation as National Regulation 
 
"Attorneys General do not create new law and do not invent new regulations; we 
simply enforce the law." 
–Richard Blumenthal, Former Attorney General of 
Connecticut1  
 
"On January 1, 1999, when I got this office, I suddenly became an enormous fan 
of the new federalism. I suddenly said, 'States’ rights are a beautiful thing.'"  
–Eliot Spitzer, Former Attorney General of New York2 
 
 
 Despite Attorney General Blumenthal’s statement above, the line between law 
enforcement and law creation is not always so clear. In fact, the negotiated multistate 
settlement is a powerful regulatory device because it allows SAGs to not only recoup the 
costs of their investigation and obtain restitution for consumers, but grants them the 
ability to create an enforceable de facto national regulatory regime through the terms 
of the settlements. Moreover, this SAG activity arises in a context in which several other 
law enforcement authorities – including several federal agencies – have jurisdiction over 
the same activities targeted in the SAGs' multistate litigation. In several situations, the 
enforcement approach the SAGs take differs from that of federal enforcement 
authorities, further muddying the seeming clarity of SAGs "simply enforcing the law." 
 The purpose of this chapter is to continue the empirical approach to SAG 
                                                          
1
 Richard Blumenthal, "The Role of State Attorneys General," Connecticut Law Review 33 (2001), 1209. 
2
 Richard P. Nathan, "In Latest Cycle, Liberals Leaning Towards States' Rights," Stateline.org, August 12, 
2006, accessed August 16, 2010, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=133958. 
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multistate litigation begun in the previous chapter, but with an emphasis on the case-
level characteristics of this litigation. The first part of this chapter sheds additional light 
on the types of cases that attract SAGs, including which industries and activities are 
most frequently the targets of SAG multistate litigation. It also discusses what these 
cases accomplish, from the monetary recoveries to the regulatory provisions that are 
part of the resolution of these multistate cases. The second part of this chapter turns to 
how this multistate litigation interacts with the priorities of the federal government. I 
present a typology of multistate litigation sorting the cases into four basic groups based 
upon interaction between the SAGs and federal enforcement authorities, and apply this 
to the original dataset of multistate litigation. Finally, I describe the importance of both 
state and federal law to the recent prevalence of multistate litigation, before concluding 
with a brief look at some of the horizontal federalism aspects of this litigation. 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SAG MULTISTATE LITIGATION 
Chapter 3 examined some of the SAG-level characteristics of multistate litigation. 
I turn now to some of the other case-level characteristics of the suits. This section takes 
a closer look at the targets of multistate suits, as well as some of the activities involved 
in multistate litigation and the monetary and regulatory terms that are part of these 
settlements. 
a) The Targets of Multistate Litigation 
In addition to the plaintiff SAGs, each multistate case, of course, involves a 
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targeted defendant or defendants. Who are these targets? Which industries are the 
most likely targets of SAG multistate litigation? Table 4.1 examines these questions by 
indicating the industries that are most frequently the targets of SAG multistate 
litigation. For each of the 511 cases in the dataset, I identified the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for each of the targeted defendants.3 The 
NAICS separates the American economy into several numerical categories, with 2-digit 
codes describing the twenty broad industry sectors and longer codes providing 
differentiation within each of these sectors. For corporations listed under more than 
one code, I used the code most closely related to the substance of the case at issue.4 
The shaded areas in Table 4.1 represent each of the twenty broad sectors that make up 
the NAICS, with the non-shaded areas listing particularly frequently targeted 
subcategories:  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The NAICS "is the standard used by federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for 
the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy." 
U.S. Census Bureau, "Introduction," accessed July 5, 2010, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/. 
4
 For example, the ExxonMobil Corporation is classified under both the "Oil and Gas Extraction" and the 
"Retail Trade" NAICS subgroups, since in addition to its refining operations it operates several "Mobil on 
the Run" stores at its gasoline stations throughout the country. If the SAGs’ litigation targeted the sale of 
tobacco products in one of these ExxonMobil "On the Run" stores, the appropriate NAICS code for this 
suit would be "Retail Trade." 
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TABLE 4.1: INDUSTRIES TARGETED IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
Code (NAICS) # % 
#31-33 Manufacturing 162 30.98% 
#3254 Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing 77 14.72% 
#311 Food Manufacturing 15 2.87% 
#334 Computer & Electronic Product Manufacturing  14 2.68% 
#3122 Tobacco Product Manufacturing  13 2.49% 
#92 Public Administration (Government) 52 9.94% 
#44-45 Retail Trade  50 9.56% 
#51 Information 50 9.56% 
#517 Telecommunications 17 3.25% 
#52 Finance & Insurance 49 9.37% 
#99 Other/Non Classified 24 4.59% 
#54 Professional, Scientific, & Technical Services 23 4.40% 
#21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 19 3.63% 
#56 
Administrative, Support, Waste Management & 
Remediation Services 16 3.06% 
#42 Wholesale Trade 15 2.87% 
#424210 Drugs & Druggists' Sundries Merchant Wholesalers 15 2.87% 
#22 Utilities 11 2.10% 
#62 Health Care Services 11 2.10% 
#11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 9 1.72% 
#81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 9 1.72% 
#81391 Business Associations 7 1.34% 
#53 Real Estate, Rental & Leasing 3 0.57% 
#61 Educational Services 3 0.57% 
#23 Construction 2 0.38% 
#48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 2 0.38% 
#72 Accommodation and Food Services 1 0.19% 
#55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 0 0.00% 
#71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 0 0.00% 
 
  
  - TOTAL 511 100.00% 
 
 As Table 4.1 indicates, the manufacturing sector generates the largest number of 
multistate lawsuits. Government defendants – most commonly the EPA – are the 
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second-most common target of these suits, followed closely by the Information 
(including telecommunications, publishing, and internet providers), Retail Trade, and 
Finance & Insurance sectors. Of the specific subgroups, the "Pharmaceutical and 
Medicine Manufacturing" subsector is by far the most prominent target at nearly 15% of 
all multistate suits. Multistate litigation frequently targets manufacturers of tobacco and 
food products, as well as telecommunication firms, companies providing advertising and 
related services, and drug wholesalers. 
 Not surprisingly, the industries targeted in multistate litigation frequently consist 
of large corporations conducting business nationally, such as large pharmaceutical 
companies, tobacco firms, and national retailers. Occasionally, multistate litigation 
involves firms that are strong regionally, but not necessarily nationally. A few multistate 
antitrust cases involve the merger of regional firms, for example.5 Still, most multistate 
litigation involves issues with salience beyond single regions, as nearly 85% of the 
multistate cases in the dataset involved SAGs representing states from more than one 
region of the country.6 
SAGs' frequent targeting of the manufacturing and retail sectors is not surprising, 
since these industries maintain the closest direct relationship with consumers. Within 
                                                          
5
 See, for example, Carolyn Ryan, "Stop & Shop Sale OK'd; 30 Stores Must be Cut," Patriot Ledger (Quincy, 
MA), July 15, 1996, 7 (describing the settlement of a supermarket merger case involving three New 
England SAGs). 
6
 Specifically, 414 of the multistate cases in the dataset (83.3%) involved SAGs from more than one broad 
region of the country (such as the Northeast, the South, and so forth). Note that even some of the cases 
involving SAGs from all one region often had national regulatory implications, such as a number of 
environmental cases involving only northeastern state SAGs as plaintiffs.  
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these categories, the manufacturers and retailers most frequently targeted produce and 
sell products that consumers use directly, rather than products sold mainly to other 
firms (such as engine parts). The prominence of the health care industry as a top SAG 
target is related to the impact state budgets face because of allegedly fraudulent 
pharmaceutical manufacturer behavior. That the issue of rising health care costs 
consistently rates a top political issue gives elected SAGs more incentive to pursue cases 
in this industry. 
Interestingly, many of the most frequent targets of multistate litigation are 
companies in industries featuring high levels of market concentration. The frequently 
targeted pharmaceutical industry, for example, consists of relatively few large firms 
whose products make up a significant portion of the market. Likewise, a relatively small 
number of leading firms dominate the finance and insurance industry, and the same is 
true in the tobacco manufacturing sector. As Michael Greve has previously observed, 
highly concentrated industries are the most likely to attract the attention of multistate 
litigators since regulatory provisions contained in settlements are considerably more 
effective when "the states and the targeted industry as a whole [are] able to reach an 
agreement" (emphasis added).7 New regulatory terms contained in settlements with the 
four largest tobacco or pharmaceutical firms will cover a larger percentage of the overall 
market, and be easier to oversee for compliance, than are settlements with companies 
                                                          
7
 Michael S. Greve, "States' Rights on Steroids," AEI Outlook Series, September 2002, accessed August 17, 
2010, http://www.aei.org/outlook/14296. 
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in more diffuse industries. 
However, SAGs do not exclusively bring multistate suits against companies in 
highly concentrated industries. Often, the strategy of the campaign is to target market 
leaders in highly diffuse industries, with the expectation that other companies not party 
to the settlement will follow. In an early multistate effort, for example, SAGs reached an 
agreement with several of the most prominent fast food restaurants to provide 
customers point-of-sale nutritional information, with the goal of setting the standard for 
the broader industry.8 More recently, SAGs have targeted large Internet businesses such 
as Facebook and MySpace in investigations,9 as well as peak business associations such 
as the Carpet and Rug Institute.10 In these cases involving industries with lower market 
concentration, SAGs frequently cite the desire that these settlements with industry 
leaders will have a ripple effect throughout the industry.11 Whether targeting dominant 
firms in highly concentrated industries or market leaders in diffuse industries, however, 
the strategy is similar – reach settlements with those firms most likely to yield the most 
impact on the given industry as a whole. 
b) The Case Characteristics of Multistate Litigation 
Now with a better picture of the plaintiff and defendants participants in 
                                                          
8
 See NAAG, "Multistate: Fast Food Advertising," Consumer Protection Report, July 1986, 19. 
9
 "Facebook Adding Safeguards Against Cyber-Bullying, Porn," San Jose Mercury News (CA), May 8, 2008. 
10
 "Multistate Attorney General Agreement to Place Health Information Labels on New Carpets," 
Consumer Protection Report, October/November 1993, 7. 
11
 See, for example, Connecticut Attorney General's Office, "Attorney General, Banking Commissioner  
Announce Settlement With Mortgage Lender," October 11, 2002, accessed August 7, 2010, 
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=1777&Q=283558. 
125 
 
multistate litigation, I now turn to what this multistate litigation actually does. In this 
section, I take a closer look at both the monetary payments and regulatory terms that 
are a part of the resolutions of multistate cases. 
1. Monetary Payments 
In multistate litigation brought by the SAGs against private companies, money is 
often involved – and sometimes considerable amounts of it. Of the multistate cases in 
the dataset, 361 contained some sort of payment to the states or state consumers, in 
the form of cash payments, coupons for consumers, or distributions of product. Figure 
4.1 displays the total amount of money received per year in SAG settlements, whether 
earmarked for SAG costs and fees, other state recoveries, or customer restitution 
(adjusted for inflation).12 Figure 4.2 displays the average amount of money received per 
year per settlement. 
Because the focus is on monetary recoveries by the SAGs, I excluded any federal 
portion of the settlement proceeds, if applicable. I also excluded a massive outlier from 
these totals – the 1998 tobacco Master Settlement Agreement and subsequent MSA-
related settlements – because inclusion of these $200+ billion settlements obscured the 
overall trend in other cases. Keep in mind, therefore, that the averages reported in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 would be considerably higher with the tobacco money included. 
 
                                                          
12
 I derived the total amounts of the settlements from the actual settlement agreements themselves, if 
available, and/or from a variety of news sources. 
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FIGURE 4.1: TOTAL STATE RECOVERIES IN MULTISTATE SETTLEMENTS, EXCLUDING TOBACCO 
SETTLEMENTS AND ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION (2009 DOLLARS) 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2: AVERAGE STATE RECOVERIES IN MULTISTATE SETTLEMENTS, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION 
(2009 DOLLARS) 
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These charts indicate that both the total and the average amount of monetary 
settlements have increased over time, particularly over the past decade. In large part, 
this increase in state recoveries is a product of the overall increase in state participation 
in multistate litigation described in Chapter 3. More multistate settlements involve all or 
nearly all SAGs than in the past, meaning that the number of states requiring settlement 
payments has likewise increased.   
Perhaps surprising, however, is that the value of many monetary settlements are 
not even higher, given that the alleged wrongdoing involved in these suits affect large 
numbers of consumers. A $4 million settlement with a major computer manufacturer 
over allegations of deceptive advertising, for example, translates into a very small 
recovery per individual consumer harmed.13 The reason for this seeming puzzle is that 
monetary recoveries are often not the central focus of these settlements. Instead, the 
focus is on the regulatory provisions of the settlements, which can often have 
significantly greater impacts than that of the monetary terms. This is especially true 
since SAGs conduct investigations parallel to private class-action litigation, which often 
recover far larger monetary amounts for the similar alleged conduct and are more 
frequently the vehicle for wider consumer compensation.  
The regulatory aspects of settlements are often much more costly to defendants 
than are any monetary penalties. As such, Figure 4.1 understates the actual cost of the 
                                                          
13
 The reference is to a recent 46-state settlement with Dell alleging that the computer giant misled 
customers with its financing offers and failed to honor warranties, service contracts and rebates. 
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settlements to defendants in multistate suits, and dramatically so in some cases. The 
costs of compliance with regulatory settlement terms can often be substantial, such as 
the costs of installing new pollution-control devices in a power plant or creating and 
implementing new codes of conduct.14 Because SAGs have employed regulatory 
settlement terms with increasing frequency, including all of these difficult-to-determine 
costs in Figure 4.1 would indicate an even greater rise in the costs of these multistate 
settlements over time. 
2. Targeted Practices and Regulatory Terms 
Subsequent chapters will go into much more detail in the specific areas of 
pharmaceuticals, climate change, and firearms, but the following section provides an 
overview of the regulatory issues dealt with in each of the four general multistate 
litigation policy areas, including consumer protection, antitrust, the environment, and 
Medicaid fraud. For each policy area, I describe the types of activities targeted and 
provide brief examples of the sort of regulatory terms included in multistate litigation. 
(a) Consumer Protection 
Multistate litigation in the consumer protection area targets a diverse range of 
activities. Table 4.2 lists some of the most common activities targeted by the SAGs in 
                                                          
14
 For example, a 2007 settlement between the several SAGs, the EPA, and American Electric Power 
required the company to spend approximately $4.6 billion on pollution control measures on sixteen of its 
plants across the country. Juliet Eilperin, "EPA Joins Settlement of Lawsuit but Adds a Waiver; Action 
Against Polluting Utility Is Ruled Out Until 2018," The Washington Post, October 11, 2007, A03. 
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multistate consumer protection litigation: 
TABLE 4.2: ACTIVITIES TARGETED IN MULTISTATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
 Alleged Activity # of Cases % 
Marketing and Advertising 135 46.23% 
Unauthorized Fees, Overcharging, or 
Service Complaints 62 21.23% 
Tobacco-Related Issues (MSA) 29 9.93% 
Customer Information 15 5.14% 
Defective and Unsafe Products 15 5.14% 
Lending Practices 9 3.08% 
Internet Safety 5 1.71% 
Debt Collection Practices 4 1.37% 
Other 17 5.82% 
 
 Not surprisingly, Table 4.2 indicates that much of the multistate consumer 
protection litigation targets those activities most likely to cross state lines. Further, the 
suits involve activities that companies cannot differentiate across markets in various 
jurisdictions. Marketing and advertising are the most frequent activities targeted by 
SAGs in multistate litigation by a significant margin, particularly since national 
advertising campaigns are conducted in most or all states and are not typically tailored 
to individual states. Many of the other multistate suits involve activities most likely to be 
the focus of consumer complaints in multiple states. Tobacco policy also continues to be 
a significant part of the SAGs' multistate efforts through the enforcement of the 1998 
Master Settlement Agreement.15 This includes litigation arising when new tobacco 
manufacturers enter the market or existing manufacturers fail to pay their required 
                                                          
15
 Note that the MSA and related agreements also involved various claims, not all of which involved only 
state consumer protection laws. This included antitrust claims and claims for Medicaid reimbursement. 
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payments under the MSA, as well as various settlements with major retailers aimed to 
prevent sales of tobacco products to minors.  
Many consumer protection settlements across each of the subcategories listed in 
Table 4.2 impose regulatory constraints on the defendants. An example from the early 
years of multistate litigation involved nutritional labeling. In one joint effort among 
attorneys general in 1986, for example, several states reached an agreement with 
several fast-food restaurants concerning nutritional information in their products. SAGs 
were concerned that due to the lack of federal requirements concerning nutritional 
information, consumers had little way of knowing what was in the increasingly popular 
fast food items they were eating. Although only a dozen or so states were involved in 
the negotiations, McDonalds, Burger King, and other major fast food chains agreed to a 
series of reforms providing nutritional information in their restaurants nation-wide.16 
 This successful effort preceded a series of related investigations and lawsuits in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s by a similarly sized team of SAGs. Under the constant 
threat of litigation under state consumer protection laws, many of which were stricter 
than federal regulations, these SAGs negotiated national settlements with food 
manufacturers requiring changes in advertising, additional nutrition labeling, and other 
changes involving a variety of products from Sara Lee cheesecakes to Campbell’s tomato 
                                                          
16
 See NAAG, "Multistate: Fast Food Advertising," Consumer Protection Report, July 1986, 19. 
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soup.17 While several of these settlements involved as few as nine SAGs, the necessity of 
maintaining standardized product lines and advertising campaigns on the part of the 
involved companies meant that the settlements had nationwide impact.  
 These food labeling cases formed the bulk of the early consumer protection 
cases, but the more recent cases have involved a more diverse array of products. Like 
these earlier nutritional marketing cases, however, these more recent cases are also 
part of a larger litigation campaign aimed at reforming an entire industry. Coinciding 
with rising concern about subprime lending beginning in the early part of the past 
decade, for example, four major multistate settlements with major lending institutions 
over the past decade sought to reform lending practices the participating SAGs viewed 
as predatory. A 2002 settlement with Household Finance required the company to 
provide nearly $500 million in restitution to customers, the largest amount of direct 
restitution provided in any multistate settlement to that point. Most importantly, the 
settlement required Household to adhere to a variety of regulatory provisions not 
required by federal law, including limits on prepayment penalties and loan origination 
fees, new disclosure requirements to consumers, and procedures to ensure that any 
loans made provide benefits to the consumer seeking the loan.18 The SAGs pursued 
other multistate efforts resulting in large amounts of restitution to customers and key 
                                                          
17
 "Attorney General Says Settlement Reached with Sara Lee," The Associated Press, September 5, 1989; 
Paul Farhi, Campbell to Pay Nine States $315,000 to Settle Dispute on Soup Ad Claims," The Washington 
Post, May 11, 1989, D1. 
18
 "States Settle With Household Finance," Consumer Protection Report, November 2002, 1. 
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changes to lending practices with other industry leaders, including First Alliance 
Mortgage, Ameriquest Mortgage, and Countrywide Financial.19 Consistent with their 
explicit goal of "send[ing] a solid message to the subprime industry,"20 the SAGs' efforts 
had regulatory ripple effects on lenders not directly subject to these settlements as well. 
Wells Fargo, for example, altered its lending practices in 2006 following the Ameriquest 
and Household settlements, undoubtedly in part because of heightened industry 
concerns over bad publicity and future lawsuits following these other large 
settlements.21 
 Less high-profile settlements contain terms regulating specific business practices, 
frequently including various disclosure requirements. These regulatory terms are often 
very specific. A typical example is a 47-state settlement with Blockbuster in 2005 
requiring the movie rental company to adhere to certain disclosure requirements as 
part of its "End of Late Fees" promotion. Under the settlement, Blockbuster was 
required to "post a one-sided 8-1/2 by 11 inch notice in multiple locations in each store 
explaining the terms of the [No Late Fees] program...on or immediately adjacent to the 
entrance door to the store facing out and the exit door facing in and in at least one 
                                                          
19
 "Five States and the FTC Reach Settlement With First Alliance," Consumer Protection Report, March 
2002, 28; Alex Veiga, "Attorneys General Praise Ameriquest Deal," Associated Press Online, January 23, 
2006; "Attorney General Brown Announces Landmark $8.68 Billion Settlement With Countrywide," States 
News Service, October 6, 2008. 
20
 Connecticut Attorney General's Office, "Attorney General, Banking Commissioner  
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location which can be viewed by all customers in advance of and in connection with 
customers concluding rental transactions."22 In addition to specific conduct changes, 
other consumer protection settlements require the defendant company to participate in 
national "consumer education campaigns," as did a settlement with Western Union in 
200523 and Bayer Corporation in 2009.24 
Additionally, SAGs often provide provisions for quasi-administrative SAG 
oversight of the regulatory terms of their agreements. Multistate settlements often 
contain provisions requiring the defendants to check in with the states to ensure that 
they are adhering to the provisions of the agreement. For example, a 2008 agreement 
with social networking site MySpace required the company to create and lead an 
"Internet Safety Technical Task Force" to explore and develop age and identity 
verification tools for social networking web sites. The Task Force is required to report to 
the states every three months on its progress.25 
This brief overview of the types of regulatory terms contained in multistate 
consumer protection settlements is not exhaustive, as the regulatory requirements in 
these cases vary considerably. As the examples above illustrate, however, the regulatory 
terms of settlements reached with defendants frequently aim to change an entire 
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industry's practices, and contain regulatory requirements as specific as any regulatory 
agency might require when promulgating "traditional" regulations. 
(b) Antitrust 
Antitrust enforcement involves a few different subtypes, including review of 
mergers and preventing price-fixing. Table 4.3 summarizes the activities:26 
TABLE 4.3: ACTIVITIES TARGETED IN MULTISTATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
Alleged Activity  # of Cases % 
Price-Fixing 36 35.29% 
Merger Review 33 32.35% 
Monopolization 19 18.63% 
Resale Price Maintenance 13 12.75% 
Bid-Rigging 12 11.76% 
Market Allocation Agreement 8 7.84% 
Horizontal Non-Price Restraint 4 3.92% 
Tying 4 3.92% 
Vertical Non-Price Restraint 3 2.94% 
Boycotts 3 2.94% 
Other 5 4.90% 
 
 About a third of the cases in the multistate dataset involve merger reviews, with 
the remaining dealing with other antitrust issues, most notably allegations of price-
fixing. As with consumer protection cases, multistate antitrust settlements frequently 
contain numerous regulatory terms in addition to any monetary provisions. A typical 
merger settlement requires the merging companies to divest assets before completion 
of the merger, with the purported aim of securing a competitive marketplace. In other 
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types of antitrust cases, the settlements contain injunctive terms aimed at prohibiting 
the specific conduct at the heart of the alleged violation (such as price-fixing).27 
 In a number of cases, however, SAGs have gone beyond divestitures and specific 
injunctions to require broader codes of conduct and other continuing regulatory 
requirements. For example, several merger settlements have enjoined defendants from 
imposing non-compete agreements on former and current employees, and require the 
defendants to notify the states at any point in the future when they acquire other 
related companies or contracts so they can review those as well.28 One antitrust 
settlement with St. Paul Travelers insurance resolving bid-rigging charges contained a 
provision mandating the company to support national legislation and regulations 
banning contingent commissions in the entire insurance industry.29 
As with several of the consumer protection settlements, many antitrust 
settlements contain extensive monitoring requirements. One antitrust settlement with 
major pharmaceutical company Warner Chilcott, resolving allegations that it attempted 
to prevent the sale of generic equivalents to its blockbuster Ovcon contraceptive, 
provides a typical example. In addition to a variety of injunctive provisions going beyond 
those contained in an earlier FTC settlement, the company agreed to provide the states 
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notice of certain agreements it has entered into with generic manufacturers, and to 
continue to make its records available to the states for inspection to determine whether 
the company is complying with the terms of the agreement.30 
 Further, a number of the large antitrust cases in recent years have had the 
underlying goal of changing the practices of entire industries. Most famously, the 
multistate litigation against Microsoft, which also involved the federal Department of 
Justice, aimed at restructuring the way software is produced, marketed, and sold 
through the imposition of various settlement provisions enjoining allegedly 
anticompetitive behavior of the market's software leader. Many of the antitrust cases 
SAGs bring against pharmaceutical companies also aim to restructure the drug market 
through prohibitions on a wide variety of industry practices. Likewise, the massive 
antitrust investigation of the insurance industry over the past several years, led by 
former New York AG Eliot Spitzer, concluded in key settlements with nationwide impact. 
When insurance broker Chubb Corporation agreed to ban contingent commissions in 
2006, the SAGs involved hailed it "as a major milestone in the pursuit to end a pay-to-
play culture in the insurance industry" and said that it would set the stage for the entire 
insurance industry to adopt bans on contingent commissions.31  
The sorts of remedies SAGs have secured as part of antitrust settlements have 
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also expanded in recent years. In addition to paying the typical penalties and costs to 
the states as part of a settlement, defendants have also been required to contribute to 
"public purpose funds" when direct value distributions to individual consumers proves 
impractical. These "cy pres" distributions do not directly benefit consumers, but go to 
charitable or "public interest" organizations, usually of the SAGs' choosing. Among many 
others, this has included payments to repair sports facilities,32 funding of state-run 
health and nutrition programs,33 and distribution of compact discs to libraries and other 
non-profit organizations.34 
(c) Environmental Litigation 
SAGs are active in environmental litigation, but many environmental suits are 
specific to single states and as such do not involve multistate litigation. A key exception 
is litigation concerning air pollution, which often involves interstate disputes due to the 
nature of air pollution. Table 4.4 reflects this, indicating that the vast majority of 
multistate environmental litigation involves issues of air pollution. 
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TABLE 4.4: ACTIVITIES TARGETED IN MULTISTATE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
Alleged Activity  # of Cases % 
Air Pollution Control 57 78.08% 
Water Pollution Control 7 9.59% 
Superfund 2 2.74% 
Energy Efficiency 2 2.74% 
Environmental Bankruptcy 2 2.74% 
Nuclear Waste Disposal 2 2.74% 
Protection of Wilderness Areas 1 1.37% 
 
 As noted, the dominant focus on air pollution in multistate litigation does not 
come as a surprise, as air pollution control involves many cross-state issues. Air 
pollution crosses several state lines to a greater degree than water, and certainly more 
than some of the other environmental areas typically involving single state-specific 
locations, such as nuclear waste disposal and Superfund issues. 
 In settlements with corporate defendants, the remedies sought by federal and 
state enforcers vary widely and are often quite extensive and expensive. Many require 
the defendant(s) to install new pollution reduction equipment or engage in other 
reduction programs aimed at achieving a specified lower level of pollution. These 
requirements are usually very specific and technical.35 Other settlement provisions 
include extensive reporting and recordkeeping requirements, such as reporting detailed 
emissions data, any anticipated problems related to compliance, and similar 
information. 
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 In recent years, multistate SAG litigation has most frequently targeted the 
federal government, as opposed to private defendants. In these cases, SAGs seek 
regulatory changes not directly through settlement provisions, but through court orders 
requiring federal agencies to alter their regulatory posture. Sometimes this involves 
challenges to regulatory requirements placed directly on the states, such as EPA-
mandated revisions to the State Implementation Plans requiring every state to achieve a 
certain level of air quality. Often, however, multistate litigation seeks broad changes in 
the federal government's regulatory posture. For example, past litigation has sought 
court orders requiring the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air 
Act,36 and for the Department of Energy to promulgate new energy efficiency standards 
for a wide range of consumer products.37 This type of multistate environmental litigation 
will be the focus of the case study in Part II of this dissertation. 
(d) Medicaid Fraud 
As noted in the previous chapter, Medicaid fraud cases have been a particularly 
large growth area for SAGs in recent years. The types of activities that are subject to 
Medicaid fraud investigations are diverse, as indicated in Table 4.5: 
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TABLE 4.5: ACTIVITIES TARGETED IN MULTISTATE MEDICAID FRAUD LITIGATION 
Alleged Activity # of Cases % 
Medicaid Best Price Fraud 10 22.73% 
Off-Label Marketing Fraud 7 15.91% 
Average Wholesale Price Fraud 6 13.64% 
Billing for Unnecessary Laboratory Tests 6 13.64% 
Kickbacks for Referrals 6 13.64% 
Medicaid Prescription Shorting Fraud 3 6.82% 
Drug Switching 3 6.82% 
Other 6 13.64% 
 
 All of these activities allegedly increase the price of prescription drugs or medical 
tests. Because Medicaid covers some of the individuals using these services, the federal 
and state governments must pay these higher costs through the program. Most 
commonly, the issue in these multistate cases involves manufacturers allegedly inflating 
the "best price" or "average wholesale price" of the pharmaceuticals sold to Medicaid 
recipients, both of which set the baseline for the ultimate cost to the government.38 
Under law, Medicaid does not provide reimbursements for drugs used for purposes not 
approved by the FDA, and as such multistate cases have increasingly alleged that 
pharmaceutical companies engage in off-label marketing campaigns that illegally raise 
the cost to the government. Because of this, SAGs have increasingly pursued these cases 
in conjunction with consumer protection marketing litigation.39 The other activities 
listed above, including illegal kickback payments, unnecessary tests, and drug switching, 
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are also involved in recent multistate cases as raising the cost of Medicaid for the states. 
Because of this, one of the chief purposes of multistate Medicaid fraud cases is 
to recover the allegedly ill-gotten gains pharmaceutical manufacturers and others 
received as part of the fraudulent behavior, and the money involved in these 
settlements sometimes runs into the hundreds of millions.40 However, as with most 
multistate settlements, SAGs often pursue these agreements with an eye towards large-
scale changes in conduct. For example, when 43 states successfully settled a $50 million 
case against pharmacy giant Omnicare in late 2006 over allegations that the company 
gave Medicaid recipients more expensive drugs instead of the generic alternative, 
Mississippi SAG Jim Hood expressed his hope that "in addition to recovering restitution, 
the settlement will deter similar actions by pharmaceutical companies in the future."41 
 The government plaintiffs seek to achieve this deterrence through a "Corporate 
Integrity Agreement" (CIA) that is typically part of most Medicaid fraud settlements. 
These CIAs, overseen chiefly by the federal Department of Health and Human Services, 
mandate a variety of disclosure and reporting requirements on the defendants over a 
certain period (typically around five years). These include requiring the company to hire 
additional compliance personnel, develop new employee training programs, and 
disclose any information regarding potential Medicaid overpayments and other relevant 
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materials.42 In addition to CIAs, settlements often place a variety of injunctions of 
specific practices of the defendants, a number of which Chapters 8 through 10 will 
discuss in detail. As is the case with other types of multistate settlements, the cost of 
regulatory compliance often exceeds any monetary restitution received in the 
agreement.43 
REGULATORY LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
a) Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdictions 
SAGs are not, of course, the only "cops on the beat" patrolling the sorts of 
activities listed above, as these activities virtually always fall under the jurisdiction of 
one or more federal enforcement agencies. Sometimes the federal agencies’ jurisdiction 
overlaps with other federal agencies as well, such as the DOJ and FTC’s shared role over 
civil enforcement of the antitrust laws. Table 4.6 below gives a sense of this by listing 
several of the federal agencies with jurisdiction over each policy area: 
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TABLE 4.6: FEDERAL AGENCY ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION IN SELECTED POLICY AREAS 
Policy Area Federal Agency Jurisdiction 
Consumer Protection 
 FTC (most marketing and advertising) 
 Consumer Products Safety Commission (defective 
products) 
 FDA (drugs and medical devices) 
 FCC (telecommunications) 
 Several additional agencies with specific consumer 
protection jurisdiction 
Antitrust Enforcement 
 FTC (civil enforcement) 
 DOJ (civil and criminal enforcement) 
Environmental Policy 
 EPA 
 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
 Department of Transportation 
 Department of Energy 
Medicaid Fraud 
 DOJ 
 Department of Health and Human Services (Office of 
the Inspector General) 
 
 In addition to this listing, many additional agencies have jurisdiction over very 
specific areas or products, such as Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau’s 
jurisdiction over the safety of alcoholic drinks.44 This reinforces the fact that many 
federal entities have jurisdiction over the types of issues most often addressed by SAG 
multistate litigation. 
b) The Rhetoric of "Filling Regulatory Gaps" 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, proponents of "polyphonic" federalism suggest that 
one of the main benefits of placing jurisdiction of regulatory issues in many different 
locations – including independent jurisdiction of the federal and state governments – "is 
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that if one [level of government] fails to act, another can step in to solve the problem."45 
The SAGs themselves frequently explain why they have pursued a particular litigation 
campaign using similar reasoning. Eliot Spitzer invoked this reason to explain his 
litigation against polluting power plants, insurance firms, and gun manufacturers. 
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut often used strong rhetoric to describe the federal 
government’s "shameful stonewalling" on a host of issues during the second Bush 
Administration.46 Another prominent attorney general suggested that SAG litigation 
represents part of the "genius" of the American system of checks and balances.47 
Several academic and journalistic observers also recite this explanation for 
increased SAG activism, beginning with Cornell Clayton’s suggestion that Reagan’s "New 
Federalism" was a driver of multistate litigation. Clayton suggests that "perhaps no 
institution of state government was affected more by federal retrenchment and 
devolution than the office of attorney general," and that "faced with public pressure to 
fill the void left by federal withdrawal, states were forced to become more aggressive in 
their own enforcement of federal laws or alternatively to establish their own tougher 
regulatory statutes and standards."48 Similarly, as Timothy Meyer suggests, "regulatory 
space left by the federal government will often determine where the SAGs' regulatory 
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opportunities lie."49 Other scholarly and journalistic sources make similar points.50 
Beyond the prominence of this explanation in political rhetoric and citations to it 
in news sources and the academic literature, however, the extent to which SAGs are 
"filling enforcement gaps" left open by the federal government is not altogether clear. 
After all, not every multistate case occurs in the context of a lack of federal government 
action. Sometimes the states and the federal government work cooperatively to 
conduct investigations and litigate cases. In others, the federal government is already 
addressing an issue when the SAGs become involved. This raises the question of just 
how frequently SAGs engage in multistate litigation in the absence of federal 
enforcement. 
The following section attempts to shed additional light on this question by again 
reviewing the cases in the original dataset of multistate litigation explored in Chapter 3. 
To sharpen the analysis, I present a typology of SAG multistate litigation that views each 
case as falling into one of four basic types of litigation describing the relationship the 
SAGs and federal enforcement authorities: "cooperative," "follow-on," "gap-filling," and 
"agency-challenging."  
                                                          
49
 Timothy Meyer, "Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the 
New Federalism," California Law Review 95 (2007), 909. 
50
 See, for example, David J. Morrow, "Transporting Lawsuits Across State Lines," New York Times, 
November 9, 1997. 
146 
 
c) A Typology of Multistate Litigation 
1. Cooperative Litigation 
In 1997, an official at the FTC described the relationship with state enforcers by 
noting, "the states have become our most valuable law enforcement partners. 
Sometimes we follow them on certain issues and then they follow us on others. Given 
our smaller resources, we all have to find ways to be more productive."51 This federal-
state partnership occurs across many areas of enforcement, with SAGs often working in 
conjunction with federal regulators to prosecute environmental, consumer protection, 
antitrust, and Medicaid fraud cases alike. This "cooperative litigation" occurs when the 
SAGs and federal enforcement agencies work together in their investigations and 
together achieve a resolution of the matter (usually a settlement). 
Quite commonly, cooperative litigation involves allegedly fraudulent activity 
affecting the treasuries of both the state and federal governments. State and federal 
enforcers prosecute nearly all Medicaid fraud litigation jointly, for example. Since 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program involving billions of dollars from both levels of 
government, allegedly fraudulent activity, whether by pharmaceutical companies, 
pharmacies, or individual medical practices, affects the costs of the program for both 
state and federal government. Federal-state litigation in this area includes the recent 
$2.3 billion settlement with Pfizer, following government allegations that the company 
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illegally promoted a number of their blockbuster drugs through off-label marketing 
campaigns and kickbacks to doctors.52 
In the broad area of consumer protection, SAGs often participate in various 
enforcement "sweeps" with the Federal Trade Commission and other federal agencies. 
These sweeps lead to hundreds of individual state lawsuits as well as some larger 
multistate cases. In May of 2009, for example, 34 states joined with the FTC in 
announcing "Operation False Charity," "a broad effort to stamp out fraudulent 
charitable solicitations nationwide."53 This campaign led to several joint state-federal 
enforcement efforts, including a multistate settlement with Community Support, Inc. 
regulating its allegedly deceptive telemarketing practices.54 A previous enforcement 
campaign resulted in several multistate settlements with sweepstakes firms.55 These 
cooperative enforcement sweeps are quite common; my search revealed at least 27 
separate formal litigation campaigns jointly announced by SAGs and federal agencies 
over the past decade.56 
 Cooperative litigation also frequently occurs in antitrust and environmental 
cases. Since 1998, for example, the federal DOJ and the FTC have agreed to a written 
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protocol regarding the practices and procedures the agencies and SAGs follow to best 
prosecute antitrust merger review cases in a cooperative fashion.57 In such cases, SAGs 
often focus on one aspect of the case – such as how specific divestitures would best 
increase competition – while federal enforcers examine other aspects.58 The EPA also 
works cooperatively with SAGs on numerous issues of environmental enforcement. 
While much of this cooperation is concentrated in single states, multistate groups 
occasionally work towards resolutions of issues along with the EPA, such as a 10-state 
settlement with  Cargill in 2005 requiring the company to install new air pollution 
technology in its corn processing plants.59 
2. Follow-on Litigation 
Not all cases where federal agencies actively enforce a matter involve close 
cooperation between those agencies and the SAGs. In some cases, federal authorities 
are already investigating a matter or have settled a case with a defendant, but SAGs 
litigate independently of federal enforcers. In this "follow on" litigation, SAGs reach their 
own resolution of cases related to parallel federal cases. 
The most well known example of this follow-on litigation was the massive 
Microsoft antitrust litigation beginning in the 1990s. In that case, both the federal 
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government and several states jointly sued Microsoft alleging that the software giant 
was abusing its monopoly position in its sales of Windows and Internet Explorer. In late 
2001, the DOJ and a few of the SAGs involved settled the case,60 but a group of nine 
other SAGs disagreed with the settlement and remained as litigants, seeking stricter 
controls on Microsoft’s practices.61 
While the dissident SAGs' litigation in Microsoft was ultimately unsuccessful, 
follow-on litigation occurs in a number of other areas resulting in regulatory settlements 
that go beyond requirements in earlier federal settlements. One such follow-on 
settlement involved litigation against an internet directory firm involving deceptive 
advertising claims. The allegations related to the company’s sending out "activation 
checks" that would automatically enroll the depositors in an internet service. The FTC 
had reached an earlier settlement with the company requiring some language changes 
on the check solicitation, but the SAGs continued litigating, successfully reaching a 
settlement requiring that the company stop marketing these activation checks 
altogether.62 Another settlement with Bridgestone-Firestone addressing defective tires 
went beyond the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s recall efforts to 
require the company to provide customers detailed safety information at the time of 
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purchase, among other requirements.63 
As was the case with the Microsoft litigation, the follow-on efforts by the SAGs 
sometimes involve a contentious relationship with federal enforcers. Often this occurs 
when federal agencies alter their enforcement posture, as when the Bush 
Administration inherited the Clinton Administration’s case in Microsoft. However, 
tension can arise even with federal enforcers with whom SAGs otherwise generally have 
cooperative relationships. Officials within the Clinton Administration's EPA, for example, 
reported feeling "blindsided" by the SAGs’ filing suit against several power plants for 
Clean Air Act violations in 1999.64 
 In other follow-on cases, the states may get involved in enforcement efforts 
because they seek different remedies than their federal counterparts. As noted earlier, 
SAGs have broader ability to seek customer restitution in antitrust cases than federal 
enforcers do, and as such several of their suits seek these additional remedies even 
when the DOJ or FTC has settled a case.65 Federal regulators tolerate or even encourage 
some of these follow-on suits. 
3. Gap-Filling Litigation 
As noted earlier in this chapter, SAGs often view themselves as acting to protect 
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consumers or the environment when the federal government is unable or unwilling to 
do so. Unlike with cooperative or follow-on litigation in which the federal government is 
active, "gap-filling litigation" occurs when federal agencies either have not acted at all 
on a specific issue or have concluded that no action is necessary, but SAGs nevertheless 
forge ahead and litigate.  
SAGs placed several of their early multistate litigation campaigns within the 
context of the alleged inaction of the Reagan Administration's FTC, as the agency took a 
decidedly different philosophical approach to regulation during this period. Shortly after 
the Reagan Administration took office, for example, the DOJ terminated a major and 
long-running antitrust suit against IBM, which many characterized as foreshadowing a 
"laissez-faire" attitude towards regulatory enforcement.66 The Reagan Administration 
introduced the ideas of the so-called "Chicago-school" approach to regulation through 
key agency appointments, such as William Baxter to head the DOJ’s antitrust division 
and James Miller to lead the FTC.67 Miller sought a hands-off approach to advertising 
regulation, and oversaw a significant reduction in FTC resources reserved for 
investigating and prosecuting advertising cases.68 Other agencies saw a similar market-
oriented shift in enforcement priorities. The newly created Consumer Product Safety 
Commission saw major cuts in agency resources and emphasized voluntary controls 
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rather than mandatory regulation,69 and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration shifted to a more pro-automaker regulatory stance.70  
The shift in enforcement priorities on the federal level provided SAGs a foil for 
their own increased litigation activity. Through NAAG, the SAGs adopted new antitrust 
guidelines in 1985 and 1987, necessary, the SAGs explained, "as a result of the U.S. 
Justice Department’s retreat from vigorous prosecution…"71 As noted above, several 
SAGs were able to act as quasi-federal regulators in the realm of nutritional advertising, 
creating new marketing standards in areas that the federal government had declined to 
identify as a regulatory priority. As a member of the Florida Attorney General’s office 
remarked following a multistate nutritional labeling settlement with Nabisco, "we felt 
that the federal government was not being as aggressive as it should be…*and+ decided 
that rather than each state addressing the issue individually, it would be better if states 
could band together and share resources and the workload." Supporters of this gap-
filling litigation concerning nutritional marketing claims pointed to a consumer group’s 
study that found that "despite promises of more vigorous enforcement, the Federal 
Trade Commission lags far behind state authorities in both pursuing and penalizing false 
advertisers."72 
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 The anti-regulatory attitude prominent during the Reagan Administration waned 
in the subsequent Bush White House, and by the time of the Clinton Administration, 
several federal enforcement agencies saw significant increases in resources and shifts to 
more pro-regulatory stances.73  The shift to a more activist enforcement approach taken 
by the Clinton Administration may help partly explain the otherwise puzzling decrease in 
the SAGs’ multistate litigation in 1993 and 1994,74 but gap-filling litigation during the 
1990s was hardly unknown. The largest and most obvious example was the SAGs’ 
tobacco litigation, which began and concluded entirely during President Clinton’s 
tenure. SAGs also entered into a number of other regulatory settlements involving 
allegedly deceptive advertising left alone by federal authorities.75 
 More recently under the second Bush Administration, SAGs have prosecuted 
prominent gap-filling lawsuits in a variety of areas, including lawsuits targeting 
insurance firms' use of contingent commissions, suits against companies polluting across 
state lines, and investigations of alleged predatory lending practices. As was the case 
during the Reagan and first Bush Administrations, strong rhetoric from the lead SAGs 
accompanied many of these suits suggesting that the Administration was failing to 
address important problems. 
While frequently involving tension, not all "gap-filling" litigation involves an 
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explicitly adversarial relationship with federal enforcers. Some of these suits involve 
cases where a smaller group of SAGs deal with a problem before the federal agency 
addresses it, and in some such cases Congress or agencies take a stronger regulatory 
position following the SAGs’ litigation. The Clinton Administration’s DOJ sued several 
tobacco manufacturers in 1999 following the Master Settlement Agreement a year 
earlier, for example.76 Likewise, the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 codified 
several aspects of the code of conduct in the student loan industry developed in a 
number of single- and multistate SAG settlements led by New York Attorney General 
Andrew Cuomo.77 Whether adversarial in nature or followed up by federal government 
actions, however, "gap-filling litigation" includes those settlements reached in the 
absence of a parallel federal enforcement action. 
4. Agency-Challenging Litigation 
Finally, a fourth type of regulatory litigation by SAGs involves litigation against 
the federal regulatory agencies themselves. This "agency-challenging" litigation comes 
in two basic forms. First, SAGs bring litigation with the aim of forcing agencies to 
regulate under federal law. Some have referred to this type of litigation as "agency-
forcing" litigation,78 and I adopt that terminology here. A second form of agency-
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challenging litigation involves SAGs aiming to limit the scope of new agency regulations 
or the agency’s ability to promulgate regulations, which I call "agency-preventing" 
litigation. 
The EPA is a frequent target of this agency-challenging litigation, particularly 
concerning the federal government’s enforcement (or lack thereof) of the Clean Air Act. 
The litigation leading to the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal Massachusetts v. EPA decision 
in 2007, which accepted several SAGs’ challenge to the EPA’s refusal to regulate carbon 
dioxide as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act, is a prominent example of agency-forcing 
litigation. SAG-led multistate lawsuits challenging the EPA’s proposed rulemaking 
concerning states’ compliance with the Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards are common examples of agency-preventing litigation. Chapters 5 through 7 
will focus on agency-challenging litigation involving climate change policy, and I will note 
more of these issues in those chapters. 
While much of the agency-challenging litigation involves the EPA, other federal 
agencies can also be targets of SAG-led suits. In 2006, for example, several states and 
the Department of Energy reached a settlement in a lawsuit seeking to compel the DOE 
to update energy efficiency standards for a wide range of consumer products, including 
air conditioners and washing machines.79 The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration was also the target of a recent agency-forcing suit concerning the 
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agency’s regulations on fuel economy standards for light trucks.80 More recently, a 
multistate group of SAGs have initiated a major agency-preventing lawsuit against 
several agencies challenging the constitutionality of the Obama Administration’s health 
care law.81 
The health care suit notwithstanding, nearly all of the agency-challenging cases 
in this study involve environmental policy, as SAGs rarely if ever bring multistate 
lawsuits against federal agencies concerning consumer protection, antitrust, or 
Medicaid fraud issues. While outside the scope of this study, however, I would note that 
other forms of multistate activity targeting federal agencies are quite common. SAGs 
frequently submit amicus briefs to bolster private or single-SAG plaintiffs in other cases 
brought against federal agencies, which often occurs in the context of a federal agency’s 
claim that its regulations preempt conflicting state law. SAGs, often as part of multistate 
groups, also frequently provide comments on proposed rules across many policy areas 
as well. 
5. A Typology of Federal/State Enforcement 
The preceding four categories of multistate SAG litigation may be placed in the 
simple typology below (Table 4.7). The rows indicate whether the federal enforcement 
takes an active enforcement posture concerning the defendants and issues involved in a 
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multistate case.  The columns indicate the federal government’s specific involvement in 
the resolution of any given multistate case. If the federal government participates in a 
case either as fellow plaintiff or as a defendant in a specific case, for instance, it falls in 
the first column. The three shaded cells indicate case types that are brought against 
private parties (such as corporations), while the non-shaded cells indicates cases 
brought against public entities (chiefly federal agencies). 
TABLE 4.7: A TYPOLOGY OF FEDERAL/STATE ENFORCEMENT 
 
Federal Government Directly 
Involved in SAG Litigation 
Federal Government Not 
Directly Involved in SAG 
Litigation 
Federal Government Takes 
an Active Enforcement 
Posture 
Cooperative Litigation 
Follow-On Litigation 
Agency-Preventing Litigation 
Federal Government Takes 
No Active Enforcement 
Posture 
Agency-Forcing Litigation Gap-Filling Litigation 
THE TYPOLOGY APPLIED TO THE MULTISTATE LITIGATION DATASET 
a) Prevalence of Litigation Types 
To determine the prominence of each of the types of litigation above, I coded 
each of the 511 cases in the multistate dataset on the basis of whether the litigation was 
"cooperative," "follow-on," gap-filling," or "agency-challenging."82 Figure 4.3 displays the 
frequency of each of the four types of SAG litigation across the thirty years of the 
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dataset. 
FIGURE 4.3: FREQUENCY OF CASE TYPES IN SAG MULTISTATE LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
 
 
Figure 4.3 indicates that multistate litigation occurs slightly less frequently in the 
absence of government enforcement concerning the specific issues in a case as it does 
when federal enforcers are conducting litigation cooperatively or parallel to the SAGs. 
Specifically, slightly over 27% of the cases were "cooperative," with an additional 23% of 
the cases coded as "follow-on" suits. The largest single litigation type was "gap-filling" 
litigation, which constituted slightly over 40% of the 511 cases in the dataset. Finally, 
nearly 10% represented agency-challenging cases brought against the federal 
government, with agency-forcing litigation slightly more common than agency-
preventing litigation. Of the four main policy areas, the one featuring the most 
cooperative federal-SAG relationship was in the area of Medicaid fraud, where nearly all 
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the investigations and settlements involved federal-state enforcement partnerships. 
Consumer protection featured the fewest cooperative suits, as most are either gap-
filling (60%) or follow-on (30%) suits. A large number of antitrust cases were gap-filling 
(35%) or follow-on suits (25%) as well. 
On the one hand, this suggests that SAGs are not always butting heads with the 
federal government when they conduct multistate litigation. A significant portion of the 
cases involved cooperative litigation, and some of the follow-on cases involved at least 
initial cooperation as well. Nevertheless, almost half the cases involved SAG litigation 
conducted either in the absence of or directly contrary to the federal government.  
b) State Attorneys General and the Federal Government 
1. Introduction 
That SAGs so frequently bring multistate regulatory litigation in the absence of 
parallel federal suits would seem to present some tension with the findings at the 
beginning of this chapter. Many of the industries targeted by SAG litigation listed in 
Table 4.1 earlier are some of the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy already, 
such as pharmaceutical companies and the finance sector. National marketing and 
advertising, the top activity targeted by multistate suits, may be "the most regulated 
industry" of all.83 One might expect instead that if SAGs are frequently engaged in "gap-
filling" multistate litigation, they would be chiefly targeting lightly regulated industries 
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or activities of a purely local (or limited regional) nature with too minor of a national 
impact for federal agencies to bother bringing enforcement actions. 
 As this chapter has indicated, however, many of the areas where SAGs are 
involved are in fact highly regulated already by federal authorities and the activities are 
national in scope. Further, the initial rise in multistate litigation occurred during the 
latter half of the Clinton era, at a time when federal agencies were considerably more 
active and pro-regulation. In 1997, for example, the FTC brought more new consumer 
fraud cases than at any time in its previous 83 years of operation.84 Yet that period also 
witnessed a sharp increase in SAG multistate litigation efforts conducted independently 
of federal government actions, including the tobacco litigation, many deceptive 
advertising campaigns, numerous major antitrust cases, and many others. 
What this suggests is that litigating SAGs are quite willing to pursue multistate 
cases not so much to step in to solve problems left completely unaddressed at the 
federal level, but rather because their view of the current level of federal regulation is 
inadequate. This distinction is important when we again consider one of the main 
justifications for the theory "polyphonic federalism" discussed in Chapter 2. In the 
polyphonic conception, state governments can "step in where the federal government 
has failed to act"85 or to overcome "regulatory inertia."86 Even with "gap filling" and 
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"agency-challenging" multistate litigation, however, it is rarely the case that the 
targeted activities fall outside of the federal government's purview altogether. In most 
cases, the targets are already highly regulated.87 It would therefore be inaccurate to 
characterize SAGs as stepping in where the federal government has failed to act, when 
in fact SAGs so frequently target precisely those areas where the federal government 
regulates heavily. Instead, the key concern is that the federal government is regulating 
certain activities improperly, contrary to the ideal (and usually stricter) level of 
regulation envisioned by the multistate litigators. Chapters 5 through 10 will examine 
this dynamic in detail in the context of air pollution and pharmaceutical litigation. 
2. The Importance of State Law 
SAGs have a significant tool with which to counter federal regulatory decisions – 
namely, state law. As noted above, the SAGs’ "gap-filling" litigation occurs most 
prominently in the area of consumer protection. A large reason for this is that many of 
these cases rely upon state consumer law, as opposed to federal enactments. In many 
of these consumer cases (and in some other policy areas), the underlying state laws 
impose stricter compliance standards on businesses than does federal law. This suggests 
again that states are often not filling a regulatory role ignored by federal agencies, but 
rather that they do not share assumptions about the proper level of regulation. 
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The sharp rise in the use of state consumer statutes in multistate litigation 
actually arose from a policy failure. In the mid- to late-1980s, just when SAGs were 
beginning to realize the potential power of multistate litigation, NAAG lobbied Congress 
to allow states the power to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and FTC 
rules and orders with respect to unfair and deceptive trade practices. This would have 
allowed SAGs to prosecute alleged consumer protection violations in a single action in 
federal court.88 However, partly due to fears that this would lead to "balkanization," 
where disparate regulations among the states would impose serious burdens on 
multistate business activities, Congress never adopted this proposed amendment to the 
FTCA.89 
In response, the states came up with their own solution to coordination in 
consumer cases, working through NAAG to coordinate consumer protection 
investigations and litigation based upon the many state consumer protection statutes 
(often dubbed "mini-FTC acts") existing in the states,90 a pattern that continues today. 
While similar to the federal FTCA in many ways, these state consumer protection 
statues often provide different – and stricter – regulatory standards than those found in 
the FTCA. Advertising that may be "deceptive" under strict state laws, for example, may 
only rise merely to the level of exaggeration and puffery not warranting enforcement 
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action under federal law. 
The many differences in state and federal consumer protection laws were the 
focus of an interesting empirical study in 2009 by Northwestern University’s Searle 
Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth. The researchers found that state 
consumer statutes allow enforcers to pursue different types of claims, including many 
that do not involve conduct that would be illegal under FTC standards for consumer 
protection.91 In order to simulate FTC decision-making, the Searle study surveyed a 
group of five individuals with substantial expertise in consumer protection issues, 
derived from experience working either in the FTC or as a practitioner. This "Shadow 
Commission" examined summaries of actual state consumer protection case decisions 
and determined whether the underlying practices would prompt FTC action. The 
Shadow Commission found that most cases did not meet FTC illegality standards, and 
that the FTC would likely enforce even fewer cases.92 
 Numerous real-life examples of this abound. One telling example involved an 
early challenge to an advertisement promoting the popular Planters’ Life Savers Fruit 
Juicers candies. The ad observed that the glass would spill if you tried to take it with 
you, but that Life Savers candies would not. A group of nine states claimed that the 
premise of this ad was misleading because it implied that a Life Saver has all the real 
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fruit juice of an eight ounce glass of orange juice, when in fact it contained only 10% real 
fruit juice.93 The FTC did not challenge the ad, presumably on the basis that this 
marketing would not deceive consumers, but Planters entered into a settlement in 
which they agreed to end the national advertising campaign. More recent consumer 
cases brought based upon more expansive state consumer statutes, rather than federal 
law, include the multistate challenge to Blockbuster’s "End of Late Fees" campaign94 
noted earlier, a consumer protection challenge to Pfizer's off-label marketing of its 
Bextra pain medication,95 and numerous others. Chapter 9 demonstrates the SAGs' use 
of state law to achieve stricter national regulation in the context of pharmaceutical 
litigation. 
 As far as the SAGs are concerned, the advantage of using state consumer 
protection statutes is clear. State statutes often have broad, vague general deceptive-
trade practices language allowing a great deal of legal flexibility.96 Further, the legal 
limits of many of these state statutes have not been tested in court, and defendants 
targeted in multistate suits are loath to spend the resources necessary to become that 
test case. The lines of coordination built through NAAG, in essence, have replaced the 
failure to allow SAGs to sue in a single action in federal court. In fact, threatening to sue 
independently in state courts and then working as a group to reach settlements is, in 
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many ways, an even more effective strategy to reach out-of-court resolutions of cases 
than the single federal court suits could have been. 
 Though the prevalence of strict mini-FTC acts is surely a large reason why so 
much "gap-filling" litigation occurs in consumer protection law, the stricter state statute 
phenomenon also occurs within the context of other policy areas. Developments in 
state antitrust law, for example, have also empowered the SAGs. Following a Supreme 
Court ruling limiting the practical application of federal antitrust laws,97 for example, 
many states enacted amendments to their antitrust statutes granting SAGs more 
enforcement authority and jurisdiction as a matter of state law.98 
The upshot of all of this is that the combination of state legal standards and 
nationally enforced settlements gives SAGs a prominent avenue for "gap-filling" 
litigation that is less about the refusal or inability for federal enforcers to regulate than 
about the imposition of different regulatory standards. Thus, even in cases where AGs 
are "enforcing the law" rather than making law, it is important to consider the statutes 
at issue in the case. If enforcement of state law results in a settlement that applies 
nationally, this may be "enforcing" the law on one (state) level but simultaneously 
creating new law on the other (national) level. 
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3. Federal Empowerment of the State AGs 
On the basis of the forgoing, it is probably fair to say that the suggestion that the 
"polyphonic federalism" of SAG litigation works to fill an "enforcement gap" left open by 
federal enforcers is overstated, or at least subject to qualification. SAGs frequently 
target industries and activities that are already highly regulated, such as pharmaceutical 
firms and national advertising. They have proven themselves willing to jump into new 
areas even in the face of growing willingness and capability to address the issues on the 
federal level. Moreover, they often do so by essentially enforcing state laws nationally – 
in other words, not filling "gaps" left open by the federal government as much as 
ramping up existing regulation through the extraterritorial use of state law. 
A reasonable conclusion one could draw from this is that SAGs are co-opting 
powers of the federal government, resulting in a form of "reverse preemption" where 
the SAGs’ preferred level of regulation trumps that of the federal authorities.99 There is, 
however, another crucial aspect to this story that complicates this interpretation. Rather 
than viewing activist SAGs as regulatory usurpers, federal lawmakers have historically 
tolerated, and even explicitly encouraged, much of the states' activism – even when it 
involves national issues and treads upon federal agency jurisdiction. Years of 
cooperation, funding, and legal changes benefiting the SAGs have empowered them to 
pursue the very multistate litigation that often conflicts with federal enforcement 
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efforts. 
For one, federal enforcement authorities have long cooperated with SAGs in 
ways that have enhanced the SAGs' enforcement abilities, even during the somewhat 
contentious Reagan era. While true that SAGs disagreed with the overall regulatory 
approach of the Reagan Administration, there were numerous attempts to improve 
enforcement cooperation throughout the 1980s.100 Indeed, when tensions between 
state and federal enforcement have occurred on matters of national importance, the 
general response has been to increase enforcement capabilities through cooperation, 
rather than attempt to preempt or displace the states. Through these avenues of 
cooperation, federal agencies serve to bolster SAG capacity. For example, since 1989 
federal and state authorities have promoted antitrust enforcement collaboration 
through the Executive Working Group for Antitrust. While one of the group's main 
purposes is to avoid duplication of enforcement, federal agencies bolster state 
enforcement by providing economists and additional attorneys to the states through the 
group, as well as share information and legal documents otherwise costly to the 
states.101 The FTC has also set up databases of consumer complaints that they have 
made available to the SAGs, offering them another "free" source of information on 
which to rely for potential litigation. Indeed, this FTC database sometimes results in 
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litigation pursued by the SAGs independently of federal enforcers.102 
Most importantly, in addition to these cooperative enforcement efforts, the 
federal government also encourages SAG litigation through federal legislation and 
subsidization of SAG activity. Federal funding has long prompted the SAGs to move into 
new fields,103 as with the enactment of the State Antitrust Grant Program in 1976 in 
which Congress appropriated $25 million to bolster state antitrust enforcement. This 
money granted the states the ability to more than double the number of antitrust 
litigators on their staffs104 and represented "the most important shot in the arm that 
state antitrust enforcement has ever received."105 The substantial funding provided to 
the states to establish Medicaid Fraud Control Units, overseen by the SAG's office in the 
overwhelming majority of states, provided additional impetus for the substantial 
increase in multistate investigations of the health care sector in recent years.106 That 
federal funding might have this effect is not surprising, particularly considering the 
strong correlation between the size of a SAG's office and the propensity of SAGs to 
participate and lead multistate litigation.107 
In addition to building SAG capacity directly through subsidization and increased 
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resource sharing, several changes over time in federal law itself encouraged more 
activity. Early legal procedural changes, including the critical 1966 amendments to Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, set the groundwork for future SAG activism 
by allowing states to sue in class action on behalf of themselves and consumers.108 The 
enactment of the federal Multidistrict Litigation Statute also assisted SAGs "to join in 
common cause and pool their resources...[making] it possible for them to more 
effectively conduct the often voluminous, far-flung, tedious, and very necessary, pretrial 
discovery programs that are usual" in multistate cases.109 
In addition to these broad litigation statutes (which also gave birth to modern 
private class-action litigation), Congress has frequently specifically authorized SAG 
activity in specific enforcement areas. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976, for example, authorized SAGs to sue in federal court based on alleged 
antitrust violations, codifying and extending previous court rulings holding that states 
were "persons" under the Clayton Act.110 Under the law, SAGs could now recover 
damages on behalf of the consumers of their state allegedly caused by a civil violation of 
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federal antitrust law.111 Crucially, the change allowed SAGs to recover treble damages 
for violations established under this statute, granting the states more incentive to 
pursue these actions. 
Since the 1970s, Congress has been even more apt to recognize and encourage 
the SAGs' role in federal law. As Joseph Zimmerman noted in 1998, "increasingly, 
attorneys general have been authorized by the Congress to exercise concurrent 
enforcement authority with federal departments and agencies in regulatory fields long 
considered to be exclusive provinces of the national government."112 This includes 
legislation such as the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Junk Fax Prevention Act 
of 2005, both of which specifically allowed SAGs to sue in federal court for several 
consumer protection violations under the statutes.113 More recently, the Consumer 
Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA) explicitly authorizes SAGs to bring 
actions in federal court on behalf of residents of their states for injunctive relief to 
enforce certain Consumer Product Safety Commission rules and orders.114 As one former 
SAG wrote, "in granting enforcement powers to the state attorneys general under the 
CPSIA, Congress has effectively put the state attorneys general on par with the CPSC 
regarding the injunction of the sale of consumer products exhibiting a substantial 
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product hazard."115 The recently enacted financial reform bill (the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) creates a host of new consumer protection 
regulations, including several enforceable by state attorneys general. Under the new 
legislation, the SAGs will also be able to team with the newly created Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau to enforce these new consumer protections, thereby 
encouraging further capacity-building cooperation for the SAGs.116 
Interestingly, Congress sometimes expands the authority and powers of the 
SAGs even when the central theme of the underlying legislation is to limit litigation. 
When President Bush signed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) into law in 2005, the 
purpose was to target a number of abuses that allegedly "harmed class members with 
legitimate claims," and "undermined public respect for our judicial system."117 The act 
would curb this "abusive" private litigation in a number of ways, including discouraging 
forum shopping on the part of plaintiff attorneys by forcing more class action litigation 
into federal court and curtailing "coupon settlements" in which private class counsel are 
awarded significant fees but consumers receive only coupons of limited value. According 
to the Act’s supporters, these changes would have a positive impact on society by 
"encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices."118 
Whether the act has had this intended effect on private class action litigation is 
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open for empirical debate. What is clear, however, is that CAFA did not curtail, and in 
fact even bolstered, the ability of state attorneys general to engage in multistate 
litigation. While an amendment explicitly exempting SAGs from the "class action" 
requirements of the bill was defeated, it was clear that the bill’s drafters did not intend 
to reduce SAGs' powers in any way.119 Further, a key portion of the act serves to build 
SAG capacity in a potentially important way. Before private class-action counsel can 
settle a case, they must notify "the appropriate state or federal officials to allow them to 
evaluate the fairness to all class members of a proposed class action settlement," which 
includes providing these "appropriate state officials" copies of the complaint, all 
materials filed with the complaint, and the settlement documents themselves.120 In this 
context, the "appropriate state officials" almost always refers to the state attorneys 
general. Through these new requirements, SAGs have additional ability to comment on 
proposed class actions and, most importantly, gain "easy access to information that may 
be used to launch an independent investigation into the defendants for consumer 
protection, fraud, Medicaid, criminal, antitrust, or other violations."121 Indeed, this single 
provision was the main reason why many SAGs came around to support CAFA in 
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Congress.122 
4. Conclusion 
 The foregoing suggests that SAGs do in fact trod heavily on territory already 
regulated by the federal government, albeit with a different vision of the proper level of 
regulation. The federal government nevertheless typically empowers the states rather 
than reins them in. Congress does not always acquiesce in expanding the jurisdiction of 
SAGs, as with the previously noted failure of NAAG to convince Congress to amend 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to allow SAGs to bring general consumer 
protection lawsuits in federal court. However, with few exceptions – one of them 
involving litigation against firearm manufacturers discussed in Chapter 11 – Congress 
rarely preempts SAG enforcement efforts. Indeed, Congress encourages such activity by 
providing them many additional legal and financial tools to pursue multistate litigation. 
 While the SAGs often encroach upon federal regulatory turf through multistate 
litigation based upon state law – thereby projecting the regulatory standards of a few 
states across the entire country – the federal government's role in fostering SAG 
activism ought to qualify the interpretation of SAGs as illegally usurping the proper role 
of the federal government.  Critics who argue that SAGs have overstepped their 
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authority through bypassing constraints on their power123 should note that whatever the 
merits or demerits of the rise of SAG multistate litigation in recent years, it has been the 
federal government itself that helped set the framework for this state-based activism. 
This does not imply that Congress or federal agencies necessarily approve of every 
individual SAG investigation and prosecution, particularly when the federal government 
itself is a target in agency-challenging litigation. However, what is clear is that SAGs have 
been empowered by the capacity-building actions granted to them by Congress and 
federal agencies to forge together their own national solutions with, on top of, and 
often beyond the regulatory schemes envisioned by federal regulators. 
c) The Horizontal Aspect of American Federalism 
The case studies in the following chapters will explore some of the dynamics 
between the SAGs and the federal government in more detail, but before moving on, I 
should note one further aspect of federalism involved in these lawsuits. As scholars of 
federalism are aware, federalism does not just encompass the familiar federal-state 
relationship, but also implicates "horizontal" relationships among the sister states. 
In addition to generating conflicts between the states and the federal 
government, multistate litigation may involve conflicts between the states. One of the 
ways this might occur is if SAGs bring lawsuits promoting the interests of in-state 
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individuals and businesses at the expense of out-of-state actors, a phenomenon 
suggested by a number of scholars in the context of private class-action litigation.124 A 
private class action brought in Louisiana state court against a New York-based 
corporation, for example, might be more likely to succeed given that the potential 
benefits of the suit (including monetary payouts) would be concentrated in-state, while 
the potential costs (such as job layoffs resulting from legal liability) are concentrated 
out-of-state.   
Similarly, this dynamic may appear in SAG multistate litigation. Is it the case, for 
example, that multistate litigation grants an incentive for SAGs to obtain a "free lunch" 
by accruing political benefits from voters while shifting the costs away from those 
voters? One way of addressing the question is by examining the extent to which SAGs 
are willing to participate in and lead multistate cases when an in-state business is the 
target of the investigation. One might expect that SAGs, as elected officials, would be 
more willing to target out-of-state businesses and reluctant to investigate the in-state 
businesses that provide employment and tax revenue to the residents of her state.  
Indeed, in certain prominent cases this dynamic appears to hold. Former 
Washington State SAG Christine Gregoire famously refused to join the multistate 
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antitrust suit against Washington State-based Microsoft because she saw "no evidence 
of harm" either to Washington consumers or to the general economy of the state.125 
Her decision raised suspicions that the real reason was that she did not want to 
prosecute the state's largest employer. Chapters 5 and 6 will note that many of the 
multistate air pollution lawsuits involve northeastern SAGs targeting businesses based in 
the industrial Midwest, which can have the effect of concentrating the benefits of air 
pollution reductions in these northeastern states while transferring the costs (such a job 
layoffs) out-of-state. 
In certain cases, then, it appears that SAGs may be more willing to target out-of-
state businesses as opposed to in-state businesses. To what extent, however, does this 
dynamic hold across the entire range of multistate cases? To help address this question, 
I identified the state headquarters for each of the targeted defendants at the time the 
cases concluded.126 Relying upon the multistate dataset, Figure 4.3 displays the 
percentage of cases in which SAGs prosecuted an in-state business, as either a lead state 
in the investigation or a non-leading participating state. 
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FIGURE 4.4: PERCENTAGE OF CASES INVOLVING SAGS TAKING  
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST IN-STATE DEFENDANTS (1980-2009) 
 
 
 Figure 4.4 indicates that a little over 60% of the cases overall involved a 
participating SAG prosecuting an in-state business. It also shows that states are not 
particularly likely to lead cases (about 25%) against companies in headquartered in their 
state. There is some variation based upon the type of case; SAGs are quite likely to 
participate in cases involving in-state businesses in Medicaid fraud prosecutions, while 
they are considerably less likely to target in-state businesses in environmental 
litigation.127 
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 On the one hand, Figure 4.4 seems to suggest that SAGs are quite likely in most 
types of cases to join litigation against home-state businesses. This is true, after all, for 
the majority of each type of case except environmental litigation. There are a few 
reasons why this might be so. For one, it may be that the political benefit of joining a 
settlement is strong enough that it overrides potential negatives accruing in the SAG's 
state.128 In the tobacco litigation, for example, a decision by one or two tobacco-state 
SAGs to refuse participation in the Master Settlement Agreement would have no effect 
on whether the settlement would occur – it would proceed with or without them – but 
it would prevent those SAGs from collecting the any large monetary benefits of the 
settlement. It may be reasonable for a SAG to believe that if a settlement is going to 
happen anyway, it may be good to at least have a seat at the negotiating table and 
recover some of the money. 
 Even so, it appears that concerns about negative economic impacts of targeting 
in-state businesses do play something of a role in SAGs' prosecutorial decisions. If the 
decision to litigate a case was based solely upon the magnitude of consumer harm, one 
might expect that the SAGs closest to the wrongdoer to participate in a higher 
percentage of the cases than they do. In particular, one might expect SAGs to take a 
leading role in more cases involving businesses within their state than they actually do, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
pollution. While the responsible regulator in such cases shifts from the SAGs themselves to the EPA, the 
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since the proximity of the alleged wrongdoer might grant them the most direct access to 
the defendant. This suggests that part of the dynamic of multistate litigation involves a 
subtle competition among the states to gain the most benefit from multistate 
enforcement efforts while avoiding direct costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between SAGs and the federal government is a complex one. On 
the one hand, SAGs are perfectly willing to use the federal government as a foil, 
claiming that they are acting only because the federal government has failed to do so. 
On the other hand, despite the sometimes heated rhetoric, there is very much a 
symbiotic relationship between SAGs and the federal government. Many cases feature 
cooperation between SAGs and federal enforcement authorities, and it appears that this 
cooperation has increased over time. Further, even as the SAGs increasingly appear to 
encroach upon federal regulatory turf, the federal government's general approach vis-à-
vis the SAGs has been to empower them through favorable legislative enactments and 
capacity-building measures such as direct funding for enforcement and information-
sharing among state and federal authorities. 
This and the previous chapter have provided an overview of SAG multistate 
litigation by concentrating on the larger universe of multistate cases. The next several 
chapters move from this larger universe to more specific detail by examining a series of 
specific and varied cases. Chapter 5 through 7 examine SAG litigation addressing cross-
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state air pollution and climate change, which generate numerous regulatory disputes 
not only between the federal and state governments, but among the states themselves. 
Chapters 8 through 10 discuss multistate litigation against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, which as noted in this chapter has become a particularly strong 
multistate litigation growth area. Finally, Chapter 11 considers a litigation campaign that 
appeared to be a promising source of multistate litigation but instead fizzled – state 
litigation against firearm manufacturers. These three cases help further illustrate the 
relationship between the SAGs and the federal government, what impact it has on the 
regulatory environment in the United States, and what this all means for American 
politics. 
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Ever since the rise of "environmental consciousness" in the 1960s and the 
celebration of the first Earth Day in 1970, environmental issues have maintained a high-
profile role in American society. Hollywood blockbusters frequently dramatize the 
potential effects of pollution and climate change, and books from Rachel Carson's Silent 
Spring to Al Gore's Earth in the Balance have topped the New York Times best-seller 
lists. Even as environmental issues have played a strong cultural role in American society 
over the past several decades, they have played perhaps an even larger role in American 
regulatory politics. Few sectors of the economy are untouched by regulatory programs 
aimed at reducing pollution problems such as acid rain, smog, and greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
This Part II examines role state attorneys general have played in air pollution 
regulation. Since the 1980s, SAGs have challenged the federal government's 
performance on air pollution control in several multistate litigation campaigns, focusing 
first on acid rain and later on climate change. Over time, they have continued 
experimenting with a variety of legal strategies to address environmental issues. In 
addition to agency-challenging litigation, SAGs have built upon their successful sue-and-
settle litigation strategy largely developed in the 1990s – most prominently in the area 
of tobacco – to bring lawsuits against polluters directly. In the past decade alone, SAGs 
have emerged from sporadic involvement in air pollution issues to bringing dozens of 
multistate cases. The period since the 1980s indicates that these state actors are more 
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willing than ever take an active role in the development and implementation of air 
pollution policy. 
The SAGs' newfound role in air pollution politics has involved interplay between 
the federal and state governments quite different from how we typically conceptualize 
the relationship. This is not chiefly a story of the federal government encroaching upon 
state prerogatives by requiring state compliance with costly new federal mandates. 
Litigation involving these types of situations has occurred in the past and still occurs 
today, as when Virginia's SAG successfully challenged an EPA rule imposing vehicle 
emission standards on Virginia and several other northeastern states in 1997.1 By 
contrast, the litigation discussed in this Part II involves several SAGs' efforts to force the 
federal government to promulgate stronger environmental regulations on the states. 
Through their agency-forcing litigation in the areas of acid rain and climate change, 
several SAGs have challenged the government to produce strict new national 
regulations that would apply to all states.  
Before proceeding to the story in chapters 5 through 7, it is useful to provide a 
brief overview of the federal air pollution regime. At the heart of the regulatory regime 
is the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970. While dramatically expanding the federal 
government's role in air pollution control, the CAA of 1970 followed on the footsteps of 
previous federal air pollution control efforts by placing much of the responsibility for 
specific air pollution control to the states. The requirements placed on the states 
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created interstate conflicts, due to the trans-boundary nature of air pollution. At the 
same time, the CAA increased the role of litigation and the courts by considerably 
expanding the opportunities for judicial review of EPA regulations as well as non-federal 
enforcement of the air pollution regime. The first major amendment to the CAA in 1977 
inserted a number of additional statutory provisions meant to address the growing 
interstate conflict engendered by the federal regime by authorizing additional use of 
litigation. The twin emphases on litigation and state implementation in the original CAA, 
along with several of the key amendments Congress placed in the act in 1977, set the 
structural stage for the SAGs' eventual "regulation through litigation" in this area. 
The irony of this development is that the two prominent multistate litigation 
campaigns described in this Part II have both used a statute not well designed to deal 
with trans-boundary pollution to address complex global pollution issues not anticipated 
at the time of the CAA's passage. The CAA's basic structure established in 1970 reflected 
the original congressional assumption that pollution going up in the air of one state 
came down in the same state. It did little to address problems of trans-boundary 
pollution.2 Congress has struggled to amend the CAA to address emerging trans-
boundary problems since the time of its original enactment. In the absence of 
congressional action, SAGs have attempted to apply the existing CAA to these new 
                                                          
2
 Thomas W. Merrill, "Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution," Duke Law Journal 46 (1997): 932 
("Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in environmental law, 
and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution as a justification for that trend, little 
meaningful regulation of transboundary pollution actually exists.") 
185 
 
problems. This is despite the inadequacies contained within the statute's structure to 
tackle air pollution issues of the regional or even global scope of acid rain and climate 
change. 
I. THE FEDERAL AIR POLLUTION REGIME 
a) The Emerging Environmental Consciousness and the Road to the Clean Air Act 
of 1970 
Until about fifty years ago, what we now know as "environmental law" was 
largely confined to the state and local level, consisting largely of disparate policies 
concerning public health and sanitation during the period of rapid industrialization and 
urbanization at the turn of the twentieth century.3 With the growth of the post-World 
War II American economy, the issue of air pollution first appeared on the map as a 
national issue. Nevertheless, the federal government's first forays into the field were 
quite modest. The first significant legislation at the federal level came in 1955 with the 
enactment of the Air Pollution Control Act. This act provided only a very constrained 
role for the federal government, containing a program of research and technical 
assistance aimed at understanding the causes and effects of air pollution.4 While 
establishing this limited federal role, Congress made sure to declare that the Act's 
purpose was "to preserve and protect the primary responsibility and rights of the States 
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and local governments in controlling air pollution."5 This emphasis on state and local 
responsibility for air pollution was to form an important theme in later federal policies 
as well. 
The federal role in air pollution control changed little during the next few years. 
The next significant air pollution enactment, the Clean Air Act of 1963, potentially 
expanded this federal role, though it ultimately had little practical effect. This legislation 
required the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to provide certain 
scientific information to the states, which in turn would provide the technical basis for 
HEW to set mandatory air quality standards. The 1963 Act also provided new 
investigatory and enforcement tools involving both the HEW and the federal DOJ, but 
were of such limited use that these agencies never took effective enforcement actions 
under the act.6 
 By this time, however, environmental issues were gaining greater salience 
among the American public. According to one public opinion poll, the percentage of 
respondents viewing air pollution as a "very" or "somewhat serious" problem jumped 
from 28% in 1965 to 53% two years later.7 Simultaneously, several members of 
Congress, including Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, began pressing for a more active 
federal role in the area. These advocates achieved some success by the mid-1960s, 
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pushing Congress to expand the federal government’s still nascent role in air pollution 
control. A pair of congressional acts, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act Air of 
1965 and the Air Quality Act of 1967, authorized HEW to establish new air pollution 
standards. The Air Quality Act in particular intended to create a comprehensive federal-
state framework for air pollution control for the first time, with the states now required 
to adopt air quality standards subject to the approval of HEW.8 
Meanwhile, concern about environmental issues quickly went from a simmer to 
a rapid boil. By 1969, the New York Times could report, "rising concern about the 
environmental crisis is sweeping the nation's campuses with an intensity that may be on 
its way to eclipsing student discontent over the war in Vietnam."9 The first Earth Day 
celebrations on April 22, 1970 were a great success, involving millions of participants 
across the country.10 Entrepreneurial actors such as Ralph Nader pressured the federal 
government to shift from its largely voluntary and informational role in pollution control 
to something considerably stronger. New "public interest environmental law" 
organizations such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) joined older organizations such as the Sierra Club to 
push for new federal environmental policies through an expanded array of political 
strategies.11 
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While Congress was debating major shifts in the federal government's approach 
to air pollution control, several states were already taking action. Approximately one 
hundred air pollution control bills were introduced in the 1967 sessions of the state 
legislatures alone, a fact that did not escape the attention of industry groups.12 The 
president of the Automobile Manufacturers Association, testifying before the House 
Commerce Committee, noted that a "multiplicity of differing state standards would 
create chaotic conditions in this Nation's largest industry...Federal preemption is, in our 
opinion, necessary to prevent the development of differing or conflicting State 
standards."13 This concern became even more pronounced when then-Governor Ronald 
Reagan of California signed into law the Mulford-Carrell Act of 1967, which established 
the California Air Resources Board as the first statewide independent agency with the 
power to promulgate air quality standards.14 
b) The Clean Air Act of 1970 
1. The Basic Structure of the Clean Air Act of 1970 
By 1970, the federal government was facing enormous pressure to act on air 
pollution control. The increased salience of the issue among the public (and especially 
younger Americans), combined with industry concern about a "multiplicity of differing 
state standards," contributed to President Nixon's decision to endorse a significant 
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amendments to the federal air pollution control regime. In early 1970, the 
Administration added its own proposed legislation to the congressional mix, which 
already contained a number of proposals introduced by members of both parties.15 
Ultimately, Congress enacted and President Nixon signed into law a Clean Air Act that 
was considerably stricter than the original Nixon Administration proposal.16 The Act, 
which formally amended the CAA of 1963, passed by huge margins in both chambers, 
including 73-0 in the Senate and 374-1 in the House. 
The basic goal of the CAA is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s 
air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare…"17 While maintaining a 
strong role for states, the CAA established a much more active federal role in air 
pollution control. For the first time, federal government established a set of minimum 
uniform federal standards that replaced the system of largely ad hoc state-by-state 
standards existing at the time. Additionally, very shortly after the passage of the CAA, 
President Nixon created via an executive order a new Environmental Protection Agency 
as a separate, dedicated federal regulatory body to deal with environmental issues. 
The CAA set up several new pollution control mechanisms, one of the most 
important being the establishment of "national ambient air quality standards," or 
NAAQS. The CAA requires the EPA to identify and set standards for certain "criteria 
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pollutants" identified as harmful to human health. In the 1970 Act, this included six such 
criteria pollutants, including carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, 
particulate matter, and hydrocarbons.18 For each of these criteria pollutants, the EPA 
sets NAAQS levels aimed to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety (the 
"primary NAAQS") and to protect public welfare against known or anticipated adverse 
effects (the "secondary NAAQS").  
Once the EPA establishes NAAQS, every state must submit a state 
implementation plan ("SIP") to the EPA, explaining how the state will achieve the levels 
required by the NAAQS. A state's SIP consists of a complex set of regulations, programs 
and policies that allow states to have the primary enforcement authority to address air 
pollution, provided that the state standards are at least as strict as federal law.19 Any 
areas within a state that fail to meet NAAQS requirements are designated 
"nonattainment areas" subject to several special requirements.20  
The CAA applies to both stationary sources of air pollution (such as power plants 
and utilities) as well as to mobile sources (including automobiles), though the regulatory 
regimes covering both are different. State governments regulate pollution standards for 
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stationary sources through state-issued permits, while the federal government generally 
sets standards for mobile sources.21 This statutory structure became important in both 
areas of SAG multistate litigation, and is discussed when relevant throughout this Part II. 
2. The Role of the States in Air Pollution Control 
As did the earlier federal forays into air pollution control policy, the CAA of 1970 
stressed the primary importance of state and local governments in the implementation 
process. The Act's preamble stresses "that air pollution prevention...and air pollution 
control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments," while 
also making clear that "Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential for the 
development of cooperative [air pollution control programs]." This approach built upon 
previous federal law in this area, and was compatible with the rhetoric of the "New 
Federalism" of the Nixon era stressing the importance of granting localities "leeway for 
local option" and "local innovation, providing a variety of experimentation."22 
Of course, this legislative rhetoric should not obscure the fact that the CAA 
represented a major shift in power over air pollution control to the federal government. 
For the first time, the states were partially preempted by a new federal regulatory floor 
(the NAAQS) set by a major new federal bureaucracy (the EPA). Nevertheless, the CAA 
placed much responsibility on the states with its decision to focus on improvements in 
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the ambient air at the local level. This NAAQS approach meant that the federal 
government would set the air quality standards and the states would determine how to 
implement those standards through SIPs. Further, it placed the responsibility of granting 
permits to stationary sources to the states as well. Several of the air pollution control 
programs developed after the original enactment of the CAA maintained this focus on 
state implementation.23  
The CAA required states to submit their initial SIPs by 1972, a little over a year 
President Nixon signed the CAA into law.24 To help enforce these requirements, many 
states established new environmental bureaucracies, supported by rapid increases in 
funds earmarked for environmental protection purposes. By 1980, most states had 
developed far greater environmental expertise and regulatory capacity than they had 
before 1970,25 assisted to a large degree by a rapid increase in federal grants to states 
and municipalities to build regulatory capacity. 
The CAA contains very few express preemption clauses while containing several 
express savings clauses and anti-preemption clauses claiming to preserve state power.26 
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This was a blow to industry groups, which largely viewed federal regulation as a 
preferable alternative to a "multiplicity of differing state standards" so long as the 
federal law preempted state regulation. Still, there were a few areas in which federal 
standards preempted state standards, most notably in the area of federal motor vehicle 
standards.27 Even there, however, the CAA allows California to apply for a special waiver 
of this preemption clause to maintain a separate regulatory program "at least as 
protective of public health and welfare" as the federal requirements," a reflection of the 
leadership role the state played in setting up a vehicle emissions control regime prior to 
federal action.28 
3. The Role of Litigation in Air Pollution Control 
Just as the CAA carved out an important role for states, it likewise encouraged 
the use of litigation as an enforcement tool. Over the objection of industry groups and 
President Nixon, the CAA became the first federal environmental statute to contain a 
citizen suit provision.29 This provision, §304 of the CAA, allowed "any person" to enforce 
any emission standard or administrative order against polluters directly. This section 
also allowed suits against the EPA Administrator "where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty...which is not discretionary with the 
                                                          
27
 CAA §209; 42 U.S.C. §7543(a). 
28
 CAA 209(b); Rachel L. Chanin, "California's Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions," New York University Annual Survey of American Law 58 (2003): 699. 
29
 Reitze, Air Pollution Control Law, 599-600. 
194 
 
Administrator."30 In addition to this provision, the CAA also explicitly authorized 
challenges to EPA rules and regulations in §307.31  
Collectively, these provisions had the effect of significantly lowering the barrier 
for groups to bring environmental litigation. Pioneering private attorney Victor John 
Yannacone described the necessity of citizens suit provisions as a tool to "housebreak 
and toilet-train American industry,"32 while key legislators viewed the tool as a way to 
extend "the concept of public participation to the enforcement process."33 Despite this 
potential, use of the citizen suit provisions in the CAA was relatively infrequent in the 
first few years following the enactment of the act, even among the environmental 
interest groups that eventually became the most frequent "citizen" plaintiffs. This low 
level of activity was particularly true of enforcement actions taken directly against 
polluters,34 a fact that puzzled several federal enforcement authorities.35 
Nevertheless, litigation under the CAA played a key role in the development of 
certain critical programs that became staples in later amendments to the CAA. One of 
the most important was the development of the prevention of significant deterioration 
(PSD) program, which emerged following a pair of court cases in the early 1970s brought 
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against the EPA.36 Additionally, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the use of the CAA's 
citizen suit provisions became more frequent. Several of the private environmental 
interest groups emerging during this period became particularly involved in the use of 
litigation, a reflection in part of the increasing complexity of environmental law. Industry 
groups also used the judicial review sections of the CAA to challenge proposed EPA 
regulations. Senator Edmund Muskie noted the growing complexity of environmental 
politics when he noted, "no longer are citizens only advocates of beauty, purity, and 
cleanliness. Public witnesses now talk about parts per million, grams per mile, 
polychlorinated biphenyls, and advanced notices of proposed rulemaking. They are 
comfortable with professionals, scientists, engineers, and lawyers."37 
Public interest lawyers and industry groups were not the only entities able to sue 
under the CAA. While §§304 and 307 allowed greater litigation by "private attorneys 
general," it provided the hook for more activity by actual attorneys general as well. In 
particular, the CAA's emphasis on judicial review of administrative decisions allowed 
SAGs the opportunity to bring multistate lawsuits against the EPA. 
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4. The Early Role of SAGs in Air Pollution Litigation 
Even prior to the passage of the CAA, a few SAGs had become increasingly 
involved in environmental issues, reflecting the increased salience of such 
environmental issues building up to the CAA. At the same time that states built other 
statewide environmental bureaucracies in response to the new federal requirements, 
several SAGs created environmental divisions within their offices. Long-time Michigan 
SAG Frank Kelley became the first in May of 1972 to establish one of these offices, 
which he said would "take bold, imaginative, and vigorous action wherever and 
whenever necessary" and would be willing to "step on toes where necessary."38 Echoing 
the concerns about "regulatory capture" stated by many environmental interest groups, 
Kelley claimed that this division was needed in part because other state bureaucracies 
would not aggressively enforce environmental laws because of conflicts of interest.39 
Other SAGs likewise worked independently of the new state agencies in "aggressively 
pursuing" environmental issues.40  
As SAGs built up their environmental capabilities during this time, they became 
more active in proposing state environmental bills and in taking enforcement actions 
against businesses for violations of the state environmental statutes and under public 
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nuisance theories.41 The SAGs' main national organization, the National Association of 
Attorneys General, became more active by suggesting more of a role for SAGs in 
environmental enforcement,42 which dovetailed with the EPA's concern about what it 
saw as lack of environmental enforcement on the state level.43 
Still, with few exceptions,44 multistate litigation in the environmental area was 
rare in the early 1970s. Most SAGs took a passive role in environmental protection, 
serving a traditional role as advisor to the state agencies with primary administrative 
responsibility for environmental issues. SAGs conducted environmental litigation, as in 
other policy areas, mostly on a single, intrastate basis. Frequently this came in the 
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context of individual states objecting to EPA actions taken on their SIPs, such as when 
the Texas SAG challenged the EPA's disapproval of the state's SIP in 1974.45  
5. Interstate Conflicts in the Clean Air Regime 
As the requirements of the CAA kicked in throughout the 1970s, it became clear 
that interstate conflicts were fast becoming one of the most prominent problems in air 
pollution control. The problem arose because of the difficulty in cabining air pollution 
generated in one state easily within that state. Increasingly, states on the receiving end 
of pollution originating from other states claimed that this interstate pollution was 
making it difficult for them to meet their NAAQS requirements. This was a particular 
concern of states in the Northeast, which frequently complained that pollution sources 
chiefly in the Midwest were contributing to pollution that drifted into their states via 
the flow of the prevailing winds. However, only one provision of the CAA of 1970 – §110 
– specifically dealt with this problem of interstate pollution. This §110 required each SIP 
to contain "adequate provisions for intergovernmental cooperation" such that pollution 
from one state would not "interfere with the attainment or maintenance" of NAAQS in 
another state. This provision, however, proved entirely ineffective at dealing with the 
problem of interstate pollution.46 
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 In the first major addition to the CAA since 1970, Congress amended the statute 
in 1977 to, among other things, attempt to address the problem of interstate air 
pollution. In addition to amending §110, Congress added a new §126 requiring states to 
provide information to all nearby states concerning any existing or proposed sources 
that "may significantly contribute to levels of air pollution" in those nearby states. The 
section also allowed "any state" to petition the EPA Administrator for a finding that any 
sources emits or would emit any air pollution in violation of §110, giving the 
Administrator sixty days to either make such a finding or deny the state petition.47 If the 
Administrator makes such a finding, the statute provides for strong enforcement 
measures. Following the EPA's finding of a violation of §110, no new or modified 
pollution source could be built or operated under the violation of the interstate 
pollution requirements. Further, existing sources would be required to either cease 
operations within three months or submit to a schedule designed to ensure compliance 
with the interstate provisions of §110.48 
It was in this context of increasing conflict over interstate pollution and following 
the changes introduced in the 1977 CAA Amendments that the first wave of multistate 
environmental litigation began. I turn now to the SAGs' multistate litigation in the area 
of acid rain, which brought SAGs to the forefront of the litigation battles during the 
Reagan years. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The First Wave of Air Pollution Lawsuits:  
Litigating Acid Rain 
 
''What is necessary is a full-scale, all-out war, which can only, in my opinion, be 
carried out by Congress...[i]n the meantime, we are fighting a guerrilla war to use 
whatever weapons we have..." 
–Connecticut SAG Joseph Lieberman on multistate  
acid rain litigation in the 1980s1 
 
 
By the late 1970s, the federal clean air regime had been transformed into a 
system involving strong involvement by the federal government together with states 
responsible for implementation. Reflecting Congress' turn to opening the courtroom 
doors to a wider array of potential litigants, the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 and the 
subsequent 1977 amendments provided individuals and groups to bring additional legal 
challenges. The most active litigants were the newly formed "public interest 
environmental law" groups, which challenged the EPA directly in dozens of air pollution 
lawsuits throughout the 1970s, particularly in the latter part of the decade. 
By the early 1980s, however, these environmental groups would gain a partner 
in these litigation battles. Shortly after the election of President Reagan, a group of SAGs 
began using the expanded litigation provisions in the post-1977 CAA to challenge the 
Reagan Administration's approach to the emerging air pollution problem of acid rain, 
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often in tandem with groups such as the NRDC and the Sierra Club. This chapter 
describes the emergence of the SAGs' multistate acid rain litigation strategy during this 
period, which represented one of the SAGs' first of many major agency-challenging 
litigation campaigns.  
While the SAGs' efforts were ultimately largely unsuccessful in the courts, this 
effort demonstrated how the SAGs could use the opportunity points available to them in 
the structure of the CAA as part of a political strategy in the policy area of air pollution. 
This campaign also illustrated how the SAGs used novel interpretations of the CAA to 
achieve goals unanticipated by the Congress that had enacted the original statute. This 
strategy would expand greatly, and encounter more success, in more recent years. 
THE PROBLEM OF ACID RAIN 
"Acid rain" refers generally to precipitation with an unusually high acidity due to 
certain pollutants – chiefly nitrogen oxide and nitrogen dioxide (collectively referred to 
as NOx) as well as sulfur dioxide (SO2) – being transported through the atmosphere and 
chemically altered by atmospheric processes. The term "acid rain" itself traces back to 
1872,2 but interest in the issue as a potentially serious environmental problem did not 
grow until the 1970s. Even then, during the early part of the decade, scientists generally 
viewed acid rain as chiefly a European problem.  
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By the mid-1970s, however, new studies indicated a "definite increase in acid 
rainfall in the northeastern U.S." brought on by pollution from the upwind Midwestern 
industrial region,3 a concern EPA officials increasingly voiced.4 The main concern was 
that this increased acid rainfall caused a variety of environmental ills in downwind 
states, such as reducing fish populations and damaging historic buildings and 
monuments. Officials from these Northeastern states also claimed that they were 
forced to curb their own industrial development in order to meet their National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), thereby representing an unfair subsidy to the 
Midwestern polluters who were reaping the benefits (including cheaper energy rates) 
from these polluting industries.5 In addition to Northeastern states expressing concern 
about the interstate effects of air pollution, Canada likewise voiced concern about the 
effects of trans-boundary pollution on Canadian water sources, particularly in Ontario.6 
However, it remained unclear just how much of a problem acid rain actually was. 
It was also uncertain what the contribution of SO2 and NOx pollution was to the 
problem,7 and EPA officials in the Carter Administration repeatedly noted that not 
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enough scientific evidence yet existed to set a tighter NAAQS for SO2. Further, it was not 
clear that the post-1977 CAA could properly deal with the problem of acid rain. The CAA 
targeted reductions in pollution in the ambient air, while acid rain resulted from the 
mixture of pollutants at higher levels in the atmosphere. This made it difficult to 
pinpoint which pollution sources were responsible for acid rain for the purposes of 
determining violations of §110. Several EPA officials during this time believed that 
addressing acid rain would require again amending the CAA.8 
 By the end of the 1970s, the growing concern about the potential problems of 
acid rain, together with the uncertainty of either the extent of the problem or the ability 
of the CAA to address it, led to efforts to conduct more extensive studies of acid rain. 
The EPA earmarked $4 million to study the problem in 1979,9 and a year later Congress 
enacted the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, creating a ten-year study of the causes and 
effects of acid rain.10 Meanwhile, environmental interest groups increasingly identified 
acid rain as their biggest policy priority, and they sought major changes in the CAA that 
would go beyond funding new studies.11 Given that Congress had three years previously 
enacted significant changes in the CAA addressing trans-boundary pollution, it was 
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reasonable to believe that it could and would do the same to specifically combat acid 
rain. 
However, this strategy of seeking a legislative solution to acid rain faced a major 
challenge with election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980. Throughout the 
presidential campaign, Reagan's emphasis on smaller government and reduced 
regulation led to consternation among environmental groups. His smashing 43-state 
victory, which brought along with it a Republican Senate majority for the first time in 
nearly thirty years, led some environmental advocates to declare that the 
"environmental decade is indeed over."12 
As would become clear in practice as well as rhetoric, Reagan's attack on "big 
government" included environmental regulations. As with the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice, the Reagan EPA faced budget cuts early in 
his Administration. In 1981, for example, Reagan proposed cutting EPA funding by 
nearly 75%, including in air pollution control.13 His appointment of Anne Gorsuch to 
replace William Costle as EPA Administrator also signaled the different regulatory 
approach the Reagan Administration would take in the environmental area. The Reagan-
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era EPA fell squarely in the camp believing that more study of acid rain was required 
before expensive regulations would be justified.14 
THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION IN THE STATES 
Two years before Reagan's election brought significant changes on the federal 
stage, long-time Republican New York Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz stepped down 
after a 22-year career. His successor was the 40-year old Democratic Bronx Borough 
President Robert Abrams, who four years previously had lost to Lefkowitz after a 
campaign in which he criticized the Republican leadership of the state for being too 
"cozy" with big business.15 In his successful campaign in 1978, he pledged instead to 
make the office of Attorney General "the people's law firm."16 As is typical for down-
ticket state races, this transition in the SAG's office did not draw nearly as much 
attention as the Governor's race also held that year in New York, not to mention the 
dramatic federal races two years later as part of the "Reagan Revolution." Yet Abrams's 
elevation to Attorney General in 1979 marked the beginning of a period in which the 
New York Attorney General took a new and important national leadership role in a 
number of policy areas including consumer protection, antitrust enforcement, and 
environmental protection. Importantly for the purposes of this chapter, Abrams and 
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several of his fellow SAGs would become frequent adversaries of the Reagan 
Administration's approach to acid rain. 
Indeed, it took little time following Reagan's election to for Abrams to start 
taking a more active and adversarial role on the issue. In December of 1980, only a 
month after President-elect Reagan's election, Abrams declared that he intended to sue 
the federal government if the EPA continued to allow coal-burning plants in several 
Midwestern states to emit the same levels of SO2. In a letter to Douglas Costle, then still 
the EPA Administrator, Abrams charged that allowable SO2 emissions had increased 
since 1978 and that he was particularly concerned that the EPA would continue relaxing 
emission standards in the future. According to Abrams, the EPA had "a legal obligation 
under the Clean Air Act to consider the effect on downwind areas of relaxed emission 
standards at any power plant," and if necessary he would use the his power as Attorney 
General in an unprecedented state effort to force the EPA to fulfill this obligation in 
court.17 
The concern about acid rain and trans-boundary pollution was, as mentioned 
above, something that had been building for several years following the passage of the 
CAA of 1970. To the extent that the interstate conflicts generated by the CAA resulted in 
litigation, the lawsuits generally involved a single state litigating an issue against another 
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single state, and state environmental agencies generally handled these cases.18 Abrams' 
comments in 1980, however, foreshadowed a new form of litigation. Particularly on 
issues concerning acid rain, several SAGs began to take a higher profile role, joining in 
multistate lawsuits in an attempt to force the Reagan Administration's EPA to address 
the issue. 
ACID RAIN AND THE SAGS' AGENCY-CHALLENGING STRATEGIES 
Due to the post-1977 CAA Amendments enacted by Congress by the dawn of the 
Reagan era, the CAA provided a number of potential opportunity points for the SAGs to 
pursue their acid rain agenda. One of the citizen suit provisions, §304, allowed lawsuits 
directly against the offending power plants. Several of the concerned SAGs considered 
using this provision as part of a litigation campaign.19 Like many of the environmental 
groups during the 1970s, however, they opted against this strategy. Instead, the SAGs 
determined that the best route would be to represent the state against the federal 
government directly, believing that this would ultimately have the widest policy impact. 
Thus, the SAGs' initial strategy focused mainly on leveraging the new §126 in the 1977 
CAA Amendments to do so. 
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a) The First Move: Filing §126 Petitions 
As noted earlier, §126(b) of the post-1977 CAA provides that any state "may 
petition the Administrator for a finding that any major source emits or would emit any 
air pollutant in violation of the prohibition" of §110, which is aimed at preventing trans-
boundary pollution from interfering with any state's achievement of its NAAQS 
requirements. In January 1981, Robert Abrams backed up his earlier threat to act by 
filing a petition with the EPA asking the Administrator for a finding that emissions of SO2 
and NOx from Midwestern sources were interfering with New York's ability to meet its 
air pollution reduction requirements.20 Specifically, Abrams claimed that the pollutants 
emitted from these sources prevented the attainment and maintenance of the 
secondary NAAQS (protecting "public welfare") in nine New York counties as well as the 
primary NAAQS (protecting "public health") in another county, in addition to causing 
general acid rain damage across the state. 
A few months following Abrams's petition, Maine SAG James Tierney filed a 
similar §126 petition alleging that the same Midwestern sources prevented attainment 
of the secondary NAAQS in four of Maine's counties. Tierney's petition also alleged that 
the Midwestern pollution created "regional haze" interfering with Maine's efforts to 
protect visibility in Acadia National Park, which was an area specifically covered by 
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§169A of the CAA concerning special visibility protection measures.21 Tierney noted that 
he acted because "in large part we have to rely on the federal government to protect us 
from long-range air pollution" that harmed Maine's forestry, fishing, and tourist 
industries.22 
 These two petitions were consolidated by the EPA with a similar petition filed by 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, and the SAGs from Vermont 
and Massachusetts filed §126 petitions shortly after as well. The EPA held hearings on 
the petitions during the summer of 1981, and continued to receive testimony from the 
states throughout the next year. The EPA, however, did not act on any of the states' 
petitions. Throughout the process, the EPA maintained that action on acid rain was 
"premature" and not cost-effective, given the lack of scientific consensus on this issue.23 
Other Reagan Administration officials echoed this position, emphasizing the uncertainty 
in the scientific data on acid rain and that "no clear link has yet been established 
between man-made emissions and acid precipitation."24  
b) The Acid Rain Issue in Congress 
As a few Northeastern SAGs engaged in an early skirmish with the EPA, pressure 
was building for Congress to deal with the problem of acid rain. However, while 
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substantial amendments to address acid rain had seemed inevitable only a couple of 
years before, it appeared increasingly unlikely that any congressional action would be 
forthcoming. The Reagan Administration's proposal for new CAA Amendments called for 
a scaling back of regulatory requirements and mentioned little about acid rain, and 
received a cool response in the House of Representatives. Rep. Henry Waxman, then 
chair of a key environmental subcommittee, labeled the Administration's proposal as 
"nothing less than a blueprint for the destruction of our clean air laws."25 
Meanwhile, several members of Congress, mostly from Northeastern states, 
proposed a flurry of bills in Congress explicitly seeking to address acid rain. Senator 
George Mitchell submitted legislation that would amend the CAA to require several 
controls of SO2 in an effort to reduce acid rain,
26 and several other similar bills emerged 
in both the House and Senate around the same time.27 All of these bills proposed 
requiring the thirty-one states east of the Mississippi to make additional reductions in 
SO2 emissions. A proposal by Senator Christopher Dodd bill sought to expand SIP 
requirements to control emissions that "interfere" with another state’s ability to meet 
air quality standards or which would "endanger public health and welfare in any other 
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state." Dodd's bill would also give more authority to the states to sue to force the EPA 
Administrator to act on petitions filed under §126 of the CAA – the same type of 
petitions previously filed by Northeastern SAGs and currently pending before the EPA.28 
However, these bills to amend the CAA, as with the very different Reagan 
Administration proposal, met with little success. 
Meanwhile, the interstate battles continued to heat up in Congress, with officials 
from both Midwestern and eastern states claiming that they were being unjustly called 
upon to pay for the other’s problems.29 Northeastern states emphasized the wind 
patterns resulting in Midwestern-generated pollution blowing into their states, charging 
that they had to pay extra for pollution mitigation even as Midwesterners reaped the 
benefits of lower electricity costs. Midwestern officials pointed to evidence suggesting 
that local sources in the Northeast were contributing more to acid rain in that region 
than were Midwestern sources.30 The Northeasterners' efforts particularly incensed 
officials from West Virginia, home to the largest coal mining industry in the United 
States. In Congress, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) consistently criticized efforts to place 
burdens on Midwestern industries, and led several filibusters of proposed acid rain 
legislation throughout the 1980s.  
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Given this political context – with the Administration seeking to scale back the 
CAA and Northeastern and Midwestern politicians from both parties engaging in 
substantial conflict in Congress – federal action on acid rain seemed unlikely. Members 
of the House and Senate stated that acid rain was inseparable from CAA reauthorizing 
legislation, but no legislation could reach the floor because the issue was so 
"tremendously polarizing."31 Many members, particularly from the Midwest, wanted the 
costs of any acid rain program to be spread around the country (through a nationwide 
tax, for example) to avoid electricity price shocks in that region.32 Nevertheless, a 
number of House proposals attempting to do so, such as one introduced by 
Representative Waxman, met defeat in subcommittee.33 Every time that acid rain 
legislation would move forward in committee – as when the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee nearly unanimously passed a compromise proposal to require 
thirty-one states east of Mississippi to reduce SO2 by 8 million tons over 12 years
34 – it 
died before reaching a full floor vote. The various attempts at compromise received 
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increasingly less support from environmentalists, labor, and industry groups alike in the 
early 1980s.35  
The seemingly dwindling chances of congressional action on acid rain contrasted 
with the increasingly political visibility of the issue. Several of the leading contenders for 
the Democratic nomination for President seized upon the acid rain issue in an attempt 
to sharpen the contrast between the two parties.36 Figure 5.1 provides one simple 
measure of this growing political salience of acid rain during this period by illustrating 
the sharp growth in references to "acid rain" in the New York Times. As Figure 5.1 
indicates, references to acid rain began growing sharply beginning in 1979 and 1980, 
peaking in the presidential year of 1984 and remaining high until the passage of the CAA 
Amendments of 1990 (which addressed acid rain). 
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FIGURE 5.1: NUMBER OF ARTICLES PER YEAR MENTIONING 
ACID RAIN IN THE NEW YORK TIMES (1970-2000) 
 
 
 
Source: Author's Calculations
37
 
 
President Reagan proposed a doubling of acid rain research during the run-up to 
the 1984 presidential election, and appointed former EPA Administrator William 
Ruckelshaus to his second non-consecutive term to the post, replacing Anne Gorsuch. 
Reagan directed Ruckelshaus to come up with a credible plan to tackle acid rain,38 and 
one of Ruckelshaus' first actions was to set up an acid rain task force to examine the 
issue.39 However, even with this new emphasis on acid rain, Ruckleshaus continued to 
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emphasize the complexity of the issue, as well as the potential for job losses upon the 
implementation of any new strict regulations such as requirements to move towards 
greater use of lower-sulfur coal.40 
 The salience of the acid rain issue remained high after the 1984 elections, but 
legislation in Congress remained stalled. A series of sweeping proposals introduced in 
the Senate died largely due to the efforts of Senator Robert Byrd and others concerned 
about the loss of coal mining and automotive jobs.41 Proponents of acid rain legislation 
in the House managed to report a bill out of a key subcommittee, but Democratic 
members from the industrial Midwest, particularly Representative John Dingell (D-MI), 
blocked further action.42 As was the case before the presidential election of 1984, 
legislators from Midwestern states claimed that acid rain bills would hurt industry and 
consumers there, while Northeastern congressmen such as Representative Silvo Conte 
(R-MA) complained that without acid rain controls "tons and tons of airborne garbage, 
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generated by utilities and industry in the Midwest, will continue to be dumped on my 
state."43  
Meanwhile, various acid rain initiatives percolated in the states. The National 
Governors' Association considered several plans to deal with acid rain beginning in the 
early 1980s,44 and pressured Congress to act on national legislation. They also promoted 
national solutions aimed at securing support from both industry and environmentalists 
through the state-level "Alliance for Acid Rain Control" coalition headed by the 
Governors.45 Meanwhile, the EPA continued to stress the states’ role in environmental 
enforcement on the state level. In an address to the National Association of Attorneys 
General at their 1982 winter meeting, the EPA’s General Counsel Robert Perry stressed 
that EPA delegations of enforcement authority to the states would continue, defending 
the agency’s policy here as protecting "the sovereignty of the states."46  
c) The Strategy Expands: Litigation Under §126 and §115 of the CAA  
Such was the political context concerning acid rain in the mid-1980s. With acid 
rain efforts stalling in Congress and the issue reaching new levels of political salience as 
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the 1984 Presidential election year approached, the SAGs turned to a more active 
stance. Just as state governors were increasingly working together to address the acid 
rain issue, SAGs increasingly collaborated their efforts as well. A substantial advantage 
the SAGs had, however, is that they had free rein to use the tool of litigation to sue the 
federal government in an attempt to force national solutions, rather than having to rely 
on state-by-state regulation. As then-Connecticut SAG Joseph Lieberman stated at the 
time: ''What is necessary is a full-scale, all-out war, which can only, in my opinion, be 
carried out by Congress...[i]n the meantime, we are fighting a guerrilla war to use 
whatever weapons we have legally to draw the attention of the E.P.A. and to try to get 
the courts to force the E.P.A. to order Midwestern states to take action."47 In a series of 
cases relying on various parts of the CAA, this is precisely what a number of SAGs did. 
1. §126 Litigation: New York v. EPA 
While acid rain legislation stalled in Congress and other state-level actors began 
taking the lead on acid rain issues, the previously noted §126 petitions filed by several 
Northeastern SAGs remained pending before the EPA. With the issue of acid rain 
becoming more politically salient by the beginning of the presidential election year of 
1984, several Northeastern SAGs decided to take additional action. In January 1984, five 
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SAGs, now joined by three environmental interest groups,48 issued an intent to sue the 
EPA under §304 of the CAA because the EPA had neither responded to their petition nor 
acted to reduce Midwestern SO2 emissions.
49 Attorneys General Abrams and Tierney, 
who had led the original effort to petition the EPA and likewise led this effort, argued 
that §126 placed a nondiscretionary duty on the EPA to respond to the petition within 
60 days. Rather than fulfill their statutory obligations, the SAGs alleged that the EPA had 
failed to respond at any time over the past two-plus years despite the "exhaustive 
evidence before it showing that Midwestern states' sulfur dioxide emissions are 
interfering with Northeastern states' ability to meet national air pollution standards."50 
Following the 60-day waiting period following the intent to sue as required by §304,51 
the SAGs brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking the 
EPA to issue a prompt and final decision in the §126 proceedings, order several 
Midwestern states to revise their SIPs to bring about compliance with the interstate air 
pollution requirements of the CAA, and to take "all other actions necessary" to eliminate 
the "offending" interstate pollution.52 
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The EPA, for their part, did not deny that the statutory limit had indeed expired, 
but asked the court for more time to respond to the petitions. Because of the "technical 
complexity" and "public significance" of the issues presented in the petitions, as well as 
the myriad other demands on the agency's resources, the agency argued that it was 
impossible for it to comply with the short time limit specified in the statute.53 The EPA 
also noted that it was currently engaged in rulemaking proceedings on the petitions, 
and estimated publication of a final decision by April of 1985. For these reasons, the EPA 
requested that the court use its discretionary equitable powers to extend the statutory 
period of compliance.54 
The District Court rejected this argument, noting the lengthy time period since 
the petitions had been filed (over two years), as well as the fact that the EPA had 
already issued a preliminary proposal determination on the issue rejecting the states' 
request a few months after the SAGs filed this §126 lawsuit.55 Since "the burden of 
showing impossibility has been deemed to be a heavy one," the EPA's ability to issue a 
preliminary determination on the petitions indicated that a final determination would 
not be "impossible."56 The court further noted that if the EPA "desires a certain degree 
of flexibility in its evaluation of section 126 petitions, the defendant must look to 
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Congress, not the courts."57 The court then ordered the EPA to respond to the states' 
petitions within sixty days, providing the states with what would be one of their few 
victories in their acid rain litigation. 
Abrams praised the court for "finally flush[ing] the EPA out into the open," but 
warned that he would sue again if the EPA failed to impose acid rain controls.58 This is 
precisely what the EPA chose to do in its response the court's order. Rather than appeal 
the District Court ruling on the procedural matter, the EPA denied the SAGs' petitions, 
claiming that the states failed to show that out-of-state emissions had contributed to 
their NAAQS nonattainment. Most critically, the states did not identify specific sources 
of harmful emissions, but instead wanted the EPA to reject state plans broadly for not 
dealing with acid rain and interstate pollution – something that §§126 and 110 did not 
explicitly require.59  
After denying the petitions, the EPA emphasized that it "is not ignoring the 
issue" of acid rain, and indeed was working on conducting further modeling and 
research on the interstate pollution problem.60 Nevertheless, Abrams stated that 
because the EPA's decision "represents an additional blow to human health, enormous 
financial loss due to property damage, and irreversible destruction to our environment," 
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the SAGs would challenge the EPA's determinations as soon as the agency finalized 
them.61  
As soon as the EPA made its determination final, six SAGs brought another 
lawsuit, also titled New York v. EPA, in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.62 As they had in 
their original petitions to the EPA, the SAG petitioners argued that §110 places an 
affirmative duty on the EPA to review existing SIPs and determine whether the SIPs are 
adequately preventing impermissible interstate impacts. By filing their §126(b) 
petitions, the states claimed, the EPA was immediately obligated to take the 
investigatory steps necessary to determine whether the SIPs in all named upwind states 
were in compliance with §110.  
In a decision written by Judge David Sentelle and joined by then-Judge Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, the D.C. Circuit rejected the states' arguments. The court held that the 
language of §126 was quite specific, allowing states to petition the EPA "for a finding 
that any major source" is polluting in violation of the interstate provisions of §110, but 
not allowing states to challenge the validity of another state's SIP.63 If Congress had 
wanted the EPA to review the adequacy of existing state plans, the court continued, it 
could have explicitly required it in either §126 or §110. In fact, the extremely short sixty-
day period between the filing of a §126 petition and the requirement that the EPA 
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either make a finding or deny the petition suggested that Congress did not intend for a 
§126 petition to trigger review of other states' SIPs. There would be no way for the EPA 
to "engage in an entire array of investigative duties...[and] undertake a full-scale 
investigation of the adequacy of the SIPs of all states named in the petition" in a mere 
sixty days. It was therefore "reasonable to conclude that Congress did not intend that 
the Administrator be required to perform all these duties in such a short period of time 
in the absence of the clearest expression."64 Further, no language within §110 expressly 
directs the EPA to reevaluate existing SIPs.65 
The court then went on to address the EPA's denial of the states' petitions, 
holding that the denials were not arbitrary or capricious. The court noted that the EPA 
reasonably denied Maine's petition, which had claimed that pollution from Midwestern 
sources contributed to regional haze over Acadia National Park, in part because Maine 
did not address regional haze in its own SIP. In Pennsylvania's case, the court left 
undisturbed the EPA's conclusion that over 80% of the SO2 contributing to 
nonattainment in that state was caused by in-state sources, as opposed to the 
Midwestern sources, and thus the latter sources did not "significantly contribute" to 
Pennsylvania's nonattainment.66 The Court did not specifically address New York's 
petition, because the EPA agreed during the course of the litigation to have the petition 
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remanded for submission of new data relevant to a new NAAQS standard recently 
adopted by the agency.67  In a short concurring opinion, Judge Ginsburg noted that 
Congress is "fully capable of instructing the EPA to address particular matters promptly" 
but that it "did not supply such direction in this instance; instead, it allowed and has left 
unchecked the EPA's current approach to interstate air pollution. The judiciary, 
therefore, is not the proper place in which to urge alteration of the Agency's course."68 
The SAGs petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which declined review 
and thus ended the SAGs' unsuccessful attempt to use §§126 and 110 to force the EPA 
to reduce pollution in the Midwestern states.69 The SAGs acknowledged that the D.C. 
Circuit Court's opinion meant that the states' attempts to use these provisions to 
address acid rain were "pretty much dead," but noted that they would continue their 
efforts to make acid rain control a priority for the next presidential administration.70  
Even amid this loss, however, the SAGs were conducting a parallel line of agency-forcing 
cases under a different provision of the CAA. 
2. §115 Litigation: New York v. Thomas 
While the SAGs sought action on their §126 petitions, they also pursued a 
parallel strategy at the very same time under another new provision added by the 1977 
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CAA Amendments. Prior to the 1977 CAA Amendments, Canada had joined northeastern 
U.S. states in their complaints that upwind pollution sources were interfering with their 
pollution control regime. To partially address this concern, Congress added §115 of the 
CAA in 1977 requiring the EPA to take actions abating emissions whenever the 
Administrator made findings regarding the international impact of U.S. emissions. In 
particular, when the Administrator receives reports from international agencies giving 
him "reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States 
cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare in a foreign country," the Administrator is directed to give 
formal notification to the Governor of the pollution-source state and to start 
proceedings to revise that state's SIP to prevent or eliminate the endangerment to 
public health or welfare.71 Triggering abatement action under this provision thus 
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requires only the rather liberal basis that the Administrator has "reason to believe" that 
upwind pollution has trans-boundary impacts on public health and welfare.72 
 This provision became directly relevant in January of 1981, only days before the 
Reagan Administration took office. In response to an international report on acid rain 
deposition, outgoing EPA Administrator Douglas Costle sent a letter to Senate Majority 
Leader George Mitchell and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie – both politicians from 
Maine who had been long involved in environmental issues in their careers – expressing 
his belief that the report "confirms that acid deposition is endangering public welfare in 
the U.S. and Canada..."73 Costle expressed similar themes in an EPA press release issued 
shortly after. These were Administrator Costle's only actions on the issue before his 
departure from the agency. Indeed, the EPA solicited no comments on the letters, and 
published neither the letters nor the findings in the Federal Register. Costle's immediate 
successor, Anne Gorsuch, concluded that these letters and press release were of "no 
legal significance" and declined to take any actions under §115.74 
 Nevertheless, several SAGs viewed the Costle actions as a possible legal hook to 
force the EPA to take action on acid rain. Following Gorsuch's determination that the 
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letters were without legal significance, a coalition of seven SAGs, several environmental 
groups, a Congressman, and several individual American citizens holding property in 
Canada75 demanded that the EPA (now under the administration of William 
Ruckelshaus) implement the §115 abatement procedures on the basis of Costle's alleged 
"findings" in his letters.76 When he declined to do so, the coalition again turned to the 
courts under the citizen suit provision of §304, seeking a court order compelling the EPA 
to act. 
 The SAGs leading this effort claimed that Administrator Costle's letters legally 
obligated his successors in the EPA to identify the states in which pollution responsible 
for acid rain originates and to order those states to revise their SIPs to abate the 
emissions. According to the suit, Costle's letters represented a formal determination 
that U.S. SO2 emissions were endangering public health in Canada (an "endangerment 
finding"). Since the liberal language of §115 requires the EPA to require stricter air 
pollution regulations in the offending states, the EPA's failure to do so constituted a 
statutory violation. The suit sought a court order requiring the EPA to prepare promptly 
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and publish emission limitations and compliance schedules in the SIPs for eight states 
allegedly generating high amounts of trans-boundary emissions.77 
 Shortly after the initiation of the SAGs' suit, Administrator Ruckelshaus made 
clear his opposition to the use of §115 to deal with acid rain. He noted that the §115 
was "a very cumbersome way" to regulate SO2, since using §115 would require the 
agency not only to reach conclusions about the international impact of SO2 emissions, 
but require states to revise their SIPs based upon their proportionate share of emissions 
and establish plan revisions for any states that refused to do so. This regulatory route, 
Ruckelshaus noted, would not only be time consuming, costly, and perhaps ultimately 
impossible, but would also be "a prescription for a decade worth of court suits" over the 
new SIPs.78 Rather than "stretching" sections of the CAA to serve purposes for which 
they were not intended, it would be more sensible, "if the country wants to do 
something about acid rain...[to] deal with it frontally" through legislative revisions to the 
CAA.79 
 Despite the agency's protestations, the SAGs achieved initial success in this suit 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The Court was not troubled by 
EPA's argument that the SAGs and environmental groups were merely attempting to act 
as surrogates for the Canadian government in the suit, finding that the citizen suit 
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provisions contained in §304 of the CAA conferred standing upon them and that the 
parties demonstrated a cognizable legal interest. In fact, though the Canadian 
government did not formally participate in the lawsuit at this stage, the Court accepted 
an unusual brief written by Canadian representatives and presented to the Court by the 
SAG plaintiffs.80 
The District Court also agreed with the SAGs that Costle's letters and press 
release constituted "official agency actions" triggering the requirements of §115.81 It 
was not necessary for the EPA to publish the findings in the Federal Register, because 
this was not a "rule or policy statement" but merely "findings" that satisfied the 
requirement that the Administrator had "reason to believe" that U.S. pollution was 
endangering public health and welfare. The majority also rejected the argument that 
Administrator Gorsuch revoked the findings, noting that Gorsuch never made counter-
findings nor did she refer to any change in circumstances that might render Costle's 
findings moot.82 Because §115 places a non-discretionary duty on the EPA to act 
following an endangerment finding under the section, the Court continued, it was 
therefore required to give notice to the Governors of the states in which the harmful 
emissions originate and set in motion the SIP revision process.83 
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 The SAGs hailed this "dramatic victory" in the District Court and expressed hope 
"that the decision will spur some action in Congress" on the acid rain issue.84 As one 
Assistant Attorney General from New York commented, this case "represents the first 
time a court has ordered the executive branch of the U.S. government to abate acid rain 
and is perhaps the first time in history that a court has ordered air pollution emission 
reductions in its own country for the protection of another nation."85 This celebration 
was short-lived, however, as the EPA appealed the decision following the agency's 
conclusion that it had neither the time nor the resources available to go forward with 
the research necessary to construct an acid rain control plan.86 The EPA also reiterated 
Administrator Ruckelshaus' earlier criticism that §115 was not intended to deal with acid 
rain.87 Four additional SAGs representing Midwestern states intervened and appeared 
on the side of the EPA and against their colleagues, as did dozens of utilities from the 
upwind states.88 The groups noted that because the EPA never formally published the 
Costle letters, they never had a chance to comment on these alleged "findings." 
 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the EPA and the opposing SAG intervenors and 
industries, reversing the temporary victory of the plaintiff SAGs at the District Court 
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level. In a short opinion released on the day after the Senate confirmed him to the 
Supreme Court, then-Judge Antonin Scalia wrote for a three-judge panel holding that 
Costle's letters and press release did not consist of a official agency "finding" triggering 
the SIP review procedures of §115.89 Scalia noted that it was clear that any agency 
determination allegedly binding all future EPA Administrators to issue SIP revision 
notices falls under the definition of a "rule" under the definition of the Administrative 
Procedure Act. As a "rule," Scalia continued, the findings in Costle's letters required 
notice-and-comment rulemaking before they could be considered official agency 
judgments. It was unnecessary to consider any of the plaintiffs' additional §115 
arguments since "because the findings were issued without notice and comment, they 
cannot be the basis for the judicial relief appellees seek."90 
Assistant New York SAG James Wooley called the D.C. Circuit Court's ruling 
"irritating" because it "ducked the issue" of using §115 to control acid rain.91 The 
decision demonstrated "the need for Congress to write a specific acid rain statute," 
particularly because the "conservative administration" does not want to act on the 
issue.92 This sentiment was seconded by Robert Abrams, who remarked after the 
Supreme Court declined review of the D.C. Circuit's opinion that "it is unfortunate that 
the courts are refusing to address the merits of this controversy...this decision highlights 
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the need for Congress to pass legislation setting strict deadlines for emissions 
reduction."93  
Nevertheless, Abrams vowed to "continue our litigation efforts,"94 and the SAGs 
made another push to use the §115 provisions to force the EPA to deal with acid rain. 
The D.C. Circuit's opinion left open the question of whether §115 would apply to the 
acid rain problem in the event of final agency determinations about the trans-boundary 
effects of upwind state pollution. In 1988, the SAG-led coalition, now totaling nine 
states as well as official involvement by the Canadian government,95 petitioned the EPA 
to publish the now eight-year old Costle letters for official notice and comment 
rulemaking.96 In response to the petition, an EPA official stated in a letter to Robert 
Abrams that he believed the petition was "premature" because the EPA was dealing 
with "very complex issues" such as "identifying the blameworthy states and determining 
the actions that would be required to eliminate the problem."97 The official noted that 
the EPA was "working vigorously" to "devise an appropriate program to deal with the 
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acid deposition problem" in both the U.S. and Canada, noting a few programs the 
Reagan Administration had put into place relating to acid rain.98 
Robert Abrams blasted the EPA's position, remarking, "to the bitter end, the 
Reagan EPA insists on ducking federal law and international obligations and ignoring 
scientific consensus on the disastrous health and environmental effects of acid rain."99 
Abrams announced he was leading yet another §115 lawsuit, now with the involvement 
of the Canadian government, to force the EPA to act on acid rain. In this case, Her 
Majesty the Queen v. EPA, the SAGs again met defeat in the D.C. Circuit. 
The Court agreed with the EPA that §115 requirements for EPA action were not 
triggered until the agency had sufficient evidence necessary to "identify the specific 
sources in the US of pollutants that cause harm in Canada," and deferred to the EPA's 
conclusion that it did not have such information and was unable to collect it at this time. 
Because the issues involved were so complex, the Court would not question the EPA’s 
own assessment of its ability to go forward with the process.100 The Court held that 
because the EPA official's letter to Robert Abrams did not constitute final agency action, 
it could not review whether the EPA's refusal to initiate §115 proceedings was arbitrary 
or capacious. The Court also noted that the National Acid Precipitation Assessment 
Program, which Congress set up in 1980 and was designed to identify the sources and 
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causes of acid rain, was due to be completed by the end of 1990. The Court accepted 
the EPA's argument that the conclusions of this program would help the EPA determine 
whether a §115 process was appropriate.101 
3. Other SAG Litigation in the 1980s 
The Circuit Court's decision in Our Majesty the Queen v. EPA provided another 
setback for the SAGs in their attempt to use novel interpretations of the CAA to force 
the EPA to deal with acid rain. Like the parallel attempts to force the EPA to act on acid 
rain under the provisions of §126, the SAGs achieved some initial success at the District 
Court level before ultimately losing in the D.C. Circuit. 
 The §126 and §115 litigation formed the bulk of the SAGs' attempts to address 
acid rain in the courts during the 1980s, though a handful other cases were part of a 
more indirect effort to deal with acid rain. In one set of cases, beginning in 1982, a 
coalition of SAGs and environmental interest groups challenged the EPA's regulations 
promulgated under the "stack height" provisions adopted in §123 of the CAA 
Amendments of 1977.102 Because the CAA of 1970 provided for fixed emission 
limitations based on local ground-level concentrations of pollutants, utilities quickly 
realized that they could lower the ambient pollution concentrations not only by 
reducing pollution emissions, but by constructing higher emission stacks that would 
disperse pollutants over a larger area. The 1977 Amendments added a §123 meant to 
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close this loophole by limiting the extent to which reductions in local ground-level 
pollutants brought about by tall-stack dispersion techniques would count towards 
satisfying the requirements of the CAA. The EPA eventually promulgated regulations 
under this statute, which several environmental groups and SAGs challenged on the 
basis that the EPA's stack height regulations allowed more emissions than intended by 
Congress. The plaintiffs noted that the emissions reductions were in part meant to 
address SO2 and NOx emissions linked to acid rain in downwind states.
103 The plaintiffs 
achieved partial success in a pair of lawsuits challenging successive iterations of EPA 
§123 regulations, though ultimately most of the EPA's stack height program was 
upheld.104 
 In a second set of cases, a similar SAG-environmental interest group coalition 
brought litigation against the EPA in 1985 to compel the agency to revise NAAQS 
standards for SO2. Under §109 of the CAA, the EPA is required to perform reviews of the 
NAAQS standards every five years. The coalition sought a court order requiring the EPA 
to tighten SO2 standards under the NAAQS in order to protect public health and prevent 
acid rain.105 The SAGs lost in the D.C. District Court, which noted that the CAA grants 
considerable discretion to the EPA in setting NAAQS standards and that the states and 
environmental groups were simply trying to replace their standards for that of the EPA, 
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an argument that the Second Circuit reiterated on appeal.106 While the coalition did 
achieve a partial victory on several jurisdictional and procedural aspects of these 
cases,107 the passage of the CAA Amendments of 1990, discussed below, ultimately 
rendered this line of cases moot. 
4. An Overview of Acid Rain Litigation in the 1980s 
In the quotation that started this chapter, then-Attorney General Joseph 
Lieberman likened the SAGs' acid rain-related multistate litigation in the 1980s to a type 
of "guerilla warfare" conducted as Congress failed to end the "all-out war" being fought 
in Congress. Guerilla warfare tends to produce messy fights in which the combatants 
seize upon any weapons they can get their hands upon, and the CAA, particularly as 
amended in 1977, provided the SAGs with plenty of ammunition in their legal battle. In 
addition to conferring legal standing upon the SAGs and their allied environmental 
interest groups, the post-1977 CAA contained a number of provisions SAGs could 
potentially use to address acid rain. The problem was that Congress did not enact the 
1977 CAA Amendments with acid rain explicitly in mind, since the issue did not gain a 
high level of scientific or political salience until the 1980s. The structure of the CAA 
focused on the quality of the ambient air, and as such focused attention on localized 
pollution. This emphasis made it difficult to deal with cross-state pollution, even after 
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§126 was added – particularly to deal with a problem caused by the mixing of air 
pollutants at higher levels in the atmosphere. 
Nevertheless, with Congress unable to come to agreement on the issue of acid 
rain and the Administration taking a cautious approach to the issue, it created a political 
opening that the SAGs could seize upon. The result was an ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt on the part of the SAGs to apply various provisions of the existing air pollution 
statutory regime to the new and highly politically salient issue of acid rain. While this 
effort met with few successes in court, the SAGs' "guerilla war" also aimed to place 
pressure on Congress to revise the clean air regulatory regime. It also set the stage for a 
later and more successful instance of the SAGs using policy space left open to them to 
address another politically salient issue through the courts – climate change. 
Before moving to these developments, however, it is worth noting a few 
additional attributes of the multistate acid rain litigation of the 1980s. Along with his 
"guerilla warfare" comments, Attorney General Lieberman was careful to note that a 
"positive part of the [litigation] is it's totally bipartisan'' since this was "a regional 
problem that transcends politics.'' Indeed, examining the political affiliations of the SAGs 
joining each of the eight acid rain-related cases prior to the 1990 CAA Amendments 
reveals that all eight featured bipartisan cooperation among the SAGs. In the few cases 
where SAGs intervened to oppose the plaintiff SAGs and take the side of the EPA, this 
SAG opposition was bipartisan as well. 
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Table 5.1 summarizes the multistate acid rain-related litigation preceding the 
CAA Amendments of 1990, noting the partisan splits in each case. As indicated, 
Democratic and Republican SAGs joined these cases in roughly equal numbers, and 
featured involvement by both elected SAGs and appointed SAGs:108 
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Rather than reflecting strictly partisan concerns, the acid rain litigation quite clearly fell 
along regional lines. The map in Figure 5.2 below displays this by highlighting the overall 
involvement of SAGs on either side of this litigation. SAGs representing states with dark-
grey shading appeared in at least one case against the EPA during this period, while 
those representing states with light-grey shading took the side of the EPA in at least one 
of the cases: 
 
FIGURE 5.2: MAP OF SAGS INVOLVED IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION CONCERNING ACID RAIN 
PRIOR TO THE 1990 CAA AMENDMENTS 
 
Dark shading indicates SAGs actively involved in at least one  
agency-challenging lawsuit against the EPA. Light shading indicates  
SAGs involved in at least one lawsuit defending the EPA's position. 
 
What stands out is that these multistate acid rain litigation battles were fairly 
contained. All of the SAGs participating in these lawsuits against the EPA's position 
represented downwind Northeastern states, with the exception of Minnesota. All the 
opposing SAGs taking the EPA's position represented upwind Midwestern or Southern 
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states, with most of the other SAGs from elsewhere in the country sitting on the 
sidelines. As Lieberman said, "it's region against region," rather than a partisan battle. 
This tracked the general trend in Congress, which was largely fought along regional 
rather than partisan lines. Democratic stalwarts from upwind states such as Senator 
Robert Byrd (D-WV) and Representative John Dingell (D-MI), for example, clashed on the 
acid rain issue with Republican Northeasterners such as Senator John Chafee (R-RI) and 
Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY). 
 It is worth noting as well that this litigation provided the SAGs who led this acid 
rain litigation with a useful political issue with which to seek higher political office. The 
two most prominent initiators of this litigation – Robert Abrams of New York and James 
Tierney of Maine – ran for U.S. Senate and Governor, respectively, while these litigation 
campaigns were in progress.109 Minnesota's involvement in this litigation – as the 
exception to the otherwise purely regional nature of these campaigns – is at least 
partially explained by the fact that the state's AG was Hubert H. Humphrey III, an 
ambitious politician who would later run for both Senator and Governor in the state.110 
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CONGRESS REVISES THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
Prior to 1990, there were many proposals but little action in Congress on the 
issue of acid rain during the Reagan Administration. As the political salience of the issue 
grew, President Reagan stated that acid rain was a "serious problem,"111 but the third 
and final EPA Administrator under Reagan, Lee Thomas, maintained that the acid rain 
legislation percolating in Congress would be extremely expensive and not warranted by 
scientific knowledge and did not rise to the level of "ecological emergency" requiring 
immediate controls.112 Before leaving office, President Reagan announced a program 
involving additional money for emission control technology, including a $2.5 billion 
commitment for clean coal technologies and demonstration projects,113 but these 
proposals were widely deemed inadequate by environmentalists and the same 
northeastern SAGs who were engaged in litigation against the Reagan Administration's 
EPA at the time.114 
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 The tenor on the issue changed under President George H.W. Bush, who pledged 
to take action to bring the acid rain problem under control.115 Because several states 
(again, particularly in the Northeast) had placed SO2 controls on in-state businesses by 
the late 1980s, industry groups also became increasingly open to uniform federal 
regulation in the form of a nationwide market-based cap-and-trade system.116 
Proponents of this idea presented cap-and-trade as a better alternative to the 
"command and control" approach built into the original CAA. This cap-and-trade idea 
found its way into President Bush's proposed amendments to the CAA by the summer of 
1989.117 Bush's proposal formed the framework of what would eventually become the 
CAA Amendments of 1990, which – after years of stalled action in Congress – were 
enacted overwhelmingly by Congress and signed into law by President Bush in 
November 1990.118 
 The 1990 Amendments represented a major overhaul of the CAA, and would be 
the last major legislative change to the act to date (2011). The amendments ambitiously 
dealt with several of major air pollution issues, including urban air pollution, toxic air 
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emissions, automobile emissions, and acid rain. Title IV of the bill dealt with acid rain 
control, aiming to reduce SO2 emissions substantially by the year 2000. The cap-and-
trade approach first established an 8.9 million ton cap of total SO2 emissions annually by 
the year 2000. The EPA would then issue SO2 emission allowances to existing sources, 
which could then bank their allowances or sell them depending on how much SO2 they 
emitted. This approach would be established in two phases. The initial phase required 
the 111 highest-emitting existing sources to meet a new emissions standard by 1995, 
with the second phase beginning in 2000 and requiring existing utilities to meet the 
same emissions standard of new sources. Congress also directed the EPA to develop 
emission standards for NOx, which would apply to the plants also subject to SO2 
controls. 
 Establishing this program required a number of congressional compromises. 
Many of the same Midwestern pollution sources the SAGs had focused on in their 
litigation were covered by the cap-and-trade system, though a compromise granted 
these Midwestern plants additional emission credits over the stricter Senate version 
preferred by environmentalists and Northeastern congressmen. In addition, a key part 
of the acid rain compromise was an assistance program for displaced coal miners and 
other workers laid off because of the Title IV provisions, aimed at softening the negative 
economic impact many coal-state representatives worried would occur in their states.119 
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 In addition to the acid rain provisions of the 1990 Amendments, the legislation 
significantly increased and streamlined civil enforcement. The amendments increased 
the penalties available for violations, and bolstered the EPA's ability to issue 
administrative subpoenas for compliance data. The amendments also strengthened the 
citizen suit provisions of §304, providing those suing under this provision to obtain new 
civil penalties that would be deposited in a special fund in the U.S. Treasury or be used 
for "beneficial mitigation projects"  that "enhance the public health or the 
environment."120 The amendments also clarified that §304 citizen suits were available to 
enforce CAA provisions against alleged past violations in addition to enforcement 
against sources currently in violation.121  
In what would become a key change relating to the "second wave" of SAG 
litigation in the next decade, the amendments also altered §167 to allow the EPA and 
states to seek orders preventing not only the new construction of major stationary 
sources failing to meet New Source Review standards under the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration provisions of the CAA, but the "modification" of these sources 
as well.122 Most importantly of all, Title V of the 1990 Amendments set up new 
requirements for all "major" and some "minor" emission sources to obtain operating 
permits from state and local permitting authorities. Modeled after a similar operating 
permit system in the Clean Water Act, these permits were meant to make enforcement 
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easier by placing all federal and state standards, emission limitations, and other 
requirements in a single document. This made it much easier to identify the 
requirements applicable to sources and thus to sue violators.123 I will revisit the 
relevance of these provisions in Chapter 6. 
While targeting an ambitiously wide number of issues in the 1990 Amendments, 
there were other issues Congress considered, but ultimately did not include in this CAA 
overhaul. Several groups had pressed Congress to address the emerging issue of global 
warming along with acid rain, and in particular urged Congress to allow for the 
regulation of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2). Congress considered 
adding CO2 emissions to the program, but ultimately rejected this idea. In fact, the only 
reference to greenhouse gases, including CO2, were explicitly removed except for one 
minor reference requiring the Administrator to "publish the global warming potential of 
each listed...substance," but making clear that this "preceding sentence shall not be 
construed to be the basis of any additional regulation under this chapter."124 Instead of 
addressing CO2 emissions, the amendments concentrated on precursors of acid rain, SO2 
and NOx. This legislative choice also became a central issue in the second wave of SAG 
air pollution in the 2000s. 
                                                          
123
 Title V of the 1990 CAA Amendments; Reitze, Air Pollution Control Law, 521. 
124
 CAA §602(e); Reitze, Air Pollution Control Law, 415-416. 
247 
 
MULTISTATE LITIGATION IN THE 1990S 
Following the CAA of 1990, SAG litigation concerning air pollution largely 
dissipated, with a few exceptions in the first phases of the amendments' 
implementation. Several SAGs sued the EPA based on missed statutory deadlines in the 
months following enactment of the 1990 Amendments. This case involved nine SAGs 
suing the EPA in April 1992 because the agency did not issue regulations concerning 
Title V of the CAA of 1990. Echoing the complaints of many Democrats in Congress, the 
SAGs' stated concern was that the EPA missed the November 1991 statutory deadline 
due to the Bush Administration's Quayle Council on Competitiveness and the Office of 
Management and Budget freezing these regulations while they sought to weaken 
them.125  
In addition to this case, New York challenged aspects of the cap-and-trade 
system in early 1992 in another case titled New York v. EPA.126 In this case, New York 
SAG Robert Abrams sued to try to restrict the emissions trading program out of concern 
that Midwestern sources could buy credits from Northeastern sources and let them 
emit at the current levels. Here, however, even other environmental groups such as the 
Environmental Defense Fund spoke out against Abrams' lawsuit because of the group 
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believed that if a market could develop in emissions trading, it would encourage 
Midwestern utilities to clean up in excess of the Federal standards. 
However, these instances of SAG litigation became the exception rather than the 
rule, as it had by the late 1980s. In the years following Bill Clinton's election in 1992, in 
fact, there were no instances of multistate SAG litigation in the field of air pollution 
control. Instead, the Clinton Administration's EPA gradually implemented the acid rain 
trading program, which was generally viewed as very successful.127 
The first multistate air pollution lawsuit filed against the Clinton Administration 
EPA occurred in 1997 and was likely encouraged by the EPA itself. The New York SAG 
and several others presented the EPA with §126 petitions alleging that the EPA had 
failed to regulate certain NOx emission sources in the Midwest and Southeast.
128 The 
SAGs then sued in an effort to "accelerate" the pollution reduction process that the EPA 
had already taken as part of a "SIP call" requiring new NOx limits in 22 states.
129 Very 
shortly after the suit was filed,  the states and the EPA settled the case, reaching an 
agreement requiring the EPA to take final action no later than May 2000 on the state 
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petitions,130 an agreement that was made legally binding in a consent decree filed the 
following February.131 Less than three months after the settlement, the EPA issued a 
preliminary assessment of the §126 petitions agreeing with the states' findings that 
upwind sources were contributing to their failure to meet federal requirements,132  
marking the first time since the that the EPA sided with the states in a §126 petition.133 
Documents obtained by industry groups opposed to the settlement suggested, however, 
that the EPA had in fact welcomed the states' suit to help provide it with political cover 
to obtain further NOx reductions from Midwestern sources.
134 
Besides the few examples mentioned here, it was clear that SAGs had largely 
turned their attention to other policy issues following the CAA Amendments of 1990. 
Indeed, the relatively unsuccessful agency-challenging litigation of the Reagan era led 
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petitions if it fails to take certain other actions designed to address ozone transport. "Midwest Utilities, 
States May Challenge Consent Decree Sought by Northeast," Environment Reporter, March 6, 1998, 2335.  
250 
 
some earlier scholars to qualify the potential power of the role SAGs played as national 
policymakers.135 Nevertheless, while this campaign ended in failure, it set the stage for a 
far more successful and intensive use of multistate litigation throughout the 2000s. As 
they had during the 1980s, SAGs used the tool of multistate litigation to advance their 
policy goals on the key air pollution issues of this period, including the issue of CO2 
regulation. As with the acid rain litigation in the 1980s, the failure of Congress or the 
President to achieve a comprehensive regulatory scheme tackling climate change in the 
face of the increasing political salience of the issue invited SAGs to enter the policy 
space left open – an invitation a number of entrepreneurial SAGs gladly accepted. It is 
this "second wave" of SAG multistate air pollution litigation to which I now turn. 
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 Cornell Clayton, "Law Politics, and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National 
Policymakers." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 552. Clayton noted that while "much more needs to be done 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Second Wave of Air Pollution Lawsuits:  
Litigating Climate Change 
 
"A glorious mess" 
–Representative John Dingell (D-MI), referring to the recent 
"morass" of regulation and litigation concerning greenhouse 
gases1 
 
 
Acid rain and cross-border SO2 and NOx emissions remained an issue at the end 
of the 1990s, though climate change and control of greenhouse gases (GHGs) gradually 
emerged as the next big environmental issue. In the second wave of multistate 
environmental litigation, the SAGs returned to the issue of acid rain and also turned 
their attention to the problem of climate change. This second wave of air pollution 
lawsuits followed a remarkably similar path as the acid rain litigation of the 1980s – only 
now in an expanded form and achieving significantly more success. This chapter 
describes and analyzes the SAGs' role in SO2 and CO2 litigation over the past decade. Not 
only did SAGs pursue a number of multistate agency-challenging cases, many of which 
found more success than the acid rain battles of the 1980s, but they added another 
prong to their strategy in litigating both acid rain and greenhouse gas policy – lawsuits 
against private companies. 
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 "Supreme Court Created ‘Glorious Mess’ On Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Dingell Says," Environment 
Reporter, April 18, 2008, 747. 
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BUILDING ON TOBACCO: A NEW APPROACH TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW 
As noted in Chapter 5, the SAGs' multistate environmental litigation in the 1980s 
reached a crescendo before dissipating following the enactment of the CAA of 1990 and 
the implementation of its emissions trading scheme for SO2 and NOx. In the 2000s, the 
agency-challenging strategy used in the acid rain campaign reemerged, and the SAGs 
developed a new strategy to address acid rain and, eventually, climate change. 
Beginning at the turn of the century, a few entrepreneurial SAGs opened a "new legal 
frontier," as one SAG put it,2 targeting private energy companies directly. They did so 
first under the "New Source Review" provisions of the CAA, building upon their previous 
regulation-by-settlement successes in other policy areas. 
a) Settlements, Spitzer, and Sulfur Dioxide 
1. The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement and the Regulation-by-
Settlement Strategy 
While the SAGs became less active in air pollution control litigation following the 
CAA of 1990 and President Clinton's election, just as they became less active as 
multistate litigators generally,3 it did not take long for SAGs to return in force to the 
courtroom. By the mid-1990s, SAGs were collaborating on numerous consumer 
protection and antitrust enforcement efforts. More frequently than ever before, SAGs 
                                                          
2
 Dan Fagin, "'Public Nuisance’ Lawsuit: NYC, 8 States sue Power Firms," Newsday, July 22, 2004, A18. 
3
 See Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3. 
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conducted investigations and brought litigation against many large corporations, 
resulting in major settlements with Reebok, electronic distributors, Internet service 
providers, and retailers, among many others. As described in Chapters 3 and 4, these 
settlements resulted not just in monetary payments, but a number of important 
regulatory changes as well. 
Beginning in 1994, SAGs cooperated on what would become by far the largest 
and most controversial of these settlements with the nation's largest tobacco 
companies. Under a variety of legal theories including consumer fraud and unjust 
enrichment, SAGs brought lawsuits in state courts across the country against several 
tobacco manufacturers. Following Congress's rejection of a comprehensive tobacco 
regulation bill, the SAGs from all fifty states reached settlements with the tobacco 
industry defendants. Four states settled individually, with the remaining forty-six 
entering into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in November 1998. 
This MSA cost the tobacco industry an estimated $206 billion over twenty-five 
years, with much of the money returning to the states as reimbursement for Medicaid 
costs allegedly caused by tobacco smoking. In addition to the very large cash payments, 
the tobacco industry defendants agreed to a series of major regulatory measures 
contained in the settlement. This included various restrictions on industry marketing 
and advertising, the disbanding of the tobacco industry's lobbying organization, and 
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various provisions aimed at protecting manufacturers participating in the MSA from new 
competitors.4 
 The agreement marked a sea change in tobacco policy. Not only would the 
industry continue payments to the states for years, but the settlement contained a 
number of provisions regulating the industry and substantially altering the entire 
tobacco market in the United States. The success of the MSA and other regulatory 
settlements reached by the SAGs demonstrated the potential power of the regulation-
by-settlement approach. It also helped to spur a similar SAG strategy in other policy 
areas, including in air pollution control. 
2. The Emergence of Eliot Spitzer 
The inspiration for the regulation-by-settlement approach to air pollution control 
came from the tobacco settlement, but the driver of the actual SAG litigation was 
located in a law office in Albany. For all the notoriety he would later gain as New York's 
Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer burst onto the scene after the MSA was already signed, 
sealed, and started delivering billions of dollars to state coffers. Shortly after the signing 
of the MSA, Spitzer was narrowly elected after a protracted recount.5 Spitzer 
immediately pledged to plan a series of lawsuits on behalf of consumers, the 
                                                          
4
 Martha Derthick, Up in Smoke: From Legislation to Litigation in Tobacco Politics (Washington D.C.: CQ 
Press, 2005), 174-178. 
5
 Jonathan P. Hicks, "After 6 Weeks, Vacco Concedes Attorney General Race to Spitzer," New York Times, 
December 15, 1998, A1. 
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environment, and civil rights in an effort to revive the office as one of "the nation's 
premier public law agencies."6 
Spitzer did not wait long before actively pursuing environmental issues. In 
addition to calling on Congress to adopt stronger controls on utility emissions, he also 
pledged to pursue "strong legal action" in order to "work to ensure that facilities 
producing air pollution both in and outside New York State are abiding by all 
environmental laws."7 That "strong legal action" would include a continuation of the 
SAGs' regulation-by-settlement approach developed in the SAGs' consumer protection 
and tobacco litigation, as well as a dramatic expansion in the willingness of SAGs to 
challenge the federal government directly in a series of agency-challenging lawsuits. This 
newly expanded strategy first manifested itself in an attempt to expand pollution 
controls on SO2 and other acid rain-causing pollutants, soon moving to include litigation 
aimed at pressuring the federal government to act on carbon dioxide (CO2), the main 
GHG behind climate change. 
3. Spitzer Makes His Move Under §304 of the CAA 
Both the 1977 and 1990 Amendments to the CAA focused much attention on 
limiting the impact of harmful emissions associated with the construction and operation 
of stationary sources of pollution such as factories, utilities, and power plants. Codifying 
                                                          
6
 "Mr. Vacco Confronts Reality," New York Times, December 15, 1998, A26. 
7
 New York Attorney General's Office, "Spitzer Urges Greater Attention To Acid Rain and Air Pollution," 
May 21, 1999, accessed May 17, 2011, http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/1999/may/may21a_99.html. 
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an existing EPA program begun in 1974, the 1977 Amendments set up a permitting 
program requiring new major stationary sources to receive construction permits before 
starting construction on new facilities or on "major modifications" of existing sources. 
The permits, which are typically issued by state or local air pollution control agencies, 
"specify what construction is allowed, what emission limits must be met, and often how 
the source must be operated."8 The process by which sources obtain these permits is 
called New Source Review (NSR).  
The NSR program refers generally to both the requirements for stationary 
sources in both "nonattainment" area with high pollutant levels ("nonattainment NSR") 
as well as in "attainment" areas currently satisfying its NAAQS (referred to as 
"prevention of significant deterioration," or PSD). This program defines "major 
stationary sources" in nonattainment areas as any sources with the potential to emit 
more than 100 tons per year of any regulated air pollutant. In attainment areas, this 
emissions cutoff is set at either 100 or 250 tons depending on the type of source.9 In 
addition to the requirements under the NSR program, Title V of the 1990 Amendments 
added additional permitting requirements applying to major stationary sources, 
requiring such sources to obtain operating permits following the start of the facility's 
operations.10 
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 Environmental Protection Agency, "Basic Information: New Source Review," accessed November 30, 
2010, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/info.html. 
9
 CAA §302; 42 U.S.C. §7602. 
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 CAA §§501-507; 42 U.S.C. §§4661-4661f. 
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Because NSR requires major stationary sources to install new pollution control 
technologies whenever construction or modifications are deemed to have a significant 
impact on air pollution, the NSR process can be very expensive for the facilities subject 
to it. Recognizing the expense in the early years of the program, the EPA exempted 
"routine maintenance, repair, and replacement" from NSR requirements, placing only 
"major modifications" under the expensive requirements of the process.11 Whether 
changes to a facility are "major modifications" or merely "routine maintenance" can 
mean millions of dollars worth of difference to the affected facilities. It is also directly 
relevant to the level of emissions the source can emit. The problem, however, was that 
from NSR's inception in 1974, neither Congress nor the EPA made clear what constituted 
"routine maintenance." Despite countless pages of rules and guidances attempting to 
define the exclusion,12 the ambiguity of the term led to considerable confusion 
regarding the applicability of the NSR process. 
It was in this context of general confusion over the NSR standards that Eliot 
Spitzer made the first move in bringing environmental litigation directly to the 
doorsteps of American industry. Only two weeks after the collapse of ongoing 
negotiations between upwind and downwind states and the EPA over an emerging 
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 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality," 40 CFR 
52.21(b)(2)(i). 
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 Matthew H. Snell, "Major Modifications and Routine Maintenance: Does the EPA's New Exclusion Equal 
More Pollution?", New England Law Review 39 (2004): 208. 
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dispute about how to resolve the transport of interstate pollution,13 Spitzer sent 
seventeen electric power plants in the Midwest and Southeast letters announcing his 
intent to sue them under §304 of the CAA in September of 1999. Spitzer alleged that the 
plants violated the NSR provisions of the CAA because they did not obtain the necessary 
preconstruction permits before making major modifications to their facilities. The 
pollution generated from these newly modified sources in turn emitted SO2 and NOx 
allegedly contributing to the formation of acid rain and ozone pollution in New York and 
other Northeastern states.14 In the suits, Spitzer stated, he would seek injunctive relief 
and penalties available under the CAA's NSR provisions.15 
In rhetoric reminiscent of his predecessor Robert Abrams, Spitzer explained that 
the lawsuit was necessary because "while we in New York are striving to protect our 
residents and our natural resources with tough environmental standards, we are under 
siege by airborne pollution originating far beyond our borders."16 He described the 
lawsuit as a "landmark" since it represented an expansion of the previous SAG legal 
strategy of suing the federal government to compel compliance with the act.17 Indeed, it 
                                                          
13
 During the first year of Spitzer's term in 1999, Northeastern states were in negotiations with upwind 
Midwestern states and the EPA as part of yet another major tangle with Midwestern states about how to 
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 "New York State Announces Intent to Sue 17 Power Plants Over Transported Pollution," Environment 
Reporter, September 17, 1999,  901. 
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marked the first time that any state had directly sued a polluter in a different state for 
alleged violations of the CAA.18 
Spitzer's suit, however, came as a surprise to the EPA, which was already in the 
process of preparing its own enforcement actions against many of the same utilities. 
Clinton's EPA Administrator Carol Browner noted that "[w]e were working on [the issue 
of SO2 and NOx], trying to do things strategically. Eliot became impatient."
19 The EPA, in 
fact, had for the past two years instructed several investigators to examine utility 
permits in an effort to determine whether specific plants had made plant modifications 
resulting in higher SO2 and NOx emissions.
20 Spitzer, on the other hand, asserted that his 
office acted "to pull the EPA along a little bit," claiming that the "EPA had been a little 
hesitant on these cases."21 In part, Spitzer defended his actions as necessary to enforce 
the law that the EPA, which he suspected of being afflicted with "regulatory capture," 
had failed to enforce.22 
Only six weeks later – while Spitzer was still waiting for the expiration of the 
statutory 60-day waiting period between his intent to sue and the actual filing of his 
lawsuit – the DOJ, acting on behalf of the EPA, sued many of the same utilities in its own 
action. As with Spitzer's suit, the DOJ alleged that the targeted utilities triggered NSR 
coverage by making major modifications at some of their plants that did not qualify as 
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 Richard Perez-Pena, "Power Plants to Cut Emissions Faulted in Northeast Smog," New York Times, 
November 16, 2000, A1. 
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acceptable "routine maintenance or repair" under the Clean Air Act.23 After the initial 
lawsuits, the DOJ soon after amended its complaint to include several additional plants 
in the Midwest, bringing the total number of plants targeted in the suit to twenty-four.24 
After its initial hesitation, the EPA also took several additional administrative 
enforcement actions against a broad range of emission sources over a large geographic 
area.25 
Once Spitzer and the federal DOJ became involved, other SAGs began to hitch 
their offices to this new litigation campaign. Two weeks after the DOJ's announcement, 
Connecticut SAG Richard Blumenthal announced his intent to sue 16 of the 17 plants 
named in Spitzer's lawsuit.26 With the DOJ now already litigating in U.S. District Court in 
Ohio, Blumenthal and Spitzer opted to join the DOJ's suit as "proposed plaintiff 
intervenors," filing their actions in late November of 1999.27 By the middle of December, 
six other Northeastern SAGs joined the action along with several environmental interest 
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 "Government Sues Electric Companies Over New Source Review at 17 Power Plants," Environment 
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groups, creating a similar litigation coalition as in the earlier acid rain lawsuits in the 
1980s.28 
The defendant companies claimed that regulators had long considered the type 
of work done at their plants "routine maintenance" under the CAA and thus not subject 
to the act's NSR provisions.29 None of the projects were designed to increase the plants' 
electric generating capacity, which the defendants argued was the crux of what triggers 
the NSR permit process. Further, the largest utility targeted in the lawsuit, American 
Electric Power, also claimed that the general five-year statute of limitations applied to 
the claims since the CAA did not have a separate statute of limitations, and argued that 
this five-year period had lapsed.30 
Apart from the specific electric utilities named in the action, the lawsuits raised 
concern across other industries regulated by the CAA. Several industry groups viewed 
the lawsuits as "rulemaking in disguise," alleging that the states, along with the EPA, 
were attempting to set a new NSR standard by employing a new broad interpretation of 
"routine maintenance" in the lawsuits. This new interpretation sought to establish that a 
plant modification does not qualify as "routine maintenance" if it increases generating 
capacity, allows a facility to regain lost capacity, or extends the life of the facility.31 This 
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was in marked contrast with the case-by-case approach the EPA had previously used to 
determine actions triggering NSR.32 Others noted the shift from rulemaking and 
lawmaking to the enforcement process to accomplish interpretations of the CAA not 
explicitly authorized in the legislation or existing regulations. Former EPA General 
Counsel E. Donald Elliot noted that while changes to the NSR provisions could be done 
through legislation or a series of rule changes, the states and the Clinton Administration 
had instead sought to "change the law through aggressive enforcement" and getting 
courts to defer to these actions, thereby changing the law.33 By doing so, the lawsuits 
sought not only to impose the new rules without rulemaking procedures, but to do so 
retroactively.34 
In the last few months of the Clinton Administration, the plaintiff SAGs and DOJ 
reached agreements in principle with a few of the utility defendants. Despite industry 
qualms about the lawsuits, the settlements largely reflected the EPA's new NSR 
interpretation. A December 2000 agreement with Cinergy Corporation, for example, 
called for Cinergy to install state-of-the-art pollution control equipment in several of its 
plants. Cinergy agreed to either shut down or repower with natural gas nine small coal-
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fired boilers at three of its power plants by 2004. In addition, Cinergy agreed to build 
four additional SO2 scrubbers starting in 2008, upgrade its existing pollution control 
systems, and phase-in NOx reduction technology year-round starting in 2004.
35 The 
parties estimated that the costs to Cinergy would total at least $1.4 billion, making it the 
largest Clean Air Act settlement in history,36 surpassing a $1.2 billion agreement the DOJ 
and SAGs reached with the Virginia Electric Power Company a month earlier.37 Cinergy 
also agreed to pay $8.5 million in fines and $21.5 in "supplemental environmental 
projects" in the plaintiff SAGs' states, as allowed under the 1990 CAA Amendments. The 
parties stated that the agreement would lead to 400,000 tons of annual reductions of 
SO2 emissions and annual cuts of NOx totaling 100,000 tons.
38 
Following the agreements in principle, Eliot Spitzer stated that he "couldn't be 
happier" with the results.39 This was hardly surprising since the SAGs accomplished 
nearly everything they sought in the suits. Rather than "spending years in time-
consuming and wasteful litigation" and to "gain certainty regarding any future 
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operations," 40 both Cinergy and Virginia Electric agreed to install the types of new state 
of the art equipment demanded by the government litigators. 
b) Clear Skies, Messy Litigation: Challenging the Bush Administration on NSR 
1. Lawsuits Against Private Industry 
Despite Spitzer blindsiding Carol Browner and the EPA with the announcement 
of his lawsuits, the SAG plaintiffs maintained a generally cooperative posture with the 
EPA and DOJ during the early stages of this NSR litigation. Carol Browner remarked that 
she was "constantly looking for ways [to make sure] that the things I cared about would 
continue even if there was a Republican administration. Having Eliot Spitzer in the mix 
was one way to do that."41 This view of Spitzer as an insurance policy against future 
regulatory reversals was to be quickly tested when the George W. Bush Administration 
came into office following the agreements with Virginia Electric and Cinergy. The Bush 
Administration took a much different administrative and legislative approach to NSR, 
even as several NSR lawsuits remained on the docket. This transition led to increased 
tensions between the federal enforcers, the EPA, and Spitzer and the other SAG 
plaintiffs. It also led to both Cinergy and Virginia Electric delaying placing their 
signatures on any final agreement ratifying the agreements in principle reached in late 
2000. 
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The first signs of conflict appeared early in the Bush Administration. As President 
Bush debated adopting a new national energy policy throughout the spring and summer 
of 2001, the Administration signaled that it was considering withdrawal from the NSR 
lawsuits.42 As part of Vice-President Dick Cheney's Energy Task Force recommendations, 
the White House called upon the DOJ to review the existing NSR actions for consistency 
with the CAA.43 The SAGs and environmental interest group plaintiffs decried this 
"outrageous" action, charging that this review meant that the targeted companies had 
no incentive to settle the suits as long as the review was pending.44 Richard Blumenthal 
bluntly suggested that industry groups were driving this review. "Make no mistake," he 
told an EPA panel convened to discuss the new strategy, "Energy industry political 
pressure is the reason for this review. False pleas by energy special interests are the 
engine driving these proceedings."45 The SAGs also accused the Bush Administration of 
shutting them out of the NSR litigation review process.46 
About a year after taking office, President Bush announced his plans to address 
the ambiguity of the NSR process by proposing a "Clear Skies" initiative aimed at 
"encourag[ing economic] growth that will provide a better life for citizens, while 
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protecting the land, the water, and the air that sustain life."47 As an alternative to the 
"confusing, ineffective maze of regulation...that has created an endless cycle of 
litigation" typifying the NSR approach, Clear Skies would replace key aspects of NSR with 
a cap-and-trade system modeled after the successful approach taken in the 1990 CAA 
Amendments. This approach would be part of a "multi-pollutant strategy" targeting SO2, 
NOx, and mercury – though specifically excluding CO2 from regulation.
48 The EPA also 
began an administrative strategy to revamp the NSR program by developing regulations 
greatly expanding the number of modifications that would fall under "routine 
maintenance."49  
 Amid the Bush Administration's legislative and administrative attempt to revamp 
and replace the NSR process, the SAGs received somewhat of a pleasant surprise when 
the federal DOJ completed its review of the NSR cases by concluding that the "EPA 
reasonably may conclude that the enforcement actions are consistent with the Clean Air 
Act and its regulations."50 Thus, the existing NSR suits could move forward as a matter of 
law, leaving it to the EPA to decide whether this was good policy.51 Eliot Spitzer, not 
surprisingly, took this as a "stamp of approval" for his lawsuits, though he suggested 
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that the EPA's parallel administrative actions on NSR might turn the DOJ's report into 
mere "disingenuous camouflage of another capitulation to the President’s industry 
supporters."52 
 From the SAGs' perspective, this is precisely what occurred. Following the DOJ's 
report, DOJ and EPA's respective approaches to NSR enforcement took on a somewhat 
schizophrenic quality. The DOJ forged ahead with the NSR suits it inherited from the 
Clinton Administration, setting trial dates and in some cases settling some of the 
lawsuits.53 The EPA, meanwhile, simultaneously moved forward with an attempt to 
administratively eliminate the central basis of both the DOJ's and the SAGs' NSR 
lawsuits.54 Reports also emerged that the EPA would drop any new NSR enforcement 
cases against major sources as part of any effort it viewed as changing the NSR 
requirements through litigation or regulatory enforcement.55 
It was in this context that the SAGs' relationship with federal enforcers 
continued to deteriorate. This was especially true after both Cinergy and Virginia Electric 
Power refused to sign consent decrees and backed out of their respective agreements in 
principle signed back in 2000. The departing head of the EPA's Office of Regulatory 
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Enforcement (who had previously served under the Clinton Administration) charged the 
Bush Administration with sabotaging settlement negotiations in these cases. As he put 
it, "companies with whom we were close to settlement have walked away from the 
table...[w]e were getting settlements, and getting it done. The companies that settled 
must be feeling pretty stupid now."56 Members of Congress later repeated this criticism, 
particularly after a General Accounting Office report suggested that other EPA staff 
members believed the agency's NSR approach negatively affected the existing 
litigation.57 The Office of Inspector General simultaneously concluded that the new EPA 
rules "seriously hampered" the existing enforcement efforts.58 
In response, EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman claimed that the Bush 
Administration maintained a "firm commitment to fully enforcing our environmental 
laws," pointing to its participation in finally bringing the Virginia Electric Power 
negotiations to a final settlement in 2003 (along with the SAGs).59 Nevertheless, the 
SAGs asserted that in contrast to the "enthusiastic collaboration" between the Clinton 
Administration EPA and the states in these suits, the collaboration between them and 
"the highest levels" of the Bush Administration was at best grudging.60 They noted, for 
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example, that the Virginia Electric Power settlement was identical to the agreement in 
principle reached two-and-a-half years earlier. The only reason the deal was delayed, 
the SAGs argued, was because the company was holding out for a better deal. The Bush 
Administration would be perfectly willing to give them this deal, the SAGs claimed, if it 
had not been for the SAGs' involvement. Indeed, the SAGs claimed that without their 
continued involvement in the lawsuits, no settlements would have been possible at all. 
"The administration would really prefer the aggressive states to go away," a top 
attorney in the New York SAG's office charged.61  
The SAGs continued their uncomfortable relationship with the Bush 
Administration concerning the NSR suits throughout the administration's tenure. The 
posture was complicated because of the diverging enforcement approaches of the DOJ 
and the EPA. In 2003, for example, the DOJ and the SAGs together achieved a major 
victory at trial against Ohio Edison, persuading the federal District Court judge that the 
utility's plant modifications were not "routine maintenance" and thus were performed 
without Ohio Edison receiving the required NSR permits.62 Prior to the subsequent 
remedy portion of the trial, however, Ohio Edison argued that in considering remedies, 
the court should consider that under the EPA's new NSR rules, Ohio Edison's "violations" 
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of the CAA would not be violations at all.63 The EPA's actions thus supplied industry 
defendants with legal ammunition in the government prosecutors' case against them. 
This continued tension between active enforcement by the DOJ and what 
appeared to be undermining it through EPA rulemaking convinced SAGs to renew their 
vow to press on with all of their NSR lawsuits, regardless of the federal government's 
enforcement posture. In reaction to the reports that the EPA would drop all new 
enforcement actions, Eliot Spitzer called upon the EPA to turn over its enforcement files 
to the states so they could take the lead on these lawsuits independently.64 In 2004, a 
trio of SAGs, led by Spitzer, filed a NSR lawsuit against a utility without any federal 
enforcers for the first time.65 While the federal government was not involved in this suit, 
the SAGs used EPA compliance data and DOJ briefs filed in existing or settled NSR cases 
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to help compensate for the missing federal resources of the DOJ.66 One industry 
attorney involved in the Ohio Edison case noted that this and other state NSR 
investigations and lawsuits were important in the politics of NSR because "[i]t keeps the 
NSR issue alive, at least periodically," even as the Bush EPA attempted to replace NSR 
altogether with a different regulatory strategy.67 
2. Lawsuits Against the Bush Administration's EPA 
As the SAGs pressed ahead with their Clinton-era interpretation of "routine 
maintenance" in their NSR lawsuits, they coupled their innovative litigation strategy 
under §304 with lawsuits aimed at blocking the EPA's attempt at altering NSR through 
administrative rulemaking.  These rules became more prominent when the Bush 
Administration's Clear Skies legislation, which would have replaced key elements of the 
NSR program with a cap-and-trade system for SO2, NOx, and mercury, stalled in 
Congress when the bill failed to move out of the Senate Environment Committee.68 With 
Clear Skies facing little prospect of passage in Congress, the EPA pursued parallel plans 
to achieve the essential contours of Clear Skies via administrative rulemaking.  
The EPA finalized its first set of rules pertaining to NSR in November 2002, basing 
them upon proposed rules first announced by the EPA during the Clinton Administration 
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in 1996. The new rules would establish plant-wide emission caps allowing facilities to 
make changes within a plant as long as the emissions did not exceed the plant-wide cap. 
This marked an important change from the current rules, which subjected all individual 
emissions units within a plant to NSR such that an increase in emissions from any one of 
them would trigger the permitting process.  The rules would also establish a ten-year 
grace period allowing "clean units" recently receiving NSR permits to continue making 
modifications without triggering NSR. In addition, the rules would exempt certain 
"pollution control projects" from NSR applicability when sources installed technology 
that, while reducing emissions of one pollutant, had the effect of increase the emissions 
of others. Finally, the rules would change the calculation of emission baselines to 
include only "projected actual emissions" rather than "projected potential emissions," 
thereby making NSR less likely for most plants.69 The EPA claimed these rules would be 
better for the environment than the current program, because the current system 
created disincentives for utilities to invest in clean technologies by subjecting too broad 
a range of modifications to expensive NSR procedures. By allowing more flexibility for 
industry, the EPA claimed, the rules would result in cleaner and more efficient 
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factories.70 These rules generated considerable controversy, and received more public 
comments than any EPA rule previously in its history.71 
A number of SAGs immediately entered the fray, accusing the Bush 
Administration of "endangering air quality by gutting a key component" of NSR,72 with 
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal accusing the administration of 
"appeas[ing] the energy industry by sacrificing the lives of people in the Northeast."73 
The SAGs filed a lawsuit against the EPA in late December 2002 challenging the new 
package of rules (New York v. EPA). Led by Eliot Spitzer and initially joined by eight (and 
eventually growing to thirteen) additional SAGs,74 the SAGs argued that these rules 
represented an arbitrary and capricious reading of several key terms phrases in the 
NSR's statutory language. In particular, the SAG petitioners' key argument was that 
"modifications" under NSR were required whenever a change "increases the amount of 
any air pollutant."75 By contrast, they argued, the EPA's new rules resulted in an 
impermissible interpretation of the meaning of "increases" in that provision (though the 
term was not defined by the CAA).  
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A bevy of amici eventually joined the SAGs, including a group of several 
Democratic Senators that included Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry.76 
Meanwhile, several industry groups sought to defend the rules from the SAGs' 
challenge. For example, the National Association of Manufacturers mobilized against the 
SAG suits, asking its member companies to contribute between $500 and $5,000 to 
defend the regulations.77 The litigation was eventually consolidated with a variety of 
industry challenges to existing NSR rules. 
The SAGs lost on their initial attempt to achieve a stay of the rules in 2003,78 but 
the D.C. Circuit's decision in 2005 granted the SAGs a victory on several of their 
challenges. While the court upheld the EPA's emission baseline rule and the plant-wide 
emission caps, it vacated both the "clean units" grace period as well as the NSR 
exemption for certain pollution control projects. The court also rejected all of the 
industry contentions that the existing NSR regulations resulted in too strict regulations.79 
The SAGs viewed the decision as "a victory for clean air and for accountability." Eliot 
Spitzer went on to note that "*t+oday’s court decision fully upholds the basis of all of our 
enforcement cases against coal-fired power plants – that plant modifications that 
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increase air pollution must be accompanied by the installation of pollution controls on 
smokestacks."80 
At the same time that the SAGs' challenges to these NSR rules worked their way 
towards resolution, the SAGs continued their approach of suing the federal government 
directly by challenging another key new EPA rule, the "Equipment Replacement 
Provision" ("ERP"). This EPA rule, issued in October 2003, sought to expand the NSR 
exemption concerning "routine maintenance." In particular, it would exempt from NSR 
the replacement of any components of a process unit that costs less than 20% of the 
replacement value of the process unit.81 The purpose of this was to reduce substantially 
the number of smaller equipment changes subject to NSR. These efforts, like the 
previous NSR rules finalized by the EPA, aimed to eliminate another disincentive for 
electric utilities to replace inefficient equipment.82  
A SAG coalition similar to the previous iteration in NSR cases brought a lawsuit 
against the ERP (New York v. EPA, known as "New York II"), claiming that they would be 
harmed by the increased SO2 and NOx emissions allegedly resulting from the rule.
83 The 
plaintiff SAGs argued that the ERP was contrary to the plain text of §111(a)(4) of the 
CAA because the definition of "modification" in that section, which applies to NSR, 
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applies to "any physical change" resulting in increased emissions.84 The EPA claimed that 
the words "any" and "physical change" were both ambiguous, and interpretation of 
these provisions should be left to the agency. In this case, several SAGs intervened on 
the side of the EPA, arguing that vacating the ERP would have a negative effect on them, 
"by increasing the costs of enforcement, constricting their enforcement options, and 
frustrating the achievement of the Act's pollution control goals in a more efficient and 
cost-effective manner."85 
The plaintiff SAGs obtained a stay of the ERP in December 2003, a decision 
Spitzer described as "one of the most important environmental victories in many 
years."86 In 2006, the plaintiff SAGs ultimately achieved an even larger victory in the case 
when the D.C. Circuit vacated the ERP. According to the Court, "the petitioners' 
approach, by adopting an expansive reading of the phrase 'any physical change,' gives 
natural effect to all the words used by Congress and reflects both their common 
meanings and Congress's purpose in enacting the 1970 and 1977 amendments."87 This 
successful agency-challenging litigation marked a significant setback to the Bush 
Administration's administrative approach to reforming NSR. 
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While New York I and II were two of the most significant SAG challenges to the 
EPA's attempt to modify NSR, SAGs brought a number of additional NSR-related 
challenges as well. While I do not discuss all of them here, I note that while SAGs 
brought most of these challenges because of concerns about acid rain damage caused 
by increased SO2 and NOx emissions, the SAGs also incorporated their NSR challenges 
into their climate change litigation campaign (which is discussed at length later in this 
chapter). In particular, they challenged the Bush Administration's decision to exclude 
CO2 from its pollution reduction strategy concentrating on SO2, NOx and mercury. For 
example, in yet another case titled New York v. EPA filed in the D.C. Circuit, several SAGs 
claimed that the CAA obligated the EPA to update its emission standards for major 
stationary sources to include CO2 emissions from these sources. Under §111(b(1)(B) of 
the CAA, the EPA is required to review and if appropriate revise air pollution standards 
for major stationary sources every eight years.88 The SAGs argued that the EPA had 
failed to review the standards for at least two decades, and were under a non-
discretionary duty under §111 to do so. Further, because scientific evidence had 
established that "carbon dioxide emissions cause global warming, resulting in significant 
harm to health and the environment," the EPA should regulate CO2 as a pollutant under 
the CAA.89 The parties eventually voluntarily dismissed this case when the Obama 
Administration EPA announced that it would begin regulating CO2 under the CAA. The 
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story of how we got to this point – a story in which the SAGs played a crucial role – is the 
subject of the following section. 
FROM SO2 TO CO2: THE SAG CAMPAIGN ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
The jumble of litigation strategies SAGs brought to frustrate the Bush 
Administration's regulatory approach to SO2 and acid rain in the NSR context were also 
emblematic of the litigation SAGs brought to challenge the Administration's perceived 
unwillingness to address the emerging issue of climate change and the regulation of CO2 
and other GHGs. The key difference between the approaches is that while the CAA dealt 
with the issue of SO2 and acid rain following the 1990 Amendments, Congress rejected 
the regulation of CO2 when it enacted those amendments. To get around this purposeful 
omission, the SAGs pursued parallel strategies in court to force the federal government 
to begin regulating CO2. It was here that the SAGs achieved their most important air 
pollution victory in Massachusetts v. EPA. At the same time that the Massachusetts 
litigation proceeded, the SAGs expanded upon the private utility litigation developed in 
the NSR cases to build additional pressure for industry CO2 reductions. 
a) Climate Change as a Scientific and Political Issue 
The potential harmful environmental effects of greenhouse gases90 became an 
increasingly major topic in the scientific community in the 1970s, when various studies 
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indicated that worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide, a key GHG, had increased rapidly 
and could lead to major temperature changes. By the late 1970s, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration was estimating that CO2 emissions would likely double 
by 2025, causing a "greenhouse effect" that would mainly result in higher temperatures 
worldwide.91 A number of scientific studies at this time suggested that the best way to 
deal with this buildup of GHGs would be to limit the total usage of fossil fuels 
worldwide.92 
While most of the attention to air pollution during this period focused on 
problems of smog and acid rain, the EPA noted the potential dangers of the greenhouse 
effect as early as 1980.93 Even so, there was still a good deal of uncertainty of climate-
altering effects of GHGs. When the EPA published a major report on the subject in 1983, 
suggesting that climate change could have a number of potentially serious effects on the 
global environment, Administrator William Ruckelshaus expressed skepticism of its 
findings. Even the National Academy of Sciences did not see the same urgency to the 
issue that this one EPA report did.94  
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Despite the scientific uncertainty, the issue of greenhouse gases continued to 
pick up steam as a political issue throughout the 1980s and became more of a priority 
among environmental groups. The Environmental Defense Fund, for example, issued a 
major report in 1988 concluding that higher temperatures would bring about major 
flooding and changes to the world’s animal and plant life.95 Another EPA analysis 
followed this report, suggesting that global warming could destroy up to 80% of the 
nation’s coastlines in the next century.96 
1. The Rocky Road to Rio and Kyoto 
The increasing salience of GHGs' effect on climate change as a political issue 
resulted in various attempts to deal with the potential problem both domestically and 
internationally. Then-Representative Albert Gore (D-TN) co-sponsored the first 
congressional hearings to study the potential implications of global warming. The first 
major bill aimed at controlling greenhouse gases was introduced in the Senate in 1988, 
with the bill calling for a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions by the year 2000.
97 The EPA 
continued to express concern about the issue, issuing reports and focusing on federal 
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agency actions potentially affecting global warming.98 In 1990, the Bush Administration 
established the State and Local Climate Change Program, which provided grants and 
technical assistance to the states to develop the capacity to deal with climate change.99 
Congress also enacted the Global Change Research Act the same year, requiring periodic 
reports to Congress regarding the environmental and economic consequences of 
climate change.100 
Despite these early efforts, Congress and the George H.W. Bush Administration 
were wary of stronger proposals. In the CAA of 1990, Congress did not include GHGs 
among the substances the EPA would regulate, concentrating instead on pollutants 
causing acid rain, such as SO2 and NOx. In fact, Congress explicitly removed all 
references to GHGs except for a reference in Title VI dealing with stratospheric ozone 
protection, in which the EPA Administrator was directed to "publish the global warming 
potential" of various listed GHGs. This section explicitly stated, however, that this brief 
reference to GHGs was "not to be construed to be the basis of any additional regulation 
under this chapter."101 The Bush Administration also separated itself from the World 
Climate Conference held in Geneva in November 1990, claiming that climate change 
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research was not well developed enough to justify the economic costs of curbing 
GHGs.102 
Meanwhile, environmental groups turned to both the local and international 
levels to pursue GHG controls. By the end of 1991, a "patchwork of state laws on ozone 
depletion and global warming [had] evolved at the state and local level before national 
standards," including ordinances banning specific uses of ozone-depleting GHGs.103 
Internationally, negotiations for a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change ("Framework Convention") in advance of the Earth Summit held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 provided additional impetus for political action on climate change. 
Initially, the Bush Administration withheld support for these negotiations, but eventually 
pledged American support for the effort.104 President Bush signed and the Senate 
ratified the Framework Convention, which set schedules and standards for reducing 
greenhouse gases on the part of the ratifying nations, but contained no binding 
commitments.105 
The United States' involvement in the Framework Convention, as well as the 
local initiatives bubbling up from the states, appeared to set the stage for eventual 
binding international commitments and national domestic policy action on climate 
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change. President Clinton, fresh off his electoral victory, announced on Earth Day in 
1993 that his Administration would commit to reductions of GHGs to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000.106 Clinton began to implement several voluntary initiatives to control GHG 
emissions,107 and legislation in Congress proposed to create a GHG emissions trading 
scheme similar to the acid rain cap-and-trade program established by the CAA of 
1990.108 Now Vice-President, Al Gore continued to voice his long-standing concern about 
climate change by taking a highly visible role in promoting action on the issue, 
particularly through his best-selling book Earth in the Balance and his oft-repeated 
refrain that GHGs represented "the world’s most important environmental threat."109 
Gore claimed that President Clinton was finally clearing the "gridlock" that occurred 
under the Bush Administration on the issue of climate change. 
Then came the 1994 elections. Riding a wave of voter discontent, Republicans 
swept into control of Congress and pledged to reduce the size and powers of the federal 
government. Republicans in the House quickly voted to freeze the implementation of 
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most new regulations,110 and the House majority whip introduced seven pieces of 
legislation to repeal the CAA of 1990 and other regulations arising from the CAA.111 
House Republicans also sought to cut the EPA’s budget by one-third, eventually passing 
a 14% cut to the agency (later vetoed by Clinton).112 Most famously, battles over the 
budget led to a partial government shutdown, forcing the EPA and many other 
government agencies to furlough employees.113 
It was clear that President Clinton could not expect to enact major new domestic 
environmental legislation related to climate change in this political environment. 
Further, it was becoming clear that any future international agreements were going to 
be much tougher to shepherd through the Senate. For example, Senator Frank 
Murkowski (R-AK), Chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, 
warned the Administration that the Senate would not go along with any international 
protocol that would impose an economic hardship on the United States.114 Other 
Republicans in the Senate expressed similar concerns, particularly to the extent that 
greenhouse gas cuts would be "legally binding" and hurt the economy.115 Additionally, 
there was additional pushback on how serious the problem of climate change was, as 
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well as the accuracy of the theory that human-emitted GHGs cause global warming in 
the first place.116 The League of Conservation Voters' annual scorecard claimed that 
congressional polarization over issues of the environment had reached its highest point 
in at least 25 years.117 
With many of his proposals meeting a hostile audience in Congress, President 
Clinton placed renewed emphasis on international diplomacy concerning climate 
change. The United States participated in a pair of meetings among the parties to the 
Framework Convention, and the Clinton Administration endorsed the Berlin Mandates 
calling for the development of binding emission targets, exempting developing nations 
from formal engagement in the process, and setting up further rounds of negotiation.118 
Amid international reports outlining the link between human activity and climate 
change and growing international pressure for nations to act on the issue,119 the Clinton 
Administration proposed a new global agreement on climate change in January 1997. In 
advance of the next major meeting of the parties to the Framework Convention in 
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Kyoto, Japan, the Administration called for an amendment to the 1992 Framework 
Convention setting up an international cap-and-trade system for GHGs.120 
The Clinton Administration's forays into international negotiations on climate 
change received increasingly negative responses in Congress. Clinton's congressional 
critics argued that the United States should hold developing and industrialized countries 
to similar commitments for reducing GHGs under any international treaty on climate 
change. As he had in the acid rain debates, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) took a leading 
role in the fight against additional pollution reduction targets, sponsoring a resolution 
with Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) expressing strong Senatorial opposition to any 
international GHG emission cuts that did not include developing countries or that 
"would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States."121 This Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution unanimously passed the Senate 95-0, leading several Senators to describe 
the resolution as a "treaty killer."122 
The Clinton Administration nevertheless pressed ahead with its international 
efforts. Somewhat surprisingly, given the failure to achieve agreement in earlier 
negotiations,123 the parties to the Framework Convention reached an agreement at 
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Kyoto in part because of several U.S. concessions on aspects of the agreement.124  For 
the first time, industrialized nations agreed to mandatory GHG emission reduction 
targets for six GHGs, including CO2.
125 These varied from country to country, with the 
United States pledging to meet a standard seven percent below 1990 levels within the 
next ten to fourteen years.126 
2. The Decline and Fall of Kyoto in Congress 
The Kyoto agreement came under attack immediately from industry groups and 
Senate Republicans, who claimed that the treaty would devastate the economy and 
allow developing countries to avoid deep emission cuts. Senate leaders warned that the 
treaty was "dead on arrival" if it reached the Senate.127 Congress also made clear in a 
budget rider that it would prevent Clinton from trying to implement any aspects of the 
Kyoto Treaty through administrative regulation, including one that would prevent the 
EPA from using funds to "develop, propose, or issue rules, regulations, decrees or orders 
for the purpose of implementation, or in contemplation of implementation" of Kyoto.128 
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President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in November of 1998 following an 
unexpectedly positive Democratic showing in the midterm elections129 and after Clinton 
had won some assurances that developing nations would accede to the same binding 
emission reduction targets as developed nations.130 However, despite an effort by the 
Clinton Administration to delay Senate consideration of the treaty to win more time to 
build support for it, it became clear that Congress was not going to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol at any point in the near future. Instead, several members of Congress 
emphasized voluntary mechanisms as the only politically possible approaches to climate 
change-related legislation.131 Abandoning much of an attempt to build support for the 
Protocol, Clinton left office without ever submitting the treaty to Congress.132 
3. The Clinton Administration's Parting Shot: The Cannon and Guzy 
Statements 
The Senate had already expressed its displeasure with the Kyoto Protocol 
through the unanimously adopted Byrd-Hagel resolution in 1997, but several 
congressmen were concerned that the Clinton Administration would attempt to pursue 
the spirit of the Protocol through administrative regulation. In addition to adopting 
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budget riders preventing the EPA's use of any funds used to implement the Protocol 
through regulation, Congress repeatedly pressed EPA officials to reveal fully their 
approach to GHGs. During budget hearings on the EPA's Fiscal Year 1999 appropriations, 
Representative Tom DeLay (R-TX) asked Administrator Browner whether the EPA 
believed it had authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA. The EPA responded 
a few weeks later with a memorandum from Jonathan Cannon, the EPA General 
Counsel, concluding that CO2 satisfied the definition of "air pollutant" under §302(g) of 
the CAA.133 This section of the CAA defines "air pollutant" as: 
 
any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any 
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, 
special nuclear material, and by-product material) substance or matter 
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term 
includes any precursors to the formation of any air pollutant, to the 
extent that the Administrator has identified such precursor or precursors 
for the particular purpose for which the term "air pollutant" is used.134 
 
Cannon noted that because this "broad definition" included "any" physical, chemical, 
biological, or radioactive matter that "enters the ambient air," CO2 must fall within the 
statutory definition. He noted that this was the case even for substances like CO2 that 
are naturally present in the air. Nevertheless, Cannon stated, the CAA also requires the 
EPA to issue a finding that CO2 is "reasonably anticipated to cause or contribute to 
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adverse effects on public health, welfare, or the environment" (otherwise known as an 
"endangerment finding").135 This, Cannon noted, the EPA had to date declined to do. 
 Cannon's memorandum displeased members of Congress worried that 
Administrator Browner would take the next step of declaring that CO2 does have 
"adverse effects on public health, welfare, or the environment." Two key environmental 
subcommittees held a joint hearing in 1999 asking: "Is CO2 A Pollutant and Does EPA 
Have the Power to Regulate It?136 In response to both these questions, the new EPA 
General Counsel, Gary Guzy, answered in the affirmative. As did Cannon, Guzy noted 
that §302(g) defined "air pollutant" very broadly – broadly enough to encompass CO2.
137 
He went on to emphasize that the CAA does not limit itself to localized pollutants. In 
1970, he noted, Congress stated in the act that consideration of a pollutant's effects on 
welfare "includes, but is not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation … 
weather, visibility, and climate." "Thus, since 1970, the Clean Air Act has included effects 
on ‘climate’ as a factor to be considered in *EPA's+ decision as to whether to list an air 
pollutant under Section 108."138 Guzy emphasized, however, that despite this authority, 
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the "Administration has no intention of implementing the Kyoto Protocol prior to its 
ratification on the advice and consent of the Senate."139 
b) The Backdoor to CO2 Controls: Massachusetts v. EPA 
1. The Initial Petition to the EPA 
 Counsel Guzy made these comments before the joint subcommittee on October 
6, 1999. Exactly two weeks later, a group of eighteen environmental interest groups 
filed a rulemaking petition to the EPA, arguing that the CAA obligated the agency to 
regulate greenhouse gases because of the harm global warming presented to the 
environment and human health. Specifically, the petition claimed that the EPA had a 
non-discretionary duty to regulate GHGs under §202(a)(1) of the CAA, which deals with 
motor vehicle emission standards (mobile sources).140  
According to the petition, the EPA's mandatory duty was clear since the 
statutory language in §202 stated that the Administrator "shall by regulation 
prescribe...standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from [new motor 
vehicles], which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare" (emphasis added). The 
petition cited Cannon's memo and Guzy's testimony in arguing that the EPA itself 
considered CO2 to be an "air pollutant." Once the EPA makes that determination, the 
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groups claimed, the "shall" language of §202 required the EPA to act following an 
endangerment finding.141 The petition noted that an endangerment finding does not 
require proof of "actual harm" and instead allows the Administrator to make such a 
precautionary finding under the "reasonably be anticipated" language of §202. The 
groups then cited several reports and statements from the EPA and other agencies 
noting the potentially adverse effects of global warming. The petition claimed these 
previous statements triggered the EPA's mandatory duty to regulate GHG emissions 
from mobile sources under §202(a)(1). 
 The petitioning environmental interest groups threatened litigation if the EPA 
did not make a decision on the petition within the statutorily imposed eighteen-month 
requirement.142 With less than 18 months before leaving office and Congress lined up 
against any attempt to regulate GHGs, the Clinton Administration opted to leave this 
issue to the next administration and took no action on the petition. 
2. The Bush Administration Takes the Stage 
The groups' petition was thus still outstanding when the Clinton Administration 
left office in January 2001, leaving the question of the EPA's duties under §202 in limbo. 
The results of the famously divisive 2000 presidential election, meanwhile, signaled that 
reducing GHGs emissions would remain on the national back burner. Despite his tapping 
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of Christine Whitman as EPA Administrator, who had overseen several climate change 
initiatives as Governor of New Jersey, incoming President George W. Bush took a much 
different approach to climate change issues than the previous Clinton Administration.  
The first indication occurred when he announced his plan in March 2001 to 
remove the United States from any further international negotiations for the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.143 Bush also reversed a campaign pledge by 
stating that he would not seek to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants, with his 
press secretary noting that the Administration would pursue a "multi-pollutant strategy" 
but that including CO2 as a pollutant during the campaign was "a mistake."
144 The Bush 
Administration also made clear that its focus on the issue would be limited to continuing 
and modifying some of the voluntary initiatives developed earlier.145 Congress, 
meanwhile, was considering a number of proposals to deal with climate change, 
including a CO2 cap-and-trade bill introduced by Senators McCain and Lieberman.
146 
These efforts, however, ran up against the common criticism that CO2 regulation would 
be too expensive and would raise costs on consumers. With sentiment against GHG 
regulation still strong in Congress, and the Bush Administration signaling that it would 
not make the issue a priority, the prospects for congressional action remained dim. 
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With action on climate change seemingly stymied on both the national and 
international levels, advocates for GHG emission reductions continued to seek other 
avenues for policy development. As documented by Barry Rabe in his excellent study of 
state-based climate change policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the failure of the 
United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the lack of priority placed on the issue by 
the Bush Administration meant that the issue "devolved on a de facto basis in the 
United States to subnational units."147 As Rabe documents, a number of Governors and 
state legislatures in the early 2000s enacted climate change policy on the state level.148 
While this state action was occurring, SAGs also became considerably involved in 
climate policy, building upon their earlier efforts on acid rain in dramatic ways. Unlike 
the actions of individual Governors or state legislatures, however, SAGs used their chief 
policy tool of litigation to try and explicitly accomplish national policy changes during an 
era in which national policy development on the issue was not forthcoming. 
At the same time that they were skirmishing with the EPA and DOJ on NSR 
enforcement concerning SO2 emissions, several SAGs entered the fray challenging the 
Bush Administration's approach to CO2. In July 2002, eleven SAGs sent a letter to 
President Bush urging the administration to take stronger action on climate change, 
including backing CO2 cap-and-trade legislation.
149 Because climate change was the 
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"most pressing environmental challenge of the 21st century," the Administration's 
"completely AWOL" approach to the issue would lead to "catastrophic" effects both 
environmentally and economically.150 The SAGs also noted, "[c]ontinued federal inaction 
will inevitably lead to a wider range of state regulatory efforts," warning that "[i]n 
addition, states and others are beginning to review their litigation efforts."151 James 
Milkey, the head of the Environmental Protection Division of the Massachusetts SAG's 
office, noted that there was not yet consensus on the mechanisms or timeframe for 
such litigation. Nevertheless, he stated, "[t]here is power in numbers" and noted that as 
more states take legal actions, they would be more likely to change national policy.152 
The Bush Administration, for their part, denied that there was any "leadership 
vacuum" on climate change, pointing to the voluntary initiatives promoted by the 
Administration.153 This voluntary strategy included creating new tax credits for GHG 
reductions, funding for research into new clean technologies, and a plan to encourage 
companies to track and report their emissions so that companies could gain credits for 
use in any future emissions trading program. This, the administration argued, would be 
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an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol that would reduce CO2 emissions while 
simultaneously balancing the need for a strong economy.154 
Needless to say, this voluntary approach did not satisfy the various 
environmental interest groups who had filed the original 1999 petition concerning GHG 
regulation under §202. The EPA had not yet acted on their petition by December 2002, 
and the groups sued the EPA in an attempt to force the EPA to act on the petition within 
60 days.155 The filing came a day after EPA Administrator Whitman stated her position 
that "carbon dioxide is not a Clean Air Act pollutant" in the same way that criteria 
pollutants (including SO2) involved in the Administration’s Clear Skies initiative "directly 
impact[ing] human health" were.156 Once the groups filed this suit, the EPA claimed they 
were still working through the backlog of comments filed after the agency's public 
comment period on the issue, which had closed the previous May of 2001.157 
A few weeks after the environmental interest groups filed their suit, several 
SAGs joined in the effort to force the EPA to take on climate change. Initially, however, 
they took a different legal approach than the environmental groups did in their mobile 
sources petition. In January of 2003, the SAGs of Connecticut, Maine, and 
Massachusetts announced their intent to sue the EPA to force it to list CO2 as a "criteria 
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pollutant" under §108 of the CAA, which would then obligate the agency to set NAAQS 
standards for CO2 under §109. The SAGs formally brought the suit, Massachusetts v. 
Whitman, in the U.S. District Court for Connecticut in June 2003.158 Quoting the earlier 
comments by Cannon and Guzy, the SAGs claimed in the complaint that the EPA had 
already declared CO2 to be an "air pollutant" and has subsequently made judgments 
that climate change harmed human health and welfare. Because of this, the SAGs 
claimed, §108 obligated the EPA to list CO2 as a criteria pollutant.
159 The states also 
identified specific harms to their economic and property interests due to the 
"reasonably anticipated effects" of global warming, including damage to coastal 
shorelines and beaches, water quality problems, and damage to agricultural and 
forestry resources.160  
This strategy was explicitly based upon a lawsuit by the NRDC back in 1976 that 
successfully forced the EPA to list lead as a criteria pollutant – the last time that a 
pollutant was added to the list.161 This NAAQS strategy differed from the mobile sources 
strategy in that it directly sought to compel the EPA to regulate GHG emissions from 
stationary sources, complementing the litigation strategy several SAGs were developing 
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in the context of NSR. Because of the wide scope of the lawsuit, one environmental 
interest group attorney noted that Massachusetts v. Whitman represented "one of the 
boldest legal moves a state attorney general has ever made," likening the scope of the 
actions to the tobacco litigation of the 1990s.162 
Meanwhile, on August 28, 2003, the EPA settled the interest group mobile 
sources litigation by denying the long-pending rulemaking petition.163 In a formal legal 
opinion issued shortly after the denial, the EPA stated that the agency could not and 
should not regulate GHGs from motor vehicles under the CAA. Formally withdrawing 
both the Cannon memorandum and Guzy's testimony, the denial of the petition argued 
that Congress had never intended for CO2 to be an "air pollutant" under the CAA.
164 
However, "even if CO2 were an air pollutant generally subject to regulation under the 
CAA, Congress has not authorized the Agency to regulate CO2 emissions from motor 
vehicles to the extent such standards would effectively regulate car and light truck fuel 
economy, which is governed by a comprehensive statute administered" by the 
Department of Transportation.165 In addition, the EPA argued such regulation is "not 
appropriate at this time" because the agency was already taking a number of actions, 
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domestically and internationally, to address climate change.166 These other programs, 
the EPA explained, made for better policy at this time than regulating CO2 under the 
CAA. This was due to both the uncertainty of climate change research as well as the 
broad economic impacts such regulation would have. Along with the denial of the 
interest group petition, the EPA on the same day filed a motion to dismiss the SAGs' 
§108 lawsuit, arguing that the SAGs should have brought the case in the D.C. Circuit.167 
3. The Interest Group and SAG Strategies Combine 
The EPA's denial of the interest group mobile sources petition led to a swift 
response from the involved interest groups, as well as a shift in strategy for the SAGs. 
On September 3, 2003, only a few days following the EPA's denial and motion to dismiss 
Massachusetts v. Whitman, the three SAGs involved in Whitman announced that they 
would file a lawsuit in the D.C. Circuit challenging the EPA's denial of the environmental 
groups' petition. The SAGs filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Whitman without 
prejudice the same day. According to the plaintiff SAGs, "[w]e are still focused on global 
warming as the problem, we just changed our approach to solving it and decided to take 
EPA head on" at the appellate level.168 
This new approach marked the birth of Massachusetts v. EPA. On October 23, 
2003, a large coalition of SAGs, cities, and interest groups joined forces to challenge the 
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EPA's petition denial in the D.C. Circuit.169 This included twelve SAGs as well as the 
environmental interest groups that had filed the original petition in 1999.170 The twelve 
plaintiff SAGs, all Democrats, included all of the SAGs from New England – with the 
notable absence of New Hampshire's Republican Attorney General – as well those from 
New York, New Jersey, Illinois, New Mexico, Washington, Oregon, and California.  
The petition contained many of the same arguments the environmental 
petitioners had presented in their original 1999 petition. The petition argued that the 
"plain language" of the CAA authorized the EPA to regulate emissions of CO2, and that 
the §202 mobile source provision obligates the EPA to regulate CO2 as an "air pollutant" 
under the act. The petition again cited the Guzy and Cannon memos as evidence that 
the EPA believed that it already had the authority to regulate GHGs. 
These SAGs worked closely with the involved public interest groups during the 
early litigation process, with Connecticut SAG Richard Blumenthal noting that, like the 
tobacco cases of the 1990s, gaining success in climate change litigation "will take 
perseverance and fortitude by State Attorneys General and their allies, such as the 
National Resources Defense Council (NRDC)…we form alliances that are greater than the 
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sum of their parts."171 A lead attorney from the NRDC likewise noted the benefits of 
working together with the SAGs when he noted that the NRDC was "delighted to be 
working with the Attorneys General office and really delighted with Dick’s *Blumenthal+ 
early leadership on these issues [including Massachusetts v. EPA]. We did have breakfast 
together and something did happen, because Dick went back and assigned a couple of 
his best staff to work on this and made contacts with other Attorneys General 
offices."172 
This joint SAG-public interest group lawsuit would wind its way through the 
courts, ultimately resulting in a major victory at the Supreme Court. Before turning to 
the resolution and implications of Massachusetts v. EPA, however, I turn first to a 
second parallel strategy the SAGs pursued while their agency-forcing litigation in 
Massachusetts remained pending. During a time when the prospects of climate change 
legislation in Congress remained dim and SAGs skirmished with the Bush EPA over a 
host of air pollution control issues, several SAGs built upon the innovative approach 
Eliot Spitzer and other northeastern SAGs had championed in their earlier NSR lawsuits 
to now address CO2. 
                                                          
171
 "Forum: The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy," Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 30 (2005): 342. 
172
 Ibid., 344. 
302 
 
c) Expanding the Utility Strategy to CO2: Connecticut v. American Electric Power 
The announcement of NSR lawsuits under §304 brought by Eliot Spitzer and 
joined by seven additional SAGs back in September of 1999 marked that first time that 
SAGs brought multistate lawsuits against private utilities to reduce SO2 emissions. It also 
served as a precedent for another "a new legal frontier in the fight against global 
warming"173 against several private utilities based on those utilities' CO2 emissions. In 
July of 2004, another coalition of SAGs announced that they would sue several private 
utilities in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in an effort to 
force them to reduce their emissions of the greenhouse gas.174 The eight SAGs, also all 
Democrats, represented states in the Northeast as well as California, Iowa, and 
Wisconsin.175 In this "groundbreaking" lawsuit, the SAGs sought no monetary damages. 
Instead, they sought an injunction against the five named utility companies to "cap 
[their] carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each 
year for at least a decade."176 SAGs selected these five power companies as defendants 
because they were, according to the EPA emissions data the SAGs used in this case, the 
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nation's five largest emitters of CO2.
177 Not only were these five companies the worst 
polluters "by a substantial margin," according to Eliot Spitzer, but they "have been 
recalcitrant" in acting to address the problem of climate change.178  
However, unlike in the NSR cases brought against private utilities, the SAGs could 
not rely on §304 of the CAA because the CAA did not explicitly provide for CO2 
regulation. To get around this problem – something they were addressing on the 
statutory side through their agency-forcing suit in Massachusetts v. EPA – several SAGs 
used a creative new argument. The complaint sought relief under the federal common 
law of public nuisance and, alternatively, under state law of public nuisance.179 The 
"public nuisance" in this case was global warming, which the SAGs claimed was 
"injurious to the plaintiffs and their citizens and residents."180 These injuries included 
"inter alia, the right to public comfort and safety, the right to protection of vital natural 
resources and public property, and the right to use, enjoy, and preserve the aesthetic 
and ecological values of the natural world."181 
The industry reaction to this suit, Connecticut v. American Electric Power 
("Connecticut v. AEP"), was swift. "This action brings new meaning to the term 'nuisance 
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lawsuit,'" one industry source said in a statement. "The idea that any one company's 
emissions are responsible for global climate change is more political science than 
environmental science."182 U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Thomas Donohue 
argued that the action was "a blatant end-around Congress" and federal and state 
agencies in setting U.S. policy on climate change. Moreover, Donohue continued, not 
only is carbon dioxide "not a pollutant," but the SAGs' complaint "is symptomatic of 
America's legal crisis and yet another example of unwarranted litigation that hurts 
American consumers and destroys jobs."183 Another observer noted that the "sweeping, 
mandatory injunction" sought by the SAGs "would require the court to be involved in 
the operations of the defendants for years."184 Other industry sources noted that the 
suit was unnecessary because the companies had taken voluntary actions under 
President Clinton's "Climate Challenge" program to reduce CO2 emissions, something 
that Eliot Spitzer nevertheless dismissed as "inadequate and inconsequential."185 
 The strong rhetoric from a variety of industry sources was a reflection of the 
potential breadth of the SAGs' new strategy. Because the SAGs based the suit on 
common law legal theories rather than statutory hooks, they did not specify specific 
pollution sources contributing to the "public nuisance." Instead, their complaint pointed 
to all of the defendants' CO2 emissions "from any state where their electric generation 
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operations may be located" as contributing to the "public nuisance."186 Because the 
SAGs' coalition included members from the Northeastern, Midwestern, and Western 
parts of the U.S., they were able to identify a wide variety of alleged harms, such as 
beach erosion in Rhode Island, injuries to agriculture in Iowa and Wisconsin, and harm 
to "chinook salmon, coho salmon and steelhead trout species" in California.187 
Connecticut v. AEP, therefore, potentially reached a far wider range of industries than 
those specific plants identified in the SAGs' §304 NSR lawsuits. 
 The SAGs explicitly noted they intended this lawsuit to have a broad impact 
across the entire electric generation industry. "[W]e are seeking relief that includes no 
money damages . . . [w]e're trying to change the way the [electric power plant] industry 
does business," as Richard Blumenthal put it.188 In response to concern about the 
plausibility of the public nuisance legal theory relied upon in this case, Blumenthal 
noted, "[s]ome may say that the states have no role in this kind of fight or that there's 
no chance of success. To them I would say: think tobacco."189 As with tobacco and the 
SAGs' other climate change litigation in Massachusetts v. EPA, the SAGs worked with a 
number of advocacy groups in this litigation. Several environmental interest groups filed 
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a similar common law-based suit on the same day and in the same court as the SAGs.190 
This private suit was eventually consolidated with the SAGs' suit. 
d) The SAGs Achieve Success in the Courts 
In their acid rain litigation in the 1980s, the plaintiff SAGs achieved some success 
on the lower court levels but saw their successes evaporate when appellate courts 
reversed those early victories. The SAGs' climate change litigation twenty years later 
produced precisely the opposite result. After initially facing losses in the lower courts in 
both Massachusetts v. EPA and Connecticut v. AEP, the SAGs managed to achieve 
success on appeal – and spectacularly so in Massachusetts. The following describes the 
victories in both cases and some of the implications of the SAGs' strategies. 
1. So Long, Chevron: The Courts Respond to Massachusetts v. EPA 
During the time that the plaintiff SAGs' case in Massachusetts v. EPA awaited 
D.C. Circuit review, opposition began to array against it. Ten SAGs, all Republicans, 
intervened on the side of the EPA along with several automobile trade groups.191 As did 
the EPA, the SAG intervenors argued that the court's analysis must be governed by the 
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.192 
Chevron requires courts, when engaging in review of agency actions, to "give effect to 
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the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress" in the underlying statute. If the 
statute is ambiguous, "the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute...[rather,] the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute."193 If this were answered in the affirmative, 
the Court would not disturb the agency's interpretation, reflecting Chevron's aim of 
prodding courts to defer to administrative agencies. Because they claimed the EPA's 
interpretation of the CAA was a reasonable and permissible construction of the CAA, the 
intervenors (and the EPA) argued that Chevron required the court to defer to the EPA's 
decision not to regulate GHGs under the CAA.194 
To defend this interpretation, the intervenor SAGs argued that the CAA's 
establishment of an ambient air approach did not and could not apply to GHG pollutants 
like CO2. Most importantly, CO2 mixes with the earth's atmosphere at much higher 
levels than the ambient air, which makes it difficult to separate CO2 emitted from 
American sources as opposed to international sources. Because the states have no 
mechanisms available to affect CO2 emissions from emissions outside the United States, 
regulating CO2 under the CAA would make it impossible for states to attain their 
required air quality standards under NAAQS where the CO2 pollution was emitted from 
sources outside the country. The intervenor SAGs were thus concerned that the EPA's 
regulation of CO2 under the CAA would trigger NAAQS requirements inevitably resulting 
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in states being in non-attainment status by no fault of their own – much as several SAGs 
had argued was the case in the acid rain litigation of the 1980s.  
In a decision issued in July of 2005, a sharply divided three-judge panel of the 
D.C. Circuit sided with the EPA upholding the agency's decision not to regulate GHGs 
under the CAA.195 The Court did not, however, address the specific concerns highlighted 
by the intervenor SAGs, nor did it decide the question of the EPA's authority to regulate 
GHGs under the CAA. Instead, Judge Arthur Randolph's short opinion decided that the 
EPA had valid reasons not to regulate GHGs. This included the EPA's judgment about the 
scientific uncertainty surrounding the effect of GHGs on climate change, as well as the 
agency's policy judgment that regulating GHGs under §202 would "result in an 
inefficient, piecemeal approach to the climate change issue."196 
The other two judges on the panel offered their own opinions, though for 
opposite reasons. Judge Sentelle concurred in the judgment, but argued that the court 
did not need to reach the issue of whether the EPA had given adequate reasons for not 
regulating GHGs under the CAA. Instead, he concluded that the case was "not justiciable 
in its present form with its present champions in the present forum" because the "EPA is 
correct in its assertion that the petitioners have not demonstrated the element of injury 
necessary to establish standing."197 In particular, the alleged harms claimed by the 
plaintiffs were general harms to "humanity at large," rather than the particularized 
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injury required by the Supreme Court's standing doctrine. Judge Tatel, on the other 
hand, provided a lengthy dissent on much different grounds. He first concluded that at 
least one plaintiff – the Commonwealth of Massachusetts – met the three elements of 
standing articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: "injury, causation, and 
redressability."198 Most importantly, Massachusetts had asserted a "particularized 
injury" with its claims that it faced the loss of its coastal lands, and that this injury was 
caused by climate change.199 Judge Tatel then went on to claim that a plain reading of 
the definition of "air pollutant" in §302(g) of the CAA requires the conclusion that GHGs 
are covered by this statutory definition.200 He then rejected each of the EPA's reasons 
for nevertheless not regulating GHGs under the statute, concluding that the "EPA has 
authority–indeed, the obligation–to regulate their emissions from motor vehicles."201 
The sharp divisions in the D.C. Circuit's opinions gave hope to the plaintiff SAGs 
that the Supreme Court would address the issue, and they pledged to "continue to fight 
to compel the federal government to use its legal authority to address this serious 
problem."202 Nevertheless, the SAGs' role to this point in Massachusetts v. EPA followed 
a similar track as the acid rain agency-forcing litigation of the 1980s – an active 
petitioning and litigation strategy, followed by a loss in the D.C. Circuit. What changed 
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this time, and dramatically so, was that the D.C. Circuit did not have the final word in 
this case. 
Following the D.C. Circuit's denial of en banc review,203 the plaintiff SAGs sought 
Supreme Court review of the D.C. Circuit's decision. In June 2006, the Court announced 
that it would grant certiorari in the case on two questions: first, whether the EPA has 
the authority under §202(a)(1) of the CAA to regulate CO2 and other GHGs from motor 
vehicles associated with global warming, and second, whether the EPA may decline to 
issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on "policy considerations" not 
enumerated in that section of the CAA. In their opening briefs to the Court, the plaintiff 
SAGs pressed their argument that the EPA conducted no "serious scientific inquiry" into 
the public health issues raised by global warming and instead adopted a "misguided" 
interpretation of the CAA, noting that only Judge Tatel's lengthy dissent addressed the 
EPA's authority to regulate GHGs under the statute in the D.C. Circuit.204 
On the day that the SAG’s filed their later Supreme Court briefs in the appeal, 
lead Massachusetts SAG Thomas Reilly held a press conference with representatives of 
several of the involved environmental interest groups in announcing the actions of the 
"powerful coalition" that had now formed against the EPA in the case.205 In addition to 
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the original plaintiffs, six additional SAGs joined the suit against the EPA as amici along 
with a broad array of additional environmental and business groups, individuals, and 
others.206 A large coalition also formed on the side of the EPA, which included the 
intervenor SAGs mentioned earlier as well as several industry groups. The coalitions on 
both sides nervously awaited the decision in the case, recognizing both the potential 
importance of the decision as well as the possibility of the Court deciding it in either 
direction. 
 The Supreme Court's landmark 5-4 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA on April 2, 
2007 reversed the D.C. Circuit's opinion, marking a striking victory on every count for 
the plaintiff SAGs. Though the question of the plaintiffs' standing was not explicitly in 
front of the Court, Justice Stevens' opinion devoted considerable length to this issue. 
The Court noted that only one of the several petitioners needed to have standing for the 
Court to review the case, and it confined its analysis only to the lead petitioner, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Stevens began by noting that "[w]ell before the 
creation of the modern administrative state, we recognized that States are not normal 
litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction."207 Relying upon a citation to 
the 1907 case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.208 – a case not cited in any of the 
plaintiffs' briefs – the Court held that as a state with a "well-founded desire to preserve 
                                                          
206
 The additional SAGs included those representing  Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and 
Delaware. 
207
 Massachusetts, 549 U.S., at 518. 
208
 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
312 
 
its sovereign territory," Massachusetts had a "special position and interest" in the case 
and was entitled to "special solicitude in *the Court’s+ standing analysis."209 I will return 
to some of the implications of this new standing rule later in Chapter 7. 
The Court then proceeded to rule for the petitioners on both counts on the 
substantive questions in front of the Court. On the first question, the Court held that the 
phrase "any pollutant" in §302(g) of the CAA "embraces all airborne compounds of 
whatever stripe", including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and 
hydrofluorocarbons, rejecting the EPA’s attempt to "read ambiguity into a clear 
statute."210 The Court addressed the contention that Congress did not intend for the 
CAA to regulate CO2 by stating that "[w]hile the Congresses that drafted §202(a)(1) 
might not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global 
warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing 
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act 
obsolete. The broad language of §202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the 
flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence." Rather than focus on the intentions 
of Congress specifically as to the regulation of CO2, the Court thus instead focused what 
it saw as the intent of Congress to provide regulatory flexibility through broad statutory 
declarations. 
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On the second question, the Court rejected the EPA’s argument that even with 
the authority to regulate, it could choose not to do so on the basis of policy 
considerations not specified in the statute. These considerations offered "no reasoned 
explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to 
climate change," as the statute requires.211 Under the "clear terms" of the CAA, the "EPA 
can avoid taking further action [to regulate GHGs] only if it determines that greenhouse 
gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation 
as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do."212 
Because of that, the EPA's judgment that regulating motor vehicle CO2 emissions would 
represent "an inefficient, piecemeal approach to address the climate change issue" was 
irrelevant. Further, if the scientific uncertainty is "so profound that it precludes EPA 
from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global 
warming, EPA must say so." Because the EPA's actions flew in the face of what the Court 
viewed as the "clear statutory command" of the CAA, the Court reversed the D.C. 
Circuit's opinion. 
Several observers noted that the Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA was 
one of the – if not the – most important cases in the history of American environmental 
law,213 an observation seconded and celebrated by the victorious SAGs.214 While the 
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Court did not explicitly order the EPA to make an endangerment finding triggering the 
regulation of GHGs under the CAA, the decision placed the EPA in a position where it 
could only rely upon scientific evidence and not policy considerations in its decision-
making. Because the Court crucially found that GHGs "fit well within the Clean Air Act’s 
capacious definition of air pollutant" under the CAA's statutory definition in §302(g), the 
EPA had to make an endangerment finding for mobile sources in §202 based only upon 
whether GHGs "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."215 Without the ability to rely upon 
policy considerations, the EPA was essentially compelled to make such an 
endangerment finding. 
2. The Backdoor Effect of Massachusetts v. EPA 
The explicit effect of Massachusetts v. EPA was that the EPA was required to 
explain its reasoning not to regulate under the mobile sources provisions of §202. 
However, the case set the stage for a much broader domino effect, triggering regulation 
of GHGs of not only mobile sources but stationary sources as well. At a time in which 
Congress had not enacted legislation to regulate CO2 and other GHGs – and had 
explicitly declined to do so in the last major amendment to the CAA in 1990 – 
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Massachusetts v. EPA provided the impetus for GHG regulation potentially at least as 
broadly as any proposed legislation would establish. 
The key to Massachusetts was the majority's holding that GHGs, including CO2, 
fit within the CAA's definition of "air pollutant." This was significant because the 
definition of GHGs as air pollutants applies throughout the CAA's NSR provisions, and 
not just in the mobile sources section. For example, the PSD program of the CAA, which 
applies to stationary sources located in "attainment" areas in which air quality is 
acceptable, requires every "major emitting facility" to install the "best available control 
technology" before any new of modified source may operate.216 Under the statutory 
definition, a "major emitting facility" includes certain types of industrial facilities 
emitting more than 100 tons per year of "any air pollutant" as well as any source 
emitting 250 or more tons per year of any air pollutant. For the purposes of NSR 
(including PSD), federal regulations define air pollutants to be regulated under the 
program as "[a]ny pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act."217 
When the EPA subjects GHGs to regulation under the mobile sources provisions in §202, 
therefore, GHGs become pollutants "subject to regulation under the Act" and thus apply 
to the NSR program. 
The problem, however, concerns the emission limits defining "major emitting 
facilities." Congress wrote this section with pollutants such as SO2 in mind, and created 
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the 250-ton threshold to apply only to sources that were indeed "major." CO2, however, 
is emitted in far greater quantities than any other air pollutant regulated under the CAA, 
such that the 250-ton per year threshold would cover a massively large number of 
pollution sources in addition to industrial facilities, including small businesses, schools, 
hospitals, and even large single-family homes.218 This, in turn, would apply the 
cumbersome NSR permitting process to construction and modification of these sources, 
extending EPA regulation under the CAA well beyond its traditional scope and creating 
an "enforcement nightmare" for the agency.219  
In the immediate aftermath of Massachusetts, members of Congress took 
different approaches to try and limit the cascading effect the Court's decision would 
have on EPA regulation beyond the §202 mobile source provisions. A number of 
Representatives and Senators introduced legislation that would essentially overturn the 
decision by revoking the ability of the EPA to regulate CO2.
220 On the other end of the 
spectrum, Senator Joe Lieberman continued his push for a cap-and-trade system for 
GHGs by eventually bringing the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act to the floor of 
the Senate.221 Advocates of comprehensive legislation now had an additional arrow in 
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their quiver – they could argue that legislation such as Lieberman-Warner would 
prevent the sort of "enforcement nightmare" that appeared to flow from the 
Massachusetts decision. However, the Climate Security Act, as with subsequent 
attempts to enact cap-and-trade legislation, have to date been unsuccessful. 
 Congress's inaction on the issue meant that the EPA was left to determine how 
to manage the fallout from Massachusetts. Following the decision and President Bush's 
pledge to finalize regulations for GHGs for mobile sources by the end of his 
administration,222 EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson set a self-imposed timetable in 
which the EPA would make a determination regarding GHG regulation under §202 by 
the end of 2007. As revealed by a memo released two years later, the Bush 
Administration's EPA had actually sent a draft endangerment finding that GHG 
emissions from cars and light trucks endangered public welfare to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for review, though the OMB apparently refused to read 
it.223 In any case, the EPA never took official action in response to Massachusetts, 
triggering additional lawsuits by several of the SAGs involved in the suit attempting to 
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force the EPA to regulate GHGs emitted from mobile sources224 and, in a later suit, from 
oil refineries.225 
 In July of 2008, the EPA finally began the rulemaking process by seeking public 
comments on ways in which the CAA could be used to tackle the emissions of global 
warming pollutants.226 Ultimately, however, the Bush EPA left the issue for the next 
incoming administration, along with one parting shot. Following Barack Obama's 
election, Administrator Johnson issued a memorandum arguing that facilities should be 
required to obtain NSR permits only for pollutants that are subject to "actual control" 
under the Clean Air Act, as opposed to those that are merely subject to monitoring and 
reporting requirements.227 Instead, the Johnson memo stated, Congress must 
affirmatively make clear that CO2 was a "regulated pollutant" before the EPA could 
require CO2 regulation under the CAA's NSR provisions. 
 The incoming Obama Administration, including new EPA Administrator Lisa 
Jackson, immediately began reconsideration of the Johnson memo, and signaled its 
intent to move forward the agency's response to Massachusetts. In February of 2009, 
several of the SAGs involved in Massachusetts requested that the EPA issue an 
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endangerment finding, with Massachusetts SAG Martha Coakley stating, "[w]ith the 
change in administrations, we're extremely hopeful that the EPA will finally start to do 
its job under the statute."228 The SAGs' hopefulness was rewarded in April 2009 when 
the EPA issued a proposed endangerment finding under §202.229 The EPA finalized this 
endangerment finding in December of 2009,230 only a few days before President Obama 
traveled to a major United Nations climate change conference in Copenhagen,231 and 
subsequently finalized regulations setting emission limits for cars and light trucks under 
§202 in March of 2010.232 
 The endangerment finding and the §202 emission regulations, as explained 
above, are what began the domino effect of triggering additional regulation under the 
stationary sources provisions. To address the possibility of over-regulation under NSR, 
the EPA proposed a GHG "tailoring rule" aimed at exempting small CO2 emitters and 
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focusing NSR only on large polluters.233 In particular, the EPA proposed applying NSR 
only to those sources emitting 25,000 or more tons of CO2 per year. After strong 
concerns from industry groups and comments from state permitting agencies, the EPA 
eventually moved this threshold to 75,000 tons per year of CO2.
234  
 The problem with this tailoring rule was that nothing in the CAA explicitly 
granted the EPA discretion to regulate pollutants at levels above those specifically 
designated in the statute. One former EPA assistant administrator noted that the EPA 
was attempting to solve the problem of GHG over-regulation "simply by changing the 
250 ton number [in the NSR provisions] to 25,000 tons. Normally, it takes an act of 
Congress to change the words of a statute enacted by Congress, and many of us are very 
curious to see EPA's legal justification for today's proposal."235 Subsequently, the EPA 
justified the proposal on the legal doctrines of "absurd results" and "administrative 
necessity." As stated by the EPA, the former "authorizes departure from a literal 
application of statutory provisions if it would produce a result that is inconsistent with 
other statutory provisions or congressional intent, and particularly one that would 
undermine congressional purposes." Administrative necessity, according to the agency, 
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authorizes it "to depart from statutory requirements if the...statutory requirements, as 
written, are impossible to administer."236 
 These justifications for the tailoring rule failed to satisfy members of both 
industry and environmental groups, and triggered a fresh round of litigation that 
continues to date.237 The EPA's actions also triggered new SAG challenges to the EPA – 
only this time from a different group of SAGs seeking to prevent the EPA's regulations 
from coming into effect. After the EPA finalized the endangerment finding, triggering 
the cascading effect of regulation under the EPA, Texas SAG Greg Abbott filed suit 
against the EPA.238 Several other SAGs followed, including separate challenges by the 
SAGs of Virginia and Alabama. 239 The SAGs charged that "despite the widespread 
consequences and billion-dollar impact of its endangerment finding, EPA did not 
conduct its own assessment" but relied upon a report issued by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This report, according to the report's critics, had "been 
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widely discredited by recently revealed evidence of key scientists’ lack of objectivity and 
their coordinated efforts to hide flaws in their research."240 
 Following these SAG agency-challenging lawsuits, sixteen other SAGs then 
moved to intervene in the case on behalf of the EPA, setting up yet another inter-SAG 
dispute.241 As of this writing, the dispute is currently working its way through the courts 
in advance of the EPA's new GHG permitting rules for stationary sources effective 
January 2, 2011. Meanwhile, the Senate failed to act on either the comprehensive cap-
and-trade legislation passed earlier in 2009 in the House or the so-called "Murkowski 
resolution" that would strip the EPA's ability to regulate GHGs under the CAA.242 This 
paved the way for the EPA to move ahead with these regulations – all of which were 
enabled by the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
3. Common Law, Uncommon Results: The Courts Respond to Connecticut v. 
AEP 
At the same time that the Massachusetts v. EPA narrative was unfolding, the 
eight SAGs who had brought the common law nuisance suits in Connecticut v. AEP 
awaited the decision of Judge Loretta Preska in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. They received their answer in September 2005, when Judge Preska 
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dismissed the SAGs' action on the basis that the case represented a "non-justiciable 
political question."243 The court, Preska said, was essentially being asked to resolve a 
major policy question requiring balancing the benefits of GHG regulation against the 
economic impacts of such regulation. "In this case, balancing those interests, together 
with the other interests involved, is impossible without an ‘initial policy determination’ 
first having been made by the elected branches to which our system commits such 
policy decisions."244 Congress or the executive branch can better balance these interests, 
and for that reason the courts should and must decline to exercise jurisdiction. Because 
Judge Preska held that the SAGs' complaint involved non-justiciable political questions, 
she dismissed the complaint without reaching any of the merits of the case. 
The SAG and environmental plaintiffs immediately appealed the decision, noting 
that the Second Circuit "has historically been extremely favorable" to the arguments of 
pro-environmental group interests.245 The plaintiffs were to wait quite some time 
before a Second Circuit ruling, however. Although the case was fully briefed by March 
2006 and oral argument occurred that June, the three-judge panel of the Second Circuit 
assigned to the case did not decide it until over three years later in September 2009. 
Several observers suggested that the delay was a direct result of the swirling (and 
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accurate) speculation that one of the three judges on the panel – Sonia Sotomayor – 
was a potential Supreme Court nominee.246 
The remaining two-judge panel decided the case on September 21, 2009.247 In a 
rather surprising and lengthy decision, the panel reversed the district court's decisions 
and reinstated the SAGs' lawsuit. The court first held that all the plaintiffs (including the 
SAGs, the cities, and the land trusts) had standing to pursue the injunctions that they 
sought in the case – an issue not addressed at the district court below. The Court noted 
that the states were suing on behalf of the "quasi-sovereign interests" of their states 
under the ancient common law doctrine of parens patriae (literally, "parent of the 
nation"), which had been relied upon in early twentieth-century cases such as Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co. The states' interest in protecting their property from damage 
satisfied the requirement that the plaintiffs demonstrate an identifiable injury. Citing 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court noted that this injury need not already be occurring, 
but merely needs to be "imminent" and relatively certain to occur. The Court then held 
that these injuries were "fairly traceable to the actions of" the utility defendants. The 
fact that many other emitters were also contributing to climate change did not affect 
the causation analysis.248 
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The court then reversed Judge Preska's holding that the political question 
doctrine barred the SAGs' claims. "It is error to equate a political question with a 
political case," the court held. "Given the checks and balances among the three 
branches of our government, the judiciary can no more usurp executive and legislative 
prerogatives than it can decline to decide matters within its jurisdiction simply because 
such matters may have political ramifications."249 Further, nowhere in the plaintiffs' 
complaints do they "ask the court to fashion a comprehensive and far-reaching solution 
to climate change." Instead, they sought specifically to limit the GHG emissions from 
several distinct coal-fired electricity plants. A decision on the merits of the case would 
not establish a national or international emissions policy, which would be outside of the 
purview of the court.250 
Finally, the Court held that the plaintiffs had stated a viable nuisance claim under 
federal common law, which was another issue the district court below had not reached. 
After a lengthy review of precedents, the Court held that both the SAGs and other 
plaintiffs had adequately stated a claim that the defendants conduct caused 
"unreasonable interference" with "a right common to the general public."251 Further, 
although Congress has enacted laws affecting air pollution, none of those laws has 
displaced the federal common law claims in this suit because those laws did not 
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"actually regulate the nuisance at issue."252 "It may happen that new federal laws and 
new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of 
nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the 
equities of suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by greenhouse gases."253 
This long-awaited decision amounted to another major victory for the SAGs in 
their multistate climate change litigation campaign. While the court did not rule on the 
merits of the suit, it cleared the way for the case to proceed. Indeed, some suggested 
that the "Second Circuit's ruling is the second most important climate change decision 
ever issued by a U.S. court, after only Massachusetts v. EPA."254 Richard Blumenthal, the 
lead SAG on the case, commented that "[t]his ruling vindicates our tenacious and 
tireless battle on behalf of a powerful coalition of states and environmental advocates – 
a battle that will now have its day in court."255 
 One of the main purposes of the suit, however, was not even to reach a day in 
court. Instead, the Connecticut v. AEP case was modeled on previous efforts to sue and 
settle with private industry. "This lawsuit is comparable to our fight against Big Tobacco, 
without the money," as Richard Blumenthal put it.256 "Our goal is not money damages, 
but a change in company practices to stem the pollution and safeguard our environment 
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and economy."257 The case thus aimed not only to result in the regulatory changes in 
one specific settlement, but to have a ripple effect on members of the electric 
generation industry.258 Perhaps most importantly to potential settlements in this 
specific case and elsewhere, the plaintiffs brought the suit to reach the discovery stage 
of the trial.  As one former SAG noted, if the energy industry possesses embarrassing e-
mail messages and memorandums similar to those that proved devastating to tobacco 
companies, "it's a hammer" that could drive industries to the negotiating table.259  
 Following the momentous decision in September 2009, the industry defendants 
unsuccessfully sought en banc review at the Second Circuit before appealing to the 
Supreme Court. The petition for certiorari generated substantial amicus activity, 
including twelve SAGs260 who filed an amicus brief urging the Court to accept the case 
and reverse the Second Circuit’s decision. The states emphasized that the question of 
climate change regulation was a political question not appropriate for the courts, 
noting, "allowing some states to seek common-law injunctions against industries in 
other states would undermine the entire state-federal regulatory scheme."261  
This time, the plaintiff SAGs encountered opposition to the suit from not only 
Republicans and industry groups, but from fellow Democrats. Five Democratic SAGs 
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joined eight Republican SAGs on the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. A 
union-oriented group also filed an amicus brief against the plaintiff SAGs’ position, 
noting that the "jobs and economic well-being of [union] members will be critically 
impacted by cases regarding climate change" and that piecemeal efforts to deal with 
GHG such as Connecticut v. AEP threaten to fail to take workers’ interests into 
account.262 Most importantly, the Obama Administration weighed in against the plaintiff 
SAGs in a brief urging certiorari, a move that caused considerable consternation among 
environmental groups.263 The government’s brief noted that the EPA was already 
dealing with climate change and CO2 controls,
264 arguing that the Second Circuit decision 
"was predicated on the now-obsolete conclusion that EPA had not taken action under 
its CAA [Clean Air Act] authority to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from stationary 
sources. Stripped of that premise, the result reached by the court of appeals is no longer 
warranted (if indeed it was at the time of the decision)."265 Further, the regulatory 
approach taken by the EPA "is preferable to what would result if multiple district courts 
– acting without the benefit of even the most basic statutory guidance – could use 
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common-law nuisance claims to sit as arbiters of scientific and technology-related 
disputes and de facto regulators of power plants and other sources of pollution."266 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Connecticut v. AEP on December 6, 
2010. A few days before this dissertation was submitted, the Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed the Second Circuit's decision267 – a decision that was widely 
expected following the Obama Administration's invention in the case. However, this 
ultimate loss for the SAGs resembles more of a speed bump in a larger litigation 
campaign than a major defeat.  
For one, the Supreme Court's opinion rested on the "narrowest possible  
grounds."268 The Court's chief holding, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, was 
that the SAG's federal public nuisance arguments had been displaced by action on 
climate change by the EPA – action that had been spurred by Massachusetts v. EPA.269 
Further, the Court held that the SAGs had standing to bring this case, upholding the 
Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction, indicating that the Court has not retreated from 
the broad statement of SAG standing announced in Massachusetts v. EPA.270 Finally, the 
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Court did not address the SAGs' potential use of state common law nuisance theories 
against carbon dioxide emitters, even with EPA action of climate change in process.271  
The general reaction from SAGs and environmental groups to the decision 
appeared to be some relief that the decision was based upon narrow grounds, and that 
the Court reaffirmed Massachusetts v. EPA in its opinion. As the director of the Sierra 
Club's Beyond Coal campaign put it, "Today the country's highest court validated EPA's 
ability to adopt strong standards, and now the Obama Administration should feel 
confident in moving forward with meaningful protections from coal-fired power plants 
and other sources of industrial pollution."272 Meanwhile, the SAGs involved in the case 
noted that the Supreme Court left open state common law nuisance claims, and have 
begun exploring their options concerning that legal avenue.273 
e) A Summary of SAG Multistate Air Pollution Litigation in the 2000s 
The second wave of multistate air pollution litigation in the 2000s was 
considerably more expansive than the acid rain litigation of the 1980s. In addition to 
several agency-challenging litigation campaigns, most notably Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
SAGs brought their courtroom battles directly to private industry. Table 6.1 below 
indicates the rather remarkable explosion in SAG acid rain and climate change litigation 
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throughout the 2000s. As one can see from a comparison with Table 5.1 in the previous 
chapter, this effort was more sustained and considerably more successful than the acid 
rain litigation in the 1980s. 
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In addition to the sheer increase in the quantity of litigation, a few other attributes of 
the litigation have also changed. As the listing of SAGs involved in each case in Table 6.1 
indicates, the litigation appears considerably more partisan than in the 1980s. With few 
exceptions, Democratic SAGs appeared most frequently on the side against the EPA and 
in favor of stricter regulations, with mainly Republican SAGs siding with the EPA and 
against stricter regulation. 
 Additionally, the playing field has expanded considerably, as the map in Figure 
6.1 illustrates. Northeastern SAGs remained highly active in these lawsuits, similar to the 
acid rain litigation of the 1980s. However, many more SAGs became involved in these 
suits from across the country. This is partially because the effects of CO2 and climate 
change had more of a national effect than the more localized acid rain problems caused 
by SO2 emissions from the Midwest. Nevertheless, even several of the SO2 cases 
included (Democratic) SAGs from outside the Northeast, including Illinois, Wisconsin, 
California, and New Mexico. 
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FIGURE 6.1: MAP OF SAGS INVOLVED IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION CONCERNING 
ACID RAIN AND CLIMATE CHANGE FOLLOWING THE 1990 CAA AMENDMENTS 
 
 
Dark shading indicates SAGs actively involved in at least one lawsuit aiming to gain 
stricter air pollution regulation. Light shading indicates SAGs actively involved in at 
least one lawsuit aiming to gain less strict air pollution regulation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Analysis and Conclusions 
 
Over the past decade, the number of multistate air pollution lawsuits pursued by 
SAGs escalated dramatically, representing a broadening of the innovative agency-
challenging lawsuits brought by smaller groups of SAGs in the 1980s. This activity raises 
a number of questions. What factors led to the growth and expansion of SAG-led 
multistate air pollution litigation? What have been the effects of these lawsuits? This 
chapter addresses both questions in the context of the SAGs' acid rain and climate 
change litigation.  
OPPORTUNITY POINTS, CAPACITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SPACE:  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTISTATE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
Both waves of multistate air pollution litigation by SAGs developed from a 
complex mixture of ingredients over time. Part of the explanation lies in the changes in 
institutional arrangements granting SAGs important "opportunity points" upon which to 
seize. The opportunity points were made available most prominently in the evolving 
structure of the environmental policy regime through three successive changes to the 
central federal air pollution statute, namely the 1970, 1977, and 1990 Amendments to 
the Clean Air Act. Actions by outgoing presidential administrations provided additional 
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legal "hooks" the SAGs took advantage of in both the acid rain and climate change 
cases. 
In addition to this expansion of opportunity points, the growth of SAG capacity 
over this period enabled SAGs to bring an increasing number of multistate cases over 
time. As part of the rapid rise in responsibilities shifted to the states in the 1970s in 
environmental policy and other policy areas, SAGs' offices had access to a greater 
amount of financial and staff resources to handle complex litigation. In addition, the 
SAGs took advantage of additional avenues to build the capacity necessary to bring 
multistate environmental litigation, including increasing cross-state collaboration with 
their counterparts as well as greater coordination with environmental public interest 
law groups as part of their litigation strategies. 
While these institutional and structural changes were a necessary condition for 
the growth in multistate litigation, they were not sufficient. Changes in the 
environmental policy regime opened up new opportunity points, and the SAGs' capacity 
for litigation increased, but it was up to individual SAGs to have both the ability and 
motivation to use their newfound resources to seize these opportunities. Litigation 
concerning both acid rain and climate change came amid not only the growing political 
salience of these environmental problems and increasing multistate conflicts in the 
policy regime, but in the context of a lack of policy action on the federal level from 
either Congress or the executive branch. This combination of political salience and 
political stalemate created the requisite "entrepreneurial space" within which the SAGs 
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were able to seize upon the opportunity points created as part of the changing 
institutional regime. The following discusses each of these in further detail. 
a) Expanding Opportunity Points: The Structure of the Clean Air Act and the 
Provision of Legal Hooks 
At the heart of the SAGs' ability to use multistate litigation to influence air 
pollution policy is the structure of the Clean Air Act itself. The drafters of the CAA chose 
an ambient air quality approach to air pollution control. This placed the chief 
responsibility of regulatory implementation on state governments, requiring them to 
meet standards set by the federal government through their SIPs. This approach was 
compatible with the "New Federalism" of the Nixon Administration, which sought to 
shift regulatory responsibilities to the states. It also reflected the fact that several states, 
including California and New York, had taken the lead on air pollution issues well before 
the enactment of the CAA. 
The CAA's requirement that the states implement air pollution regulations 
quickly led to sharp multistate conflicts. The CAA now required states to meet certain 
NAAQS standards through their SIPs, but the original act said little about the problems 
engendered by cross-border air pollution. It was not clear how to address pollutants 
generated in upwind states that drifted into the downwind states' ambient air. 
These growing multistate conflicts led to the increasing use of another key 
aspect of the CAA's approach to air pollution control – litigation. Congress enacted the 
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CAA in 1970 at a time in which groups were increasingly turning to the courts to pursue 
their policy goals. In part, the growth of this manifestation of adversarial legalism was a 
product both of a growing emphasis on broad rights claims, as well as growing distrust 
of administrative agencies allegedly "captured" by industry-oriented interest groups. 
Congress encouraged adversarial legalism by enacting several statutes in the 1960s and 
70s containing provisions allowing "private attorneys general" to enforce the provisions 
of the statutes by resort to the courtroom. 
The CAA was no exception. Over the objections of industry groups, §304 of the 
CAA of 1970 allowed "any person" to enforce any emission standard or administrative 
order against polluters directly. In addition to this provision, the CAA also reflected 
growing skepticism over the operation of administrative agencies by authorizing legal 
challenges to EPA rules and regulations in §307.1 When Congress addressed the issue of 
interstate pollution in the 1977 CAA Amendments, it built upon this litigation regime by 
allowing "any state" to petition the EPA to abate cross-border pollution through the new 
§126 mechanism. Any decision to approve or deny these §126 petitions could be 
challenged in court, as with most regulatory decision-making by the EPA. 
The emphasis on litigation in the CAA both influenced and was influenced by the 
creation of several new litigation-oriented environmental interest groups, such as the 
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council. These 
groups used the new provisions of the CAA of 1970 to actively challenge EPA decision-
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making throughout the subsequent decades. While the CAA aimed to allow greater 
access to the courts by "private attorneys general," the twin emphases on state 
implementation and litigation in the CAA also opened new opportunity points for actual 
state attorneys general to pursue their policy goals through litigation. This was 
particularly true after the enactment of the 1977 CAA Amendments, which granted an 
additional mechanism, §126, for states to press the EPA to address interstate pollution. 
In addition to congressional enactments, the actions of key members of outgoing 
presidential administrations provided SAGs with additional legal ammunition for their 
subsequent litigation. One of EPA Administrator Douglas Costle's last actions in his 
position before President Reagan took office was to issue a pair of statements 
suggesting that acid rain was endangering public health and welfare in Canada – an 
action that played a key role in the SAGs' §115 litigation. In a similar fashion, the 
memoranda from EPA General Counsels Gary Guzy and Jonathan Cannon provided key 
evidence in the SAGs' climate change litigation under §202. While in both cases the 
subsequent EPA Administrators sought to ignore the legal significance of these 
documents, they both opened key opportunity points in advance of the SAGs' 
subsequent multistate litigation. 
b) Building Capacity – The Growth of SAG Offices and Coordination Mechanisms 
At the same time Congress was creating external opportunity points for state 
action and litigation in the CAA of 1970 and 1977, the SAGs were gaining additional 
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tools to take advantage of these new opportunities. Partially in response to the growing 
regulatory responsibilities placed on the states, state governments built new 
environmental bureaucracies to handle these new responsibilities. Many SAGs did the 
same within their own offices, creating environmental litigation divisions and dedicating 
attorneys and other staff specifically to environmental protection issues. 
Simultaneously, with the increased emphasis on state enforcement not only of 
environmental issues but in consumer protection, antitrust, and a host of other issues, 
state legislatures responded by granting SAGs greater financial and staff resources. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, SAG offices grew dramatically in terms of both 
budgets and attorneys.2 As Chapter 3 explained, the resources available to the SAGs 
form an important, and probably the most important, factor in a SAG's decision to 
participate and lead multistate litigation campaigns. The increased budget and staff 
resources in the 1970s into the 1980s enabled the SAGs to take advantage of the new 
opportunity points created in the CAA. 
In addition to the increase in state-level resources available to SAGs, the SAGs 
increasingly expanded their capacity through increasing coordination. Chapter 3 noted 
the role of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) in helping to build new 
networks of collaboration among the SAGs, particularly in the 1980s. During this period, 
the SAGs came to understand the benefits of multistate collaboration as a way to best 
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leverage the increase in state-level resources available to them in order to take on 
increasingly large and complex litigation. 
Particularly in the environmental arena, however, the SAGs collaborated not only 
with their fellow SAGs, but with the new public interest environmental litigation groups 
that proliferated around the time of the enactment of the CAA of 1970. Nearly every 
multistate litigation campaign conducted in both the first and second waves of SAG 
multistate litigation also involved several environmental interest groups. As noted in the 
discussion of Massachusetts v. EPA, these environmental groups and plaintiff SAGs 
actively coordinated their litigation strategies, filing simultaneous parallel cases that 
would later be joined in a consolidated lawsuit. Along with the increase in office budgets 
and staff and collaborative networks developed through NAAG, this coordination with 
the new array of litigation-oriented environmental interest groups granted the SAGs 
additional resources to take advantage of the opportunities created in the CAA. 
c) Creating Entrepreneurial Space: The Rise of SAGs as Policy Entrepreneurs 
In addition to the structural opportunity points created through the structure of 
the CAA and the increase in resources available for the SAGs, the second key element to 
the growth in environmental multistate litigation by SAGs was the expansion of what I 
call "entrepreneurial space."  This in turn consists of three elements. First was the rise of 
individual entrepreneurial actors, who identified the new opportunity points open to 
them and who were willing to seize the opportunity to act. Second, the SAGs required 
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motivations to act, which were in ample supply in the case of environmental litigation, 
Third, the expansion of entrepreneurial space requires, as Barry Rabe has called it, 
adequate "policy room" to operate.3 To take the lead on issues of air pollution control, 
the SAGs required the failure of other federal entrepreneurs to achieve the goals that 
they sought.  
1. The Rise of Entrepreneurial SAGs 
As I have stressed throughout this chapter, speaking of the "states" bringing 
lawsuits is somewhat misleading, since it is not states but individual SAGs who have 
control over their state's litigation posture. It was this independence from other state-
level political actors that led Bill Clinton to declare the office of SAG as "the best job in 
politics," and it is this independence that allows entrepreneurial individuals to have 
considerable discretion and control over their pursuit of their policy objectives. More 
than other political actors, the activities of SAGs can be explained by reference to 
individual, entrepreneurial choices. The nature of the SAGs occupying these offices is 
quite important since not all are entrepreneurial types – some focus on local "law and 
order" issues, for example. The nature of the SAG occupying the New York SAG's office 
is particularly important.  
In both waves of SAG multistate litigation, the litigation campaigns were 
preceded by the election of a strong entrepreneurial SAG in New York. Shortly after 
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entering office in January 1979, Robert Abrams quickly pledged to act as the "people's 
law firm," leading several early campaigns concerning consumer protection and 
antitrust issues. In December of 1980, only a month after Ronald Reagan's election, he 
became the first SAG to file a petition under the new §126 of the 1977 Amendments as 
part of a decade's worth of his leading multistate environmental litigation. 
Following a similar political trajectory, Eliot Spitzer, like Abrams, failed in his first 
attempt to gain the NY Attorney General's office but prevailed in his second attempt. 
Like Abrams, Spitzer did not wait long before using the impressive litigation resources at 
his disposal to become involved in a number of policy issues, including environmental 
policy.  Spitzer's innovative §304 NSR lawsuits were announced only a few months of his 
taking office, beginning several years worth of his playing a leading role in several 
multistate environmental campaigns. Both of these New York SAGs were joined by other 
entrepreneurial SAGs, such as James Tierney (appointed Maine's SAG in 1980), Joe 
Lieberman (Connecticut's SAG from 1983 to 1989) and Richard Blumenthal 
(Connecticut's SAG from 1991 to 2010), all of whom took leading roles in the multistate 
litigation campaigns and used their office on their way to run for future office. 
2. Motivations to Act: Politics, Economics, and Litigation Success 
Entrepreneurial SAGs such as Abrams and Spitzer had ample motivations to act 
as they did in these multistate litigation campaigns. For one, their use of the structural 
opportunity points available to them allowed the involved SAGs to raise their political 
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profile. I noted in Chapters 5 and 6 that in both the areas of acid rain and climate 
change, the SAGs became increasingly involved in litigation as the issues gained political 
salience. During both waves of multistate litigation, the SAGs' activities were 
accompanied by reams of press releases announcing how the SAG was "fighting for the 
environment" against the forces of inaction at the federal level. 
With growing political polarization (discussed more below), this litigation was a 
good way for SAGs to display their bona fides to their partisans. Attacking the Bush 
Administration on the environment was a good way to get ahead as a Democrat, 
particularly for SAGs eying the possibility of running in a Democratic primary for other 
statewide positions including Senator and Governor. Indeed, several of the leading SAGs 
taking high-profile roles in both the acid rain and climate change litigation subsequently 
ran for other statewide positions, including Robert Abrams and Eliot Spitzer in New 
York, James Tierney in Maine, and Richard Blumenthal in Connecticut. More recently, 
Republican SAGs have realized the potential benefits of multistate challenges for their 
own political futures. While Republican SAGs rarely challenged the Clinton 
Administration, in large part because SAG multistate litigation had not yet become a 
regularized phenomenon, several Republican SAGs have already challenged the Obama 
Administration on several grounds. Just as directly standing up to President Bush served 
as a high-profile political benefit for Democratic SAGs, challenging President Obama 
does the same for ambitious Republican SAGs. 
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In additional to the potential political benefits accruing to the individual SAGs in 
these multistate suits, economic motivations also helped to drive this activity. As 
discussed throughout the chapter, much of the conflict on acid rain involved 
Northeastern states claiming that Midwestern states were reaping unjust economic 
rewards by exporting their pollution elsewhere. This pollution was not only causing acid 
rain damage throughout the state, but also contributed to several state counties 
entering NAAQS nonattainment status. Midwestern states, on the other hand, claimed 
that much of the Northeast's problems were of their own making, and that they were 
just trying to get a "free lunch" by exporting the costs of cleanup. In the case of climate 
change, several SAGs pointed to CO2 emissions from mostly Midwestern pollution 
sources as contributing to a wide variety of damage in their states resulting from climate 
change, much of it with economic consequences. Others accused these SAGs as acting 
to shift the costs of regulation to other states. While purely economic motivations did 
not seem to be nearly as important as partisan motivations in recent climate change 
litigation (see below), the broad impact of potential CAA regulation on individual states' 
economies provided another key motivation for the SAGs. 
Finally, the political and economic motivations for bringing multistate 
environmental lawsuits would probably not amount to much if there were no 
probability of policy success. After all, lawsuits are expensive and time consuming, and 
there are always other political issues to seize upon if one appears to lead only to a dead 
end. For that reason, the SAGs' increasing success inside and outside the courtroom 
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throughout the late 1980s and 90s increasingly helped to lower the barrier for SAG 
action on air pollution issues. 
In the early 1980s, at a time in which multistate litigation was quite uncommon 
and untested overall, the SAGs' acid rain strategy seems quite restrained in hindsight. 
Despite Attorney General Tierney's declaration that he was "determined to use every 
legal means available to prevent the slow poisoning of Maine people and the air, lakes 
and land of our state...,"4 his and the other SAGs' first forays into the field were limited. 
Not only did the SAGs shy away from using "every legal means" to fight acid rain – they 
opted against the use of §304 suits against private industry, for example – but the SAGs 
waited several years before moving from their EPA petitioning strategy to active 
litigation. It was during this early period in the "first wave" of litigation that the SAGs 
were cautiously testing the possibilities of multistate litigation to address acid rain. 
However, as time went on, the SAGs' strategy expanded and began to operate 
on compressed timelines. As the SAGs were pursuing new actions in the areas of 
consumer protection and antitrust in the late 1980s – many of which achieved success 
either in the courtroom or via out-of-court settlement – the SAGs' legal strategies on 
acid rain expanded to testing the suitability of multiple provisions of the CAA to deal 
with acid rain. After a period in the mid- to late-1990s in which SAGs found increasingly 
large success in other policy areas, most notably with the tobacco Master Settlement 
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Agreement, the SAGs' strategies continued expanding to include not only agency-
challenging actions but lawsuits against private industry. The onset of this "second 
wave" of litigation reflected the SAGs' newfound regulatory power of the out-of-court 
settlement. This second wave of suits also displayed how agency-forcing lawsuits such 
as Massachusetts v. EPA have become increasingly regularized and immediate. Rather 
than taking a "wait and see" stance following their filing required statutory petitions 
with the EPA, they have largely shifted to a "hurry up and sue" approach in which they 
appear less likely to grant the EPA time to address increasingly complex petitions 
beyond the timeframes specified in the CAA. 
3. The Opening of Policy Space 
During the expansion of the acid rain and climate change litigation campaigns, 
the political salience of the underlying issues continued to rise even as action from the 
federal political institutions stalled. Conflict between Midwestern and Northeastern 
members of Congress prevented action on a major acid rain-oriented overhaul of the 
CAA throughout the 1980s, and partisan conflict in Congress over the past decade has 
blocked action on more recent CAA amendments aimed at addressing climate change. 
Meanwhile, during much of that time, the other logical federal entity capable of action 
on these issues – the EPA – was controlled by a conservative Republican administration 
declining to take stricter regulatory action. 
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With Congress passing on taking the lead on issues such as acid rain and climate 
change, and Republican Presidents (namely Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush) taking 
an "anti-regulatory" approach, the SAGs had policy space in which to pursue an 
alternative agenda. This occurred when the other factors – including expansion of 
opportunity points and increasing motivations to act – were already pushing toward 
litigation. 
With legislative and administrative avenues stalled, the SAGs used litigation as 
another avenue to try to force an end to the policy stalemate. Indeed, SAGs viewed 
many of these lawsuits as a way to ramp up pressure on the federal political branches to 
act. Not only would the litigation continue to keep the issues alive in the national policy 
conversation, but the prospect of successful lawsuits and subsequent piecemeal 
regulation by the EPA was particularly distasteful to industry groups. Facing the 
possibility of litigation resulting in regulation under the "command and control" 
provisions of a CAA not designed to deal with acid rain, industry groups turned to a 
market-driven cap-and-trade system as a more palatable solution. Likewise, the far 
more successful climate change litigation of the past decade threatens to impose 
"command and control" regulations on industry via provisions of a CAA not designed to 
deal with CO2 and other GHGs, leading some industry to sign on to supporting national 
cap-and-trade legislation for CO2. The common law nuisance lawsuits against private 
industry as part of the second wave of multistate litigation, particularly Connecticut v. 
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AEP, only added to the ratcheting up pressure on industry to support national legislation 
displacing these lawsuits.5 
The SAGs' actions in both waves of litigation did not match up perfectly with the 
lack of action taken by the executive branch. It is not precisely the case, as suggested by 
a number of observers,6 that SAG action flowed from the failure of Ronald Reagan's EPA 
to regulate acid rain. After all, Robert Abrams filed his first §126 petition to the EPA, 
which kicked off the acid rain litigation of the 1980s, occurred only a month after Ronald 
Reagan's election before he had even named a new EPA Administrator. Eliot Spitzer's 
activities in the area of air pollution came in late 1999, when President Clinton was still 
in office. Nevertheless, the bulk of the litigation activity in both instances was enabled 
by the lack of any federal action displacing the SAGs' lawsuits. Until the CAA 
Amendments of 1990, the SAGs maintained the policy space to litigate the issue of acid 
rain. Until the Obama Administration EPA's regulation of CO2, SAGs likewise used the 
policy space open to them to press other parts of the political system to act. 
d) A Summary of Factors 
The factors contained in the categories mentioned above were all necessary but 
not sufficient factors leading to the development of the two waves of SAG multistate 
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litigation. The following Figure 7.1 places the factors leading to the development of SAG 
litigation discussed here in the greater political context. 
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WHY DOES IT MATTER? THE EFFECTS OF THE SAGS' MULTISTATE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
a) The "Glorious Mess" of Litigation 
The SAGs' multistate litigation campaigns concerning both acid rain and climate 
change had a strong strategic logic to them. By employing a "kitchen sink" approach of 
trying a variety of litigation techniques to force a shift in air pollution policy, the SAGs 
helped to ratchet up pressure on other political institutions to act. The potential results 
flowing from a successful litigation campaign not only possessed the advantage of 
moving the regulatory ball forward at the EPA, but it would have the effect of convincing 
regulatory opponents to come around and support comprehensive regulatory solutions 
in Congress.  
While the SAGs and other litigators understood that most private utilities would 
prefer no acid rain or GHG regulation at all to a comprehensive congressional mandate, 
they also suspected that industry would be more comfortable with a predictable 
regulatory environment as opposed to one in which the EPA would conduct piecemeal 
and unpredictable SO2 or GHG regulation under the existing CAA. By forcing the EPA to 
address these pollutants under a statute not specifically designed to regulate them, the 
resulting specter of EPA regulation would provide an additional impetus for them to 
petition Congress to enact comprehensive legislation. As Representative Edward Markey 
(D-MA) described the prospect of EPA regulation of CO2, "[w]e think this is a very helpful 
development that focuses the mind of industries and congressmen and senators all 
357 
 
across the country." Markey noted that the EPA's endangerment finding for CO2 shifted 
the political playing field: "Now you have a choice if you are in Congress: Do you want 
EPA to make that decision [about regulation] or would you like ... to be in the room 
drafting the legislation?"7 Just as a patchwork of state-level regulations have often led 
to industry clamoring for a single federal regulatory scheme, a patchwork of 
administrative regulations might lead industry to give their support for a single national 
solution. In this way, the admittedly second-best8 "Plan B" of forcing administrative 
regulation of air pollutants could be used as a way to ratchet up pressure for the "Plan 
A" of comprehensive congressional action.  
In the second wave of multistate litigation, the SAGs added a "Plan C" to this 
strategy. While the specter of piecemeal administrative regulation could be used as a 
tool to build pressure for congressional action, the use of litigation targeting private 
utilities could be a way to ratchet up pressure for either administrative or congressional 
solutions. Utilities facing private lawsuits not only would face protracted litigation 
expenses and the possibility of losses in court, but any additional regulations placed on 
the defendant industries via court order or settlement with the SAGs would also apply 
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only to the defendant firms and not other non-party utilities. This piecemeal approach 
to regulation would represent a third-best regulatory solution, but one that could 
trigger second-best solutions of administrative regulation or the ultimately preferable 
comprehensive legislative solutions. 
Whatever the political value of these lawsuits as a way to ratchet pressure on 
other institutions to regulate, any success on a Plan B or Plan C might actually mean the 
creation of a "glorious mess" of less-than-ideal policy. The main reason is that without 
Congress specifically amending the CAA to deal with acid rain or climate change, the 
structure of the Act was a mismatch for dealing with these emerging problems. When 
Congress originally designed the CAA in 1970, it did so with the assumption that 
pollution was a localized problem. The Act focused on the sort of pollution bellowing 
out of dirty smokestacks and mixing with the ambient air in the same local area as the 
pollution sources. Until 1977, the CAA contained few provisions at all dealing with the 
complex issues of interstate pollution, and even then Congress simply overlaid these 
provisions on top of the general ambient air approach established by NAAQS regulation.  
Indeed, throughout both the first and second waves of multistate litigation, the 
EPA stressed that the existing CAA was a poor way to deal with acid rain or climate 
change – and the agency certainly had a point. On the acid rain issue, the attempt to use 
both §115 and the §126 petition process as a blunt instrument to force changes in 
upwind states' SIPs did not mesh well with the short statutory windows mandated by 
Congress in these provisions. This regulatory route, as the EPA noted at the time, would 
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not only be time consuming, costly, and perhaps ultimately impossible, but would be "a 
prescription for a decade worth of court suits" over the new SIPs.9 Stretching the CAA in 
such as way to deal with an issue in acid rain that Congress had not intended to deal 
with in the CAA Amendments of 1977 would mean a very uncertain regulatory 
environment, and likely would have drained agency resources away from other serious 
environmental problems. 
The failure of the first wave of SAG multistate suits, along with the 
comprehensive SO2 acid rain provisions adopted by Congress in 1990, meant that the 
EPA's feared potential regulatory morass never occurred. With the later successful SAG 
lawsuits forcing the EPA's hand on GHG regulation, however, the potential for a 
"glorious mess" has become a reality. Regulation of GHG pollutants such as CO2 under 
the CAA's ambient air approach is particularly troublesome given that CO2 emitted from 
sources around the globe mixes throughout the atmosphere, making it particularly 
difficult to determine which sources are responsible for any damage caused by CO2. 
Further, the strategy of the environmental interest groups and SAGs to challenge 
the EPA's refusal to regulate GHGs under the mobile source provisions faced the 
problem of not being cabined easily to "only" mobile sources. A finding that CO2 was an 
"air pollutant" endangering "public health or welfare" such that it must be regulated 
under §202 also meant triggering additional regulatory requirements throughout the 
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CAA. As discussed in Chapter 6, such an endangerment finding would require the EPA to 
set emission standards for stationary sources under §111, as well as potentially require 
the agency to set NAAQS standards for GHGs under §108. The latter would, in turn, 
require states to develop SIPs to comply with federal standards for GHG – probably a 
practical impossibility.10 The EPA worked has subsequently attempted to work through 
the cascade of additional issues following its endangerment finding through its "tailoring 
rule," but the lack of solid statutory authority for this approach only opens the door for 
yet more litigation coming from both industry and environmental groups. Indeed, such 
litigation has already begun.11 
The SAGs' strategy of litigating cases directly against private utilities in order to 
address acid rain and climate change may work as a good political strategy to ratchet up 
pressure on Congress and the EPA to act, but face additional problems of their own. The 
most obvious, as noted at the end of Chapter 6, is that the Supreme Court has recently 
placed at least some limits on the use of federal common law nuisance theories to 
address problems already tackled under federal environmental statutes. For another, 
out of court settlements, as did the NSR settlements, often include regulatory provisions 
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going beyond those explicitly required by the CAA, and all without the typical notice-
and-comment rulemaking required of administrative action. Additionally, this patchwork 
approach to regional and national environmental issues was, as the parties involved 
themselves admitted, hardly the best approach. 
In short, the SAGs' legal strategies in the acid rain and climate changes cases 
aimed to ratchet up pressure for regulation on the federal level, either via legislative or 
administrative means. However, the downside of using second- or third-best 
approaches is that if they succeed in the courts but fail to achieve the goal of forcing 
Congress to act, they remain second and third-best approaches that may result in more 
of a "glorious mess" than a regulatory environment that actually achieves the goals of 
reducing pollutants. This situation was avoided with the SAGs' "first wave" litigation 
failures in the courts in the 1980s combined with congressional action on CAA 
amendments in 1990. The SAGs' successes in the "second wave" of litigation, however, 
have had repercussions throughout the American clean air regime – repercussions that 
have spawned another ongoing cycle of regulation and litigation.  
b) Increase in SAG Power 
In addition to the direct policy effects of the multistate litigation discussed in this 
chapter, another legacy of these litigation campaigns is that they ultimately have served 
to increase the potential power of the SAGs. As mentioned previously, the successful 
settlements and agency-challenging lawsuits marking the second wave of SAG litigation 
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sets the stage for continued activism in the future on environmental issues. As long as 
the structural opportunity points still exist in the federal statutory scheme, the 
increased probability of successful lawsuits means that SAGs have ever greater 
motivation to pursue these multistate litigation campaigns. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA opened the 
door even further for SAG plaintiffs. As several observers of environmental law and 
litigation have noted, the question of standing has long been one of the key issues in 
environmental cases.12 It was thus not surprising that the Court devoted much attention 
to the question of standing in Massachusetts. What was surprising, however, was the 
new theory of standing developed in Justice Stevens' opinion. Reaching only the 
question of Massachusetts' standing to sue in the case, the Court held that states must 
be afforded "special solicitude" because of their interests in protecting "quasi-sovereign 
interests."13 This new standing test may be one of the most lasting effects of 
Massachusetts,14 and since "states" suing typically means "SAGs" suing, this may make 
SAG litigation even more important in the future.  
At least since the Court's key 1992 case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the 
Court has required litigants to demonstrate a "concrete and particularized injury that is 
either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it 
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is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury."15 However, citing the 1907 
case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., Justice Stevens' opinion held that "States are 
not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction."16 Instead, the 
majority held, states act under the ancient common law principle of parens patriae to 
protect "the well being of [the] populace."17 The reason for this, the majority concludes, 
is that the states have such a strong dependence on the federal government to protect 
them.18 The states thus have a special interest when the federal government fails to 
protect them, and for that reason they should be treated differently than private 
litigants. Although the Court went on to discuss how Massachusetts met the three 
aspects of injury, causation, and redressability, it did so with the understanding that the 
state was to be afforded "special solicitude" in this analysis. 
The importance of this "special solicitude" standard was noted in Chief Justice 
Roberts' dissenting opinion, which argued that the decision "recalls the previous high-
water mark of diluted standing requirements."19 He noted that Massachusetts and the 
other states were trying to act as a stand-in for the alleged interests of states' citizens 
against the federal government, under the guise of the state's "quasi-sovereign 
interests." The problem with this, Roberts argued, was that it conflicted with the long-
standing doctrine that it is "the United States, not the State, [which] represents the 
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citizens as parens patriae in their relations to the federal government."20 What the new 
rule does, according to Roberts, is treat public and private litigants differently when it 
comes to standing. 
It is still too early to tell exactly how important the new "special solicitude" rule – 
a ruling that survived the Court's recent decision in American Electric Power v. 
Connecticut – will be for SAGs in the future, though a few post-Massachusetts cases 
indicate that the rule will have some vitality. A Ninth Circuit case,21 for example, relied 
upon Massachusetts to hold that two SAG intervenors were entitled to special solicitude 
because both "have an interest in protecting in-state waterways from pollution 
originating outside their borders."22 A federal district court in California also held that 
the state of California, represented by its SAG and other administrative departments, 
had standing to challenge the U.S. Forest Service's land management plans for certain 
forests in California.23 Notably, the court distinguished a similar Supreme Court decision 
dismissing a case on standing grounds by noting that the previous case "did not involve 
a state plaintiff," and California's involvement in this suit meant that "special solicitude" 
for this state plaintiff applied.24  
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The D.C. Circuit has also relied upon the special solicitude rule. In one case,25 the 
D.C. Circuit held that the SAGs of Alabama and Florida had standing to challenge an 
agreement between Georgia and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to set aside a large 
portion of Lake Lanier to supply drinking water to Atlanta. The SAGs had argued that this 
agreement would have damaging effects to their states because of the reduced water 
flow this agreement might cause. The court (citing "special solicitude") noted that this 
alleged damage was enough for Alabama and Florida to claim that its quasi-sovereign 
interests were at stake.26 In another case in which the North Carolina SAG challenged 
the EPA's withdrawal of northern Georgia from the agency's NAAQS regulations, the 
D.C. Circuit relied upon the "special solicitude" standard. While ultimately dismissing 
North Carolina's case on the basis of failing to demonstrate redressability, the D.C. 
Circuit noted that, country to industry contentions, "North Carolina, like the state in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, has standing to challenge EPA's failure to regulate a third 
party."27 
Perhaps the most high profile application of the special solicitude analysis 
concerns the effort by several SAGs to challenge the constitutionality of the "individual 
mandate" provisions of the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
("the health care bill"). In one of the challenges brought against the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services ("HHS") in federal district court in Virginia, the Virginia SAG 
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alleges that "the failure—or refusal—of its citizens to elect to purchase health insurance 
is not 'economic activity' and therefore not subject to federal regulation under the 
Commerce Clause."28 The HHS argued that Virginia lacked standing in this case, arguing 
that the state was attempting to prosecute the case on behalf of its citizens, which was 
barred by long-standing precedent. In an August 2010 opinion, however, the District 
Court cited Massachusetts v. EPA to note, "[g]iven the stake states have in protecting 
their sovereign interests, they are often accorded "special solicitude" in standing 
analysis."29 In part because of this broad power to protect their sovereign interests, the 
District Court held that Virginia had standing to challenge the health care bill in order to 
defend a state statute protecting Virginia residents' right to refuse health insurance. 
This was true even though "this lawsuit has the collateral effect of protecting the 
individual interests of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia."30 While Virginia's 
case was somewhat different because of the existence of a state statute that the federal 
legislation would preempt, other observers have suggested that the "broad theory of 
state standing" announced by the "special solicitude" rule will positively influence other 
SAGs' challenges to the health care bill.31 
However the challenges to the health care bill are resolved, it appears clear that 
Massachusetts v. EPA effectively increased the entrepreneurial space in which SAG 
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operate by removing another obstacle to SAG-driven lawsuits. At the very least, the 
"special solicitude" rule leaves the door open for further expansive SAG action against 
federal agencies. Further, because the Court in Massachusetts addressed only the 
question of state standing and left open the question of the standing of the private 
environmental groups, the special solicitude rule may encourage the already substantial 
collaborations between such groups and sympathetic SAGs in which the states take the 
lead in the litigation. Active environmental litigators such as the National Resource 
Defense Council and the Sierra Club have an incentive to shift efforts to try and lobby 
SAGs to sue where the organizations would have done so alone in the past, due to their 
knowledge that the "special solicitude" rule will provide a more secure fallback position 
for their policy goals if courts determine that only the states, but not the private groups, 
have standing. While state litigation failures against the EPA in the 1980s may have led 
to fewer incentives for collaboration between environmental groups and SAGs,32 there 
are far greater incentives now for these groups to encourage (and piggyback on) 
litigation initiated by SAGs. 
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c) The Increase in SAG Partisanship 
Several scholars have documented the rise in political polarization in America, 
particularly over the past two decades. As Barbara Sinclair has noted, congressional 
partisan polarization has increased dramatically increased since the 1990s.33 With the 
battles in Congress being mirrored in SAG litigation, it appears that SAG litigation has 
followed the congressional trend and has also become more partisan, particularly 
concerning the sort of environmental litigation examined in this chapter. 
In the 1980s, there was no sharp division between the main parties on the issue 
of acid rain. The divisions in Congress reflected regional divisions rather than partisan 
splits, with leading Midwestern Democrats such as Senator Robert Byrd and 
Representative John Dingell leading the charge against stricter acid rain controls, and 
Northeastern Republicans including Senator John Chafee and Representative Sherwood 
Boehlert calling for greater action on acid rain. The same was true of the parties outside 
of Congress. In 1988, for example, a substantial number of Republican delegates to the 
convention broke with the Reagan Administration to support government action to 
reduce acid rain.34  
In the early to mid-1990s, similar cross-aisle activity occurred in regards to the 
issue of climate change. Even in 1994, Republican Senators signed on to letters urging 
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Reporter, August 19, 1988, 691. 
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stricter regulations through comprehensive climate change legislation.35 Republican 
Senatorial leaders such as Chafee and Robert Stafford introduced global warming bills, 
while substantial numbers of congressional Democrats expressed qualms about climate 
change legislation. Today, however, the parties are much more polarized on 
environmental issues. One report by an environmental organization noted in 2002 that 
Republicans and Democrats were more divided than ever before on environmental 
policy.36 
While some scholars have noted that state governments have recently tended to 
feature less overt partisanship and more cross-party cooperation on issues of the 
environment,37 it appears that the SAGs' multistate litigation campaigns have more 
closely tracked the partisan trends in Congress as opposed to those in state 
governments. In the acid rain litigation, the conflict was more sectional; Northeastern 
SAGs battled with their Midwestern counterparts at the same time that Northeastern 
members of Congress battled with their Midwestern counterparts. This was a reflection 
of the interstate disputes generated by the CAA and the different economic incentives 
to join one side or the other. Now, however, the battles in Congress and among SAGs 
alike are far more partisan than sectional. While questions of political economy are not 
unimportant, it appears that they are overshadowed by partisan concerns. 
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It may also be helpful to take a closer look at the various SAGs involved in 
Massachusetts v. EPA case to examine closer the relationship between SAG participation 
and the partisan and economic interests involved. As noted earlier, the case featured 
sharp partisan splits between the SAGs involved on both sides of the case. The nineteen 
SAGs (including D.C.) involved as plaintiffs or amici against the EPA were all Democrats, 
with the exception of Washington State's Rob McKenna, who inherited the state's 
involvement in the case from his Democratic predecessor. The ten intervenor SAGs 
taking the side of the EPA, on the other hand, were all Republicans. 
 However, it might not be surprising that the opposing SAG coalitions in the case 
would feature economic cleavages in addition to partisan divisions, especially given that, 
as the intervenor SAGs argued in their briefs in Massachusetts v. EPA, "regulation of CO2 
emissions would have a substantial impact, either directly or indirectly, on nearly every 
facet of each state's economy."38 For certain states, the economic impact would be even 
more direct. Regulation of GHGs under the mobile source provisions of §202 would have 
an obviously major impact on the automotive industry, for example. The importance of 
that industry to Michigan's economy helps to at least partially explain why Michael Cox, 
Michigan's SAG, took the lead in defending the EPA's position in the case. Cox indeed 
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specifically mentioned the automobile industry by stating, "I will not stand by silently 
while a handful of states try to drown the U.S. auto industry in new regulation."39  
One way of examining the degree to which SAGs were driven by economic 
considerations is to examine per capita CO2 emissions from each state. One would 
expect that states with higher per capita CO2 emissions would have the most to lose on 
a relative basis from stricter EPA regulation of GHGs, and those with the lowest per 
capita emissions the most to gain. In theory, it would make sense for this economic 
consideration to enter the SAGs' decision to side either for or against the EPA's decision 
not to regulate GHGs under the CAA. Jason Scott Johnson provides some evidence for 
this proposition by strikingly noting that all of the plaintiff states arrayed against the EPA 
in Massachusetts v. EPA, with one exception, already had relatively low per-capita CO2 
emissions.40 These states "therefore stand to gain an economic comparative advantage 
relative to other, higher emitting states from federal regulation of GHGs."41 This 
economic explanation is unconvincing, however, for at least two reasons.  
First, looking at a different and perhaps more relevant measure of economic 
impact of GHG emissions – total CO2 emissions emitted in the state – the picture is 
considerably cloudier. I was also able to find numbers concerning the total number of 
tons of carbon dioxide emitted in each state for 2005, the closest year to the original 
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filing of Massachusetts v. EPA available.42 The three top emitters of carbon dioxide were 
Texas, Louisiana, and California, and the SAGs of these states each took a different 
position in this litigation – for the EPA, non-participating, and against the EPA, 
respectively. A number of the SAGs representing states with low industrial carbon 
dioxide emissions took the position against EPA regulation, whereas several states with 
high emissions favored EPA regulation. 
 Most importantly, however, the patterns of participation and non-participation 
in Massachusetts v. EPA do not cleanly follow the CO2 emissions argument nearly as well 
as do partisan considerations, even if we use the per-capita CO2 emissions measure. 
Several Republican SAGs representing states with relatively low per-capita CO2 
emissions, and thus facing the same economic incentives to join the SAGs opposing the 
EPA, nevertheless sided with the EPA. Several Democratic SAGs representing states with 
relatively high CO2 emissions sided against the EPA. Perhaps most tellingly, the states 
with the very highest relative CO2 emissions joined the litigation if represented by 
Republican SAGs, while they sat out the litigation if represented by Democrats. Table 7.1 
summarizes this finding by indicating the participation rates of Democratic and 
Republican SAGs depending on whether they were from a "high" or "low" CO2 emission 
state ("high" being in the top half of per-capita CO2 emissions, and "low" in the bottom 
half). 
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Table 7.1: SAG Partisanship and Per Capita CO2 Emissions  
on SAG Participation in Massachusetts v. EPA 
 
 High CO2 Emission State Low CO2 Emission State 
Democratic SAGs 
Against EPA............4/13 
For EPA...................0/13 
Non-Participating...9/13  
Against EPA............15/17 
For EPA...................0/17 
Non-Participating...3/17 
Republican SAGs 
Against EPA............0/12 
For EPA...................8/12 
Non-Participating...4/12 
Against EPA............1/9 
For EPA...................3/9 
Non-Participating...5/9 
 
 Table 7.1 suggests that the patterns of SAG participation in Massachusetts 
tracked partisan concerns as opposed to economic concerns. Democrats from states 
with "high" and "low" per capita CO2 emissions alike participated in the case against the 
Bush Administration's EPA, while none of them sided with the EPA. The situation was 
precisely the opposite for Republicans, with the aforementioned exception of the 
Republican Washington State SAG who inherited the case from his Democratic 
predecessor. 
 However, Table 7.1 also suggests that economic concerns – at least as measured 
by per capita CO2 emissions – indeed played some role in the SAGs' decision-making.  
The table suggests that in situations where the SAGs were cross-pressured – Democrats 
in high- CO2 emission states and Republicans in low- CO2 emission states – they tended 
to sit out the litigation rather than to take either side in the lawsuit. However, even this 
may be better explained by partisan political concerns, rather than economic concerns. 
Examining the twelve non-participating Democratic SAGs and nine non-participating 
Republicans SAGs as a group, it appears that the underlying partisan leanings of these 
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SAGs’ states, as measured by presidential vote, may have played a major role. Most 
strikingly, all twelve of the non-participating Democrats represented "Republican-
leaning" states won by George Bush in 2004 and John McCain in 2008. The ten 
Republicans were more mixed, as only three of the non-participating Republicans 
represented "Democratic-leaning" states won by John Kerry in 2004. However, all but 
two of the ten states represented by non-participating Republican SAGs voted for 
Barack Obama in 2008, indicating that most of these non-participating SAGs 
represented contested, Democratic-trending swing states. This suggests that the non-
participating SAGs of both parties sat out Massachusetts v. EPA not directly because of 
economic considerations, but because of the political problems they could face if they 
took an active role either for or against the Bush Administration in the case. 
Of course, this analysis does not prove or disprove the potential importance of 
economic concerns in SAG decision-making, particularly since this examines just one 
case (albeit the most important single case). It is one piece of evidence suggesting, 
however, that partisan concerns, rather than economic concerns, tend to predominate 
SAG participation in this litigation. As noted earlier, these partisan considerations 
appear to be driving greater political polarization among the SAG – quite similarly to the 
polarization occurring in Congress. 
 While the apparent trend towards polarization among SAGs is tracks similar 
trends in Congress, there are a couple of notable differences. First, while Barbara 
Sinclair notes that partisan polarization in Congress originated with sharper partisanship 
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from the Republicans that gradually flowed to the Democratic members,43 the opposite 
is true in SAG polarization. The trend towards greater multistate litigation generally 
originated from activist Democrats leading and coordinating these efforts, with 
Republican SAGs either joining Democratic-led efforts or refraining from multistate 
litigation. Only more recently have Republican SAGs taken an activist approach to 
multistate litigation, as with the ligation concerning the health care bill and challenges 
to the Obama Administration EPA's CO2 endangerment finding.  
The second difference is that while partisan polarization has often been blamed 
for policy "gridlock" in Congress, it is more likely that polarization among SAGs leads to 
more coordinated activism. As Democratic SAGs increasingly use the tool of multistate 
litigation to force the federal government or private industries to adopt stricter 
environmental regulatory standards, Republican SAGs have banded together to 
challenge the federal government's imposition of greater environmental regulation. This 
coordination makes this tool of litigation more prominent and more effective, and 
particularly in an age of seeming partisan gridlock in Congress, will likely be increasingly 
employed by SAGs of both parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Chapters 5 through 7 have examined two "waves" of multistate SAG litigation in 
the area of air pollution, including the acid rain-focused litigation in the 1980s and the 
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more recent and considerably expanded litigation strategies used over the past decade. 
While litigation in the first wave of multistate litigation consisted entirely of agency-
challenging lawsuits, the second wave has included lawsuits brought directly against 
polluters. Several factors contributed to the rise of multistate litigation in this area, 
including the creation of several structural opportunity points by Congress, the increase 
in SAG capacity, and the expansion of entrepreneurial space offering individual SAGs 
both the motivation and policy room to use the tool of multistate litigation in this policy 
arena increasingly. The latest litigation campaign has potentially lessened the barrier for 
SAG litigation considerably, particularly agency-challenging litigation brought against 
federal agencies. The most recent SAG litigation also reveals signs of increasing 
polarization among SAGs at least on environmental issues, tracking similar trends 
elsewhere in the national American political system. 
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Part III 
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Regulating the Pharmaceutical  
Industry Through Litigation 
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The health care sector represents one of the largest and fastest-growing shares 
of the American economy, with total health care spending representing more than 17% 
of the United States' entire gross domestic product.1 A significant portion of this 
spending is associated with spending for pharmaceutical products, which is forecast to 
reach as high as $330 billion in 2011.2 The increase in health care and prescription drug 
spending overall is reflected in the rapidly rising spending on government health care 
programs over the past couple of decades, including in Medicare and Medicaid. This 
rapid rise in health care costs has, in turn, led to health care policy emerging as one of 
the most hotly contested items on the political agenda in recent years. Because of the 
role prescription drugs have played as a driver of health care costs, pharmaceutical 
companies have increasingly come under the spotlight. A number of members of 
Congress have suggested that the high costs of pharmaceuticals is the result of 
unscrupulous business practices,3 and several states have enacted legislation aimed at 
reducing the costs of prescription drugs for their residents.4 
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 "Health Care's Share of U.S. Economy Rose at Record Rate," New York Times, February 4, 2010, accessed 
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 Responsibility for the federal government's regulation of pharmaceuticals falls to 
a few different agencies. The Food and Drug Administration has jurisdiction over the 
prescription drug approval process, in addition to its general role in protecting public 
health by regulating a variety of consumer products. The FDA also regulates drug 
marketing and advertising, a role carved out of the FTC's general jurisdiction in the area 
of advertising regulation. The FDA, however, does not have jurisdiction over prescription 
drug pricing. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), on the other hand, 
has administrative responsibility concerning the federal government's payment for 
drugs under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The CMS thus oversees drug pricing 
matters in relation to government reimbursement to pharmaceutical companies. The 
Federal Trade Commission, in keeping with its general role in policing antitrust matters, 
handles numerous cases involving competition within the pharmaceutical industry. The 
FTC shares this antitrust responsibility with the Department of Justice's Antitrust 
Division. 
 The SAGs have in recent years emerged as pharmaceutical industry regulators 
concerning issues in each of these federal agencies' jurisdictions. In a number of 
litigation campaigns involving antitrust, consumer protection, and Medicaid fraud 
enforcement, SAGs have made the pharmaceutical industry one of their foremost 
targets.5 By litigating against and reaching settlements with several drug companies, 
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SAGs have placed a variety of new and regulations on the pharmaceutical industry 
stricter than the existing regulatory regimes established by Congress and federal 
administrative agencies. While the SAGs have not reached a single global settlement 
with pharmaceutical companies similar to their settlement with virtually the entire 
tobacco industry in the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998, their multistate litigation 
against the pharmaceutical industry has created a patchwork national regulatory 
scheme overlaid on top of the existing federal scheme, built settlement by settlement. 
By creating new regulatory baselines for drug companies, the SAGs have essentially 
become a parallel DOJ, FTC, and FDA on the state level. Though the SAGs have fashioned 
this activity as law "enforcement," the litigation campaigns resemble instead law 
creation, with the goal of changing the way the entire national pharmaceutical industry 
operates. 
 Part III proceeds by examining three areas of SAG pharmaceutical litigation 
serving to illustrate how SAGs have become important policymakers and regulators in 
this area. Chapter 8 describes how SAGs have brought litigation against drug companies 
for allegedly defrauding government health care programs by inflating the prices for 
prescription drugs. As this chapter explains, the SAGs have helped transform long-
standing prescription drug pricing practices into actionable "fraud," bringing waves of 
lawsuits seeking to change the way the industry sets prices for its products. Chapter 9 
describes two additional multistate litigation campaigns. The first discusses multistate 
antitrust suits challenging so-called "pay-for-delay" settlements in which brand-name 
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drug patent holders pay generic firms to delay marketing generic equivalents of brand 
name drugs. Despite Congress's hesitation to ban these settlements and the FTC's 
measured approach to addressing them, SAGs have sought to strictly enforce federal 
and state antitrust laws against pharmaceutical companies in this area. By reaching 
settlements with the targeted defendants, they have supplemented their own ability to 
oversee drug company behavior. Chapter 9 also examines how SAGs have used state 
consumer protection statutes to litigate against pharmaceutical firms' marketing 
practices. A series of multistate settlements with the SAGs have placed advertising 
restrictions on these firms going beyond anything required by existing federal statutes 
or regulations. Finally, Chapter 10 provides an overall analysis of these three litigation 
campaigns, taking a closer look at both the factors helping to drive these suits as well as 
the monetary and regulatory results achieved in these settlements. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Lawyers, Drugs, and Money: 
Litigating Prescription Drug Prices 
 
"We've got state attorneys general who are very excited about these cases." 
–Plaintiffs' lawyer Janet Goldstein, referring to litigation targeting 
"fraud" in the health care industry1 
 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, Medicaid fraud litigation is the fastest growing area of 
SAG litigation. On the individual state level, these lawsuits seek to address a variety of 
schemes seeking to increase reimbursements paid for through government health care 
programs. This runs the gamut from individual physicians charging Medicaid for services 
never performed to providers double-billing both Medicaid and a private insurer for the 
exact same procedures for the same patient.2 The focus of the SAGs' multistate 
Medicaid fraud litigation has been quite a bit different, however. These lawsuits 
typically target the activities of the nation's largest pharmaceutical firms, rather than 
the actions of health care providers. In some of these lawsuits, SAGs have challenged 
the way in which drug companies price their products. As explained in this chapter, the 
suits involve pricing practices that have long been standard in the industry, and which 
Congress and federal and state government health care agencies have accepted as 
                                                          
1
 John Gibaut, "Seeking the Cure," ABA Journal, October 24, 2006. 
2
 Emily Myers and Lynne Ross, State Attorneys General: Powers and Responsibilities, 2
nd
 ed. (Washington, 
D.C.: National Association of Attorneys General, 2007), 332-333. 
383 
 
appropriate. However, litigation by the SAGs and other parties has helped to transform 
what was standard industry practice into actionable fraud under state and federal law. 
a) Medicaid, Rising Drug Costs, and the Focus on Fraud 
Before turning to the litigation, a brief background on Medicaid and the rising 
focus on fraud within government health care programs would be helpful. Medicare and 
Medicaid came into existence in 1965, as part of the flurry of legislation enacted by the 
89th Congress. Enacted as Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Medicaid provides medical 
assistance to those unable to pay for health care. Unlike the federally funded and 
administered Medicare program, the health insurance program for the elderly, Medicaid 
places much of the responsibility for program operations on the states. Every state must 
create an agency to implement the Medicaid program, which is in turn overseen by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services within the Department of Health and 
Human Services ("HHS"). These state agencies are tasked with carrying out the details of 
program administration, including enrolling eligible individuals in the program, 
determining the benefits to be covered, calculating the compensation for covered 
services, processing health care provider invoices, monitoring the quality of services, 
and accounting to the federal government for its share of Medicaid funds.3 Within broad 
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federal baselines, states control these aspects of their Medicaid program as well as the 
creation of eligibility standards and the type, amount, duration, and scope of services.4 
As a joint federal/state venture, the funding for Medicaid services is also a 
shared responsibility between the two levels of government. The amount of the federal 
share for Medicaid payments varies from 50% to 76% of the total program costs, 
depending on the state.5 As of 2009, the total program costs for Medicaid totaled 
$373.9 billion.6 The costs of Medicaid have risen rapidly over the course of the 
program's existence, driven in large part by the rapid increase in expenditures for 
pharmaceuticals under the program. Unlike Medicare, which provided only a limited 
number of prescription drugs under the Part B health insurance program prior to the 
adoption of the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit in 2005, Medicaid pays for a 
variety of prescription drugs for eligible individuals. Between 1997 and 2000, 
expenditures under Medicaid's drug benefit grew at an average annual rate of 18.1%, 
more than two times the 7.7% annual growth in total Medicaid spending.7 
This rapid increase in Medicaid costs, and particularly the cost of prescription 
drugs covered by the program, increasingly drew the attention of policymakers. 
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Throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, Congress convened numerous 
committees aimed at examining the high costs of pharmaceuticals. A number of 
legislators argued that the rise in drug prices was the result of the large profits garnered 
by pharmaceutical firms. "Now, how do they make these enormous profits?" Senator 
David Pryor (D-AR), one of the industry's biggest critics, asked on the Senate floor in 
1992. "One, by outright price gouging of our American citizens who can least afford the 
medications – the elderly, the poor and the other vulnerable parts of the American 
population."8 Another industry critic, Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), suggested, 
"unless the industry can provide an adequate explanation for these price hikes, one can 
only conclude that what is going on is greed on a massive scale."9 Industry critics 
spearheaded numerous congressional efforts at establishing stricter price controls for 
prescription drugs, though these efforts generally met little success.10 
Meanwhile, as Congress debated attempts to control health care costs by 
addressing drug company "greed" through federal legislation, a variety of state and 
federal actors increasingly focused on the role fraud played in driving up Medicaid costs. 
As enacted in 1965, the original Medicaid program had few controls in place to combat 
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fraud.11 Increasingly, this led to concerns about the existence of widespread fraud in the 
system, as revealed by congressional hearings on the matter. Beginning in the 1970s and 
continuing through today, this focus on Medicaid fraud has been a lynchpin in federal 
and state efforts to reduce costs in the Medicaid program. One of the most important of 
these efforts was the establishment of Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCUs) on the 
state level. Under the purview of the state attorneys general in nearly all states, the 
MFCUs have taken a very active role in combating Medicaid fraud. 
b) The Role of the MFCUs 
The impetus to uncover health care fraud began at the state level, with New 
York leading the way as the first state to establish an independent counsel to investigate 
fraud in the Medicaid program. With the support of then-Attorney General Louis 
Lefkowitz, New York Governor Hugh Carey appointed a Special Prosecutor to examine 
health care fraud in 1975 following a major scandal in the state's nursing home 
industry.12 Governor Carey explained that this special prosecutor was necessary because 
"the [health care fraud] schemes in operation are so complex, wide-ranging and 
sophisticated, they require a special staff of highly trained professionals working full 
time to even provide the ghost of a chance of coping with them."13 
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Congress followed New York's lead in 1977 when it enacted the Medicare-
Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, which granted the states 
additional resources to establish special prosecutors to investigate health care fraud, 
similar to New York's program.14 These special prosecutors were located within MCFUs, 
and were specifically tasked with tackling fraud within the government-funded Medicaid 
system. After an initial three-year period in which the federal government covered 90% 
of the costs of the MFCUs, Congress decided to make the federal funding of these units 
permanent. Today, the federal government continues to fund the majority (typically 
75%) of each state’s MFCU. The grant amounts to the states under the MFCU program 
now total nearly $200 million, enabling these units to employ over 1,800 staff members 
collectively.15 
This federal anti-fraud program began as a voluntary initiative that the states 
could opt into, but as part of the increased attention legislators were placing on rising 
health care costs in the 1990s, Congress enacted legislation in 1993 requiring each state 
to either establish a MFCU or receive a waiver from the federal Department of Health 
and Human services.16 To date, only North Dakota has applied for and received such a 
waiver, and the remaining forty-nine states currently maintain a MFCU. The federal 
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state must demonstrate to HHS that it has a minimum of fraud in its Medicaid program. 
388 
 
statutory definition of "state MFCU" in the original 1977 statute encouraged states to 
place the MFCU under the purview of the state's attorney general, since SAGs already 
typically possessed the sort of statewide authority to prosecute criminal violations 
specified as part of the MFCUs' duties.17 Nearly all of the states have done so, with forty-
three state MFCUs under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state's attorney general.18 
Thanks to the considerable federal and state funding of these units, most MFCUs 
retain a number of experienced attorneys and investigators on staff. For example, New 
York’s MFCU, the largest in the nation, retained 325 attorneys and other staff as of 
2009.19 These MFCUs have a great deal of discretion to pursue cases independently from 
the state Medicaid agency. In fact, federal requirements prohibit state Medicaid 
agencies from reviewing or overruling any activities of the MFCU, a requirement 
instituted to prevent conflicts of interests that could occur if the same agencies tasked 
with administrating the program were also tasked with investigating waste, fraud, and 
abuse within those same programs.20 
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Typically, the Medicaid fraud investigations handled by the MFCUs feature a 
good deal of cooperation among the states as well as with federal investigators. Helping 
organize the activities of the states is the National Association of Medicaid Fraud 
Control Units (NAMFCU), established in 1978. The NAMFCU provides a forum to discuss 
multistate investigations, and helps to coordinate state actions with the many federal 
agencies involved in combating Medicaid fraud, including chiefly the Office of Inspector 
General within HHS, but also including the DOJ, the FBI, the IRS, the Post Office, and 
others.21 NAMFCU also works closely with the National Association of Attorneys General 
("NAAG") in coordinating state actions.22 
The number of federal statutes aimed at reducing health care fraud has 
increased over time, and many of these statutes have increased the jurisdiction of the 
MFCUs. While state investigations of health care fraud must still be primarily related to 
Medicaid, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 allowed 
MFCUs to investigate fraud in any federally funded health care program, including 
Medicare and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.23 While the traditional 
responsibility of the MFCUs has been criminal enforcement, the MFCUs have 
increasingly pursued civil remedies in recent years. Civil enforcement allows the MFCUs 
to recover the state share of Medicaid payments, allocated on the state’s actual 
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damages. 
When MFCUs first entered into operation, the focus was on what one might 
characterize as "run of the mill" fraudulent behavior by health care providers 
concentrated within individual states. A health care provider might bill Medicaid for 
blood tests or x-rays that were never performed, for example.24 Another common fraud 
handled by MFCUs involves providers billing both Medicaid and a private insurance 
company for exactly the same health care treatments.25 These sorts of fraudulent 
schemes, existing from the early days of the Medicaid program, are typically handled 
through single-state prosecutions resulting in civil or criminal penalties. These law 
enforcement activities have typically generated little controversy since they usually 
involve fairly clear and obvious schemes to defraud the Medicaid system. As I explain 
below, however, the type of "fraud" investigated by the SAGs has expanded well beyond 
these sorts of clearly fraudulent schemes. "Law enforcement against fraud" now 
encompasses attempts to change nationwide pricing practices of the pharmaceutical 
industry in ways often indistinguishable from changes in public policy. 
c) Prescription Drug Reimbursement in the Medicaid Program 
The federal government handles payment for Medicare, but because of the 
states' role in administering the Medicaid program, payments for Medicaid services are 
handled primarily at the state level. States may pay health care providers directly for 
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services rendered to individuals enrolled in Medicaid, or can use various prepayment 
arrangements (such as HMOs) to provide for state reimbursement to providers. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers, because they are not enrolled as Medicaid providers, do 
not receive reimbursement directly from state programs. Instead, Medicaid reimburses 
pharmacies for the drugs they dispense for eligible enrollees.26 
Within certain limits imposed by the federal government, the states have some 
discretion in regards to the payment rates associated with prescription drugs under the 
Medicaid program. For that reason, some state-to-state variation exists regarding 
pharmaceutical reimbursement to pharmacies. However, at the heart of the 
prescription drug payment scheme for both Medicare and Medicaid was for many years 
the notion of "Average Wholesale Price" ("AWP"). This AWP is set up to be the pricing 
benchmark for drugs reimbursed by government health care programs, reflecting the 
average price at which wholesalers sell drugs to physicians, pharmacies, and other 
customers.27 The AWP, however, has no statutory definition, and the states rely upon 
commercial publishers of drug pricing data, the most prominent being First DataBank, 
for the AWPs of drugs covered by Medicaid.28 These commercial publishers in turn 
receive the AWP pricing information "based on data obtained from manufacturers, 
distributors, and other suppliers."29 In other words, the AWPs for any given drug have no 
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set benchmark but instead originate from information provided by the manufacturers of 
that drug. Because of this manufacturer-reported pricing system, the AWP has often 
been equated with a "sticker price" or "list price," similar to those used in automobile 
sales.30  
Typically, payments for prescription drugs under both Medicare and Medicaid 
are based on AWP minus a set percentage. Prior to Medicare Part D going into effect in 
2006, the Medicare program used the AWP as a benchmark for payments for the limited 
number of drug prescriptions (most significantly for cancer treatments) provided under 
Medicare Part B. Because Medicaid provides much broader drug prescription coverage 
than did Medicare (pre-Part D), and because it is administered by the states, the use of 
AWP under the Medicaid program is a bit more complex.  
Federal law does not specify what each state may pay for prescription drug 
coverage under Medicaid, but it does place limits on the federal contribution. This limit 
is the "Estimated Acquisition Cost" ("EAC"), which in nearly all states is calculated as the 
AWP of the drug minus a discount.31 Congress mandated this discount as part of the 
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. As a 
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way to address the problem of growing costs, the Drug Rebate Program mandated that 
the price of any drug sold to Medicaid has to be lower than the "best price" paid by any 
private-sector purchaser. Under the rebate program, drug manufacturers are required 
to sign a rebate agreement with the federal government in order to receive payment for 
outpatient prescription drugs provided to Medicaid beneficiaries. In exchange, the 
states are required to cover all FDA-approved drugs manufactured by a drug company 
that has signed the rebate agreement.32  The basic rebate must be at least 15.1% of the 
"average manufacturer's price" ("AMP") of the drug, which represents the price paid by 
wholesalers to manufacturers after all discounts are taken into account.33 To help clarify 
the system, Figure 8.1 illustrates a simplified drug reimbursement payment process 
under Medicaid. 
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FIGURE 8.1: EXAMPLE OF MEDICAID PRESCRIPTION DRUG REIMBURSEMENT PAYMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 illustrates how the reported AWP and AMP of drugs are related to the 
ultimate cost for drugs paid by states to pharmacies dispensing prescription drugs to 
Medicaid enrollees. As noted earlier, both of these concepts are not defined specifically, 
but rely upon data provided by the manufacturers themselves. Because the term "AWP" 
Baseline for Drug Reimbursement Under 
Medicaid: 
 
 
Medicaid Rebate Determination: 
 
Average Wholesale Price  
(AWP) of Drug "X" 
 
$100 
 
Average Manufacturer's Price 
(AMP) of Drug "X" 
 
$80 
 
State pays provider according to the 
State Medicaid Reimbursement Formula 
(here, assume AWP-10%), plus a set $3 
dispensing fee. 
$93 
Drug manufacturer pays state a 
rebate of 15.1% of AMP (or 
must otherwise match the "best 
price") 
 
$12 
 
Net cost to state: 
$81 
This illustration is adapted from Dawn M. Gencarelli, "Average Wholesale Price for Prescription Drugs: 
Is There a More Appropriate Pricing Mechanism?" National Health Policy Forum, June 7, 2002, 9. 
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is not defined in law or regulation, "the manufacturer is free to set an AWP at any level, 
regardless of the actual price paid by purchasers."34  
A major consequence of this pricing system is that it gives providers an incentive 
to prescribe drugs where the greatest difference exists between the listed AWP and 
actual market price for the drug. This difference is often referred to as the "spread," 
which the providers can then use to bolster their own revenues. This, in turn, gives drug 
manufacturers the incentive to increase the spread by increasing the AWP benchmark 
they report to commercial drug price publishers such as First DataBank. By doing so, 
drug companies can encourage the utilization of their drugs by providing larger spreads 
to health care providers. 
d) The Clinton Administration Tries to Change the AWP Benchmark 
The potential that these incentives would drive up drug costs under Medicare 
and Medicaid did not go unnoticed by the government. As early as 1968, the Task Force 
on Prescription Drugs of the Department of Health Education and Welfare noted that 
the AWP could be used as an "umbrella" beneath which the [pharmaceutical] company 
can maneuver against competing products."35 In 1977, the Health Care Financing 
Administration actively tried to get states to move away from AWP as a reflection of 
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actual costs of drugs.36 As concern about rising health care costs reached ever higher 
levels in the 1990s, President Clinton noted the potential for higher costs to the 
government because of the flawed, but legal, AWP system. In a 1997 address calling for 
additional efforts to reduce health care costs, Clinton explained the AWP system as an 
example of a type of "waste and abuse" that "aren't even illegal [because] they're just 
embedded in the practices of the system."37 For years, the difference between AWP and 
the actual market prices for drugs led pharmaceutical industry observers to refer to 
AWP as "Ain't What's Paid."38 
Despite these concerns, neither Congress nor the states replaced the use of the 
manufacturer-reported AWP benchmark. The reason had largely to do with the 
testimony of physicians, and particularly oncologists, who argued that there would be 
no way for them to stay in business and serve Medicare and Medicaid recipients 
without benefiting from the "spread" created by the AWP.39 While the AWP indeed 
exceeded the providers' costs for drugs, the spread helped to make up for inadequate 
government payments related to other professional services by health care providers 
under Medicare and Medicaid. 
 Congress was generally swayed by these arguments, particularly the prospect 
that AWP cuts would lead to more limited access to services available to Medicare and 
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Medicaid enrollees. This was true even when the Clinton Administration made a 
significant push in the 1990s to alter the AWP system for the purposes Medicare drug 
reimbursements. In his 1998 budget proposal, Clinton proposed eliminating AWP and 
replacing it with a formula directly related to actual acquisition costs paid by providers. 
Congress rejected this proposal, instead making the much less drastic change of 
dropping the drug reimbursement to AWP minus 5%.40 Following this failure, the 
Administration proposed reducing the reimbursement further to AWP minus 17% in 
both 1999 and 2000, but neither of these proposals gained traction in Congress. 
e) The Fight Moves From Congress to the Courts 
1. The Industry Investigation Begins 
Amidst these failed attempts at statutory changes of the AWP formula in 
Congress, the Clinton Administration DOJ, along with several SAGs, began shifting to a 
litigation strategy by investigating the use of AWP by certain pharmaceutical companies. 
The investigation, which focused on the activities of more than a dozen large 
pharmaceutical firms, examined the way in which drug companies "marketed the 
spread" between AWP and actual costs to provide incentives to providers to prescribe 
their products and apply for reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid.41 According 
to the government prosecutors, this practice represented actionable fraud. One letter 
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from New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to Medicaid pharmacy directors across the 
country announced that this investigation "has revealed a pattern of misrepresentation 
by some drug manufacturers" resulting in Medicare and Medicaid "substantially" 
overpaying for certain drugs."42 This "misrepresentation" was the use of allegedly 
inflated AWP information reported by manufacturers to the commercial publishers of 
drug pricing data. 
The governments' first step was to pressure First DataBank, the largest of these 
commercial publishers, to alter the way it reported prices for several dozen prominent 
drugs. In the face of the growing federal/state investigation, the company agreed in 
2000 to list prices that the SAGs, as part of their investigation, determined were closer 
to what providers actually paid for the drugs.43 Following this informal agreement, 
Spitzer noted that this pricing change would likely result in "initial complaints or 
objections about lowered Medicaid payments" by providers,44 which is precisely what 
occurred when the Health Care Financing Administration announced plans to uses these 
new rates reported by First DataBank to compensate providers. 
Following the predicted outrage from health care providers, particularly 
oncologists worried about reimbursement rates under Medicare Part B, Congress 
enacted the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 
2000. This act, among other things, precluded HHS Secretary from "directly or indirectly 
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decreas[ing] the rates or reimbursement...under the current reimbursement 
methodology" until the General Accounting Office released a study on the matter of 
AWP and it was reviewed by HHS.45 
With Congress still very hesitant to proceed with any significant changes to the 
AWP system, the federal DOJ and the SAGs pressed ahead with their investigation. The 
government coalition reported that it had uncovered a variety of "fraudulent" behavior 
by the pharmaceutical companies that had ultimately cost the federal and state 
governments billions of dollars. Some of the activity was the sort of garden-variety fraud 
the MFCUs had been prosecuting for years. Central to the investigation, however, was 
the notion that marketing the "spread" between the drug's listed AWP and the actual 
cost of that drug represented illegal fraud. 46 
2. Fraud Under the False Claims Act 
The government coalition made clear that it was willing to turn to active 
litigation if necessary to recover government funds expended because of this alleged 
AWP fraud. The governments' legal hook relied upon an innovative use of the False 
Claims Act ("FCA"), a Civil War-era statute that originally aimed to crack down on 
"rampant fraud" among defense contractors doing business with the Union army.47 The 
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purpose of the FCA is to recover money paid by the government to private contractors 
as the result of fraudulent claims. The FCA contains qui tam provisions, which allow 
private whistleblowers suing on the government’s behalf to retain a substantial 
proportion of the proceeds of the suit.48 Following such a qui tam complaint, 
government enforcers are granted a period in which to investigate the allegations and 
to intervene in the action. The qui tam whistleblowers thus serve as a sort of fraud alert 
system for government prosecutors. 
For a variety of reasons, the FCA had fallen out of favor during and after World 
War II, and was infrequently used in government prosecutions. However, Congress 
dusted off the FCA in the 1980s as part of an effort to cut down on fraud in defense 
contracting. As part of the False Claims Act Amendments of 1986, Congress increased 
the incentive of private whistleblowers to bring qui tam actions by increasing the cap on 
monetary recoveries from double to treble damages and increasing mandatory 
penalties to up to $10,000 (up from $2,000). It also reduced the burden of proof 
necessary to prove a claim.49 Following the congressional amendments, a FCA violation 
required the government to prove (1) the existence of a submission of a claim for 
payment to the government, (2) that was false, and (3) that the defendant knew or 
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should have known was false, or that the defendant showed reckless disregard towards 
the truth or falsity of the claim.50 These amendments made clear that the specific intent 
to defraud the government, which can be difficult to prove, was unnecessary to violate 
the FCA. 
While fraud in defense contracting provided the impetus for the 1986 
Amendments, the FCA formed the legal hook for the litigation threatened by the DOJ 
and the states as part of their AWP investigation. The prospect of FCA liability was 
particularly disturbing for pharmaceutical firms, since every filled Medicare or Medicaid 
prescription might be considered a "false claim" subject to treble damages and the 
maximum penalty under the statute. These penalties could quickly add up to create 
potential exposure to these firms running into the hundreds of millions of dollars.51 
Additionally, if a company was found guilty of any criminal violations involved in a 
potential suit, the company could be excluded from Medicare and other federal health 
programs, a penalty some have described as a corporate "death sentence."52 Under 
these conditions, drug companies quickly realized that litigating any government claims 
all the way to a jury verdict would be very risky and potentially fatal to the corporations. 
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3. The Precedent for "AWP As Fraud" – the Bayer and TAP Pharmaceuticals 
Settlements 
The DOJ and the SAGs understood the potential leverage they maintained over 
potential drug company defendants, and made no secret of the fact that they sought to 
force a settlement with a major manufacturer in the hope that it would set a precedent 
for other companies to move towards a more accurate pricing system.53 In January of 
2001, the government coalition achieved its first major victory. Since May of the 
previous year, the group had been in talks with Bayer Pharmaceuticals over the pricing 
of several its drugs used to treat hemophilia and AIDS.54 The case originally arose in 
1995, when Ven-A-Care, an independent pharmacy in Florida, filed a qui tam case under 
the FCA alleging that Bayer inflated the AWP of these drugs. The federal and state 
governments intervened in the case, alleging that Bayer was "marketing the spread" to 
physicians and other health care providers and that the company had not included the 
proper level of discounts to the government in such a way that inflated the "Best Price" 
for these drugs under Medicaid.  
Essentially, the governments argued that the way that Bayer calculated the AWP 
and AMP for these drugs represented fraudulent actions leading to liability under the 
FCA. Bayer, along with the rest of the industry, argued that setting prices for AWP was in 
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no way "fraudulent" given that the government had known for years that marketing the 
spread was an accepted industry practice and nevertheless kept AWP as part of the 
government reimbursement system. Nevertheless, under pressure from DOJ and nearly 
all of the SAGs, Bayer decided to settle the governments' allegations. In separate but 
closely related settlements, DOJ and the states reached an agreement with Bayer 
containing a small monetary payment of $14 million to be divided up between the 
federal government and the 45 states involved in the suit. Reflecting the ambitions of 
the governments to use the settlement to send a message to the pharmaceutical about 
the legality of AWP, however, the importance of the regulatory requirements in the 
settlement overshadowed the relatively minor monetary payments. 
The key provision of the settlement, which was accompanied by a Corporate 
Integrity Agreement with HHS, required Bayer to report the "average sale price" (ASP) 
for all of the drugs reimbursed by Medicaid, and to no longer report the AWPs for each 
of these drugs.55 In contrast to AWP, this new pricing benchmark was defined in the 
settlement as the weighted average of all non-Federal sales of drugs to wholesalers, 
including all discounts, rebates, and other benefits tied to the purchase of the drug.56 
Because the ASP, unlike the AWP, was a defined term and set by the market rather than 
by the manufacturer, this was intended to reduce the sort of price "manipulation" by 
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the pharmaceutical industry involved in these cases. Because companies could not 
create a spread between the AWP and market prices, the aim was to reduce costs of 
drugs reimbursed under government health care programs. State Medicaid officials 
would be able to use the ASP data to set "fair" reimbursement rates for prescription 
drugs.57 
The government prosecutors viewed the Bayer settlement as a watershed 
agreement that could be used to replace the existing AWP system with the "more 
accurate" ASP system. New York SAG Eliot Spitzer characterized the settlement as "a 
significant victory...[that] sends a strong message to other pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and health care providers that we will not allow them to enrich 
themselves at the expense of taxpayers and those most in need."58 This "strong 
message" resonated across the industry, as Bayer was but the first domino to fall in the 
government prosecutors' strategy to attack the AWP reimbursement system.  
The federal and state prosecutors followed up the Bayer settlement with an 
even more significant agreement later in 2001 involving TAP Pharmaceuticals. As with 
Bayer, this case also arose from qui tam cases under the FCA. This case involved a filing 
by the TAP's former Vice President of Sales, as well as a Massachusetts doctor whose 
business TAP hoped to secure.59 The governments alleged that TAP engaged in a wide 
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range of illegal conduct, some of which appeared to be "clear" fraud under existing 
federal statutes.60 For example, the government prosecutors alleged that TAP violated 
the federal Prescription Drug Marketing Act by giving physicians free samples of Lupron, 
a prostate cancer drug, and encouraged them to bill Medicare for those samples.61 The 
governments also alleged that TAP offered various kickbacks and incentives to doctors 
to continue using Lupron instead of its main competitor at the time, AstraZeneca's 
Zolodex. These alleged kickbacks included free drugs, educational grants, trips to 
resorts, free consulting services, medical equipment, and forgiveness of debt, all offered 
to physicians in violation of the federal Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protection Act of 
1987.62 
However, as with the Bayer case, the allegations also included as evidence of 
"fraud" TAP's "marketing the spread" between its published AWPs for Lupron and the 
actual purchase price. As in Bayer, then, the TAP allegations aimed to introduce the 
notion that the AWP payment system was inherently fraudulent. This was despite the 
fact, as TAP argued, that "marketing the spread" and similar practices concerning the 
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AWP and AMP had been legal for years – and that Congress had even considered the 
spread an acceptable way to ensure that physicians and other providers remain in the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. TAP President Thomas Watkins vigorously disagreed 
with the allegations of wrongdoing, stating, "[w]e fundamentally disagree with 
government claims regarding TAP's pricing and reimbursement policies. We believe we 
consistently complied with pricing laws and regulations."63 
However, the government prosecutors saw in the TAP case an opportunity to 
make the statement that they had begun with Bayer. Despite the legally questionable 
nature of these AWP claims in the case, none of which had previously been tested in 
court, the accusations of other illegal kickbacks and other violations of the Prescription 
Drug Marketing Act were on firmer legal ground. Because these charges could lead to 
criminal as well as civil liability if proven in court, TAP faced the prospect of exclusion 
from Medicare and other federal health programs.  
The threat of this "death sentence" gave the federal and state prosecutors 
additional leverage to force a significant settlement related to not only the kickback 
claims, but the alleged AWP fraud as well. In October of 2001, the strategy came to 
fruition in the form of a massive $875 million settlement between the DOJ and the 
SAGs, the largest health care fraud settlement in history to that time.64 Of the monetary 
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recovery, $290 million was related to criminal fines for violations of the Prescription 
Drug Marketing Act. The remainder of the civil penalties was split between the federal 
government and the two qui tam whistleblowers, with nearly $60 million going to the 
states.   
 As part of the settlement, TAP also entered into a Corporate Integrity 
Agreement ("CIA") with HHS requiring strict oversight of TAP’s marketing and sales 
practices for seven years, the first ever settlement to require this sort of strict scrutiny.65 
Perhaps most importantly of all, the settlement required TAP to report the ASP for each 
of its drugs on a quarterly basis, similar to the provision the prosecutors had won in the 
Bayer settlement.66 The CIA also permitted the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) to rely upon this ASP data in setting reimbursement rates for TAP's 
products under Medicare Part B, as well as by state Medicaid programs in setting their 
own reimbursements rates.67 This settlement provision therefore allowed the CMS to go 
beyond its explicit authority established by Congress, which had specifically set 
Medicare reimbursement rates at 95% of AWP. 
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4. The Floodgates Open and the States Rush In 
These two settlements, prosecuted by DOJ and the state MFCUs, were viewed as 
watershed cases and a "wake-up call" throughout the industry.68 As one health care 
fraud attorney stated at the time, "[t]he TAP settlement sent a huge chill through the 
pharmaceutical industry."69 Not only did the size of the TAP settlement raise eyebrows 
throughout the pharmaceutical industry, but both the Bayer and TAP settlements 
introduced the notion that the AWP pricing mechanism, which had long been seen as 
standard company practice, was inherently fraudulent. The pharmaceutical industry's 
concern would rise even higher after comments like those from the head of the Florida 
SAG's Medicaid Fraud division, who characterized AWP payments as a "scheme" 
involving "virtually every major pharmaceutical manufacturer that's operating in 
America."70  
SAGs fully understood that the Bayer and TAP precedents opened up additional 
opportunities for state litigation. As former Maine SAG Andrew Ketterer stated at the 
time, "the area [of AWP] is fertile for attorneys general to look into. Pharmaceutical 
companies spend a fair amount of money on research and development for wells that 
don't have oil and they have to recover from those losses in some way. [A lawsuit] is not 
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out of the range of possibilities that would come on to the radar screen. It's an area that 
is of great interest to a lot of people."71 
(a) The First SAGs Litigate AWP Independently of the Federal DOJ 
Attorney General Ketterer's words proved prescient, because SAGs began 
litigating AWP suits independently of the federal government during and especially 
shortly after the Bayer and TAP settlements were announced. Republican Texas SAG 
John Cornyn, in the midst of the Bayer and TAP investigations, filed the first state AWP 
lawsuit in the fall of 2000. This state lawsuit arose after Ven-a-Care, the Florida 
pharmacy that also served as a qui tam whistleblower in the Bayer case and several 
subsequent AWP lawsuits, had alleged that that Dey Laboratories had inflated the AWP 
for asthma inhalants and marketed the spread to pharmacists.72 After investigating the 
claims brought to light by Ven-a-Care, Cornyn filed suit against Dey and two other 
pharmaceutical firms, Schering-Plough (including its subsidiary Warrick) and Roxane 
Laboratories. 
Texas was in a somewhat unusual position to sue these firms relative to other 
states, because Texas was one of the few states to have a state-level FCA specifically 
targeting health care fraud. This state FCA, enacted in 1995, allowed the state to recover 
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double damages and costs from defendants found liable of Medicaid fraud.73 Cornyn 
had also created a civil Medicaid fraud section within his office in 1999.74 Texas was also 
the only state in the country requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to complete a 
questionnaire for each drug for which the company sought reimbursement under the 
state's Vendor Drug Program. This questionnaire required companies to certify the 
prices of their drugs, while other states relied upon published pricing information from 
private publishers including First Data Bank.75 This pricing data, provided directly by the 
manufacturers to the state, was then used as the benchmark to calculate 
reimbursements under Medicaid.  
These state laws, along with the information provided by Ven-a-Care, provided 
Cornyn with the tools sufficient to bring his AWP case against the three pharmaceutical 
firms in September of 2000. The allegations were similar to those in the Bayer and TAP 
cases. The state accused the companies with allegedly falsely inflating the prices 
charged to the Vendor Drug Program, causing the state to pay more for the drugs that 
was appropriate. Cornyn claimed that the companies did so "knowingly" – the key 
standard to prove unlawful acts under the statute. He further alleged that each 
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reimbursement constituted separate violations under the state FCA, which provided for 
penalties of up to $10,000 for each individual violation.76  
The suit had a near-immediate effect on how Texas reimbursed drugs under its 
Vendor Drug Program. Shortly after Cornyn filed the case, the head of Texas's Medicaid 
program ordered an audit of its drug reimbursements, and soon after cut the 
reimbursement rates for the drugs involved in the suit.77 The reimbursement rate for 
Warrick's asthma inhalers was cut by more than half, for example, and the company's 
share of the state Medicaid market for asthma inhalers dropped to 42% from 71% in less 
than two years.78 Eventually, all three defendants named in Texas's AWP lawsuit 
reached settlements with the SAG's office.79 These settlements included combined 
monetary recoveries of over $55 million, representing nearly twice the damages 
allegedly caused by the defendant's "inflating" their drug prices.  The settlements also 
required the defendants to enter into pricing agreements with the state Medicaid 
division to ensure "accurate" pricing in the future.80 
                                                          
76
 Texas Human Resources Code Annotated §32.039. 
77
 According to Greg Abbott, Cornyn's successor in the Texas SAG's office, the overcharge litigation 
spurred the state to change the way it reimburses pharmacists and physicians for prescription drugs 
under the Medicaid program, charges that Abbott said will save the state hundreds of millions of dollars in 
the future. "Boehringer Ingelheim to Pay $10 Million To Settle Texas AG's Overcharge Allegations," 
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, December 2, 2005, 1233. 
78
 Andrew Caffrey, Scott Hensley, and Russell Gold, "States Go To Court in Effort to Rein in Costs of 
Medicine," Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2002. 
79
 Dey settled in June of 2003, Schering-Plough (Warrick) settled in May 2004, and Roxane settled in 
November 2005. Yelkin, "States Target Medicaid Fraud." Texas gave about half of this settlement amount 
to the federal government, reflecting the federal government's share of the losses allegedly incurred 
because of the defendants' conduct. 
80
 See, for example, Settlement Agreement and Release, State of Texas v. Roxane Laboratories, No. GV3-
03079 (District Court of Travis County, Texas), III(3). 
412 
 
Texas's lawsuit was aided by the fact that manufacturers reported the pricing 
data upon which the state based its reimbursements directly to the state, rather than 
employing an intermediary such as First Data Bank. However, this did not stop a number 
of other SAGs from bringing expansive AWP suits following Texas's example. In January 
of 2002, Nevada SAG Frankie Sue Del Papa filed a suit in Nevada state court accusing 
seventeen pharmaceutical companies81 of inflating the AWPs that they reported to First 
Data Bank, which in turn were used to set the reimbursement rates for prescription 
drugs under Nevada's Medicaid program. The litigation, unlike in Texas's case, was 
handled by a private contingency lawyer acting on behalf of the state because, in Del 
Papa's words, "[w]e're a small state, and resources are very limited."82 
Del Papa's lawsuit went well beyond that of Cornyn's in Texas. Not only did the 
state name a broader range of defendants, but the complaint listed a variety of 
Medicaid fraud, antitrust, and consumer protection claims in the lawsuit.83 In addition 
to allegedly employing "deceptive practices" constituting consumer fraud that harmed 
Nevada residents and the state budget, Nevada alleged that the companies' behavior 
also constituted a "racketeering enterprise" aimed at deriving profits from states across 
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the nation by inflating AWPs.84 "We're trying to assert every possible claim of relief," 
stated Tim Terry, the chief of the Nevada MFCU.85 The complaint also repeatedly 
referred to the pharmaceutical companies' behavior as part of an "AWP Scheme,"86 a 
seeming attempt to coin a negative label for pricing behavior that had for decades been 
part of the government's reimbursement practice.87 
Del Papa explained her rationale for filing the lawsuit by noting that "[t]his 
country and our state have struggled to provide cost-effective health care while the 
elderly are often forced to choose expensive medicines over food and housing." In 
Howard Beale-esqe terms, she remarked, "[t]oday, we have fired the first salvo sending 
a message on behalf of our state and our citizens that we aren't going to take it 
anymore."88 In addition to requesting damages of "three times the amount unlawfully 
obtained" and at least $5,000 for each allegedly false claim – monetary recoveries that 
could easily reach at least into the tens of millions – the complaint also asked for a 
redefinition of AWP. Rather than continuing with the long-settled notion that AWP 
represented the manufacturer-defined "sticker price" for prescription drugs, the 
complaint requested "the Court enjoin defendants and order that any and all future 
disseminations of AWP...accurately reflect the average wholesale prices paid by 
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physicians and pharmacies."89 Del Papa noted that the breadth of the complaint meant 
that her litigation "has nationwide applications because of its similarities to the historic 
tobacco litigation in which the states eventually recovered billions of dollars."90 
A month after Nevada's lawsuit, Montana SAG Mike McGrath filed similar 
litigation. This state court lawsuit alleged very similar charges against eighteen 
defendants, most of whom Nevada's suit also targeted. Like Nevada's complaint, 
Montana's alleged the AWPs reported by the pharmaceutical manufacturers bore little 
or no relationship to prices actually paid by physicians or pharmacies in the state, and 
had failed to comply with the Medicaid "best price" requirements in federal law.91 The 
complaint also contained a variety of causes of action, seeking civil penalties of $2,000 
per false claim, double damages, and legal costs and fees.92 As with the Nevada lawsuit, 
the Montana complaint also asked the court to "enjoin Defendants and order that any 
and all future disseminations of AWP and 'best price' accurately reflect the average 
wholesale prices paid by physicians and pharmacies."93 The similarity between the 
Nevada and Montana complaints comes as little surprise, given that the litigation in 
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both states was handled by the same private contingency-fee firm, Hagens Berman, that 
also went on to represent other state AWP litigation as well.94 
(b) Subsequent Lawsuits and Litigation Successes 
Building upon this earliest multistate AWP litigation, which also included West 
Virginia, the quantity of litigation expanded, both in terms of the number of SAGs 
involved in bringing lawsuits as well as the number of defendants involved in the 
lawsuits. Table 8.1 indicates the progression of these lawsuits over time. 
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TABLE 8.1: AWP-RELATED MEDICAID FRAUD LAWSUITS BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
 
State Date Filed Defendants 
Texas September 2000 Dey Laboratories, Schering-Plough, and Roxane 
West Virginia October 2001 Schering-Plough and Abbott Labs 
Nevada January 2002 17 defendants 
Montana January 2002 18 defendants 
Minnesota June 2002 Pharmacia 
California January 2003 
Abbott Labs  
(expanded to 39 defendants in September 
2005) 
New York February 2003 Pharmacia and GlaxoSmithKline 
Connecticut March 2003 7 defendants 
Florida July 2003 
3 defendants  
(amended to included three others in April 
2005) 
Kentucky September 2003 5 defendants 
Massachusetts October 2003 13 defendants 
Arkansas January 2004 4 defendants 
Ohio March 2004 5 defendants 
Pennsylvania March 2004 13 (later expanded to 38) 
Wisconsin June 2004 20 defendants 
Kentucky November 2004 41 defendants 
Alabama January 2005 72 defendants 
Illinois February 2005 48 defendants 
Missouri May 2005 
Dey and Warrick  
(expanded to 4 others in December 2005) 
Mississippi October 2005 86 defendants 
Arizona December 2005 42 defendants 
Hawaii April 2006 44 defendants 
Alaska October 2006 44 defendants 
Idaho January 2007 18 defendants 
Utah September 2007 10 defendants 
Iowa October 2007 78 defendants 
Kansas November 2008 17 defendants 
Louisiana November 2010 18 defendants 
 
 While SAGs brought most of these suits in individual state courts under state 
law, the SAGs collaborated closely on these cases, particularly through the NAAG 
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Pharmaceutical Task Force established in 2002. The goal of this Task Force was to 
encourage communication and collaboration among the states and accelerate and 
coordinate investigation and litigation efforts with other states, federal enforcement 
agencies and the private bar.95 This Task Force tied in with the existing Antitrust Task 
Force and Pharmaceutical Industry Working Group at NAAG,96 and aimed to integrate 
the SAGs' antitrust, consumer protection, and Medicaid fraud efforts.97 
The complaints in these state AWP cases bear a great deal of similarity with each 
other, reflecting both the SAGs' close collaboration on these issues, as well as the fact 
that a single private law firm (Hagens Berman) handled much of the day-to-day litigation 
for several of the states on a contingency fee basis. Variation arose depending on each 
state's underlying statutory arrangements. Alabama's lawsuit, for example, accounted 
for the state's lack of a state FCA by bringing claims alleging common law fraud, 
including fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent suppression.98 However, all of 
the state complaints requested substantial monetary recoveries, and many included 
claims for injunctive relief similar to that in Nevada's and Montana's as well.  
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In addition to these SAG lawsuits, a wave of private party lawsuits also emerged 
at the same time. This litigation involved a number of patients, private insurers, labor 
unions, health care advocates, and others. Many of these groups coordinated their 
litigation under the direction of the "Prescription Access Project," a coalition of over one 
hundred organizations founded in 2001 "working to end illegal pharmaceutical industry 
practices and fighting for more affordable drug prices."99 This private litigation attacked 
the same general AWP practices as the SAG lawsuits. 
 Faced with a growing plethora of similar state and private party lawsuits, the 
defendants sought to consolidate the claims in federal court. Many of the SAGs' claims, 
including those of Nevada, Montana, and several others, were consolidated along with 
many of the private claims in a massive lawsuit in federal district court in 
Massachusetts, in a case known as In Re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale 
Price Litigation.100 This litigation continued for years, with the state plaintiffs winning 
several key motions.101 Perhaps most importantly of all, in November of 2006 Judge Patti 
Saris adopted the definition of AWP the SAGs had urged. For the purposes of the 
upcoming trial in the case, the pharmaceutical defendants had wanted AWP to be 
defined as a term of art – as the "sticker price" that the industry had long assumed AWP 
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meant under federal drug reimbursement practice. Instead, the court held that 
"[d]etermining the plain language meaning of the regulatory and statutory term 
'average wholesale price' is a straightforward exercise that begins with the 
dictionary."102 Using the "plain meaning" of the term meant that AWP should be defined 
as the average price at which wholesalers sell drugs to their customers – precisely the 
definition that the SAG plaintiffs sought.103 This key decision undercut the companies' 
contention that AWP was in fact "Ain't What's Paid." 
 The states also secured a number of multistate and individual-state settlements 
with many industry defendants as the In Re Pharmaceutical Industry litigation 
continued. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) was the first defendant to resolve the claims it faced 
in the In Re Pharmaceutical Industry litigation, entering into settlements with five 
SAGs104 and a number of private litigants concerning allegedly inflated AWPs for two of 
the company's cancer medications, Zofran and Kytril. In addition to a $70 million 
monetary payment split between the various plaintiffs, the company was also required 
to report the ASPs for the two drugs to the states' Medicaid programs. Gaining this 
information was critical to the states, since these prices, which were not previously 
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available, could form a new baseline for Medicaid reimbursements in these states.105 
Combined with an earlier settlement between the DOJ, several MFCUs, and GSK, these 
settlements were viewed by one of the private plaintiffs as "a nail in the coffin of AWP 
and a move toward a more transparent system that will prevent drug companies from 
charging inflated prices that have no relation to the actual cost of a drug."106 Eliot Spitzer 
described the lawsuit as helping "stop a longstanding practice that inflated the cost of 
drugs for people suffering from cancer and cheated the Medicaid system."107 
Shortly after GSK settled, other defendants involved in the federal district court 
case did as well. This included AstraZeneca in May of 2007 regarding Zolodex, and 
eleven other companies in March of 2008. Many of these settlements were precipitated 
by a victory on the merits by several of the private plaintiffs in one part of the In Re 
Pharmaceutical Industry consolidated federal case. In a ruling handed down in July 
2007, Judge Saris held that the industry defendants "unfairly and deceptively caused to 
be published false AWPs...knowing that [third party payers] and the government did not 
understand the extent of the mega-spreads between published prices and true average 
provider acquisition costs."108 Saris adopted the characterization of the companies' 
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activities as an "AWP Scheme," finding that the companies' "[u]nscrupulously taking 
advantage of the flawed AWP system for Medicare reimbursement by establishing 
secret mega-spreads far beyond the standard industry markup was unethical and 
oppressive...[causing] real injuries to the insurers and the patients who were paying 
grossly inflated prices for critically important, often life-sustaining, drugs."109 Following 
this order, several of the SAGs' cases consolidated in the lawsuit that were scheduled to 
go to trial settled out-of-court.110 
AWP litigation continues to this day, with SAGs reaching individual and 
multistate settlements with pharmaceutical company defendants. While the days of the 
AWP benchmark may be numbered because of these settlements and subsequent 
congressional changes (discussed below), AWP litigation will likely continue, especially 
since the government has stated that drug prices are still inflated.111 Table 6.2 provides 
an overview of the multistate Medicaid fraud litigation settled to date by SAGs since the 
Bayer and TAP settlements opened the floodgates for these suits. 
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TABLE 8.2: MULTISTATE MEDICAID FRAUD LITIGATION BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL  
(THROUGH 2009) 
 
# of States Defendant Product 
Year 
Settled 
Total Federal/State 
Monetary Recovery 
45 states Bayer Various 2001 $14 million 
50 states 
TAP 
Pharmaceuticals 
Lupron 2001 $875 million 
47 states Pfizer Lipitor 2002 $49 million 
49 states GlaxoSmithKline Flonase/Paxil 2003 $88 million 
49 states Bayer Cipro; Adalat 2003 $250 million 
50 states AstraZeneca Zoladex 2003 $355 million 
50 states 
Abbott 
Laboratories 
Enteral feeding pumps 2003 $414 million 
50 states Warner-Lambert Neurontin 2004 $430 million 
50 states Schering-Plough Claritin 2004 $346 million 
49 states 
Serono 
Laboratories 
Serostim 2005 $704 million 
49 states 
King 
Pharmaceuticals 
Various 2005 $124 million 
49 states GlaxoSmithKline Kytril; Zofran 2005 $150.8 million 
43 states Omnicare Various generics 2006 $49.5 million 
6 states GlaxoSmithKline 
Kytril; Zofran; Amoxil; 
others 
2006 $70 million 
49 states Schering-Plough 
Claritin; K-Dur; 
Temodar; PEG-Intron; 
Rebetron; Intron-A 
2006 $435 million 
50 states Purdue Pharma OxyContin 2007 $634.5 million 
50 states Aventis Anzemet 2008 $190 million 
49 states Merck Vioxx; Zocor; Pepcid 2008 $671 million 
43 states 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
Abilify; Serzone 2008 $515 million 
50 states Cephalon Provigil;Gabitril;Actiq 2008 $375 million 
37 states Eli Lily Zyprexa 2009 $800 million 
49 states Mylan 
Albuterol; Dermatop; 
Nifedipine; Cephalexin 
2009 $149 million 
50 states Omnicare Risperdal 2009 $98 million 
50 states Aventis 
Azmacort, Nasacort 
and Nasacort AQ 
2009 $95.5 million 
49 states Pfizer 
Bextra; Geodon; Lyrica; 
Zyvox 
2009 $1 billion 
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f) AWP Litigation as Political Strategy 
Throughout the AWP litigation campaign conducted by the SAGs and other 
parties over the past decade, the SAGs made no secret that they were attempting to 
alter practices in the pharmaceutical industry on a national scale. As Ohio Attorney 
General Betty Montgomery stated in reference to the SAGs' pharmaceutical litigation, 
"[o]ur major task is to change behavior. Money is incidental. We see a problem that 
violates the law, and we've decided to go forward."112 Another observer noted that in 
this AWP litigation, SAGs were "filing cases where they know full well it's not clear that 
they can win if they go to trial...they're not seeking damages in many of these situations 
– they're seeking structured settlements."113  
Through this litigation, the SAGs targeted a long-standing industry practice of 
using AWP as an incentive for health care providers to prescribe their prescription drug 
products – a practice Congress repeatedly countenanced as a way to compensate 
providers for losses incurred by their provision of other services under the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. For all of the flaws in the system, the industry relied upon and 
accepted this practice. "Three or four years ago, if you surveyed manufacturers and 
asked if AWPs were kickbacks," stated one attorney for the industry following the TAP 
settlement, "they'd have looked at you like you were from another planet."114 Yet SAGs 
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played a key role, along with other public and private litigators, in transforming this 
accepted system into actionable "fraud." They obtained regulatory settlements and 
significant monetary recoveries that redefined the pharmaceutical pricing system and 
placed a de facto tax on the industry. 
This litigation campaign occurred as policy advocates for stricter price controls 
on prescription drugs attempted to alter the way government provided reimbursement 
prescription drugs both on the national level and in the states. A Maine statute enacted 
in 2000 placed price controls on drugs sold in the state, making it "illegal profiteering" 
for a drug manufacturer to charge a price that is "unconscionable" or produces an 
"unjust or unreasonable profit."115 Other states, including Indiana, attempted to cut 
Medicaid reimbursement rates paid to pharmacies unilaterally.116 These state legislative 
and administrative strategies, however, faced the problem that their impact was limited 
to individual states, as well as the fact that these policy developments were frequently 
challenged in court. Courts granted injunctions to stop states from unilateral cuts in 
reimbursement rates,117 for example, and the Maine price control law and similar 
statutes were challenged in court by the pharmaceutical industry's peak association, 
PhRMA.118 Meanwhile, industry critics in Congress were losing their battle to end AWP 
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on a national level, winning only modest reductions in prescription drug reimbursement 
rates. 
The campaign to redefine AWP by means of litigation solved both problems by 
sidestepping Congress to force drug pricing changes throughout the entire industry. In 
many of these cases, the SAGs teamed up with both private class action attorneys and 
public interest groups to attack AWP as fraudulent and attempt to change the pricing 
benchmark from the previously long-standing practice. The litigation was also an 
attempt to obtain more information about drug prices, which could be used both in 
future litigation as well as to alter the states' payments for drugs.119 Texas's AWP 
litigation provides an example of this, with the state Medicaid agency relying upon the 
"accurate transaction prices" obtained by the Texas SAG through settlements to set the 
new reimbursement benchmark for state Medicaid payments.120 
Further, these lawsuits continued to exert more pressure on Congress to address 
alleged "regulatory lapses"121 in the area of drug pricing, essentially granting 
pharmaceutical industry critics in Congress more ammunition for their own legislative 
campaigns. As noted earlier, Congress as a whole declined to change the AWP system 
for years, but there were many within Congress eager to go after the industry for their 
pricing "schemes." Congressman Pete Stark (D-CA), for example, argued that the 
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industry had "abused their position of privilege in the United States by reporting falsely 
inflated drug prices" and continued to "engage in the fraudulent price manipulation for 
the express purpose of causing federally funded health care programs to expend scarce 
tax dollars in order to arrange de facto kickbacks for the drug manufacturers’ 
customers..."122 Stark and his legislative allies did not succeed in prohibiting these 
practices in Congress for many years, but the AWP litigation essentially extended Stark's 
and like-minded legislator's arguments to the courtroom. The frequent references to 
"AWP Schemes" in this litigation was meant to cement the notion that AWP was 
inherently "fraudulent" in a way industry critics had argued for some time. 
As government prosecutors reached significant settlements with Bayer and TAP, 
and AWP litigation proliferated in courtrooms all around the country, Congress finally 
acted. In the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act, signed 
into law in December of 2003, Congress addressed the issue of prescription drug 
reimbursement under Medicare. The provisions intended to reduce Medicare’s 
reimbursement rates for physician-administered prescription drugs while at the same 
time increasing reimbursement rates for the services associated with administering 
those drugs.123  
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Most importantly, Congress changed the pricing benchmark from AWP to the 
"Average Sales Price" – precisely the benchmark DOJ and the SAGs had won in the Bayer 
and TAP settlements and that the SAGs had urged in their individual suits and 
settlements. Under the Medicare Modernization Act, Congress set the new prescription 
drug reimbursement for Medicare at 106% of ASP.124 The Act defined ASP in the same 
way as did the Bayer and TAP settlements – as an average
 
of the final sales prices to all 
U.S. purchasers, net of rebates and other discounts.125 Congress also required 
companies participating in the Medicare program to report the ASPs for their drugs to 
CMS on a quarterly basis, similar to the provisions previously achieved in the Bayer and 
TAP settlements.126 These congressional changes came only after the concerted 
litigation campaign by government prosecutors and a series of settlements provided a 
model for later statutory changes. 
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At the same time that Congress was ratifying the concept of "AWP-as-fraud" and 
altering the reimbursement system for Medicare to match the goals of previous 
settlements and ongoing litigation, it also provided more incentives for the states to 
bring AWP litigation. As part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ("DRA"), Congress 
offered a variety of grants to states for anti-fraud efforts.127 Specifically, the DRA 
provided financial incentives to states to enact qui tam provisions in their state False 
Claims Acts, providing an incentive for whistleblowers to file state as well as federal 
lawsuits.128 The financial incentives to states in the act, which included the ability of 
states to recover a portion of the federal share of Medicaid recoveries in FCA 
settlements in addition to the state share, made it more attractive for SAGs to intervene 
in existing state qui tam lawsuits. To date, twenty-seven states have now enacted state-
level FCAs, as have the cities of Washington D.C., New York City, and Chicago.129 
Finally, in another ratification of policies previously adopted in state settlements, 
the DRA of 2005 also directed HHS to clarify how AMPs are determined for purposes of 
calculating the Medicaid rebate required under the federal "best price" laws.130 The 
subsequent regulation defined the AMP for the first time, and stipulated that best price 
must include any sale or price concession that is not specifically excluded from the 
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determination of the statistic by statute or regulation.131 This language was also a 
ratification of the provisions contained in the various settlements achieved by federal 
and state prosecutors to that point. 
In short, the SAGs' AWP litigation, along with the federal and private lawsuits, 
had several effects on the industry. For one, it was part of a concerted campaign to 
redefine the existing AWP system as industry "fraud," despite neither Congress nor state 
Medicaid agencies electing to change the system. Through a series of settlements, SAGs 
were able to achieve regulatory settlements creating an alternative pricing benchmark 
and placing additional pricing disclosure requirements on drug firms. Following these 
successful settlements, Congress reacted not by preempting the litigation for 
encroaching upon its legislative jurisdiction and threatening previously agreed-upon 
congressional policies. Instead, Congress ratified several of the elements previously 
contained in these settlements. The result has been the decline and fall of AWP as a 
pricing benchmark, a policy change with implications reverberating throughout the 
health care industry. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Attorneys General as State-Level FDAs and FTCs: 
Litigating Drug Patents and Advertising 
 
"The goal is nothing less than changing the way the industry does business..." 
–Mark Schlein, director of Florida's Medicaid Fraud Control Unit 
within the Attorney General's office1  
 
 
The extent of the role of multistate litigation in shaping pharmaceutical policy 
does not end with pricing issues. Mainly relying upon state statutes, SAGs have also 
targeted a variety of other practices in the industry. Numerous multistate antitrust 
lawsuits have challenged allegedly anti-competitive actions by manufacturers of brand-
name pharmaceuticals, which SAGs claim block generic versions of brand-name drugs 
from entering the market. Other litigation campaigns have aimed to change drug firms' 
marketing and advertising strategies. In both areas, the SAGs have banded together to 
resemble state-level FTCs and FDAs in this area, seeking to regulate a variety of 
corporate behavior these agencies do not or cannot address. 
As with the AWP litigation described in Chapter 8, the SAGs' regulation through 
litigation approach often runs contrary to the delicate balance between competing 
concerns at the heart of the existing national regulatory regime the SAGs seek to alter. 
The antitrust approach Congress and federal agencies have pursued attempts to balance 
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incentives for the development of new drugs with the cost-saving potential of having 
more generic drugs on the market. Congress and the FDA alike have tried to balance the 
safety and cost benefits of pharmaceutical advertising with its potential negatives. This 
balance in federal policy in both areas reflects a number of congressional compromises 
in the building of the federal regulatory regime. The SAGs' multistate litigation, which 
has ended in a series of settlements involving significant monetary and injunctive 
provisions, has, effectively trumped these concerns by pressing a different, and stricter, 
vision of antitrust and consumer law on the pharmaceutical industry.  
PUSHING GENERIC DRUG ACCESS IN THE COURTROOM – THE CASE OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
a) Generic Drugs and the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Congress established the modern system of generic drug approval in the United 
States with the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, more 
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.2 For the first time, Hatch-Waxman 
established an expedited process for the approval of generic versions of brand-name 
drugs. The new process allowed these generic versions to use the safety and 
effectiveness data submitted by the inventors of the brand-name drugs to obtain 
approval from the FDA.3 This expedited process, referred to as the Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (ANDA) process, required only that generic drug manufacturers to 
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show that their drugs were "bio-equivalent" to the brand-name drug. Thus, these 
generic manufacturers were no longer subject to the lengthy and expensive process of 
establishing the safety and effectiveness of their drugs.4 
The chief purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase generic competition 
with brand name drugs by reducing the costs and time associated with bringing a 
generic drug to the market.5 This increased competition, in turn, would help to reduce 
the costs of pharmaceuticals.6 On this score, the law might be viewed as something of a 
success. Use of generic drugs doubled from 20% to 40% of the total number of 
prescriptions filled in the United States following the passage of Hatch-Waxman in 1984 
to the year 2000.7 The drafters of Hatch-Waxman understood, however, that the goal of 
increasing greater competition in the industry could come at the cost of reducing the 
financial incentives for manufacturers of brand-name drugs to expend the considerable 
resources necessary to develop these drugs. Because so much of the cost of brand-
name drugs is tied to research and development costs, rather than the actual 
manufacturing process, allowing generics to enter the market too quickly would trump 
the purpose of patent protections and reduce innovation. 
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 Hatch-Waxman served as a compromise between the goal of reducing drug costs 
with the generic ANDA process and promoting brand-name drug innovation.8 As part of 
the effort to encourage innovation, the Act created a way for brand-name 
manufacturers to extend their patent rights to make up for lost patent life due to the 
length of the initial FDA approval process for that drug.9 At the same time, the Act 
granted an incentive to generic firms to challenge these existing patents in court. 
Specifically, Hatch-Waxman allowed the first generic firm to challenge an existing patent 
a six-month period of exclusivity in which it would enjoy no competition from other 
similar generic drugs.10 
 The purpose of this provision was to overcome the free-rider problem faced by 
generic firms when it came to patent challenges. Because these challenges were 
potentially quite expensive, it would normally be in a generic firm's interest to wait for 
another generic firm to challenge the brand-name patent, since all generics would 
benefit from a successful patent challenge whether or not they participated in the 
lawsuit. Congress meant for this six-month exclusivity period to give an incentive to 
firms to become the first to challenge a patent. However, as part of the effort to 
maintain the incentives for brand-name manufacturers to innovate, Hatch-Waxman also 
allowed brand-name patent holders to enforce their patent rights in court against these 
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first-filing generic firms prior to the generic drug hitting the market. Under the Act, such 
a challenge triggered a stay in the approval of the generic drug for up to thirty months 
while the challenges worked their way through court. 
 These periods of generic exclusivity on the one hand and the ability for brand-
name manufacturers to achieve stays before generics could hit the market on the other 
can spell the difference of millions of dollars to the affected firms.11 They also create 
incentives for the first-filing generic firm and the brand-name patent holder to reach 
settlements resolving these complicated and potentially protracted lawsuits.12 Some of 
these settlements involve the brand-name patent holder paying the first-filing generic 
firm to delay the introduction of the generic into the market, often called "pay-for-
delay" settlements (or also "reverse payments"). This delay is possible because the 180-
day period of exclusivity enjoyed by the generic firm does not begin until either the firm 
begins commercial marketing or a court decision holds the challenged patent invalid. By 
paying the first-filing generic firm to refrain from triggering the 180-day exclusivity 
period, the brand-name firm can thus prevent all firms from entering the market for 
some time. 
 These pay-for-delay settlements have raised concerns about their anti-
competitive potential. It is not altogether clear, however, just how harmful these 
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settlements between brand name and generic firms are. On the one hand, according to 
estimates provided by current FTC Chairman Jon Liebowitz, banning these pay for delay 
settlements would save consumers $3.5 billion a year due to generics hitting the market 
faster.13 On the other hand, these settlements may actually serve as "pro-competitive, 
pro-consumer settlements" leading to generics hitting the market faster than if the 
generic company lost its lawsuit over the patent. In such cases, the settlements can 
result in generics entering the market before expiration of the brand-name company's 
patent.14 Indeed, generic companies themselves have suggested that drug patent 
settlements "typically result in the early and predictable introduction of generic 
competition, at tens of billions [of dollars] of savings to consumers."15 According to the 
generic drug industry's peak association, "More than a decade of evidence shows that 
patent settlements actually help bring lower-cost generic drugs to market much sooner 
than patent expiration dates, saving millions of dollars for consumers and the health 
care system."16 PhRMA recognized that some reverse settlements may be 
anticompetitive, but suggested that individualized treatment was appropriate in 
approaching the legality of such settlements "whereby the competitive effects of a 
particular settlement are evaluated by applying a logical economic framework to the 
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facts specific to that settlement."17 Otherwise, according to this argument, innovation in 
pharmaceutical marketplace might be stifled. 
b) Congressional Attempts to Alter Hatch-Waxman 
The ambiguous value of these settlements has led to a highly contested debate 
in Congress. A number of congressional critics of the pharmaceutical industry have 
blasted the patent settlements encouraged by Hatch-Waxman, reflecting Senator 
Charles Schumer's (D-NY) comments in one congressional hearing on the matter that "as 
the stakes and profits have become higher, lawyers for [the brand-name 
pharmaceutical] industry have picked the Hatch-Waxman law clean."18 In 2001, Schumer 
and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced the Greater Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals Act ("McCain-Schumer") which attempted to close certain perceived 
"loopholes" in the Hatch-Waxman Act.19 McCain-Schumer would have eliminated the 
automatic 30-month stay granted to brand-name firms filing suit against a generic firm's 
patent challenge, instead requiring brand-name firms to seek a preliminary injunction 
from the courts.20 The bill also would have altered the 180-day exclusivity period by 
creating a "use-or-lose-it" provision stating that if a generic firm settles litigation and 
decides not to enter the market, it would lose the exclusivity period to the next generic 
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applicant.21 However, this legislation stalled over several sessions, occasionally passing 
one house of Congress but then being bottled up in the other.22 Contributing to the 
failure of McCain-Schumer was concern that amending Hatch-Waxman would alter the 
balance between the interests embodied at the time of its enactment.23 
The FTC, recognizing the balance of interests contained within Hatch-Waxman, 
had sometimes had challenged these settlements as anti-competitive violations of 
federal antitrust law, but not in all cases.24 The FTC supported a "rule of reason" 
approach to these reverse payment settlements, suggesting that it would only pursue 
antitrust cases where these settlements constituted unreasonable restraints of trade.25 
The federal DOJ Antitrust Division, at least during the George W. Bush Administration, 
generally took a more hands-off approach than the FTC in regards to these settlements, 
generally taking the position that the settlements were in fact pro-competitive.26 
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c) State AGs Take the Stage 
While Congress hesitated to alter Hatch-Waxman and both the FTC and DOJ 
allowed certain reverse payment settlements to continue, SAGs began initiating their 
own coordinated litigation efforts to challenge these settlements. The SAGs' purpose 
was to challenge patent settlements that they believed inhibited generic drug 
competition and led to drug price increases. The effect was to challenge indirectly the 
balance of policy concerns reached on the federal level in regards to these settlements. 
The SAGs' negative views of pay-for-delay settlements more closely matched the 
regulatory vision behind the failed McCain-Schumer legislation and other attempts to 
restrict the practice rejected by Congress. The SAGs' litigation has also had the effect of 
bolstering their powers of oversight over the pharmaceutical industry.  
The SAGs' litigation in this area began at nearly the same time that the SAGs 
were also launching their various AWP lawsuits as well. One of the first of these 
campaigns targeted a pair of drugs, BuSpar and Taxol, developed by Bristol Myers 
Squibb (BMS). In November of 2000, just a few hours before the patent for BuSpar, an 
anti-anxiety medicine, was about to expire and as generic manufacturer Mylan 
Laboratories was preparing to release their generic version of the drug, the U.S. Patent 
office issued a new patent to BMS for BuSpar. Mylan's generic sales were restrained 
immediately following BMS filing this new patent with the FDA.27 A large group of SAGs 
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began investigating, soon thereafter suing in 2001 in federal court under state and 
federal antitrust and consumer protection statutes. The SAGs claimed that the company 
"knowingly made false statements to the [FDA] concerning the scope of its new patent 
in an effort to prevent" generic drug manufacturers from marketing BuSpar generics.28  
Specifically, the SAGs alleged that BMS had claimed that the patent had covered 
a new method of using BuSpar for all approved purposes. In fact, the patent extension 
was granted only on the more limited basis of BMS's discovery that the ingestion of 
BuSpar created a new chemical in a patient's body.29 This distinction was important 
because BMS was allegedly able to extend a patent extension on an old drug based 
upon a discovery that should not have been by itself enough to warrant a patent 
extension. In the complaint, the SAGs also claimed that BMS had earlier (in 1994) 
entered into a pay-for-delay agreement with a generic manufacturer that had the effect 
of restraining competition for BuSpar.30 Because of these actions, BMS caused 
"consumers and governmental entities to lose the substantial cost savings that generic 
entry would have produced."31 BMS, for its part, maintained that the patent was 
properly listed in full accordance with the law. "This is how the patent process is 
supposed to work, by providing incentives to manufacturers for research and 
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development," a BMS spokesman stated. The patent gives the company the 
"opportunity to [research] new agents to treat anxiety."32 
As the BuSpar litigation proceeded, the SAGs became involved in another case 
involving one of BMS's cancer drugs, Taxol. In early 2001, a coalition of interest groups 
had written to a group of SAGs urging them to take action against BMS's "inflated" drug 
prices, including Taxol. The group complained that the federal government had done 
little to prevent BMS from fraudulently obtaining patents for old drugs and entering into 
anticompetitive pay-for-delay settlements with generic firms. The correspondence 
asked the SAGs to "demand a federal investigation" of the matter. The group targeted 
these SAGs – those of Texas, California, Florida, and Massachusetts – because these 
SAGs were already involved in investigating pharmaceutical companies in relation to the 
AWP pricing issues.33 
Going beyond "demanding a federal investigation" into the Taxol case, the SAGs 
conducted their own inquiry, eventually bringing an antitrust suit in the federal U.S. 
District Court in D.C. in June of 2002. The allegations were similar to those in the BuSpar 
case, with the SAGs claiming that BMS committed fraud on the U.S. Patent Office by 
obtaining a fraudulent patent and that they entered into an anticompetitive agreement 
with a generic competitor to keep the generic equivalent of Taxol off the market. As a 
result, the SAGs asserted, hospitals, cancer patients, and states paid nearly a third more 
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for Taxol treatments from 1997 to 2001.34 The FTC eventually began its own 
investigation of BMS's actions concerning Taxol, though the states and various private 
parties sued before the FTC had taken any formal action.35 
In January 2003, BMS settled both the BuSpar and Taxol cases with the states. 
The SAGs settled in conjunction with several private suits brought by advocacy groups 
and private parties concerning the same conduct.36 The comprehensive agreement 
involved a monetary payment of $670 million, of which the states received $148 
million.37 The settlement, like those in the AWP litigation, was meant to "send a 
message" to the remainder of the pharmaceutical industry. As New York SAG Eliot 
Spitzer stated, "The case shows we will hold drug companies accountable when they 
attempt to unlawfully block generic competitors from the market."38 He continued by 
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noting that the SAGs were going to "continue to be very aggressive" bringing antitrust 
challenges against pharmaceutical firms.39  
The message sent by the settlement included the threat of not only large 
monetary penalties for alleged antitrust violations, but significant injunctive relief as 
well. The settlements achieved by the SAGs specifically barred BMS from securing a 
patent extension on any of its drugs after a generic manufacturer has sought FDA 
approval to market a generic version of the drug. It also prohibited the company from 
entering into any settlements with generic manufacturers to keep generic drugs off the 
market.40 
Perhaps most importantly of all, the agreements required BMS to notify the 
SAGs of patent litigation settlements with generic drug competitors and to provide them 
with yearly compliance reports for the next decade.41 The provision also gave the SAGs 
the power to approve or reject any such patent agreement before going into force.42 
Interestingly, later in 2003 Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act, which required drug companies to disclose to the 
FTC and DOJ litigation settling the type of patent disputes giving rise to "pay for delay" 
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potential.43 This is precisely the result the SAGs previously achieved for themselves, but 
through a settlement and not by any act of a legislature. 
The provisions of the BuSpar/Taxol settlement allowed SAGs to keep a close 
regulatory eye on BMS. The obligations placed on BMS soon proved useful to the SAGs 
in regards to another of the company's drugs, Plavix. Plavix, a blood-thinning drug, was 
the subject of litigation by the generic drug firm Apotex Corp., which challenged the 
patent covering Plavix. In March 2006, BMS reached a settlement with Apotex Inc. in 
which BMS would pay at least $40 million to Apotex and agreed not to launch its 
(BMS's) own generic version of the drug (known as an "authorized generic") after its 
brand-name patent expired. In return, Apotex would not sell its generic Plavix for five 
years. 
This agreement triggered BMS's notification obligations under the BuSpar and 
Taxol settlements.44 In accordance with their new powers under these settlements, the 
SAG shortly thereafter rejected the agreement between the two companies, and the 
deal collapsed.45 BMS and Apotex then signed a revised agreement in which BMS agreed 
to move up the date when Apotex could begin selling its generic version of Plavix, and 
deleting the provision regarding BMS's agreement to refrain from selling an authorized 
generic. However, after the companies filed this agreement with the SAGs and the FTC, 
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Apotex apparently told the FTC that the written agreement did not include certain oral 
side deals between the companies, including oral agreements that were essentially the 
same as the provisions that were in the original settlement rejected by the SAGs but 
dropped from the written revised agreement.46 
The SAGs subsequently led another antitrust investigation of BMS alleging that 
the information provided by the company in its revised Plavix settlement, as well as in 
its 2007 and 2008 compliance reports to the SAGs, was inaccurate and incomplete. This 
investigation culminated in another settlement between the SAGs and BMS in which the 
company agreed to pay the states an additional $1.1 million in addition to extending 
SAG oversight of the company and establishing new monetary penalties on BMS for any 
future violations of the provisions of the BuSpar/Taxol settlement.47 
The SAGs extended similar oversight provisions on brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturer Warner Chilcott and generic firm Barr Pharmaceuticals in 2007 and 2008. 
The SAGs had alleged that both firms entered into anticompetitive reverse payment 
settlements involving Barr's agreement to refrain from marketing a generic version of 
Warner Chilcott's oral contraceptive Ovcon. The SAGs reached a pair of settlements 
resolving these allegations with each firm in 2007 and 2008.48 The Warner Chilcott 
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settlement prohibited the company from entering into any agreement that would limit 
the research, development, manufacture, or sale of a generic alternative to one of its 
drugs.49 The agreement also required Warner to provide copies of any such agreement 
to the thirty-four participating SAGs, as well as make its records available to the states 
for inspection to determine whether the company is complying with the terms of the 
agreement.50 Later, Barr entered into a similar settlement that containing similar 
provisions for that company.51 These provisions thus enabled SAGs to obtain additional 
information with which they could strictly enforce antitrust law against both firms. 
In addition to building up their ability to oversee patent agreements through a 
series of out-of-court settlements, these antitrust cases have resulted in substantial 
monetary recoveries. SAGs have initiated several additional antitrust litigation 
campaigns with other companies focusing on bringing money back to the states and 
consumer groups allegedly harmed by reverse payments. In one major case, twenty-
nine states led by the Michigan and New York SAG offices alleged that Aventis (later 
Sanofi-Aventis) had paid generic pharmaceutical firm Andrx $89 million not to produce a 
generic version of Aventis’ blockbuster heart-disease drug Cardizem CD.52 The result of 
this patent settlement, according to the states, was that consumers and state Medicaid 
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programs were forced to continue paying the significantly higher brand-name price for 
Cardizem CD instead of the lower generic price.53 The SAGs' litigation ended with an $80 
million settlement requiring the manufacturers to refund overcharges of $51 million to 
consumers and third-party health plans, reimburse nearly $5 million to state Medicaid 
agencies, and pay the SAGs $24 million for their attorneys' fees and litigation costs.54 
d) The Consequences of SAG Patent Suits 
In the midst of heated debate about the value of reverse payment settlements in 
Congress, SAGs have continued to bring litigation against major pharmaceutical firms, 
challenging these settlements as anticompetitive restraints of trade under both federal 
and state antitrust law. Table 9.1 provides a summary of this litigation. 
TABLE 9.1: MULTISTATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION AGAINST  
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES (THROUGH 2009) 
 
Number of 
States 
Defendant Product 
Year 
Settled 
Total Monetary 
Recovery 
14 states Aventis Cardizem CD 2003 $80 million 
29 states Bristol-Myers Squibb BuSpar 2003 $93 million 
50 states Bristol-Myers Squibb Taxol 2003 $55 million 
50 states Organon USA Remeron 2004 $36 million 
46 states Alpharma Motrin 2004 $7.75 million 
50 states SmithKline Beecham Relafen 2005 $10 million 
3 states Abbott Laboratories Hytrin 2005 $30.7 million 
49 states GlaxoSmithKline Paxil 2006 $14 million 
48 states GlaxoSmithKline Augmentin 2006 $3.5 million 
34 states Warner Chilcott Ovcon 2007 $5.5 million 
34 states Barr Pharmaceuticals Ovcon 2008 $6 million 
50 states Bristol-Myers Squibb Plavix 2008 $1.1 million 
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In these antitrust cases, the SAGs have often brought litigation when the federal 
government has not, operating parallel to the private bar and various advocacy groups 
to reach significant settlements with the affected firms. These settlements often bring 
back a good deal of money back to state coffers, consumer groups, and the SAGs' 
offices. At least as importantly, by using antitrust law to attack patent settlements as 
anticompetitive restraints on trade and by reaching settlements with the targeted firms 
containing various monetary and injunctive relief, the SAGs have been able to pursue a 
particular side in the debate about the value of reverse payments and make it stick 
nationally. While Congress and the FTC struck a certain balance between the competing 
concerns in this debate, the SAGs have attempted to alter that balance by enforcing 
federal and state antitrust law in such a way as to send a message that reverse 
payments are per se illegal – something Congress has failed to do. In a number of these 
cases, the SAGs have essentially seconded-guessed the U.S. Patent Office and the FDA 
by suggesting that the approval of the brand-name patent was fraudulent.  
The SAGs have also set themselves up to be more powerful antitrust enforcers in 
this area in the future. In a number of these settlements, SAGs have placed various 
restrictions on companies prohibiting them from entering these agreements in the 
future. They have also expanded their own enforcement capacity by providing 
themselves greater oversight of these patent settlements. Similar to powers only later 
granted to the FTC, the SAGs managed to secure requirements that pharmaceutical 
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companies provide them with notification of patent settlements and various other 
regular disclosures, as well as the power to strike down any patent settlements they 
deem anticompetitive. Not only do these settlement provisions enable SAGs to have 
greater access to information concerning reverse payment settlements, but they also 
grant SAGs an additional lever with which to enforce their vision of antitrust law on the 
involved firms. 
In the meantime, in cases involving reverse payment settlements that have 
reached trial (involving private parties) subsequent to the start of the SAGs' litigation 
campaign in this area, federal appellate courts have been divided on whether the patent 
settlements violate antitrust law.55 Congress, for its part, has placed some additional 
restrictions on pay-for-delay payments, but has not gone nearly as far as to adopt the 
theories the SAGs have pursued in their litigation. In 2003, Congress enacted changes to 
Hatch-Waxman, including limiting the number of automatic thirty-month stays and 
allowing multiple generics to gain the 180 day exclusivity for sales.56 However, despite 
the urging of several advocates, the 2003 act did not fully ban these "pay for delay" 
settlements. 
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The debate continues in Congress to date, with critics of reverse payments 
advocating for stricter legislation. This includes the "Preserve Access to Affordable 
Generics Act," which would prohibit participation in agreements resolving a patent 
infringement lawsuit where the generic company receives anything of value and the 
generic company agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell the drug 
for a period.57 This proposed Act has stalled, however, and the latest attempt to include 
it in the recent health care reform bill failed.58 The circuit courts remain split on whether 
pay-for-delay settlements are per se illegal under antitrust law, and the Supreme Court 
in 2011 declined to review a lower court decision upholding a reverse payment 
settlement despite several SAGs (as well as the FTC and many private advocacy groups) 
urging review.59 Amidst this legal uncertainly over these patent settlements, SAG 
litigation attacking these agreements as anticompetitive violations of state and federal 
antitrust law continues, allowing SAGs to implement a particular regulatory vision of 
these "pay for delay" settlements nationally and giving themselves more oversight over 
major pharmaceutical firms in the process. 
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CREATING A PARALLEL FDA ON THE STATE LEVEL: 
THE CASE OF PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISING AND MARKETING 
In addition to seeking changes in government drug reimbursements and stricter 
oversight of patent settlements between brand name and generic firms, SAGs have also 
sought to regulate the advertising and marketing of pharmaceutical products. As 
prescription drug utilization increases and the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical 
industry continues to grow, the advertising and marketing activities of pharmaceutical 
firms have also risen in importance. These advertising efforts come in two basic forms. 
The first includes marketing efforts targeted to doctors and other healthcare providers 
in efforts to persuade these providers to prescribe their medications rather than a 
competitor's. The second involves advertisements aimed directly at consumers, either in 
print or broadcast media. 
The FDA retains the primary responsibility of regulating both forms of drug 
advertisements, exercising its authority through "a comprehensive surveillance, 
enforcement and education program, and by fostering better communication of labeling 
and promotional information to both healthcare professionals and consumers."60 The 
agency has a variety of enforcement tools to target unlawful promotion available under 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, including administrative, civil, and criminal 
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penalties.61 The FDA has traditionally retained nearly exclusive authority to regulate 
national drug advertising, with its authority carved out of the FTC's general regulatory 
jurisdiction over advertising and marketing of most consumer products.62 
Over the past few years, however, SAGs have become powerful new regulatory 
authorities in this area, using the tool of multistate litigation to secure settlements 
imposing new and stricter national restrictions on pharmaceutical advertising. As they 
have in other lawsuits against drug firms, the SAGs have used state law as the basis for 
these lawsuits, charging that drug firms have engaged in various "false and deceptive 
advertising" practices in ways that have harmed consumers and state budgets. Much of 
this activity has occurred as both the FDA and Congress have loosened restrictions on 
pharmaceutical advertising to doctors and consumers. As in the "pay for delay" 
litigation, SAGs have effectively created a patchwork national regulatory regime through 
a variety of settlements that has not only established stricter rules for pharmaceutical 
firms to follow, but has increased their own oversight authority in the process. 
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a) Loosening Federal Restrictions on Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Off-
Label Marketing 
1. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
Unlike manufacturers of over-the-counter medicines such as Tylenol, 
prescription drug firms have long been highly restricted from advertising their products 
directly to potential consumers. Since the passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
of 1938 gave the FDA power to mandate that pharmaceutical companies prove the 
safety of their products before advertising them, prescription drug firms focused their 
marketing on doctors and other providers.  This began to change in the 1980s, when 
several prescription drug firms began aiming their advertisements at consumers, 
referred to as "direct-to-consumer" (DTC) ads. At first, these advertisements appeared 
exclusively in print newspapers and magazines, but the first television advertisement for 
a prescription drug medication appeared shortly after in 1983.63 Concerns about the 
possible negative effects of these DTC advertisements led the Reagan Administration's 
FDA to impose a temporary moratorium on these ads the same year.64 The 
administration lifted this moratorium after a couple of years, however, in part because 
of the FDA's concerns that restricting DTC advertisements would violate the First 
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Amendment and also because the agency believed that current federal law provided 
adequate consumer protections.65 
Most DTC advertisements throughout the 1980s and 1990s remained in print 
due to a FDA requirement that all such advertisements include all warnings, 
precautions, and adverse side effects of the drug.66 These requirements made short 
broadcast advertisements all but impossible. In the mid-1990s, the FDA began to 
reevaluate this policy, and in 1997 the FDA released new guidelines to the 
pharmaceutical industry entitled "Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast 
Advertisements."67 This guidance clarified existing regulations concerning broadcast 
advertising of prescription drugs, making clear that pharmaceutical firms were no longer 
required to state every warning and side effect associated with the drug. Instead, the 
advertisements need only grant consumers "reasonably convenient access to the 
advertised product's approved labeling" through a telephone number, website, or 
referral to a healthcare professional.68  
This FDA Guidance made it much easier for pharmaceutical firms to advertise 
their products in the broadcast media, and helped lead to a sharp increase in DTC ads 
overall. For example, one study found that DTC advertising increased by 330% between 
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1996 and 2005.69 Another study in 2008 found that pharmaceutical manufacturers spent 
approximately $4.8 billion on direct-to-consumer television, radio, magazine, and 
newspaper advertising.70 This burgeoning DTC advertising in America contrasts with 
nearly every other nation, as DTC advertising is highly restricted or illegal in every other 
country with the exception of New Zealand.71 
2. Off-Label Marketing 
Prior to the FDA's approval of a drug, the company must prove that the drug is 
"safe and effective for its intended use(s)" before marketing it.72 When a drug is 
approved for a particular intended use, the drug's labeling must reflect this intended 
use. This labeling is also subject to FDA oversight. Because the FDA approves drugs for 
specific intended uses, promotion of a drug for uses beyond those specified on the 
labeling is generally prohibited.73 For pharmaceutical firms to promote drugs for uses 
other than those specified on the labeling, the drug must go through the lengthy FDA 
approval process for the new intended uses. This restriction on promoting drugs for off-
label use helps ensure that all drugs pass through the proper procedures to be deemed 
appropriate for "safe and effective" use. 
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 Despite this general prohibition on promoting the off-label utilization of 
prescription drugs, the federal statutory scheme recognizes the considerable medical 
benefits that can flow from the off-label use of drugs. For that reason, doctors and other 
health care professionals can legally prescribe drugs for off-label purposes.74 Indeed, for 
a number of drugs, this off-label prescribing is very common. One 2006 study found that 
more than 20% of prescriptions written for the most commonly used prescription drugs 
in the United States were prescribed for off-label use.75 The National Comprehensive 
Cancer Network estimated that between 50% and 75% of all uses of drugs in cancer care 
were off-label.76  
The public health benefits of off-label uses spurred lawmakers to reconsider the 
extent of the restrictions on the off-label promotion of prescription drugs. In the same 
year that the FDA issued its Guidance concerning DTC advertising, Congress enacted the 
FDA Modernization Act of 1997. This statute abolished the long-standing prohibition on 
drug manufacturers disseminating information related to "off-label" uses of their 
products to healthcare providers.77 While maintaining the general prohibition on off-
label promotion, this statute allowed firms to provide doctors with information about 
how their drugs might be used to treat conditions for which the FDA had not approved. 
For example, the statute allows firms to disseminate peer-reviewed journal articles 
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regarding off-label uses for their products.78 Doctors, as they had before, were still free 
to prescribe drugs for off-label uses, consistent with their medical training. 
3. Balancing Priorities In Advertising 
Much like the debates about the proper pricing mechanism for prescription 
drugs under Medicaid and the proper extent of protection for prescription drug patents, 
the debates about pharmaceutical advertising was essentially a debate about how to 
best balance two main competing concerns. On the one hand, critics of loosening 
restrictions of prescription drug advertising have focused on the potentially negative 
effects such advertisements might have on consumers. Such critics have claimed that 
DTC advertisements are at best unnecessary and at worst completely misleading to 
consumers.79  
In addition, by heavily promoting the use of brand-name drugs rather than 
generic equivalents, DTC advertising may be partially responsible for driving up health 
care costs. For example, one 2000 study examining drug inflation found that the fifty 
drugs most frequently advertised to consumers in 2000 were responsible for 47.8% of 
the rise in retail spending on prescription drugs from 1999 to 2000.80 Critics have also 
suggested that allowing companies to suggest the benefits of off-label use of their drugs 
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to healthcare professionals risks subverting the entire system of FDA regulation. 
Because the FDA has not evaluated off-label uses of drugs, the increased use of off-label 
utilization may lead to the very sort of public health risks that necessitated stronger FDA 
regulation in the first place. 
 On the other hand, others have noted the public health benefits associated with 
DTC advertising and off-label drug utilization. DTC advertising, for example, may help 
patients realize that their condition is treatable and may spur medically helpful 
conversations with his or her doctor.81 Pharmaceutical firms have also been quick to 
point out evidence that DTC ads may improve health care by increasing patient 
compliance with their therapies.82 As briefly noted above, the off-label use of drugs can 
be extremely beneficial to public health as well. Allowing greater dissemination of 
information regarding off-label use can give doctors and their patients more options in 
their health care treatments. 
 The federal government has balanced these competing concerns by retaining 
certain restrictions on prescription drug advertising while also moving away from 
wholesale advertising prohibitions. The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 recognized a 
balance between the need to regulate new drug utilizations as well as the potential 
health benefits of off-label use, a balance generally shared by the FDA.83 Officials at the 
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FDA have also noted that there is "no evidence that DTC promotion is harming the 
public health" by, for example, encouraging doctors to prescribe inappropriate 
medications.84 The FDA has thus taken a more hands-off approach to DTC advertising, 
believing that the benefits of this advertising outweigh any of the potential negatives. 
 When the FDA finds violations related to either DTC advertising or promotion of 
off-label uses by pharmaceutical companies, the Division of Drug Marketing, 
Advertising, and Communication (DDMAC) within the FDA can and has taken 
enforcement actions. One option is to send "untitled letters" to firms outlining the 
DDMAC's concerns and requesting that a company take specific action to bring the 
company into compliance within a certain amount of time.85 The FDA views these 
untitled letters as less serious than "warning letters," which are "written 
communications... to a company notifying the company that DDMAC considers one or 
more promotional pieces or practices to be in violation of the law."86 Though other 
stronger enforcement actions are also possible,87 untitled letters and warning letters 
form the bulk of the actions taken by the DDMAC. 
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b) Criticism of the FDA's Position From Industry Critics 
While both SAGs and the federal DOJ were ramping up Medicaid fraud and 
antitrust prosecutions of pharmaceutical firms, the FDA was facing growing concern that 
it was not doing enough to police drug advertising and marketing.  In one congressional 
panel in 2001, for example, Sidney Wolfe, director of Public Citizen's Health Research 
Group, told the panel that the FDA needed more investigators and more enforcement 
power to regulate DTC ads properly. Wolfe cited the "sharp and steady decrease during 
the last three years in the number of FDA warning letters and notices of violation of FDA 
laws and regulations to drug companies concerning prescription drug advertising," also 
noting a more than 50% drop-off in overall FDA enforcement actions from 1997 to 
2001.88 Another recent study also cited the decreasing FDA enforcement during the 
George W. Bush Administration, noting that the FDA had issued 142 warning letters in 
1997, but only 21 in 2006.89 
Some members of Congress also began criticizing the FDA's alleged lack of strong 
enforcement. Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), a frequent critic of the 
pharmaceutical industry, issued a report in 2004 claiming that the FDA was guilty of 
"weak enforcement" of rules regarding "false and misleading" drug advertisements.90 
Waxman's report demanded that the FDA Commissioner, Mark McClellan, explain why 
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the FDA was not taking more aggressive enforcement actions. In addition, the 
Government Accountability Office released a report in 2006 finding that delays in issuing 
regulatory letters limited FDA's effectiveness in overseeing DTC advertising and in 
reducing consumers' exposure to false and misleading advertising.91 One theme running 
through these criticisms of the FDA was that the agency's alleged lack of oversight of 
DTC advertising and off-label uses had the effect of driving up the costs of health care by 
unnecessarily encouraging greater utilization of brand-name pharmaceuticals.92 
c) Multistate Litigation Concerning Pharmaceutical Advertising 
It was in this political context that SAGs have become considerably more active 
in bringing litigation against pharmaceutical companies, challenging the way that they 
advertise their products and disseminate information related to off-label uses. 
Particularly in the latter half of the 2000s, SAGs have become increasingly aggressive in 
creating a patchwork national regulatory regime by out-of-court settlements with the 
nation's largest drug companies. By adopting the arguments of drug advertising's critics 
and transforming them into a form of national regulation, the SAGs have altered the 
balance between competing concerns achieved in the federal system. 
It is important to note that much of this litigation employs state consumer 
protection statutes, many of which are either stricter or considerably broader than 
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federal consumer laws. As noted in Chapter 4, advertising that may be "deceptive" 
under strict state laws, for example, may only rise merely to the level of exaggeration 
and puffery not warranting enforcement action under federal law. In addition to using 
state consumer protection statutes, this litigation has sometimes included claims under 
states' False Claims Acts, alleging that by illegally promoting their products off-label, the 
pharmaceutical companies have fraudulently caused higher expenditures for Medicaid. 
The following provides several examples of these litigation campaigns and the 
significant regulations the SAGs have achieved through settlements. 
1. Pfizer's Zithromax and Bayer's Baycol – Altering DTC Advertising 
One of the SAGs' first significant lawsuits concerning pharmaceutical marketing 
involved Pfizer's blockbuster antibiotic drug, Zithromax. Zithromax was (and is) 
approved by the FDA as a safe and effective treatment for childhood ear infections, and 
Pfizer marketed the drug for this purpose. In 2001, the SAGs of several states began 
investigating Pfizer's advertising of Zithromax out of concerns that some of the 
company's advertisements contained "false and deceptive" claims under state 
consumer protection statutes.  
The SAGs claimed that while Pfizer's DTC advertising contained information 
regarding how many doses and how often Zithromax should be administered, it failed to 
disclose information about antibiotic resistance and other factors that physicians must 
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consider before prescribing antibiotic treatment for ear infections.93 The SAGs also 
claimed that Pfizer had misrepresented the efficacy of Zithromax in treating ear 
infections in comparison to other antibiotics on the market.94 In the words of 
Connecticut SAG Richard Blumenthal, the states initiated this investigation because 
"[d]rug ads like Pfizer's must put health before hype...[p]arents deserve to know that 
the antibiotic won't work against viral infections, such as colds or the flu, and that 
excess or unnecessary medication leads to antibiotic resistant infections."95 
Pfizer, however, noted that it was marketing Zithromax consistently with all 
applicable federal laws as well as the FDA-approved labeling for the product. In fact, 
Pfizer had voluntarily submitted the exact DTC advertisements challenged by the SAGs 
to the FDA for review before Pfizer ran the ads, and the FDA had approved them.96 Once 
the DTC advertising was on the air, consistent with the agency's approval of the ads, the 
FDA had taken no enforcement actions against Pfizer for its marketing of Zithromax. 
Nevertheless, the SAGs' legal theories rested on state consumer protection law, 
not federal labeling laws. The SAGs claimed that under the laws of the nineteen states 
involved in the investigation,97 Pfizer's failure to disclose certain information and claims 
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about the efficacy of the drug represented fraudulent misrepresentation and deceptive 
trade practices.98 Pfizer publically denied the states' claims, but faced with the prospect 
of a protracted and public litigation battle with nearly half of the nation's SAGs, Pfizer 
agreed to enter into a settlement with the SAGs in December of 2002.  
The amount of monetary recovery involved in the settlement was a relatively 
small $6 million. Of this amount, Pfizer agreed to pay $4 million to the states to cover all 
investigatory costs and attorneys' fees.99 The remaining $2 million was to fund a public 
service announcement campaign over the next three years to educate parents about 
"the proper use of antibiotics" to treat childhood ear infections.100 While Pfizer could 
develop the PSAs, the settlement required the PSAs to address each of three specific 
topics related to the use of antibiotics in treat ear infections, including "the 
ineffectiveness of antibiotics in combating viral infections." The settlement also 
prohibited Pfizer from mentioning Zithromax specifically in any of these PSAs.101 To help 
enforce the provision, the SAGs required Pfizer to submit to the nineteen signatory SAGs 
a "written affirmation setting forth Pfizer's compliance" with these provisions.102 
In addition to the monetary payments and creation of a new PSA campaign, the 
settlement also placed various restrictions on Pfizer's DTC advertising of Zithromax in 
the future. First, the settlement required Pfizer to cease the DTC ads that were the 
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subjects of the investigation. Additionally, the settlement required Pfizer to make 
specific statements about Zithromax in all of its future advertisements for the product. 
For example, when making any claims relating to the effectiveness of Zithromax as 
compared to other antibiotics, Pfizer's advertisements must state, "Antibiotic resistance 
is a consideration that may affect your doctor's choice of treatment for your child's ear 
infection."103  In addition, the settlement required Pfizer additional disclosures, 
including the following specific phase: "Remember that antibiotics don't work for viral 
infections, such as a cold or flu, so don't insist on a prescription for an antibiotic. Only 
your doctor can decide what type of infection your child has and the best way to treat 
it."104 Finally, the settlement stated that if consumer ads for Zithromax refer to data in a 
scientific study related to dosing convenience, frequency of use or effectiveness, Pfizer 
must disclose whether the study was published, peer-reviewed, or funded by Pfizer. The 
company also must make available to consumers the full study or a summary of the 
study, and must post the study or a summary on its Internet site.105 Federal law or the 
FDA required none of these various disclosures and advertising changes. By requiring 
them in this settlement, however, the SAGs wanted to send a "strong message" not only 
to Pfizer but also to the pharmaceutical industry generally that "advertisements that 
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mislead or fail to provide complete information about pharmaceutical products will 
meet with tough enforcement actions."106 
 SAGs followed up this settlement with Pfizer with additional multistate 
settlements with other major drug manufacturers. SAGs have used some of these 
settlements as a way to regulate pharmaceutical company behavior beyond placing 
specific marketing restrictions of a single drug, as in the Zithromax case. One such 
settlement involved Bayer Corporation and its blockbuster drug Baycol. The FDA 
approved Baycol as a cholesterol reduction drug in 1997, but following its post-
marketing studies Bayer learned that Baycol might lead to elevated instances of a rare 
but severe muscle disorder. After notifying the FDA about this possibility, Bayer 
voluntarily removed the product from the market four years later. Following the 
voluntary recall, the SAGs of thirty states107 began investigating Bayer in 2004. They 
claimed that while Bayer voluntarily notified the FDA about possible problems with 
Baycol and subsequently removed the FDA-approved product from the market, the 
company violated state consumer protection laws by failing to adequately warn 
prescribers and consumers about these problems with Baycol. 
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The SAGs saw in this case a way to reform the way in which pharmaceutical firms 
disclosed the results of internal clinical studies of drugs, an issue that was the subject of 
considerable debate in Congress.108 To that point, neither Congress nor the FDA placed 
requirements on companies to disclose the results of both positive and negative clinical 
drug studies, a policy issue that pharmaceutical industry critics had pursued for some 
time.109  
Through a settlement reached by the SAGs and Bayer in January of 2007, the 
SAGs were able to achieve these requirements. In addition to a payment of $8 million to 
the states to cover litigation expenses, the settlement required Bayer to register clinical 
trials of most of its prescription products, and post all results, not just those with 
positive outcomes.110 "By agreeing to publicly disclose information on both positive and 
negative studies about the safety and efficacy of its drugs," Michigan SAG Mike Cox 
stated, "Bayer has provided an important new direction for the entire pharmaceutical 
industry to follow."111 In addition to this important clinical trial provision, the settlement 
also required Bayer to comply fully with state laws regulating marketing, sale, and 
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promotion of its pharmaceutical and biological products and from making "false and 
misleading" claims relating to any of its product sold in the United States.112 
2. Neurontin, OxyContin, and Zyprexia – Disseminating Off-Label Drug 
Information 
In addition to focusing on DTC advertising and the failure to warn consumers 
about potential prescription drug side effects, SAGs have brought litigation against 
pharmaceutical companies concerning the off-label use of drugs. In some of these cases, 
the SAGs have collaborated with federal enforcers to achieve significant regulatory 
settlements that tie together Medicaid fraud and consumer claims. In other cases, the 
SAGs have worked independently of federal enforcers to reach settlements. 
An early example of federal-state collaboration in this area involved the 
governments' investigation into Warner-Lambert's marketing of Neurontin, which 
ended in a major settlement in 2004. Neurontin was approved by the FDA specifically to 
treat epilepsy, though the drug proved highly effective in treating general pain, 
attention deficit disorder, and bipolar disease.113 These alternative uses, as well as the 
drug's use of use and relative lack of serious side effects, led to approximately 90% to 
95% of Neurontin prescriptions used for off-label purposes.114 In 1996, however, a 
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former employee of the company brought a whistleblower suit under the False Claims 
Act, alleging that the division of Warner-Lambert tasked with advertising the drug was 
marketing it for some of its many off-label uses.115 Federal and state enforcers 
subsequently intervened in the case, alleging that Warner-Lambert had made false 
statements to government health programs and offered illegal kickbacks to prescribers, 
in the form of trips and falsely labeled consulting fees, to promote off-label uses of 
Neurontin.116 The governments also claimed that Warner-Lambert disseminated 
information to doctors about the off-label uses of the drug in such a way that it 
constituted illegal off-label marketing. These off-label marketing violations, the 
governments claimed, led to the increased utilization of Neurontin under the Medicaid 
program, helping to drive up costs for the federal and state governments. 
The federal DOJ concentrated on the criminal allegations in the case and 
collaborated with the MFCUs on the civil Medicaid fraud aspects of the case, while the 
SAGs activated not only their fraud enforcement personnel for this case but their 
consumer protection divisions as well. The SAGs' consumer protection investigation 
focused on alleged violations of state consumer protection laws occurring when 
Warner-Lambert promoted the drug for off-label uses. Both of these Medicaid fraud and 
consumer protection claims rested upon innovative interpretations of existing law, 
raising questions both about the theories of causation employed in the case as well as 
                                                          
115
"Pfizer Unit Pays $430 Million to Settle Neurontin Off-Label, Medicaid Claims," Pharmaceutical Law & 
Industry Report, May 14, 2004, 534. 
116
 Ibid. 
469 
 
constitutional concerns. For one, the government enforcers suggested that 
pharmaceutical companies could and should be held liable for false claims made to 
health care programs by providers because the provider's prescription decisions were 
based upon information provided to them by the drug company, despite the fact that 
the company was likely unaware that any of these claims were made by the 
physicians.117 Further, because the alleged communications by Warner-Lambert about 
off-label uses were in fact truthful, the claims also raised constitutional free speech 
issues.118 
Warner-Lambert initially fought these claims in federal district court, but after 
losing a couple of key rulings at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages, 
the company opted to settle.119 The government prosecutors announced a $430 million 
settlement in May 2004, representing the largest health care fraud recovery since the 
TAP Pharmaceuticals case in 2001. The bulk of the monetary recovery consisted of 
criminal fines paid to the federal government, though the settlement directed Warner-
Lambert to pay federal and state Medicaid programs $190 million for losses allegedly 
incurred by the company's off-label marketing of Neurontin.  
On the same day as this settlement, forty-six SAGs also entered into a separate 
but closely related settlement resolving their consumer protection claims. In addition to 
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injunctive provisions aimed at baring Warner-Lambert from continuing its alleged off-
label marketing, the SAGs' settlement established a new "Neurontin Multistate 
Executive Committee" headed by the SAGs of California and North Carolina.120 This new 
committee would administer the new "Attorney General Consumer and Prescriber 
Education Grant Program" funded by a $21 million payment by Warner-Lambert, the 
purpose of which would be to fund programs around the country designed to educate 
physicians and patients about prescription drug marketing and other related issues.121 
Governmental entities, academic institutions, and not-for-profit groups would be 
eligible to apply for grants from this program, which the SAG members of this 
committee would administer.122 An additional $6 million of the states' settlement was 
allocated to a "corrective advertisement campaign" regarding Neurontin to be run by 
Warner-Lambert, and $10 million went directly to the SAG offices to compensate them 
for investigation and litigation expenses.123 
Following this settlement with Warner-Lambert, a number of SAGs have 
continued to investigate pharmaceutical companies in relation to alleged off-label 
marketing. For several years, SAGs and various consumer interest groups had criticized 
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the FDA for not doing enough to ensure the safe use of Purdue Pharma's powerful pain 
reliever OxyContin. The concern was that the FDA was ignoring how Purdue Pharma was 
persuading providers to prescribe more frequent doses of the drug than that approved 
by the FDA. Connecticut SAG Richard Blumenthal took the lead in criticizing the agency, 
filing a petition in 2004 to require stronger labeling of OxyContin "expressly warning 
prescribers of the increased occurrence of side effects or potentially serious adverse 
reactions resulting from off-label prescribing at more frequent dosing intervals."124 
According to Blumenthal, "The FDA turned its back on its serious responsibility with 
regard to OxyContin....[e]arly and aggressive FDA action on this petition may have saved 
lives. The FDA's glaring and galling failure to act demonstrates the need for wide-ranging 
reform of the agency."125 He cited the alleged off-label marketing of OxyContin as only 
"the latest grim example of corporate greed and arrogance causing death and serious 
injury."126  
Following perceived unwillingness by the FDA to address the issue, SAGs took 
matters into their own hands. West Virginia SAG Darrell McGraw was the first to sue 
Purdue Pharma over its alleged marketing violations, reaching a $10 million single-state 
settlement with Purdue in which the company agreed to fund various "education 
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programs for doctors, law enforcement drug-prevention programs, and community 
drug-rehabilitation programs."127 A group of twenty-six SAGs followed up McGraw's 
settlement with an investigation of their own. This ultimately resulted in a 2007 
settlement with Purdue in which the company agreed to pay $19.5 million to the states 
as well as significantly reform its practices. In addition to requiring Purdue Pharma to 
cease engaging in "off-label promotion and other improper marketing of OxyContin,"128 
the settlement contained a number of additional restrictions on the marketing of the 
drug. Purdue was required to maintain an "abuse and diversion-detection program" to 
detect problem prescribing and to ensure that all of their sales representatives undergo 
training in the program before promoting OxyContin.129 The agreement also contained 
various provisions regulating Purdue's internal operations, prohibiting Purdue Pharma 
from sponsoring any events in which it knew that a speaker would recommend the off-
label use of OxyContin, and restricting the company from basing bonuses of its sales 
representatives solely on the volume of OxyContin prescribed.130 
A recent SAGs settlement concerning Eli Lilly's Zyprexa further illustrates the 
extent of regulatory provisions contained in these off-label marketing settlements. In 
2007, several SAGs sued Eli Lilly claiming that the company launched an "aggressive" 
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marketing campaign in 2001 called "Viva Zyprexa!" in which the company illegally 
marketed the drug for a number of off-label uses beyond its FDA-approved use to treat 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.131 According to the SAGs' lawsuit, which was again 
based upon state law, Eli Lilly knew Zyprexa increased greatly the risk of diabetes, heart 
attacks, and other health problems, but nevertheless actively marketed it to doctors for 
use with patients who were not diagnosed with mental illness.132 The company then 
failed to warn consumers of the risks associated with the drug.133 
As have a number of companies facing similar off-label marketing lawsuits, Eli 
Lilly viewed the SAGs' lawsuits as a disservice to patients who had been successfully 
treated by the drug after receiving advice from their doctors. Eli Lilly also noted that all 
information they provided to health care professionals was truthful, not "false and 
misleading." Nevertheless, facing a growing number of state lawsuits concerning the 
drug, the company entered into an agreement with thirty-two SAGs to resolve the 
investigation in 2008.134 The $62 million settlement, then a record monetary recovery 
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for a multistate consumer protection case,135 placed a variety of regulatory restrictions 
on the company. Among other requirements, the settlement barred Eli Lilly from giving 
product samples of Zyprexa to health care providers whose specialties are not 
consistent with Zyprexa’s label or from using any grant funds to promote the drug.136 
The settlement also required Eli Lilly's medical staff, rather than its marketing staff, to 
have the ultimate responsibility for the medical content of medical letters and 
references regarding Zyprexa.137 In addition to these regulatory provisions governing 
internal company operations, the agreement also required a significant amount of new 
disclosures, including information about grants received, lists of "promotional speakers 
and consultants who were paid more than $100 for promotional speaking and/or 
consulting," and the results of the company's clinical trials.138 Echoing a number of his 
colleagues, Florida SAG Bill McCollum described agreement as a "landmark settlement 
[that] sends the message that pharmaceutical companies will be held responsible for 
their actions, including any inappropriate marketing practices which may promote off-
label uses that have not been approved."139 
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3. Bayer, Pfizer, and Merck – Establishing Greater Government Oversight of 
Advertising 
In several of their recent multistate lawsuits, SAGs have been relying on state 
consumer protection law to create greater government oversight of a broad range of 
pharmaceutical advertising in the future, in addition to establishing stricter marketing 
practices and disclosures on companies than federal law requires. In one settlement 
involving Merck's blockbuster arthritis drug Vioxx, the SAGs essentially provided 
themselves to power to enforce provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act – a 
power that is nowhere in the statute itself. 
Merck voluntarily recalled Vioxx from the market in 2004 after a study the 
company sponsored found that the drug nearly doubled the risk of a heart attack and 
stroke.140 Shortly after the Vioxx recall, several SAGs began investigating Merck's 
marketing of the drug, claiming that since 1999 the company waged an aggressive 
direct-to-consumer advertising campaign that misrepresented the safety of Vioxx and 
concealed increased risks associated with the product's use.141 These claims, again 
based upon state consumer protection law, were resolved in what was then the largest 
                                                          
140
 Drew Douglas, "Merck Will Pay $58 Million to Settle States' Probe Into Marketing of Vioxx," 
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, May 23, 2008, 611. 
141
 Office of the New York Attorney General, "Cuomo, Bloomberg Sue Maker of Vioxx for Hiding Drug's 
Risks," September 17, 2007, accessed March 10, 2011, 
 http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2007/sep/sep17b_07.html. See also Douglas, "Merck Will Pay." In 
2000, Vioxx was the number one DTC advertised drug, with $160 million devoted to DTC advertisements 
in that year alone. William W. Buzbee, ed., Preemption Choice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 65. 
476 
 
consumer protection case against a pharmaceutical company (prior to the Eli Lilly case 
settlement noted above). 
The settlement included a substantial $58 million monetary payment to twenty-
nine states,142 but as with many other consumer protection settlements, the most 
important part of the settlement was its regulatory provisions. As with the Eli Lilly 
Zyprexa settlement, the SAGs required Merck to adhere to a number of new procedures 
relating to the disclosure of clinical trials and potential conflicts of interest.143 The 
settlement also included a number of provisions requiring anyone named on a Merck-
sponsored study to adhere to a variety of authorship conditions before their names can 
appear on the study.144 This provision was meant to address controversies over so-
called "ghostwriting" in the industry, in which companies would allegedly pay authors to 
put their names on independent research that was instead actually conducted by the 
pharmaceutical company. Certain guidelines regarding these practices had been 
suggested by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors,145 but before this 
settlement had not been required by any law or regulation in the United States. This 
settlement provision, however, essentially adopted the guidelines promulgated by this 
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International Committee and turned them into an affirmative requirement that Merck 
had to follow. 
In addition to these regulatory requirements, the settlement also contained 
provisions increasing the authority of the FDA to oversee Merck's advertising. According 
to the settlement, Merck must submit its television commercials to the FDA for approval 
before any DTC advertisements are broadcast, further requiring the company to comply 
with any FDA recommendation to delay advertising for new pain medications.146 In a 
subsequent settlement with Merck over another of its drugs, Vytorin, SAGs extended 
this pre-clearance provision to cover all of Merck's products, not just the drugs involved 
in the investigations.147 These provisions mirrored several of the unsuccessful attempts 
of congressional supporters to require FDA pre-approval of DTC advertisements.148 
In addition to increasing FDA oversight of Merck's DTC advertising, the Vioxx 
settlement also essentially granted the power to SAGs to enforce federal law. In the 
settlement, Merck agreed to refrain from making "false, misleading or deceptive" 
promotional claims as defined under state law, as well as to comply with the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act and FDA regulations in connection with advertising and promotion. 
Merck was already under an affirmative obligation to adhere to federal law and 
regulations or face potential penalties from federal enforcers, but this provision allowed 
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the state attorneys general to oversee Merck's compliance with federal law as well. 
Particularly since so many SAGs had criticized the FDA's performance in regulating 
pharmaceutical firms, this provided them with additional leverage to forge ahead with 
the enforcement of federal law even where the FDA has "failed" to do so. 
One problem with the Vioxx settlement from the SAGs' perspective was that 
despite granting themselves additional ability to enforce existing federal law, the SAGs 
still relied on the FDA to "properly" review the DTC advertising the settlement required 
Merck to submit before running the advertisements. The SAGs solved this problem in a 
subsequent settlement with Pfizer in October 2008 supplementing their capacity to pre-
clear DTC advertisements. This settlement resolved thirty-three SAGs'149 investigation of 
Pfizer's alleged off-label marketing of a pair of Pfizer's drugs, Celebrex and Bextra.150 The 
$60 million settlement included many of the same disclosure and conflicts of interest 
requirements that several previous settlements had,151 and became the second SAG 
settlement to include a requirement that a company receive pre-clearance of all of its 
DTC advertisements before broadcasting them.152 Unlike the Merck settlement, 
however, the Pfizer settlement required the company to report to the SAGs if the FDA 
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did not act within a certain amount of time. The settlement also required Pfizer to 
provide the SAGs with all of the DTC advertising information that the company provided 
to the FDA. Essentially, then, this provision created a two-layered enforcement regime 
that simultaneously expanded the FDA's authority while granting the SAGs additional 
information with which to enforce their new pre-clearance regulation if the FDA for 
whatever reason did not act to enforce it. 
The SAGs have continued to supplement their new regulations in recent 
settlements. Particularly with the increase in enforcement activity by the FDA under the 
Obama Administration, the SAGs have increasingly used the FDA's warning letters as a 
basis for subsequent litigation. In a settlement with Bayer concerning Yaz, a birth-
control pill, the SAGs relied upon a FDA warning letter to Bayer stating that two of the 
company's advertisements were misleading because they overstated the efficacy of Yaz 
and minimized serious risks associated with its use.153 In its letter, which the agency 
posted publically on its website, the FDA asked Bayer to stop using the ads immediately 
and to submit a written response describing Bayer's intent to comply with the agency's 
request.154 Bayer responded to the warning letter and pledged to work with the FDA in 
regards to the full range of its Yaz promotional materials.155 
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Several SAGs were not content with this regulatory approach, and soon after 
began investigating the company's advertising of Yaz. The FDA's warning letter was a 
key part of the state's case. According to one Florida Assistant SAG, the warning letter 
was the "canary in the coal mine" in the Yaz litigation, adding that warning letters "have 
served as the impetus or trigger for many attorney general investigations."156 The SAGs 
used the allegations made by the FDA in its warning letter to threaten litigation based 
upon state consumer law, subsequently achieving a settlement in 2009 that contained 
no monetary recovery at all, but instead a number of significant injunctive provisions 
mirroring the regulations contained in the previous settlements mentioned above. In 
addition to pre-clearance provisions and significant provisions granting SAGs additional 
monitoring of Bayer's operations, the company was also required to run a $20 million 
"corrective advertising campaign" to "remedy" the information aired earlier in Bayer's 
Yaz advertisements.157 Noting the importance of the FDA's warning letter in the case, 
the Florida Attorney General characterized the case as "a strong example of 
federal/state collaboration to stop the unlawful marketing of prescription drugs...[b]y 
combining our state enforcement authority with the FDA's technical expertise, we 
achieved an excellent result that ensures future advertisements will be lawful."158 
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d) Litigation as Drug Advertising Regulation 
The increase in the number of investigations brought by SAGs targeting the 
marketing activities of pharmaceutical in recent years is matched by the growing 
extensiveness of the regulations contained within the settlements resolving the 
investigations. Table 9.2 summarizes several of the SAGs' major multistate consumer 
protection advertising cases brought against pharmaceutical firms in recent years.159  
TABLE 9.2: SAG MULTISTATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LITIGATION  
AGAINST PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS (THROUGH 2009) 
 
States Defendant Product 
Year 
Settled 
Significant Settlement Terms 
19 states Pfizer Zithromax 2003 
$6 million; specific alterations to 
advertisements 
46 states 
Warner-
Lambert 
Neurontin 2004 
$38 million; corrective 
advertisements 
30 states Bayer Baycol 2007 
$8 million; disclosure of clinical trial 
results 
26 states 
Purdue 
Pharma 
OxyContin 2007 
$19.5 million; various marketing 
restrictions and disclosure 
requirements 
33 states Pfizer 
Celebrex; 
Bextra 
2008 
$60 million; pre-clearance provisions, 
clinical trial disclosures 
32 states Eli Lily Zyprexa 2008 
$62 million; various disclosures and 
marketing requirements 
29 states Merck 
Vioxx; Zocor; 
Pepcid 
2008 
$58 million; pre-clearance provisions, 
bans on "ghostwriting" 
35 states Merck Vytorin 2009 
$5.4 million; pre-clearance provisions, 
disclosure of clinical trial results, 
various conflict-of-interest 
regulations 
27 states Bayer Yaz 2009 
$20 million; pre-clearance provision, 
corrective advertisement campaign 
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 By achieving settlement after settlement with some of the nation's largest 
pharmaceutical firms, the SAGs have managed to step into the role of Congress and the 
FDA by establishing stricter marketing restrictions on industry than anything required by 
federal statutes or regulations. In a few short years, SAGs have managed to implement 
strict rules concerning disclosure of clinical trial results, new conflict of interest 
regulations, specific requirements companies must follow when advertising their 
products, and requirements that companies receive pre-clearance before running any 
DTC advertisements.  
While these provisions technically only apply to the companies party to a 
particular settlement, they provide a new regulatory baseline the entire industry must 
follow to be certain that they will not be subject to potentially expensive multistate 
investigations that could harm their public image. This is why the SAGs' frequent talk 
about these settlements "sending a message" to the entire pharmaceutical industry is 
not mere bluster. Indeed, the impact of the settlements even beyond the significant 
consequences for the individual companies involved in the agreements is apparent 
when the pharmaceutical industry peak association adopts new voluntary guidelines, 
mirrored after recent SAGs settlements, aiming to help avoid liability for its members.160 
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 One of the many interesting aspects about the SAGs' attempt to regulate 
prescription drug advertisements through litigation is the way in which the SAGs have 
simultaneously relied upon the FDA for information while criticizing it for its allegedly 
"hands-off" attitude towards regulating these ads. The SAGs' fiery rhetoric concerning 
the FDA's role in drug advertisement regulation is rarely in short supply, particularly 
from frequent FDA critics like former Connecticut SAG (now U.S. Senator) Richard 
Blumenthal. In speaking of the federal government's policy towards off-label drug 
marketing, Blumenthal remarked, "The FDA has been abysmal policing this area. One 
reason the states have been more and more active is that the federal government has 
been asleep at the switch."161  
Nevertheless, the FDA also serves as a resource for entrepreneurial SAGs seeking 
to place further regulatory restrictions on DTC and off-label pharmaceutical advertising. 
As noted above, SAGs have relied upon FDA warning letters to help notify them of new 
opportunities for litigation. This occurred not only recently in relation to warning letters 
sent by the FDA under the Obama Administration, but with the warning letters sent by 
the George W. Bush Administration's FDA – the very agency SAGs frequently criticized 
for its "abysmal" regulatory efforts. The Vioxx investigation, for example, was spurred at 
least in part by a 2001 FDA warning letter expressing concerning about the drug's 
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advertisements.162 As the deputy West Virginia SAG noted after securing a $4.5 million 
consumer protection settlement against Johnson & Johnson in 2004 that relied heavily 
on a FDA warning letter, "It's the best evidence I think you can get. That was the crux of 
our entire case."163 
By using the FDA as both a foil as well as a source of information for their own 
lawsuits, the SAGs have built themselves up as a sort of miniature FDA on the state 
level. Not only do they use state law to create nationally applicable regulations that are 
required neither by congressional legislation nor federal agency regulation, but they 
have used these settlements to extend government regulatory oversight over drug 
company advertisements into the future and build up their own enforcement capacity. 
The new requirements that the FDA pre-clear DTC advertisements granted the FDA 
powers the agency did not even seek out for itself. While helping to build up the FDA's 
regulatory power, the SAGs also built up their own. The Vioxx and Vytorin settlements, 
for example, gave the SAGs' the ability to enforce federal laws and regulations against 
Merck. The Celebrex/Bextra and Yaz settlements contained provisions giving SAGs more 
tools to monitor industry compliance with their new regulations. 
The SAGs' attempt to remake themselves as national regulators of drug company 
advertising raises a number of questions about the proper role of the SAGs in this area. 
The first involves the mismatch between the SAGs' position as state-level politicians on 
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the one hand, and the outcome of their regulatory settlements, which apply to the 
affected firms nationally, on the other. By using state consumer protection statutes as 
their legal hook to create national regulations, the SAGs are effectively projecting 
stricter state definitions of "deceptive" advertising across the entire nation, substituting 
federal standards for their own vision of how drugs "ought" to be marketed. 
 Whether the SAGs' vision of deceptive advertising is "correct" or not as 
compared that of Congress or the FDA is a difficult question to resolve. As noted earlier 
in this section, setting the proper level of regulation in the area of prescription drug 
advertising requires the consideration of trade-offs in both directions. Issues concerning 
consumer confusion and safety must be balanced with considerations of the benefits of 
drug marketing. While DTC advertising might drive up utilization of brand-name drugs, 
thereby increasing health care costs generally, this may itself have health benefits as 
consumers who would have otherwise struggled with health conditions instead receive 
treatment under the supervision of their doctor. While the off-label use of 
pharmaceuticals raises legitimate questions about drug safety, off-label uses of drugs 
are so common and recognized as beneficial by the health care community that 
restricting information may actually have net negative effects on patient health. 
The FDA, as an expert agency in the area of pharmaceuticals, is tasked with 
making determinations about the balance between benefits and drawbacks of DTC 
advertising and off-label uses of drugs. The SAGs, however, have neither the technical 
expertise of those in the FDA nor the incentive to examine how their regulatory 
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settlements might have unintended negative consequences to public health beyond the 
seeming benefits of the regulations. The regulations in the Zyprexa and Vioxx 
settlements relating to conflicts of interest may, for example, deter significant numbers 
of well-qualified physicians from engaging in promotional relationships with 
pharmaceutical companies or from participating in continuing medical education 
activities altogether. The SAGs' litigation concerning alleged off-label promotion by drug 
companies might result in a reduction in funding for educational and clinical research 
for off-label promotions. The preclearance provisions might lead to companies 
becoming "way more conservative" about DTC advertising, leading to less effective 
advertising and fewer opportunities for consumers to learn about medications that may 
be beneficial to them.164 This is not to say that all DTC advertising and off-label 
prescription drug use is beneficial to human health, but certain regulations that initially 
appear beneficial may in fact be counter-productive. As an expert agency tasked with 
looking at the operations of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, the FDA may be in 
a better position to make the sort of difficult regulatory trade-offs inherent in this area. 
The SAGs' method of regulation through litigation in the area of pharmaceutical 
advertising also raises a bevy of constitutional questions, particularly concerning free 
speech. For one, the restrictions on off-label dissemination of information SAGs have 
sought in several litigation campaigns may unconstitutionally restrict commercial speech 
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– particularly when the information involved in these cases is entirely truthful.165 For 
another, the preclearance provisions contained in several recent settlements raise 
questions about unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. As noted earlier, there have 
been attempts in Congress to require drug companies to pre-clear their advertisements 
with the FDA before broadcast.166 However, neither Congress nor the FDA have enacted 
any such preclearance requirements to date, largely because of concerns that any such 
legislation or agency regulations would be unconstitutional restraints on speech.167 
The preclearance provisions established by the SAGs get around this 
constitutional constraint by placing the preclearance requirement in an out-of-court 
settlement. Because the SAGs' preclearance provision is the result of an "agreement" 
between the SAGs and the involved companies, it is not vulnerable to the same sort of 
constitutional challenges that a congressional enactment or agency regulation would be. 
After all, if the company agreed to abide by this provision, how could it then turn 
around and claim that it is unconstitutional? As indicated throughout this dissertation, 
however, companies often do not agree with the legal theories employed by the SAGs 
but nevertheless feel compelled to sign settlements to reduce their own risk and 
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uncertainty. Merck, for example, objected to preclearance provisions as 
unconstitutional prior restraints before ultimately acceding to them in order to resolve 
all of the government litigation surrounding the drug. Essentially, the SAGs have 
discovered a way to leverage state judicial power to force settlements, but 
simultaneously shield the regulations contained therein from constitutional challenge by 
placing them in an out-of-court "agreement." 
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CHAPTER 10 
Analysis and Conclusions 
 
As the foregoing illustrates, state attorneys general have become much more 
active actors in health care regulation, particularly over the past ten years. They have 
used novel interpretations of state and federal law to enforce a regulatory vision on the 
pharmaceutical industry stricter than that pursued by federal authorities. This activity 
has frequently disrupted previous congressional compromises seeking to balance 
competing concerns. In the process, the SAGs have bolstered their own regulatory 
powers through settlement provisions. In this chapter, I examine some of the reasons 
why multistate litigation targeting pharmaceutical companies has been so common in 
recent years. I also examine the larger effects of this litigation in the broader landscape 
of pharmaceutical law and policy. 
HOW DID WE GET HERE, AND WHAT DOES IT MATTER? 
a) Has SAG Pharmaceutical Litigation Increased So Dramatically? 
1. Opportunity Points – The Structure of Medicaid and State Law 
As with the environmental litigation examined in Part II, the structure of the 
underlying statutory regime in health care has provided SAGs with important 
opportunity points to latch upon in order to bring litigation against pharmaceutical 
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firms. For one, the Medicaid program's mixed federal/state structure has ensured that 
state-level actors would remain very much involved in health care policy. Of all 
governmental health care programs, Medicaid is the one that places the most 
responsibility on the states, both in terms of the details of administration as well as 
funding. Similar to what occurred when the federal government began placing many 
responsibilities on the states in the area of air pollution control, the states' integral role 
in Medicaid meant that institutional actors on the state level would continue to 
maintain a special interest in issues concerning the program. As state-level actors tasked 
with enforcement oversight over an entire range of statewide programs, the SAGs have 
been no exception. 
One key in this litigation, however, has been the importance of another 
opportunity point for the SAGs – state law. As noted throughout this chapter, state 
Medicaid fraud, antitrust, and consumer protection statutes were all critical legal hooks 
for the SAGs bringing lawsuits against drug companies. While Congress has increased 
the SAGs' ability to enforce federal statutes directly in recent years,1 most of the 
pharmaceutical litigation (with the exception of the antitrust cases involving patents) 
has originated in state courts under state law. The existence of this body of state law 
gives SAGs a significant, independent legal resource with which to bring lawsuits. These 
state statutes not only give SAGs the authority to sue under their provisions, but also 
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they are often considerably broader and more vague than similar federal statutes. The 
broad legislative language in state consumer protection statutes, as well as the fact that 
the body of case law interpreting the statutes is considerably less developed than at the 
federal level, grants SAGs additional flexibility to bring innovative litigation. By seizing 
upon the ambiguities of state law to redefine corporate responsibilities, the SAGs have 
been able to use their role as "law enforcers" to essentially create new law – and, as 
described in this chapter, to ensure that this new law applies nationally.  
2. The Growth of SAG Capacity – Resources and Litigation Coordination 
The large body of available state law, as well as the states' central role in 
Medicaid oversight and administration, provided SAGs the opportunity points necessary 
to become active litigators in this area. Also critical to the SAGs' litigation success has 
been their impressive ability to marshal the resources necessary to bring complex 
litigation. As noted throughout this dissertation, multistate litigation itself serves as an 
institutional mechanism for combining resources in such a way as to increase leverage 
over targeted defendants. As in many other areas, the National Association of Attorneys 
General (NAAG) has played a key role in coordinating these efforts in the 
pharmaceutical litigation. Right at the time that litigation against drug companies was 
heating up, NAAG established a "Pharmaceutical Pricing Task Force" in 2002 aiming to 
increase communication and collaboration among the states on issues involving the 
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costs of pharmaceuticals.2 Through this task force, NAAG helped the states "streamline" 
their litigation against drug firms, encouraging them to integrate antitrust, consumer 
protection, and Medicaid fraud issues.3 Rather than taking a "silo approach" to 
investigating pharmaceutical firms in which issues of Medicaid fraud and consumer 
protection might be handled as separate cases within their offices, SAGs have 
increasingly combined various investigations of the same defendants in order to address 
a wider range of "unlawful" conduct.4 This coordination has helped SAGs become "a real 
force for change" in the pharmaceutical industry.5 
In addition to combining and coordinating their litigation resources among 
themselves, the SAGs have also often joined with other litigators in these cases. As in 
the area of air pollution control, SAGs have conducted their litigation campaigns parallel 
to those of public interest groups. Many of the cases litigated by the SAGs against drug 
companies were also the focus of the efforts of the Prescription Access Litigation (PAL) 
project, the national coalition of various consumer, health care, and labor organizations 
seeking "to challenge illegal pricing tactics and deceptive marketing by drug 
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companies."6 Other large interest groups such as the AARP also became involved in 
litigation against the pharmaceutical industry.7 Though the connections between the 
SAGs and these interest groups may not have been as formal as in the air pollution cases 
– where the SAGs and groups like the NRDC joined in the same lawsuits, for instance – 
both the goals and the legal tactics were the same for both the SAGs and the interest 
groups. Both were well aware with litigation conducted by other, like-minded parties. 
SAGs reached several major global settlements with pharmaceutical firms in conjunction 
with cases brought by PAL and other groups,8 and interest groups understood that SAGs 
could serve as an independent "force for change" in this area.9 Interest groups were also 
able to point to previous SAG settlements as "proof" of corporate misconduct and 
follow up on the SAGs' settlement with litigation of their own.10  
In the pharmaceutical litigation, as opposed to much of the air pollution 
litigation, the SAGs also had another prominent litigation partner in the form of the 
private bar. Stung by criticism of the SAGs' relationships with private contingency fee 
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attorneys in the tobacco litigation, the SAGs initially signaled that their litigation against 
pharmaceutical companies would be different. "This is not going to be another windfall 
for plaintiffs lawyers around the country," stated one spokesman for the first chair of 
NAAG's Pharmaceutical Pricing Task Force, Ohio SAG Betty Montgomery.11 A number of 
SAGs had a "lingering ill will" toward the lawyers in the tobacco cases over the size of 
the legal fees in those cases, and some SAGs were concerned that the private lawyers' 
focus on large monetary settlements would interfere with the SAGs' chief goal of 
obtaining regulatory changes throughout the industry through this litigation.12 
Despite these stated concerns, the private bar has played a major role in the 
pharmaceutical litigation. This was especially true in the AWP litigation, which created 
the greatest prospects of large monetary recoveries. All of the SAGs bringing AWP 
litigation except for Texas hired contingency attorneys to handle these cases in the 
name of the state. The reason for this, as stated by the SAGs themselves, was to 
supplement their limited resources with the expertise of these plaintiffs' lawyers. This 
was particularly useful in the AWP litigation, which involved a number of highly complex 
issues with which the SAGs had little previous experience. For the private contingency 
fee attorneys, on the other hand, "[t]his fell hand-in-hand with a lot of consumer work 
we do."13 Plaintiff's law firm Hagens Berman wrote several of the complaints for their 
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SAG clients, leveraging their expertise in pharmaceutical pricing "fraud" on behalf of 
their state clients.14 
In addition to establishing relationships with like-minded groups and the private 
bar in an effort to help to expand their litigation resources, SAGs have also used the 
settlements themselves to build up their own capacity. Many of the settlements across 
all three areas examined in this chapter included payments to the SAGs to cover their 
litigation fees and costs. These provisions essentially serve as a way to minimize risk to 
the SAGs bringing this litigation, helping to ensure a steady stream of resources to 
replace funds expended in their investigations. The often considerable amount of 
money the SAGs have brought back to the states, particularly in their antitrust and 
Medicaid fraud suits, serves as an incentive for state legislatures to appropriate more 
money to SAG offices to bring these lawsuits. The early success of Texas's Medicaid 
fraud unit earned it more appropriations from the state throughout the past decade, 
with legislative Medicaid fraud appropriations increasing 550% from 2004 to 2009.15 
In addition to helping to supplement their monetary resources through their 
settlements with pharmaceutical firms, the SAGs have also increased their legal capacity 
as well. As noted throughout this chapter, several settlements have included provisions 
extending the SAGs' oversight of the drug company defendants. The BuSpar and Taxol 
settlements, for example, required Bristol-Myers Squibb to notify the SAGs of patent 
                                                          
14
 A listing of the various cases the Hagens Berman law firm has been involved in is available on the firm's 
website,  accessed March 19, 2011, http://www.hbsslaw.com/cases-and-investigations/. 
15
 Yelkin, "States Target Medicaid Fraud." 
496 
 
litigation settlements with generic drug competitors and gave them the power to 
approve or reject any such agreement before going into force. The Merck and Pfizer 
consumer protection settlements required the companies to give information to the 
SAGs regarding DTC prescription drug advertisements before broadcasting them. In 
other settlements, the SAGs were able to grant themselves the ability to enforce the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act despite the lack of any statutory language giving them this 
power. In this way, the SAGs have made it easier gain information from drug companies 
that could prove useful in future lawsuits, and have also increased the number of legal 
tools available to them in order to oversee the industry. 
Finally, as with the environmental litigation, Congress has been instrumental in 
supplementing SAG capacity to bring pharmaceutical litigation. Congress's growing focus 
on tackling fraud within government health care programs has lead to considerable 
federal resources flowing to SAG offices. The creation of state Medicaid Fraud Control 
Units, typically placed in the SAGs' offices and bolstered by significant federal funding, 
has been key in making health care litigation an important part of the SAGs' repertoire. 
More recently, Congress has supplemented the resources it has given the states to fight 
alleged pharmaceutical fraud by providing incentives for states to enact their own False 
Claims Acts, an invitation many states have accepted since the Deficit Reduction Act 
went into force in 2006. 
Congress has thus supplemented the monetary and legal resources the SAGs 
have developed for themselves over time, contributing to the SAGs' capacity to bring 
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the often complex litigation involved in these pharmaceutical suits. Ironically, this has 
occurred at the same time that Congress was attempting to reduce litigation elsewhere, 
such as through the Class Action Fairness Act enacted the very same year as the Deficit 
Reduction Act.16 
3. Creating Entrepreneurial Space 
Central to all these pharmaceutical lawsuits, from AWP to patents to marketing, 
has been the overall context of rising health costs and increased pressure that these 
rising costs have had on state budgets. On both the federal and state levels, health care 
costs have become one of the most prominent issues on the political agenda. As the 
head of the Oregon MFCU stated, "I can't emphasize enough the financial pressure state 
Medicaid programs are under.”17 With state budgets getting tighter and drug prices 
rising rapidly, this litigation has been used as a way to relieve some of this financial 
pressure. As noted above, the money obtained by the SAGs in many of these 
settlements serves as a de facto tax on the pharmaceutical industry, amounting to tens 
of millions of dollars flowing back to the states during difficult economic times. 
For entrepreneurial SAGs, litigation against pharmaceutical firms is an excellent 
way to bolster their resumes for future political campaigns. That these settlements 
serve the dual purpose of serving as a deficit reduction measure by placing de facto 
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taxes on an unpopular industry, as well as allowing individual SAGs to claim that "they 
are doing something" about rising health care costs, makes participation in these 
lawsuits particularly attractive. In addition to bringing money back to state coffers (as 
well as their own offices), the settlements also work to bring money back to consumers, 
much like consumer class actions – except the SAGs are doing so as representatives of 
the state. In this way, the SAGs are not only able to raise money, but to distribute it to 
their liking as well. Often, for example, the SAGs have distributed monetary proceeds to 
provide drugs to the poor and elderly18 or for public groups applying for grants to be 
paid out of settlement proceeds. Furthermore, successfully fighting "fraud and waste" is 
a political positive for any politician, regardless of party. Not surprisingly, SAGs have 
been quick to trumpet their successes in achieving settlements in this litigation.19 
It is also not surprising that overall SAG participation in most of these lawsuits 
against drug companies has been much more widespread than in the air pollution 
litigation campaigns examined in the previous chapter. Once a settlement is finalized, it 
usually makes sense for a SAG to sign the deal and obtain a portion of the proceeds.20 
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This dynamic is similar to what some observers have noted about the tobacco 
settlement eventually signed by all SAGs, despite qualms by some about the injunctive 
provisions constituting "regulation through litigation," because of the money involved in 
the settlement.21 This is unlike the environmental suits, many of which SAGs brought 
directly against the federal government and involved no claims for monetary relief. 
Further, despite the significant injunctive provisions in the settlements, Republican and 
Democratic SAGs alike tend to view pharmaceutical litigation as "fraud enforcement" 
rather than "regulation through litigation." These are likely a major reason why no 
partisan differences exist in regards to SAG participation in these cases. 
The fact that pharmaceutical companies are both politically unpopular and have 
deep pockets surely contributes to the fact that so much of this litigation targets 
pharmaceutical companies as opposed to doctors or hospitals.22 After all, one might 
think that litigation strategies against health care providers might make sense in the 
AWP litigation given that it was the providers who pocketed the AWP "spreads," not the 
pharmaceutical companies. However, another factor contributing to the viability of 
pharmaceutical companies as litigation targets is that the industry is relatively 
concentrated. According to the 2002 Economic Census, the eight largest pharmaceutical 
firms accounted for nearly half of all drug manufacturing output, with the twenty largest 
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accounting for over 70% of the market.23 This market concentration makes it easier for 
the regulations in each SAG settlement to reach across significant portions of the entire 
industry. Placing advertising pre-clearance requirements on the eight largest firms 
through multistate settlements would mean, for example, that the SAGs have reached 
about half of the entire pharmaceutical industry. This makes it much more viable to 
regulate the entire industry settlement-by-settlement than if it exhibited a more diffuse 
market structure. Because the SAGs' goal multistate litigation generally is as much to 
change industry practices as it is to bring back money to the states, the pharmaceutical 
industry's relative market concentration makes it a particularly good target.24  
Finally, in addition to these political and economic factors contributing to the 
creation of entrepreneurial space in which the SAGs can operate, Congress's decision 
not to adopt stricter regulations opened up the required policy space as well. At least 
until after the SAGs' litigation campaigns were already proceeding, Congress did not act 
to alter the AWP system, to ban "pay-for-delay" settlements, or to place certain 
additional restrictions on drug marketing such as pre-clearance requirements. Much as 
the federal government's perceived "failure to act" on climate change granted SAGs the 
opportunity to take the lead on these issues, Congress's hesitation to alter existing 
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regulatory regimes gave SAGs room to spearhead regulatory changes in this area as 
well. 
b) Why Does It Matter? The Effects of the SAGs' Multistate Pharmaceutical 
Litigation  
The SAGs' litigation against pharmaceutical firms simultaneously created a 
national patchwork regulatory regime parallel to that established by Congress and 
federal agencies, while also expanding their own ability to bring additional lawsuits in 
the future. This story helps to show how they have altered the policy landscape as well 
as the institutional structures for future regulation through litigation through their 
settlements. This also shows how SAGs have deftly used ambiguous statutory language 
such as "fraud" and "deceptive advertising" to pursue a "law enforcement" approach 
that is essentially "law creation." The difference is that the SAGs, Congress, and others 
do not see this as regulation-through-litigation. They see it instead as "fraud control" to 
be encouraged, particularly in an era when government budgets are tight. 
1. The Importance of Injunctive and Monetary Relief 
As with so much of the SAGs' multistate litigation, one of the chief goals of the 
SAGs is to obtain strong injunctive relief through settlements that can serve to regulate 
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corporate behavior into the future.25 Also as in other areas, the SAGs targeted a policy 
area that was getting much political attention, yet was not being regulated on the 
federal level in the manner many policy advocates would have liked. The SAGs' turn to 
the courtroom to regulate the national pharmaceutical industry has helped to push 
forward these policy agendas. As Ron Pollack of Families USA, a health care advocacy 
group, stated in regards to rising drug prices, "[c]onsumer groups, government agencies, 
hospitals, insurance companies and others are now saying enough is enough. They've 
decided that if they can't succeed through the legislative process, then they will 
challenge the companies through the legal process."26 
Each of the SAGs' three major litigation campaigns against drug firms reflects this 
turn to regulation-through-litigation in order to regulate the price of prescription drugs. 
The most direct method was to challenge a pricing system used in government health 
care programs for decades by re-describing the AWP system inherently "fraudulent." 
Congress had considered the substitution of AWP with some other standard, but 
ultimately rejected this idea. However, through a series of lawsuits and settlements, the 
SAGs sought to replace AWP with an alternative pricing benchmark (ASP) defined not in 
any federal statute or regulation, but rather by a series of out-of-court settlements. 
Starting with the Bayer and TAP settlements, and in conjunction with the federal DOJ, 
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the SAGs placed new requirements on drug firms to report the ASP for their drugs so 
that state and federal Medicaid agencies would have the information necessary to set 
new (and lower) reimbursement rates for the drugs. Perhaps most importantly, the 
wave of lawsuits attacking the pharmaceutical industry's "AWP Scheme" that arose after 
the Bayer and TAP settlements helped to establish the notion of AWP-as-fraud – 
something that Congress had already rejected and that the industry would have viewed 
as preposterous only a few years earlier. 
SAGs also sought to regulate another common industry practice in court when 
they initiated a number of lawsuits challenging patent settlements between brand name 
and generic drug firms. As with the AWP lawsuits, this litigation occurred in the context 
of an established federal regulatory regime that had withstood various attempts within 
Congress to alter it. The patent settlements at issue in this litigation were in fact 
encouraged by the underlying federal statutory regime, and federal antitrust enforcers 
tended to examine the legality of the settlements under federal antitrust law on a case-
by-case basis. It was in this context that the SAGs sought to put an end to the practice of 
patent settlements by reaching a series of settlements with pharmaceutical firms 
placing additional restrictions on the targeted companies to enter such patent 
settlements. Through this litigation, the SAGs also granted themselves new power to 
oversee and prohibit future patent settlement activity by the firms as well. 
Finally, SAGs have viewed the sharp increase in marketing expenditures by 
pharmaceutical firms as contributing to increases in drug costs. As Congress and the FDA 
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generally viewed these advertisements in a positive light and adopted policies loosening 
advertising restrictions on drug firms, the SAGs have pursued precisely the opposite 
policy agenda through a series of regulatory settlements. Relying heavily on state 
consumer protection law, SAGs have been able to redefine the responsibilities of the 
pharmaceutical industry nationwide in relation to the marketing of their products. 
Despite facing no such requirements in federal statutes or regulations, several 
companies must now abide by the provisions of settlements reached with SAGs, 
including new disclosure requirements and preclearance provisions. 
 In addition to the important injunctive relief achieved in the settlements, the 
monetary provisions in these cases have often been substantial, running into the tens of 
millions per settlement – and considerably more when the federal DOJ brings parallel 
criminal prosecutions. As states and the federal government struggle to contain health 
care costs, this litigation has been used to recoup money and lower the costs of drugs in 
a way that has effectively served as a de facto tax on the pharmaceutical industry. As 
noted earlier, this aspect of the litigation is particularly valuable to the government 
prosecutors at a time in which both federal and state governments are running 
substantial deficits and the political will to raise taxes is lacking. In this context, legal 
settlements targeting ever-expanding definitions of "fraud" and "deceptive trade 
practices" are an attractive way to raise additional government revenue – especially 
when this revenue is derived from an unpopular industry already under fire for its 
alleged corporate "greed" and malfeasance. The cost-effectiveness of the settlements 
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from the perspective of the government helps to join together deficit hawks from both 
ends of the political spectrum. As one report by public advocacy group Taxpayers 
Against Fraud noted, "[c]ivil health care fraud is surely one area of the federal budget 
where the government is running a substantial 'surplus'."27 Few politicians of either 
party would seek to disrupt such an arrangement. 
2. SAG Litigation and Industry Practices 
While similar to traditional regulation in terms of requirements placed on the 
pharmaceutical industry nationwide, the SAGs' litigation and settlement approach 
differs in some ways from "traditional" regulation, not the least of which is that the 
targeted companies agree to be covered by settlement provisions. This raises the 
question of why companies agree to these settlements in the first place. 
 Part of the reason is because this litigation raises the specter of bad publicity and 
uncertainty for the targeted firms, regardless of how much they might protest the 
strength of the legal theories involved in the litigation. Particularly since officials tasked 
with "law enforcement" do not carry the baggage that "ideological" advocacy groups or 
"money-seeking" plaintiffs' firms might into litigation, a SAG investigation into company 
practices may create a negative image of the companies as law-breakers. Lengthy 
litigation may also have a negative effect on a targeted company's stock price. As one 
health care analyst put it, "[w]hat Wall Street hates more than anything else is 
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uncertainty, so the faster a company can conclude the matter, the better...it makes 
sense to reach a settlement. It's not lingering in the media, so there's no lingering effect 
on the stock price."28 
 Also contributing to the push towards settlement is the fact that many of the 
laws targeting health care fraud give rise to the possibility of very large damage awards 
if litigation is successful. Federal and state False Claims Acts provide for significant 
monetary penalties for each individual false claim submitted to the government. In the 
context of government health care reimbursements, this could apply to every individual 
prescription filled and paid for by government health care programs, leading to massive 
potential liability exposure for firms involved in the investigation. Further, federal law 
provides that any company found guilty of health care fraud can be excluded from 
government health care programs for several years, which (given the size of the 
government-funded health care market) could amount to a corporate "death sentence." 
Further, many state antitrust and consumer protection statutes provide for treble 
damages upon findings of liability for violations, giving SAGs an additional lever with 
which to try to force settlements.  
Finally, contributing to the difficulty from the industry perspective is the fact that 
the industry's peak association, PhRMA, is prohibited from rising to the defense of its 
members, at least when it comes to pricing litigation, because such a coordinated 
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defense would constitute an antitrust violation.29 This requires individual companies to 
defend these lawsuits, which makes it difficult for the industry defendants to provide a 
united front in the face of litigation. When the first defendant settles – as Bayer did in 
the AWP litigation – it places additional pressure on the remaining firms to resolve any 
ongoing investigations and litigation quickly as well. 
 Even when industry defendants do reach settlements with the SAGs, the SAGs 
have often skillfully described their settlements as something different from what even 
the settlements themselves say. Nearly all SAG settlements, in the pharmaceutical 
litigation and in other areas as well, contain clauses in which the corporate defendant 
denies the SAGs' claims and makes clear that by settling the case the company is 
admitting no wrongdoing or any violation of the law.30 Yet in subsequent press releases 
and discussion about the cases, the SAGs often characterize the settlements as 
something different. To take one of many potential examples, Eliot Spitzer's press 
release following the Pfizer Zithromax consumer protection settlement was titled "Ads 
for Leading Antibiotic Found to Be Misleading."31 However, this headline was itself 
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misleading since no court had made any "findings" in this case and the underlying 
settlement specifically disclaimed any admission of wrongdoing on the part of Pfizer.32 
 The possibility that lawsuits will bring on unwanted publicity and opportunities 
for SAGs to describe even the subsequent settlements as de facto admissions of guilt 
gives companies the incentive to avoid investigations in the first place. After the 
quantity of pharmaceutical litigation rose sharply in the early part of the 2000s, 
pharmaceutical trade groups such as PhRMA adopted new codes of conduct to help 
their members ward off litigation.33 Individual firms also altered their practices to try to 
preempt future investigations.34 Given that one of the chief aims of the SAGs' litigation 
is to change industry behavior, the stricter policies voluntarily adopted by industry as a 
result of these lawsuits indicates that such litigation can be effective even apart from 
reaching settlements. By "sending a message" through litigation and settlements with 
one company, the SAGs can encourage industry-wide changes by essentially expanding 
the potential exposure of industry members. If this effort to send a message is not 
heeded, litigation can and has remained a viable option. 
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3. SAG Litigation and Congress 
As mentioned throughout this Part III, the SAGs' pharmaceutical ligation is 
essentially an effort to sidestep Congress, place a thumb on one side of the balance of 
interests enacted by the legislature, and otherwise encroach upon the regulatory 
ground originally thought to reside with the federal government. One might expect 
Congress to react with strong concern about the SAGs' efforts to intrude upon their 
regulatory turf, and seek to preempt the states' efforts to create their own national 
policy. Instead, by and large, precisely the opposite has occurred. Congress, rather than 
preempting SAG litigation campaigns, has instead encouraged them and often ratified 
the results of their settlements. 
Throughout the 1990s, for example, Congress refused to go along with Clinton 
Administration efforts to alter the AWP system out of concerns that this change would 
unduly harm physicians. This followed the effort of previous Congresses to likewise cut 
reimbursement rates and change the drug pricing benchmark. Following the success of 
the Bayer and TAP settlements, and the wave of SAG litigation that followed, Congress 
did an about-face. Building upon the existing federal and SAG investigations, an 
increasing number of members of Congress decided to respond with their own.35 
Indeed, key congressional committees sought and incorporated information from these 
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lawsuits as part of their own congressional investigations.36 After decades of 
acknowledging the AWP payment system as accepted practice, Congress held at least 
two hearings on the problem of pricing "fraud" following the federal and multistate 
Bayer and TAP settlements and subsequent individual state litigation.37 
Ultimately, Congress increasingly accepted the view of AWP-as-fraud and ratified 
the settlements achieved by federal and state prosecutors. Congress codified the new 
ASP benchmark – created and defined in the Bayer and TAP settlements and subsequent 
SAG complaints – in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003. In essence, this was acquiescing to the national changes in pharmaceutical 
pricing that the SAGs were already achieving, settlement by settlement, through their 
litigation.  
Congress made several policy changes following the SAGs' other multistate 
pharmaceutical litigation campaigns as well. Congress's subsequent ratification of a 
number of the regulatory disclosure requirements resulting from the SAGs' consumer 
protection settlements, such as regarding the results of internal clinical trials, applied 
these provisions to the entire industry.38 While not going nearly as far as the SAGs urged 
in restricting "pay-for-delay" patent settlements, Congress placed additional restrictions 
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on such settlements as part of the Medicare Part D reforms in 2003 following the 
increasing antitrust litigation in this area. As noted earlier, throughout the time when 
Congress was doing this, it encouraged further litigation by providing additional 
incentives for SAGs to beef up their fraud enforcement efforts.  
 The pharmaceutical litigation examined in this chapter thus helped spur 
additional attention on issues involving the pharmaceutical industry in Congress. Not 
only did the litigation help to serve as a sort of agenda-setting device by refocusing 
congressional attention on new "frauds" and "deceptive" practices of drug companies, 
but also several settlement provisions served as templates for future statutes. Similar to 
how Congress has frequently ratified the federal courts' interpretations of a variety of 
statutes even though the decisions go beyond Congress's original intent,39 Congress has 
likewise ratified new regulatory baselines adopted by SAGs in their out-of-court 
settlements, despite these settlements encroaching upon their policy jurisdiction and 
contravening the choices of previous Congresses. 
CONCLUSION 
In all three of these areas targeted in this litigation, the SAGs sought to change 
regulatory policy on a national level and bring in additional monetary recoveries to 
government coffers. None of these areas have resulted in a settlement as spectacularly 
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large as the Master Settlement Agreement in area of tobacco policy, but the SAGs have 
nevertheless built a new regulatory regime covering the pharmaceutical industry piece 
by piece, settlement by settlement. This regulatory regime produced national regulatory 
results similar to what Congress would achieve through legislation or the FTC and FDA 
would achieve through traditional regulatory processes, but which also stretched 
beyond anything required under existing federal law. In many ways, the SAGs have 
established themselves as a state-level FDA and FTC, with enforcement and oversight 
powers established through a variety of provisions reached in out-of-court settlements. 
SAGs have often described this activity as simply "enforcement of existing laws 
via multistate lawsuits,"40 but in fact the SAGs' enforcement actions blur the line 
between neutral "enforcement" and active creation of new regulatory standards. In this 
way, SAGs have used their prosecutorial power as a regulatory power. This is similar in 
ways to the New Source Review litigation examined in Chapter 6. In both cases, 
Congress set up a new statutory regime complete with vague standards and 
requirements, with federal administrative agencies subsequently struggling to craft 
reasonable regulations to carry it out. The areas of vagueness within federal law – as 
well as, crucially, vague standards in state law – have allowed the SAGs to "clarify" the 
law through "enforcement." Through a series of these actions, the SAGs have been able 
to develop the law to correspond to a particular interpretation, even when that 
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interpretation is contrary to established practice. This indicates a different, important, 
and often overlooked way of regulatory policy-making in the United States. 
In some ways, the SAGs' regulatory results are even more powerful than those 
reached by the typical lawmaking or regulatory process, because they are immune from 
judicial review. This is a particularly important benefit to regulation reached through 
out-of-court settlements, given the shaky legal ground of many of these lawsuits. The 
contention that AWP was "fraudulent" faced a number of legal problems, including the 
fact that doctors, not pharmaceutical firms, actually benefited from the AWP spread, as 
well as the fact that governments knew for years that AWP really meant "Ain't What's 
Paid." The notion that patent settlements between brand-name and generic drug firms 
were inherently suspect under antitrust law ran counter to the existing Hatch-Waxman 
Act, federal enforcement practice, and the decisions of several courts. Attempts to 
regulate drug advertising – either by requiring pre-clearance of DTC advertising or by 
restricting companies' ability to distribute truthful information about their drugs to 
physicians – raises important free speech issues arising under the First Amendment. By 
lodging their regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in out-of-court settlements, the 
SAGs have sidestepped potential legal challenges to these provisions. Ironically, then, 
the SAGs have simultaneously leveraged the judicial power to force new regulations 
through settlements, but then insulated these regulations from future review by courts. 
In all three areas of litigation examined in this chapter, the underlying federal 
regime was indeed probably flawed. The AWP benchmark really did result in higher 
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prices for prescription drugs under Medicaid and Medicare. The Hatch-Waxman Act did 
provide incentives for brand-name companies to devise ways to extend their patents 
sometimes beyond the term originally intended by Congress and federal regulators. 
Drug companies have tiptoed very close to the line between the dissemination of drug 
information to physicians and the explicitly illegal marketing of off-label uses of their 
products. In all of these cases, however, Congress and other federal regulators either 
were aware or eventually became aware of these industry practices, and chose not to 
alter the existing system prior to the SAGs' litigation campaigns. While some have 
pointed to pharmaceutical company lobbying and agency capture as the main factors 
explaining this federal "inaction," all of the areas involved federal regulators trying to 
balance important competing concerns. The AWP system, flawed as it may be, helped to 
compensate providers for losses they incurred when providing other services under 
government health care programs. Some patent settlements might actually help to 
bring generic drugs to the market faster by efficiently resolving complex patent 
litigation. The advertising of pharmaceutical products may help to provide consumers 
and physicians with useful information about drugs that can ultimately promote public 
health. 
By seeking changes to the federal regulatory regime by initiating litigation, the 
SAGs have created an alternative regulatory regime that typically reflects only one side 
of the balance between competing concerns. By altering this balance reached on the 
federal level, the SAGs' regulation-through-litigation threatens to unleash certain 
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unintended results as well. Reductions in reimbursement rates precipitated by a move 
from AWP to ASP provides less of an incentive for health care providers to offer services 
to Medicare and Medicaid recipients, thereby restricting the options available for these 
covered populations. Further restrictions on patent settlements between brand name 
and generic firms may, as previously noted, actually result in fewer generics available on 
the market, thereby driving up drug costs. Stricter regulation of pharmaceutical 
advertising may have an effect on overall drug costs, but at the expense of public health 
generally by making it more difficult for physicians to consider off-label uses of drugs 
and for consumers to learn about potentially helpful treatments for their conditions. 
*  *  * 
Both the SAGs' pharmaceutical and environmental litigation campaigns 
ultimately illustrate a subtle yet consequential way to regulate. In both instances, 
Congress or federal administrative agencies begin by declining to set regulatory 
baselines at the point SAGs prefer. SAGs then bring "enforcement" litigation as a way to 
bring money back into state coffers, create new regulatory baselines through settlement 
provisions or by directly challenging the federal government's regulatory stance, and 
increase the pressure on the federal government to alter federal regulation in a stricter 
direction. Throughout this process, Congress then gives more tools to the SAGs to bring 
additional litigation, subsequently ratifying aspects of the SAGs' litigation in new federal 
statutes. Only in a few situations, such as the gun litigation examined in the following 
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chapter, has Congress stepped in to re-assert its authority over a policy area targeted by 
the SAGs. 
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CHAPTER 11 
The Abortive Attempt to Regulate Guns Through Litigation 
 
"If you do not sign, your bankruptcy lawyers will be knocking at your door."  
–New York SAG Eliot Spitzer, referencing a possible settlement with 
firearm manufacturers1  
 
"The possibility of imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely 
caused by others is an abuse of the legal system...invites the disassembly and 
destabilization of other industries and economic sectors lawfully competing in the 
free enterprise system of the United States, and constitutes an unreasonable 
burden on interstate and foreign commerce of the United States." 
–Congressional findings in the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms 
Act of 2005, which preempted lawsuits against the firearms industry2 
 
 
Throughout the 1990s, rising crime rates and a series of high-profile shooting 
incidents focused national attention on the role of guns in American society. Many gun 
control advocates argued that the relatively weak federal regulatory regime covering 
guns was at least partially to blame for this state of affairs. The main federal statute 
regulating firearms, the Gun Control Act of 1968, forbid interstate commerce in guns 
except through federally licensed dealers but contained few restrictions on gun 
purchases and ownership, giving states and localities primary control of firearms.3 
Congress had already expressly forbidden the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
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(CPSC) from regulating gun design, making guns an exception among the many other 
products regulated by the agency.4 Gun control advocates pushed for stronger national 
legislation to fill in these "gaps" in federal regulation and won some early battles in 
Congress in the early 1990s. However, enthusiasm for stricter gun control legislation on 
the national level was blunted following the election of a Republican Congress in the 
1994 elections. With the path toward legislative reform seemingly blocked, proponents 
of gun control began turning to the courts to regulate the nation's largest gun 
manufacturers in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
This chapter discusses this attempt to regulate guns through litigation, with a 
focus on the role of the SAGs in the larger litigation campaign. For several reasons, it 
appeared that firearms manufacturers would be a prime target for a sustained 
multistate litigation campaign. The issue of gun violence had become more politically 
salient during the very time that Congress declined to fill in several of the perceived 
"regulatory gaps" in federal law. Furthermore, SAGs had just recently achieved a 
monumental settlement with another "vice" industry. The SAGs' settlement with the 
nation's largest tobacco companies was worth billions of dollars to state treasuries and 
it imposed new regulatory requirements on cigarette manufacturers. Several observers 
at the time suggested that guns could and perhaps should be the next SAG target.5 
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Following a bevy of private and municipal lawsuits against gun manufacturers in the late 
1990s, a number of SAGs expressed interest in using litigation to force the gun industry 
to adopt a variety of design, marketing, and distribution changes to their products. 
Nevertheless, a sustained multistate SAG effort failed to materialize. The 
litigation campaign against the gun industry failed to attract more than a handful of 
SAGs – only one of which, New York SAG Eliot Spitzer, actually filed a lawsuit – and a 
comprehensive settlement between Smith & Wesson and several government parties in 
2000 triggered a backlash against both Smith & Wesson and this attempt at "regulation 
through litigation." In 2005, Congress took the unusual step of preempting most 
litigation against firearms manufacturers. This was in marked contrast to the other 
litigation campaigns explored in Parts II and III, which resulted in court decisions and 
settlements often encouraged and later codified by Congress.  
 Why did this particular attempt at "regulation through litigation" fail and 
provoke such a strong negative congressional reaction even as several other SAG 
litigation campaigns – including those involving climate change and pharmaceuticals – 
flourished? This chapter seeks to shed light on this question by drawing out the 
differences between the government litigation against the gun industry and the 
litigation campaigns noted previously in this study.  
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THE EMERGENCE OF LITIGATION AGAINST GUN MANUFACTURERS 
a) Gun Control in Congress and the Courtroom 
Civil litigation against gun manufacturers arising from the use of firearms is 
nothing new. Dating back to at least 1837, when an English court held a gun 
manufacturer liable for harm caused by a defective firearm, individual claimants have 
brought lawsuits against manufacturers claiming that a company should be liable for 
harm caused by their products.6 Traditionally, the claims concerned defective firearms 
directly harming individual users. However, the tenor of these suits began to change 
beginning in the 1980s when private plaintiffs pressed a variety of new legal theories 
seeking to hold gun manufacturers liable for broader harms caused by firearms. Several 
of these lawsuits sought to hold firearm companies to a standard of strict liability for 
their products and suggested that the companies had a legal obligation to take 
precautions concerning the intentional criminal misuse of their products. None of these 
private lawsuits in the 1980s were successful, however, with courts refusing to extend 
tort law to impose new legal requirements on the gun industry as a whole.7 
Nevertheless, the notion that gun manufacturers should bear some 
responsibility for gun-related violence continued to percolate into the 1990s as the rates 
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of violent crime nationwide skyrocketed. Between 1985 and 1993, the rate of gun 
deaths (including homicides, suicides, and accidents) more than doubled among 15 to 
19 year old males, and the rate for twenty to twenty four year olds increased from 35 to 
59 deaths per 100,000.8 Most of this rapid spike in gun deaths was attributable to gun 
homicides. Following this trend, crime became a more salient issue among the public.9 
Particularly after several high-profile shooting incidents in the early 1990s left dozens 
dead,10 polling indicated more support for tougher gun control among the public. One 
poll released in June 1993, for example, found that for the first time a majority of 
Americans supported an outright ban on the ownership of all handguns.11 
Gun control advocates seized upon this increasing public attention to the issue of 
guns. Many increasingly sought to frame the rising tide of gun violence as a public 
health crisis, as opposed to an issue of crime control alone.12 Several supporters of gun 
control suggested that because of the limited success of efforts "directed at controlling 
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the possession and use of guns...gun policy would be more effective in reducing gun 
death if it were focused on the manufacture, marketing, and sale of guns."13 In the early 
to mid-1990s, pro-gun control forces met with some success in pushing their policy 
objectives on the federal level. President Bill Clinton latched on to the gun control issue 
early in his first term in office. In 1993, he signed into law the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act, which sets up a system of background checks for firearms purchasers 
and imposes a five-day waiting period on the purchase of handguns.14 Clinton signed 
another major gun control bill the following year banning several types of 
semiautomatic assault weapons.15 
However, any legislative momentum towards more comprehensive federal 
regulation of guns established during the first half of the decade slowed following the 
1994 elections, when Republicans gained majorities in both houses of Congress. In the 
first month after being sworn in, the new Republican leadership pledged to repeal the 
assault weapons ban just signed into law a few months earlier.16 New House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich pledged, "As long as I am speaker of this House, no gun control legislation 
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is going to move in committee or on the floor of the House."17 While many members of 
Congress continued to press for stricter gun control legislation, it was becoming 
increasingly clear to gun control advocates that prospects for stricter gun regulation at 
the federal level were growing dimmer. 
Just as the momentum for congressional action on gun control dissipated, 
however, gun control proponents achieved their first-ever significant success in the 
courtroom. In January 1995, nine gunshot victims and their families sued a large group 
of firearm manufacturers before Judge Jack Weinstein in federal district court in New 
York.18 Among product liability claims similar to those previously rejected in other 
courts, the plaintiffs in this case, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, included a novel theory of 
"negligent marketing" in their claims. Gun manufacturers, the plaintiffs argued, had 
knowingly marketed their products "in a manner that fostered the growth of a 
substantial underground market in handguns."19 This market, in turn, made it much 
easier for potential criminals to obtain handguns and "contributes greatly to the 
problem of handgun-related violence in American society."20 
In a significant victory for the plaintiffs, Judge Weinstein denied the defendant 
manufacturers’ motion for summary judgment on the negligent marketing claims and 
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allowed the case to proceed to discovery.21 Weinstein’s ruling on this pre-trial motion 
marked the first time that a court allowed plaintiffs to argue that the firearms industry 
was collectively responsible for gun violence, without the plaintiffs having to prove a 
causal connection between a particular manufacturer and a gun used in a violent 
crime.22 The case subsequently became the first firearms lawsuit to proceed to trial 
after another key ruling in May 1998 in which Judge Weinstein noted that the plaintiffs 
had already uncovered evidence suggesting that the collective action of the handgun 
industry could be held responsible for the shooting underlying the lawsuit.23  
b) The Emergence of Governments as Gun Litigation Plaintiffs 
Despite the private plaintiffs’ success in reaching trial in Hamilton, there was 
good reason for skepticism concerning the long-term probability of success of private 
party litigation as a strategy to challenge practices of the firearms industry. Not every 
judge would be as open to innovative tort arguments as Judge Weinstein, who was well 
known for his expansive views of liability in mass torts.24 In some private suits, industry 
defendants might be able to raise additional defenses, such as contributory negligence. 
Further, the very different circumstances often surrounding individual incidences of gun 
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violence made certifying a private class action difficult. Most importantly, private 
plaintiffs faced the difficult hurdle of explaining how individual instances of gun violence 
should give rise to collective manufacturer liability, as opposed to (at best) liability of the 
individual manufacturer of the gun used in the specific crime. For advocates of gun 
control, relying on private litigants to place pressure on the entire gun industry 
remained problematic. 
A promising alternative was to enlist government plaintiffs in a broader legal 
challenge to gun makers. This strategy originated with Temple University law professor 
David Kairys, who developed the idea to sue the firearms industry on a theory of public 
nuisance. Gun manufacturers, Kairys suggested, knowingly made handguns easily 
available for the purposes of a crime through their marketing and distributing 
practices.25 In particular, the manufacturers oversaturated certain (mostly suburban) 
markets with guns which then found their way into municipalities with much stricter 
gun control regulations, creating a "public nuisance" akin to pollution drifting across 
state lines.26 Kairys believed that a governmental plaintiff would be best suited to make 
this argument, noting that the SAGs' ongoing tobacco litigation at the time "play[ed] 
some role in my thinking about a possible government [firearms] suit."27 Because thirty-
three states already had preemption laws on the books preventing localities from 
enacting gun control regulations stricter than that provided by state law, a strategy of 
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enlisting governmental plaintiffs in lawsuits against the industry was particularly 
attractive. Gun control advocates had long complained that these laws tie the hands of 
city and county councils,28 but, as one attorney working on gun litigation later remarked, 
"You don't need a legislative majority to file a lawsuit."29 
Kairys first tried to generate interest in a government public nuisance lawsuit by 
turning to his hometown city officials, including Philadelphia mayor Edward Rendell. 
Rendell had made reducing gun violence a priority, and upon Kairys’ recommendations 
he assembled a team to explore the possibility of court action against firearms 
manufacturers.30 By January of 1998, it appeared that Philadelphia was poised to file the 
first government suit against the gun industry. Philadelphia's approach would mirror 
"that taken by a group of state attorneys general who negotiated a groundbreaking 
settlement with the tobacco industry."31 The proposed lawsuit would adopt Kairys’s 
innovative argument by resting on the grounds that firearms manufacturers created a 
public nuisance by saturating Philadelphia with firearms used by criminals.32 The city 
would claim millions of dollars in damages from gun manufacturers to reimburse the 
city for costs stemming from gun violence, including "everything from the cost of 
washing blood off streets, to homicide-unit overtime, to the expense of counseling 
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survivors of murder victims."33 Mayor Rendell, however, ultimately decided not to file 
the lawsuit, and Kairys left the team advising Rendell on the matter to float the idea to 
other big-city mayors.34 
Parallel to but separate from Professor Kairys’s efforts, the idea of enlisting 
governments as plaintiffs against the gun industry was gaining attention among a group 
of prominent plaintiffs’ attorneys. Under the auspices of the Castano Safe Gun Litigation 
Group ("Castano Group"), a team of nearly sixty plaintiffs' law firms that had previously 
collaborated on class-action tobacco litigation from their New Orleans headquarters, 
turned its sights to lawsuits against the gun industry.35 The group found a willing partner 
in New Orleans mayor Marc Morial, who retained the Castano Group to represent the 
city in firearms litigation on a contingency fee basis in October 1998.36  
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Under the direction of the Castano Group, New Orleans became the first city to 
sue several gun manufacturers, including Smith & Wesson, Colt, and Beretta.37 This suit, 
unlike the litigation Professor Kairys proposed, relied upon products liability theories. 
The complaint alleged that the defendants' handguns were defectively designed 
because they lacked locking devices which would prevent children from using them and 
because they did not use technology to personalize firearms so criminals could not use 
them.38 The city alleged that the defendants "caused the city to pay out large sums of 
money to provide services including...necessary police, medical, and emergency 
services, health care, police pension benefits, and related expenditures, as well as to 
have lost substantial tax revenues due to lost productivity."39 While the lawsuit 
contained only claims for money damages and no injunctive relief, Mayor Morial stated 
at the time "money is not our primary aim. Changing the behavior and the practice of 
the gun industry is."40 
 Two weeks after New Orleans filed its suit under the direction of the Castano 
Group, Kairys finally found success in convincing a city to adopt his public nuisance 
argument. After working with Kairys on the issue, Chicago sued a similarly large group of 
handgun manufacturers as in the New Orleans lawsuit, along with several gun stores 
and distributors. Unlike the New Orleans lawsuit, Chicago decided to use the City 
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Attorney's office rather than private plaintiffs' attorneys, relying heavily on the legal 
theories Professor Kairys had introduced.41 The lawsuit followed an investigation by the 
City Attorney's office finding that a large number of the illegal guns confiscated by the 
Chicago Police Department originated from a small number of retail gun shops just 
outside of the city limits.42 After meeting with Kairys, the city lawyers became convinced 
that gun manufacturers and distributors were knowingly oversupplying these shops with 
guns they knew would end up in Chicago in violation of the city's strict gun control 
ordinance.43 
Chicago’s lawsuit claimed that this activity amounted to a common-law public 
nuisance. In particular, the city claimed that the defendant manufacturers had 
knowingly designed, manufactured, marked, and supplied their products in such a way 
that enabled a black market in illegal firearms to form within the Chicago city limits. 
Chicago also alleged that the manufacturer's advertising emphasized aspects of their 
products that would appeal to potential criminals, such as the fingerprint-resistant 
nature of the TEC-9 firearm marketed by Intratec. As Mayor Richard Daley stated in 
announcing the suit, "gun manufacturers and retailers know exactly what they’re doing" 
when they "knowingly market and distribute their deadly weapons to criminals in 
Chicago and refuse to impose even the most basic controls" on their products.44 The suit 
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claimed damages of $433 million for police and medical costs resulting from handgun 
violence, and sought to enjoin the defendants from facilitating the flow of illegal 
firearms into Chicago from the outlying suburbs. 
The New Orleans and Chicago actions opened a floodgate of subsequent lawsuits 
against the gun industry, with over thirty municipalities eventually filing suit.45 The 
allegations in these suits relied upon a wide range of legal claims. Following the Chicago 
lawsuit, all the municipalities pursued a public nuisance claim,46 and nearly all of the 
suits contained products liability and negligence claims similar to the New Orleans 
litigation and several of the existing private suits.47 Some included related innovative 
claims, such as Boston's claim that the defendants deceptively marketed guns to people 
who might not have purchased them if they instead had "accurate information" about 
the guns. Manufacturer claims that guns are "your safest choice for personal 
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protection" contradicted evidence, Boston claimed, that gun ownership actually 
decreases safety in the home.48  
In all of the lawsuits, the cities sought compensatory damages related to the 
public expenditures resulting from gun violence incurred by the residents of those cities. 
This included the costs of police investigations, emergency personnel, "substantial tax 
revenue due to lost productivity," and reduced economic development.49 In addition to 
these monetary claims, most of the cities sought strong injunctive relief as well, 
including requiring manufacturers to creating new standards and training regarding 
their distribution of firearms, to monitor the sales of gun dealers to whom they have 
distributed their products, and to include various safety features and warnings on the 
guns.50 By focusing on how the harm allegedly caused by the actions of the industry as a 
whole contributed to higher governmental expenditures, the cities' approach mirrored 
the approach the SAGs had taken in the tobacco litigation settled a few months 
earlier.51 
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THE EXPANSION AND (FLEETING) SUCCESS OF GOVERNMENT GUN LITIGATION 
a) The Involvement of Eliot Spitzer and the Clinton Administration 
As the number of cities involved in the lawsuits against gun manufacturers grew, 
the industry initially pledged to put up a strong fight. The spokesman for one of the 
three main trade associations for gun makers, the American Shooting Sports Council, 
vowed that his members "won’t be intimidated into an out-of-court settlement, 
regardless of how many cities line up against them."52 The cities, however, were soon 
joined by another set of government plaintiffs. 
Shortly after taking office in January 1999, New York SAG Eliot Spitzer began 
work on a number of investigations of alleged corporate misconduct. Fully cognizant of 
the city lawsuits against the gun industry, and after meeting with David Kairys, Spitzer 
identified this litigation as a promising avenue by which to introduce new requirements 
on firearms manufacturers.53 In early 1999, he quietly had his staff draft a complaint 
naming firearm manufacturers as defendants, while simultaneously composing an 
industry code of conduct that he would offer to the companies as an alternative to 
being sued.54 The proposed lawsuit would rely heavily on the theory of public nuisance, 
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and the code of conduct would require several changes to the design, marketing, and 
distribution of guns.55 
Despite the earlier vow to not be intimidated into accepting changes to industry 
practices, several gun manufacturers signaled that they would be willing to consider 
supporting limited gun control measures in exchange for warding off additional lawsuits 
and even stricter gun control efforts.56 Beginning in February 1999, several 
manufacturers including Smith & Wesson, Colt, Beretta, and Glock agreed to meet with 
Spitzer along with several officials involved in the city lawsuits to discuss possible ways 
to resolve the city litigation and Spitzer's own inquiries.57  
Spitzer brought in Connecticut SAG Richard Blumenthal along with the city 
attorneys in these early meetings with industry leaders. Along with Spitzer, Blumenthal 
had been among the SAGs most interested in potential legal actions against the gun 
industry. He would later become the nation’s first SAG to file an amicus brief on behalf 
of a municipal plaintiff, arguing that the "manufacturers fail to use feasible technology 
that can make guns safer, falsely tell consumers that guns will make their homes safer, 
and market guns with the knowledge that they will reach buyers whose possession and 
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use violates criminal law."58 Blumenthal and Spitzer were both also exploring the 
possibility of bringing their own lawsuits against the manufacturers in the name of their 
states.59 Both SAGs would agree to drop the investigations, however, if the 
manufacturers agreed to install safety locks, limit retail purchases to one a month and 
stop selling to dealers with a history of selling crime guns.60 The alternative, both SAGs 
made clear to the industry representatives, would be the first-ever state lawsuits 
against the industry. 
At the same time that Spitzer and Blumenthal were becoming involved in this 
issue, President Clinton challenged members of his administration to determine ways to 
put pressure on gun manufacturers to alter their practices.61 The Columbine school 
shootings in April 1999, which left thirteen people dead and a stronger spotlight on the 
issues of gun control, made this an even larger priority for the Administration.62 Andrew 
Cuomo, Clinton's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), took up the 
challenge and devised his own plan. HUD's involvement in the issue would be 
predicated on the notion that housing authorities under the aegis of HUD tend to be 
particularly affected by gun violence, and must spend additional funds on measures 
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such as security guards and alarm systems to prevent gun violence.63 He began working 
on a legal strategy that mirrored many of the city lawsuits, alleging that gun 
manufacturers have not been properly supervising their distribution channels and have 
otherwise failed to promote gun safety.64 Later in December 1999, President Clinton and 
Secretary Cuomo jointly announced that they were planning a class action lawsuit 
against gun manufacturers on behalf of 3,200 public housing authorities across the 
country, based upon the notion that the actions of the gun manufacturers had increased 
federal expenditures.65 
The state and federal efforts to pressure gun manufacturers operated on 
separate tracks at first, but Spitzer eventually learned about Cuomo's interest shortly 
before the federal lawsuit was announced. Cuomo subsequently joined Spitzer’s 
ongoing discussions, which occasionally became strained when he and Spitzer both 
attempted to take control of negotiations.66 Nevertheless, the combined pressure on 
industry members from the state, city, and federal governments in these negotiations 
was soon to result in a major, albeit temporary, victory. 
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b) The Smith & Wesson Settlement 
While several of the city lawsuits claimed monetary damages in their lawsuits, 
"the real goal of the [government] litigation isn't large damage awards but a settlement 
under which the industry would agree to more stringent regulation in an effort to keep 
guns out of the wrong hands."67 In March of 2000, the government negotiators reached 
what appeared to be a major breakthrough with one of the companies involved in the 
talks, Smith & Wesson, that would do just that. 
Smith & Wesson was the largest manufacturer of handguns in the industry, 
producing approximately half a million of the 1.7 million handguns produced 
domestically every year.68 The company had been interested in reaching a deal for some 
time because the city lawsuits were already taking a toll on their business, and an 
agreement would be a way to ensure "the viability of Smith & Wesson as an ongoing 
business entity in the face of the crippling cost of litigation."69 The CEO of the company, 
Ed Schultz, was willing to negotiate a deal in which the company would agree to changes 
in their business practices in exchange for an end to the cities' lawsuits and avoidance of 
any future federal or SAG lawsuits.70 
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The two sides soon reached a significant agreement. On March 17, 2000, Smith 
& Wesson agreed to a comprehensive and highly detailed settlement with HUD, Spitzer, 
Blumenthal, and officials from several of the cities.71 While containing no dollar payouts, 
the 21-page settlement (also referred to by the parties as a "Code of Conduct") 
contained numerous provisions relating to firearms safety and design, as well as several 
more concerning Smith & Wesson’s sales, marketing, and distribution practices. The 
settlement throughout referred to "manufacturer parties" rather than Smith & Wesson 
specifically, an indication that the government parties expected other manufacturers to 
follow Smith & Wesson and join the agreement. 
In terms of gun design, the settlement required manufacturers to include 
internal and external safety locks and other childproofing devices, as well as minimum 
barrel lengths for all firearm models.72 All handguns were also to contain hidden serial 
numbers in order to help police track guns used in crimes, and all handguns would 
undergo a series of stringent performance tests before entering the market.73 Finally, 
manufacturers would spend two percent of their annual revenues towards developing 
"smart guns" that could only be used by one authorized user.74 The only exception to 
these design requirements was for guns sold to law enforcement and military personnel, 
who could purchase firearms not subject to these requirements.75 
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In addition to design requirements, the settlement imposed a number of new 
marketing and distribution regulations. Every firearm sold would have to include a 
prominent and specifically worded warning on the packaging.76 Manufacturers would 
further agree to refrain from marketing guns in "a way that would make the firearm 
particularly appealing to juveniles or criminals," and would cease all advertising "in the 
vicinity of schools, high crime zones, or public housing."77 Signatory manufacturers 
would agree only to sell to "authorized distributors or dealers" who agreed to adopt a 
strict code of conduct, which included additional requirements for training, exams, and 
government oversight of sales.78 All dealers would be prohibited to sell products sold by 
signatory manufacturers at gun shows without conducting full background checks, even 
if the check took longer than the three-day waiting period mandated by federal law.79 
Dealers could only allow one gun purchase at a time,80 and must carry expensive liability 
insurance to pay for and damages, injuries, or deaths "as a result of the sale" of any 
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gun.81 All "authorized distributors and dealers" were also required to maintain records 
going well beyond current requirements, including keeping an electronic record of gun 
traces that would have to be reported to the manufacturer.82 The signatory 
manufacturers also agreed to end sales to any gun dealers who sell a disproportionate 
number of guns used in crime.83 
The settlement contained several provisions aimed at ensuring compliance with 
these stringent requirements. The agreement was filed as an enforceable court order,84 
and required manufacturers to designate a compliance officer tasked with ensuring that 
the company comply with the agreement.85 Most importantly, the settlement also 
established a new national "Oversight Commission." Eliot Spitzer introduced this 
provision, which became one of the most controversial aspects of the settlement, as a 
way to monitor the manufacturers' compliance with the agreement.86 The authority of 
this Oversight Commission was broad and vaguely worded, stating that it was 
"empowered to oversee the implementation of this Agreement," including the ability to 
maintain records and "to inspect participating manufacturers and authorized dealers 
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and distributors" at any time.87 The Commission would include two representatives 
appointed from the signatory cities, one appointed by the state parties to the 
agreement, one from the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and one 
industry representative.88 The agreement was vague about where the funding for the 
Commission and its staff would come from, though later correspondence between the 
governments and Smith & Wesson made clear that the governments expected all the 
funding would be provided by the manufacturers.89 
Many of these provisions went well beyond any current requirements under 
federal law, mirroring failed congressional attempts to further regulate the gun industry. 
The design requirements resembled the sort of product regulations the CPSC was 
statutorily prohibited from promulgating in respect to firearms. Perhaps most 
importantly, the agreement placed a variety of compliance requirements on dealers and 
distributors of products manufactured by the company signatories, even though none of 
the dealers or distributors were party to the negotiations or the final agreement. The 
national Oversight Commission created by the document would also have broad 
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authority to oversee both manufacturer conduct and distribution channels, which no 
federal statutory bureaucracy had the equivalent power to do.  
Bruce Reed, President Clinton's Domestic Policy Adviser, cited the deal as proof 
that "the public good doesn't have to be held hostage to legislative stalemate."90 
President Clinton expressed optimism that other companies would follow suit and adopt 
the agreement,91 and Richard Blumenthal remarked that the settlement "is only a first 
step and I hope it will generate powerful momentum to compel other manufacturers to 
adopt this responsible code of conduct."92 Having Smith & Wesson sign the deal was 
significant, because the company was (and is) the largest handgun manufacturer in the 
United States.93 This agreement with the nation's largest handgun manufacturer was 
seen not only as a way to compel other companies to join the deal, but also "as a lever 
to impact the entire distribution chain for firearms."94 If Wal-Mart wanted to continue 
selling Smith & Wesson guns, for example, it would have to accept all of the restrictions 
described in the agreement for all of their sales.95 The deal also eliminated another 
potential barrier to further state and congressional gun control legislation, as the 
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settlement required the manufacturer signatories to work with the government parties 
to "support legislative efforts to reduce firearms misuse" and the development of smart 
gun technology.96 
At first, it appeared that this strategy of using the settlement with Smith & 
Wesson as a lever for further industry changes would pay immediate dividends. In 
addition to getting the nation's largest handgun manufacturer on board, Austrian-based 
Glock looked like it might settle as well. Glock estimated that it was costing the 
company $15 million a year to fight various firearms lawsuits, and as such they were 
willing to settle "under the right conditions."97 Other gun manufacturers, such as 
Brazilian-based Taurus, also considered joining the settlement.98 
THE BACKLASH TO THE SMITH & WESSON DEAL 
a) The Immediate Reaction to the Settlement 
The Smith & Wesson settlement initially appeared to be in a key turning point in 
favor of gun control advocates, but it proved instead to be the movement’s high-water 
mark. The reaction against Smith & Wesson from gun rights groups and their customer 
base was swift and overwhelmingly negative. Just three hours after the parties 
announced the settlement, the NRA sent out a bulletin to its membership entitled 
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"Smith & Wesson Surrenders."99 The chief lobbyist for the organization followed up by 
condemning the Smith & Wesson "sell-out" as a "futile act of craven self-interest" that 
"promised away not only its own rights but those of licensed gun dealers and law-
abiding gun owners."100 Another NRA spokesman stated that the settlement was a 
"shameful succumbing to financial blackmail."101 
 Individual gun owners and related organizations such as the Gun Owners of 
America organized a boycott of all Smith & Wesson products.102 One of the nation's 
largest gun distributors announced that it would stop distributing Smith & Wesson 
handguns, and many other retail dealers announced their intention to boycott the 
company as well.103 Several organizers of shooting match events even notified the 
company that they were no longer welcome at any of their events.104  
Witnessing this reaction, other manufacturers began turning their backs on 
Smith & Wesson as well. The head of the National Shooting Sports Foundation, one of 
the industry's trade groups, remarked, "The decision by foreign-owned handgun 
manufacturer, Smith & Wesson, to forge an agreement with the most anti-gun 
administration in history has violated a trust with their consumers and with the entire 
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domestic firearms industry."105 This pressure had a significant effect on Smith & 
Wesson's sales. By the summer of 2000, the company had to furlough a large number of 
its employees.106 Eventually, a few months after receiving intense pressure from the 
consumer boycott, Smith & Wesson put itself up for sale.107 
Meanwhile, other gun manufacturers who had previously been close to reaching 
an agreement broke off all further negotiations with Spitzer, Blumenthal, Cuomo, and 
the city officials. Glock, which had seemed the most willing company after Smith & 
Wesson to join the settlement, pulled out of the talks stating that it would not succumb 
to government-sponsored "blackmail."108 Smith & Wesson itself began inching away 
from its agreement shortly after the announcement. About a month after signing the 
agreement, the company issued a series of "clarifications" of the agreement arguably 
contradicting the language on the settlement itself.109 
Also contributing to Smith & Wesson's reluctance to stand by the deal was the 
fact that many of the city lawsuits continued to proceed with the company as a 
defendant. None of the cities agreed to drop their lawsuits unless they incorporated the 
terms of the March 17th agreement in consent decrees with each of the individual 
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cities. Despite assurances from Cuomo that he would "use all of my influence and all of 
the influence of HUD, which pours billions into their communities every year" to get the 
city suits dropped,110 Smith & Wesson was only able to reach consent decrees with two 
cities, Atlanta and Boston.111 That many of the cities refused to drop Smith & Wesson 
from their lawsuits made it considerably more difficult for the SAG/HUD-negotiated 
settlement to stick. 
b) The Government Negotiators Scramble to Save the Deal 
The breadth and intensity of the reaction against Smith & Wesson surprised 
Spitzer and the other government negotiators, and they worked to provide a carrot for 
companies joining the agreement and a stick for those that would not. The carrot took 
the form of a variety of governmental preferences for parties to the agreement. For 
one, President Clinton announced that the federal Department of Justice would be 
providing a $600,000 grant to Smith & Wesson to help them develop "smart gun" 
technology.112 Another more important "carrot" was possible because Smith & Wesson, 
as did several other companies, depended heavily on government contracts procuring 
firearms for police and military personnel. Using this as leverage, Spitzer and Cuomo 
tried to reward Smith & Wesson (and other manufacturers signing the agreement) by 
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encouraging mayors to favor them in police procurements. Spitzer came up with the 
idea, announcing the day before Smith & Wesson signed its settlement that he was 
forming a coalition of state and local governments to boycott manufacturers who did 
not adopt his proposed code of conduct.113 Spitzer also issued an Administrative 
Memorandum prohibiting the Department of Law from purchasing handguns from any 
company that had not signed the code of conduct.114 
 Andrew Cuomo also worked on getting HUD behind this strategy. He 
spearheaded an effort to assemble the "Communities for Safer Guns Coalition," in which 
allied municipalities would agree buy police firearms only from those companies 
agreeing to sign the Smith & Wesson Code of Conduct.115 This effort eventually 
attracted nearly 600 municipalities and local leaders as well as Spitzer, Blumenthal, and 
Maryland SAG J. Joseph Curran.116 The law enforcement agencies represented by the 
Coalition purchased between 20% and 30% of all the guns sold annually in the U.S., so 
the coalition had considerable potential economic clout.117 The Clinton Administration 
simultaneously explored getting federal agencies including the Capitol Police and the FBI 
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to switch to guns manufacturers by companies party to the settlement.118 Spitzer stated 
explicitly that this strategy aimed to "squeeze manufacturers like a pincers" by using the 
leverage of government procurements to force the industry into the agreement.119 
In addition to the "carrot" of preferential treatment in government 
procurements, a number of SAGs attempted to introduce new sticks to challenge the 
industry. Some of this activity was conducted by individual SAGs leveraging their state 
laws to alter industry practices. Shortly after the Smith & Wesson deal in early April 
2000, for example, Massachusetts SAG Tom Reilly announced that he was using the 
broad consumer protection authority provided to him by state law to enforce strict new 
gun control regulations developed by the SAG's office.120 It was no coincidence that the 
only new handguns that met the requirements of Reilly's new consumer protection 
regulations were models made by Smith & Wesson.121 
Most importantly, Spitzer and Blumenthal threatened to sue the gun makers for 
shunning Smith & Wesson in their business dealings. Both attorneys general, along with 
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Maryland SAG J. Joseph Curran, started an antitrust investigation of the gun industry 
triggered by several national gun distributors’ refusal to carry Smith & Wesson 
products.122 The investigation centered on whether the actions of manufacturers and 
other key players in the gun industry were coordinating their actions in violation of state 
antitrust law. Blumenthal took the lead role in the investigation and was the first to 
issue subpoenas and begin initial interviews, and Spitzer followed shortly after.123 Other 
SAGs soon after joined this effort, including those of California, Florida, and 
Massachusetts.124 
According to an industry spokesman, however, Spitzer "underestimated the 
resolve of the executives to fight" these attempts to force compliance with the March 
17 agreement.125 Charging that Spitzer and Cuomo were trying to impose "a national 
gun control scheme,"126 several of the largest manufacturers, as well as the National 
Shooting Sports Foundation, filed a lawsuit of their own against HUD, Spitzer, 
Blumenthal, and several cities. They asserted that the concerted effort to engage in 
selective purchasing policies represented an illegal effort to regulate interstate 
commerce under the Commerce Clause.127 It was in the immediate aftermath of this 
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lawsuit that all of the talks between the industry and government investigators broke 
down, never to be started again.128 
Following this unexpected pushback from the industry,129 Spitzer filed his own 
state lawsuit on June 26, 2000 against several of the largest national gun manufacturers 
and distributors, with the exception of Smith & Wesson.130 The lawsuit was similar to 
much of the city litigation, alleging that the manufacturing, distributing, and marketing 
practices of the corporate defendants constituted a public nuisance. In particular, 
Spitzer charged that the defendants operated in a manner "that knowingly places a 
disproportionate number of handguns in the possession of people who use them 
unlawfully" such that "they endanger the health and safety of a significant portion of 
the population."131 In addition to a common-law public nuisance claim, Spitzer also cited 
a provision of New York statutory law explicitly defining unlawfully possessed handguns 
as a public nuisance.132 Unsurprisingly, Spitzer stated that the goal was to change the 
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conduct of manufacturers and wholesalers similar to what the Smith & Wesson deal 
required.133 The claim itself sought only injunctive relief in the form of abatement of the 
"nuisance," and did not seek any monetary damages. 
Spitzer's lawsuit, however, failed to gain much traction. Richard Blumenthal 
cheered on Spitzer's lawsuit but did not file his own state suit in Connecticut, citing the 
fact that New York had codified public nuisance in a statute broader in relation to 
firearms than what was available to him in Connecticut.134 Other SAGs, such as 
Republican Texas SAG John Cornyn, specifically declined to join the investigation or any 
existing lawsuits, citing instead the need to enforce gun laws already on the books.135 In 
the end, Spitzer's lawsuit against the industry would be the first and only instance of a 
SAG bringing active litigation against the firearms industry. 
Proceeding alone among SAG plaintiffs, Spitzer met a series of defeats in court. 
The trial court dismissed both the statutory and common-law claims in August 2001, 
holding that the state did not adequately link gun manufacturer conduct with the 
creation of the public alleged nuisance.136 Spitzer appealed the decision, personally 
arguing a case for the only time in his entire tenure as attorney general.137 In June 2003, 
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the appellate court upheld the decision, holding 3 to 1 that the causal connection 
between the alleged business conduct and harm was "too tenuous and remote."138 The 
court expressed particular concern that allowing this case to continue would likely 
"open the courthouse doors to a flood of limitless, similar theories of public nuisance, 
not only against these defendants, but also against a wide and varied array of other 
commercial and manufacturing enterprises and activities."139 According to the majority, 
"the legislative and executive branches are better suited to address the societal 
problems concerning the already heavily regulated commercial activity at issue."140 
The New York Court of Appeals denied an appeal from this decision in October of 
2003, thereby ending Spitzer's lawsuit against the firearms industry.141 The SAGs' 
parallel antitrust investigation noted earlier also ended with a whimper when the six 
SAGs involved voluntarily dropped the investigation. "The fact of the matter is, we didn't 
have a case," stated Richard Blumenthal.142 
c) State Courts and Legislatures React to the Gun Lawsuits 
Meanwhile, many of the private party and city lawsuits were achieving mixed 
results in court. Before the Smith & Wesson deal occurred, the private party litigation in 
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek went to trial. After contentious jury deliberations, the Hamilton 
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jury found fifteen of the twenty-five manufacturers named in the suit liable under the 
"negligent marketing" theory, imposing damages on three of those companies.143 While 
the verdict was the first in which a jury found firearms manufacturers liable for gun 
violence, the verdict was overturned by a state appellate court soon afterwards in 
2001.144 
Cincinnati's lawsuit was the first city suit to be dismissed in October 1999, and 
this was followed soon after by dismissals of lawsuits by the city of Bridgeport, 
Connecticut and Miami-Dade County in Florida.145 Chicago's public nuisance lawsuit was 
initially dismissed, though the city initially won on appeal when the Illinois Appellate 
Court reversed.146 Ultimately, however, Chicago lost before the Illinois Supreme Court, 
which found that there was no indication that the Illinois legislature had intended that 
public nuisance law would be used in firearms litigation.147  "Any change of this 
magnitude in the law affecting a highly regulated industry must be the work of the 
Legislature, brought about by the political process, not the work of the courts," the 
justices wrote.148 The Florida appellate court dismissing Miami's lawsuit likewise 
criticized the city's effort as "an attempt to regulate firearms and ammunition through 
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the medium of the judiciary."149 Other courts likewise dismissed city lawsuits on similar 
grounds.150 
Nevertheless, the municipal plaintiffs did find some success in the courtroom. 
After the lower court dismissed the case, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed and allowed 
Cincinnati to proceed with its lawsuit.151 The court favorably quoted the authors of a law 
review article who argued that "while no one should believe that lawsuits against gun 
manufacturers and dealers will solve the multifaceted problem of firearm violence, such 
litigation may have an important role to play, complementing other interventions 
available to cities and states."152 The cities of Boston and Gary, Indiana were likewise 
able to proceed to the discovery phase.153 
More problematic for the city lawsuits, however, was the reaction of several 
state legislatures to the gun litigation. Shortly after the filing of the first municipal 
lawsuits against firearms manufacturers, state legislators across the country pushed to 
enact legislation prohibiting municipalities from suing the gun industry. Georgia was the 
first state to enact such a statute, which the Governor signed only five days after it was 
introduced and about three weeks after Atlanta's mayor announced his lawsuit.154 The 
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main sponsor of the bill argued that the legislation was necessary because "the law suits 
are a backdoor form of gun control."155 The Georgia legislature enacted the bill 
overwhelmingly by a 44 to 11 vote in the state Senate and 146 to 25 in the state 
House.156 Following Georgia, the Louisiana state legislature enacted similar legislation 
preempting the New Orleans litigation.157 A large number of states followed over the 
next few years, and eventually at least thirty-two states had enacted statutes providing 
the gun industry some level of immunity from further litigation.158 These statutes varied 
in their application, with some statutes prohibiting only municipalities from suing the 
industry and others providing blanket immunity from all lawsuits with very narrow 
exceptions.159 
d) Congress Preempts the Litigation 
The reaction to the lawsuits and the Smith & Wesson agreement also 
reverberated on the national level. Shortly after taking office, the Bush Administration 
backed away from the Smith & Wesson deal, calling it merely a "memorandum of 
understanding" and not a legally binding settlement.160 Eventually, in 2005, Congress 
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would enter the fray and take the unusual step of preempting much of the existing and 
potential litigation against the firearms industry.  
Initially, however, the congressional reaction to the city lawsuits and the state 
and HUD investigations mirrored the overall debate on gun control that had divided 
Congress throughout the 1990s. In 1999, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) introduced 
legislation seeking to encourage state and city lawsuits against the firearms industry by 
allowing cities and states to recover any federal damages such as economic harm for 
Medicaid related costs to treat gunshot victims.161 Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) also 
introduced legislation guaranteeing the right of cities to bring these lawsuits.162 
Meanwhile, congressional critics of the Smith & Wesson agreement attempted to enact 
a bill prohibiting HUD from enforcing the settlement, though this effort failed by a 
narrow vote.163 The same day, however, the House narrowly passed a provision barring 
HUD from spending any of its resources on the Communities for Safer Guns Coalition 
established by Spitzer and Cuomo.164 
This congressional debate on gun control and litigation reflected the sharp 
divisions in Congress concerning the issue of gun control. Following the 2000 
presidential election, however, the pro-gun control contingent in Congress began to 
collapse. Several Democrats, Bill Clinton included, cited the gun control issue as the key 
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reason why Al Gore narrowly lost key swing states as New Hampshire, Missouri, and 
West Virginia.165 The Democratic Party's shift on the issue became apparent in the years 
following the election. The 2000 Democratic presidential platform had called for 
"strengthen[ing] gun control to reduce violence" including "mandatory child safety 
locks...[and requirements for] a photo license I.D., a background check, and a gun safety 
test to buy a new handgun."166 By the time of John Kerry's presidential run four years 
later, the Democrats' official position on gun control was much more limited, with the 
party's statement on guns even starting with the pledge that "we will protect 
Americans’ Second Amendment right to own firearms."167 This de-emphasis of the gun 
control issue among Democrats was likewise apparent in Congress, with party leaders 
such as Senate Democratic Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SC) warning that the 
Democrats "can overdo the rhetoric on guns, and I think we need to be careful about 
it."168 
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With several previously strong gun control proponents in Congress turning away 
from the issue, a number of members of Congress sought to enact legislation protecting 
the gun industry from pending and future lawsuits. Numerous members of Congress 
were openly critical of the gun litigation, arguing that it represented a form of 
"regulation through litigation" that ought to be preempted.169 Proponents proposed 
legislation in both the 106th (1999) and 107th (2001) Congresses under the title of the 
"Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act."170 Repeatedly citing the "abuse of the 
legal system" that threatened rights under the Second Amendment,171 the bill 
prohibited future claims for monetary or injunctive relief against gun manufacturers 
"resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse" of firearms by either potential plaintiffs 
or third parties.172 The bill also would immediately dismiss all pending actions against 
the industry on the date of enactment.173 The bill contained some exceptions allowing 
certain limited legal actions to proceed,174 but generally provided immunity to the gun 
industry for the types of claims pursued by Eliot Spitzer and the various municipalities. 
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The statute had many bipartisan cosponsors, including Democratic leaders such 
as Tom Daschle.175 A filibuster by a handful of liberal Democratic Senators and a 
legislative poison-pill amendment by gun control supporters derailed the bill in 2003, 
but the bill's sponsors succeeded in enacting the legislation in the following legislative 
session. The final bill passed 65-31 in the Senate and 283-144 in the House, with nearly 
all Republicans voting for the measure along with significant numbers of Democrats.176 
President Bush signed the legislation into law in October of 2005. 
ANALYSIS 
The intended effect of the government litigation against firearms manufacturers, 
as was the case in other policy areas such as pharmaceuticals and tobacco in which SAGs 
have collaborated, was to get the targeted industry to the negotiating table to adopt 
prospective business reforms very much resembling regulation. Nevertheless, unlike 
most other high-profile litigation campaigns, this campaign ended in defeat. Not only 
did it fail to materialize into a large coordinated effort among the SAGs, but Congress 
took the unusual step of preempting the litigation. This was quite a different outcome 
than in the pharmaceutical, environmental, tobacco, or other cases in which Congress 
not only fails to preempt SAG litigation, but often codifies in federal statute provisions 
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reached by SAGs in out-of-court settlements.177  What helps to explain this very 
different outcome in the firearms litigation? 
a) Factors Suggesting Settlement 
The failure of this litigation is puzzling because there are several reasons to 
expect that the gun litigation would have been a particularly good target for successful 
SAG litigation. Many of the factors that were present in the other case studies explored 
in this dissertation were also present in this campaign. First, the SAGs appeared to have 
adequate opportunity points to latch on to in the litigation. As with air pollution control 
and Medicaid, the states play a major role in the regulation of firearms. While a certain 
(limited) federal regulatory structure exists in the form of the Gun Control Act of 1968 
and subsequent amendments, regulation of firearms has traditionally come under the 
purview of the state and local governments. The traditional role of the states on this 
issue appeared to offer SAGs, as state officials, more leeway in which to operate on this 
issue. 
Furthermore, there is little doubt that SAGs had the capacity to bring a 
coordinated campaign against the firearms industry. The SAGs were fresh off their 
successful and highly coordinated litigation against the tobacco industry, which itself 
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was preceded by instances of cooperation in several areas. The legal issues involved in 
the firearms litigation, while innovative, were not particularly complex, particularly 
compared to those involved in the areas of air pollution control or pharmaceutical 
pricing. Gun litigation thus did not require legal resources the SAGs could not hope to 
generate. Further, as in other policy areas, the SAGs also had several potential coalition 
partners for a possible litigation campaign. Numerous cities and private plaintiffs had 
already filed suits, and several gun control interest groups (such as the Brady Campaign 
to Prevent Gun Violence) were willing to assist the effort. 
 Further, it would appear that the entrepreneurial space necessary to wage this 
litigation campaign to a successful conclusion was also present. The federal 
government's failure to act on stricter gun control measures created initial policy space 
in which the SAGs could take the lead on creating new policy. Further, the issue of gun 
control reached considerable political salience in the 1990s with the rising crime rates 
and incidents such as the Columbine High School shootings. As with the highly salient 
issues of climate change or health care costs, politicians seen as "doing something" to 
address the problem of gun violence stood to receive potentially considerable political 
rewards. To be sure, the largely partisan nature of gun control made it more likely that 
several SAGs would refrain from joining litigation against firearms manufacturers. But 
particularly for liberal Democratic SAGs from Democratic states looking forward to 
future statewide political campaigns, taking on the gun industry could be a political 
asset. Indeed, the six SAGs who joined Eliot Spitzer and Richard Blumenthal's antitrust 
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investigation were all Democratic SAGs, and all but one from states with strongly 
Democratic electorates.178 
 The economic structure of the firearm manufacturing industry would also seem 
to point towards it being a likely target of a multistate campaign. As with the 
pharmaceutical and financial services industries, gun manufacturing exhibits high levels 
of market concentration. In 2000, for example, only three companies produced 53% of 
the rifles in America, two manufacturers produced 76% of the revolvers, and four 
companies produced 55% of the pistols.179 Smith & Wesson alone accounted for 41% of 
the revolver market. This market concentration made firearm manufacturers an 
attractive litigation target, as any settlements with market leaders would serve to 
regulate a large portion of the industry. 
The gun manufacturing industry is also much smaller than either the tobacco or 
pharmaceutical industries. In 1997, the total value of manufacturing in the U.S. totaled 
only $2.2 billion, as opposed to $28.3 billion for the tobacco industry.180 The smaller size 
of the industry meant that it would be more vulnerable to large damage awards that 
could have a ruinous effect on individual companies. Given that the gun industry's 
profits are nowhere near those of the tobacco or pharmaceutical industries, one might 
suspect that this would make settlement more likely. It is true that because gun 
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manufacturers are largely privately held companies and are not publically traded like 
tobacco or drug firms, the companies did not face additional pressures from 
shareholders to settle the uncertainty of litigation.181 Nevertheless, the litigation did 
have an economic effect on the targeted defendants. Liability insurers scrambled to 
drop gun manufacturers as clients, noting that insuring the companies in this litigation 
environment was "like trying to insure a house when it's in the path of an oncoming 
hurricane."182 Other companies, such as Colt, laid off a large part of its workforce and 
scaled back its consumer handgun business.183 Another well-known gun manufacturer, 
Davis Industries, declared bankruptcy because of the suits.184 
b) Key Differences in the Gun Litigation 
 Lawsuits against the gun industry appeared to embrace several of the factors 
leading to successful litigation campaigns, including the availability of opportunity 
points, adequate capacity on the part of the SAGs to bring lawsuits, and the opening of 
adequate entrepreneurial space in which the SAGs could act. So what helps to explain 
the ultimate failure of the firearms campaign, in stark contrast to the tobacco, 
environment, and pharmaceutical litigation?  
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One potential answer focuses on the weakness of the legal theories involved in 
the lawsuits. For example, law professor Richard Nagareda suggests that doctrine is part 
of the story of the failure of the firearms litigation because it involved a stretching of 
tort law beyond its previous boundaries.185 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the legal 
theories involved in the firearms litigation were any weaker than those involved in 
other, successful, litigation campaigns. The legal theories in the tobacco litigation, the 
merits of which reached a jury in only one state,186 were no less innovative than the 
public nuisance claims involved in the gun litigation. The successful climate change 
litigation noted in Chapter 6 rested upon innovative readings of federal statutes that 
arguably conflicted with the purpose and structure of the text. The pharmaceutical 
litigation described in Chapters 8 and 9 likewise directly conflicted with the existing 
federal regulatory regime and relied upon vague notions of "deceptive trade practices" 
that were stretched to include the targeted conduct. Further, some of the city and 
private lawsuits did achieve some success in the courts, suggesting that the legal claims 
were not obviously "weak," at least to some courts. 
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1. Concentrated Customer Interests as a Barrier to Industry Settlement 
 The main difference has much more to do with politics than "the law," per se. It 
is unlikely surprising that a big part of the story of the failure of these lawsuits had to do 
with the efforts of the National Rifle Association and other organizations representing 
the interests of gun owners, such as the Gun Owners of America. As an organization 
representing a highly organized and passionate constituency of gun owners, the NRA 
immediately and successfully fought back against the city lawsuits and the Smith & 
Wesson settlement. The presence of an interest group like the NRA was critical, because 
it gave a concentrated voice to an otherwise diffuse set of consumer interests. This 
concentrated voice also articulated strong rights-based claims. This is a considerably 
different dynamic than that present in other litigation campaigns such as tobacco, air 
pollution, or pharmaceuticals. These targeted industries may exhibit high levels of 
market concentration, but no significant organization represents the interests of 
smokers, energy consumers, or prescription drug users. No organization is available in 
those areas to present any negative side effects of regulatory settlements that fall to 
these groups (in the form or higher cigarette prices, energy costs, or availability of 
medication). By contrast, the NRA made clear to its members the connection between 
the regulatory ambitions of the gun litigation and their members' interests. 
It is also important to note that the interests of the NRA and the gun 
manufacturers were not always identical throughout the litigation. The head of one of 
the manufacturers' three main trade groups, the American Shooting Sports Council, 
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noted how events like the Columbine shootings "just drives the wedge deeper"187 
between the gun makers and the NRA because of industry perceptions that the NRA’s 
hard-line position against gun control measures was untenable and ultimately damaging 
to industry interests. As another key industry spokesman stated, the NRA is interested in 
getting mobilizing members and fund-raising, but "the industry just wants to be left 
alone to produce product and make money."188 Despite initial statements to the 
contrary, industry members were willing to settle because of their perception of 
uncertainty, potentially ruinous legal awards, and large legal fees. For the risk-averse 
industry, agreeing to a regulatory settlement was simply a matter of weighing the 
benefits of settling against its costs. Without the outcry against Smith & Wesson 
following its settlement, Glock likely would have joined the agreement (as the company 
had been signaling), and others would have probably followed. Ultimately, however, the 
consumer boycott led by the NRA tipped the cost-benefit analysis in the other direction 
towards industry rejection of a settlement.  
While the importance of the NRA as a factor in successfully fighting the gun 
litigation is unsurprising, this factor illustrates just how unusual the gun case was. In 
very few cases is there a group willing to defend manufacturers targeted by litigation to 
a greater extent than the manufacturers are willing to defend themselves. While certain 
trade groups serve as peak organizations for industry interests, such as PhRMA for the 
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drug industry, these trade groups have neither the ability nor the willingness to increase 
the costs of individual firms settling (for example, by organizing a boycott) thereby 
tipping the balance against settlement. Many trade groups may even recognize 
members' settlement as an economically rational choice for the targeted companies. 
Further, there are few industries where there is an organization representing a 
passionate customer base willing to fight back against industry regulation. As noted 
before, smokers are not organized, prescription drug users are not organized, and 
energy customers are even more diffuse. What makes settlements so appealing in 
virtually every other industry targeted by government lawsuits is the absence of this key 
factor, which alters the cost-benefit analysis against settlement. 
2. The Shifting Political Context as a Barrier to SAG Participation 
Even so, this unusual factor present in the gun litigation only helps to explain 
why the industry was particularly willing to fight the lawsuits rather than settle. It does 
not explain, however, why the SAGs and other government litigators ultimately gave up 
their fight. At first, it appeared that several SAGs would try to fight back against the 
industry's unwillingness to settle. Following the consumer boycott, at least six SAGs 
signaled their intent to place more pressure on industry in the form of carrots (in the 
form of procurement preferences) and sticks (antitrust investigations against the 
industry). Eliot Spitzer took the step of filing a lawsuit against the industry, and Richard 
Blumenthal provided legal support for the city of Bridgeport's litigation. 
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The lack of SAG participation is largely attributable to changes in Congress and 
the broader political context in which the SAG lawsuits and investigations operated. 
Soon after the industry shifted from a conciliatory to a resistant stance because of 
pressure from the NRA and their customer base, the political winds began shifting 
against gun control advocates to such an extent that the political support from other 
branches for bringing litigation in this area began to disintegrate. This shift went further 
than the fact that a strongly pro-gun control president in Bill Clinton was replaced by the 
anti-gun control George W. Bush. In fact, this presidential transition alone would seem 
to point to even greater reason for SAGs to becoming involved in the issue, as gun 
control could be another viable issue on which SAGs could challenge the "weak" 
enforcement posture of the Bush Administration. SAGs could set up a contrast between 
themselves and a presidential administration unwilling to move on an issue important to 
key constituencies in future SAG political campaigns, as they had done on numerous 
other issues.  
Though the pro-gun litigation SAGs lost an ally in the White House, more 
importantly they lost a key partner in Congress. Whether or not they correctly 
diagnosed the reason for their loss in the 2000 presidential election, many Democrats 
perceived that the issue of gun control had cost them the election. The subsequent 
appetite for gun control among members of the Democratic Party, which had supported 
stronger gun control measures (as well as the gun litigation) throughout the 1990s, 
rapidly dissipated. The national Democrats' deemphasizing the issue meant that any 
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SAG litigation would no longer serve the purpose of empowering one side of a vigorous 
debate in Congress. Instead, any SAG continuing to pursue gun industry litigation after 
the 2000 election would be politically much more on his or her own, lacking the 
institutional support of a strong likeminded contingent in Congress. This shift in the 
political context also helps to explain why SAGs lost interest in the possibility of gun 
litigation well before Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 
in 2005.   
This situation is in contrast to the political context surrounding the SAGs' 
environmental and pharmaceutical litigation. In the campaigns involving acid rain, 
climate change, and pharmaceutical pricing and marketing, the regulatory goals of the 
SAG litigation had substantial support in Congress. Many members of Congress pushed 
for stricter air pollution regulation, for example, or for more regulation of the sorts of 
pharmaceutical industry practices targeted by the SAGs. This congressional contingent 
usually represented a political minority in Congress, but nevertheless a very substantial 
minority. This minority either challenged the lack of a comprehensive federal regulatory 
regime (as with climate change) or represented one side of a congressional compromise 
balancing various interests (as in pharmaceutical policy). The SAG litigation had the 
effect, if not the intention, of altering the balance within Congress to empower this 
minority contingent. In the firearms litigation, this substantial congressional group 
existed until 2000, after which it shrank considerably when the national Democratic 
Party de-emphasized the issue of gun control. While the ultimate success of government 
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gun litigation in court was very much up in the air at that time (well before the litigation 
was preempted by Congress), it also became clear that any multistate litigation would 
no longer serve the purpose of empowering a significant legislative coalition in 
Congress. 
This suggests that sustained SAG multistate litigation campaigns require a certain 
broader political context, combining with the other necessary factors discussed in this 
and earlier chapters. There must be enough support within Congress such that the 
litigation serves to empower a significant legislative contingent within Congress. Too 
little support within Congress and the litigation campaign risks dissipating and eventual 
congressional preemption, while "too much" support is more likely to lead to a focus on 
legislative strategies, making a sustained multistate litigation campaign unnecessary. In 
the middle of these two extremes lies the ideal political context for multistate litigation. 
Figure 11.1 below expresses this dynamic. In this figure, the non-shaded area indicates 
the relative probabilities of Congress either enacting new legislation or preempting 
litigation, depending on the level of congressional support. As the figure indicates, these 
probabilities increase as support for either option grows. In the middle area, the relative 
probability for congressional action is at its lowest. 
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FIGURE 11.1: INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT AND MULTISTATE LITIGATION 
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This chapter has examined the government gun litigation of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. While lawsuits against gun manufacturers initially appeared to be "the next 
tobacco," the campaign ultimately met with only fleeting success. A small group of 
SAGs, led by Eliot Spitzer and Richard Blumenthal, joined various municipalities and key 
members of the Clinton Administration to exert pressure on the firearms industry. This 
coalition achieved a settlement with market leader Smith & Wesson containing no 
monetary relief but instead a variety of new provisions regulating gun design, 
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& Wesson's customer base revolted against the company, building intense pressure on 
the company and eventually leading it and other potential parties to the settlement to 
back away from the deal. Shortly after the settlement unraveled, a number of additional 
SAGs joined Spitzer and Blumenthal in an effort to place pressure on members of the 
gun industry to accept the settlement. Following the 2000 presidential election, 
however, the substantial pro-gun control contingent in Congress dissipated as the 
national Democratic Party blamed the gun control for their electoral defeat and quickly 
de-emphasized the issue. Within this changing political context, SAGs abandoned this 
once-promising litigation campaign. In 2005, Congress took the unusual step of 
immunizing the gun industry from most current and future lawsuits, thereby 
preempting any future litigation efforts. 
This chapter suggests that the ultimately unsuccessful litigation against the gun 
industry stems from two factors not present in other litigation contexts. First, the 
presence of powerful organizations representing gun consumers (as opposed to simply 
organizations representing industry members) tipped the balance of the cost-benefit 
analysis conducted by firms targeted by litigation against settlement. This is quite 
different from in other contexts, in which the consumer base ultimately affected by a 
regulatory settlement between SAGs and the industry remains too diffuse to affect any 
settlement decisions.  Second, this chapter suggests that in addition to the necessary 
factors identified earlier, the broader political context in which the SAGs' litigation 
campaigns operate is critical. When congressional support for stricter gun control 
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litigation dissolved following the 2000 elections, SAG litigation no longer served the 
purpose of empowering one side of a closely divided debate within Congress. 
Ultimately, both of these factors suggest that the gun litigation was indeed quite 
unusual. Few industries have concentrated consumer bases as strong as present in the 
gun industry, and rarely does congressional support for one side of a regulatory debate 
collapse as rapidly as it did in the gun control context. In most areas of SAG litigation, 
the prospects for a sustained campaign, once identified, are considerably brighter than 
it was in this abortive litigation campaign. 
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CHAPTER 12 
State Attorneys General and  
Multistate Litigation in American Politics 
 
"We are talking about the new frontier of federalism..."  
– Michael Leavitt, former Governor of Utah, on the 
states' modern regulatory roles1  
 
"Expect litigation, definitely."  
– Former EPA Deputy Administrator Robert 
Sussman2 
  
 
This dissertation began with a common assumption about American politics. 
Separation of powers, it is often said, makes significant national policy change quite 
difficult. Myriad veto points populate the system from the ground up. It seems a wonder 
at all that significant policy development occurs, especially during periods of divided 
government. Depending on one's perspective, this state of affairs represents either a 
beneficial restraint on majority power or a dangerous inefficiency serving to block 
necessary change. 
Yet significant policy change does not always require moments of united 
government or messy compromises necessary to navigate the minefield of veto points. 
The separation of powers regime establishes not just veto points but opportunities for 
                                                          
1
 Jonathan Walters, "Save Us From the States!" Governing Magazine, June 2001, 20. 
2
 Steve Cook, "Decisions Forthcoming on Enforcement, Power Plant Emissions, Air Quality Standards," 
Environment Reporter, January 25, 2002, 5 (speaking in reference to multistate environmental litigation). 
575 
 
entrepreneurial actors to press their policy agendas. The rise of multistate litigation 
indicates how one set of entrepreneurial actors – state attorneys general – have seized 
upon two elements of America's system of separation of powers to pursue their policy 
goals. Federalism and litigation are both at the heart of the SAGs' institutional position, 
and SAGs have used these opportunity points not simply to inject their agenda into the 
national conversation but to achieve major nationwide policy change. 
ADVANCING NATIONAL POLICY THROUGH MULTISTATE LITIGATION 
a) Law Enforcement as Law Creation 
As the states' top law enforcement officials, state attorneys general are often 
dubbed the state's "top cop." SAGs themselves view their law enforcement role as 
something quite distinct from the process of law creation. As former Connecticut SAG 
Richard Blumenthal put it, "Attorneys General do not create new law and do not invent 
new regulations; we simply enforce the law."3 Even relatively conservative SAGs, such as 
Utah SAG Mark Shurtleff, have claimed a distinction between "improper" uses of courts 
and the type of litigation in which the SAGs engage.4  
                                                          
3
 Richard Blumenthal, "The Role of State Attorneys General," Connecticut Law Review 33 (2001), 1209. 
4
 Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements, Hearing 
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Congress (May 24, 2001), 27. In this congressional 
testimony concerning multistate antitrust litigation targeting pharmaceutical company "pay-for-delay" 
settlements, Shurtleff remarked, "There are those who believe that litigation is the desirable method of 
resolving those conflicts, and, in effect, using the courts to legislate. I do not share that belief. To the 
contrary, it is the most expensive and the least effective method of resolving apparent conflicts in the law 
and closing loopholes. But until the law is changed by the legislative branch and we, as representatives of 
the executive branch, have substantial evidence that existing laws have been violated to the injury of our 
States and our citizens, we must move to hold the offenders accountable." 
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Yet in practice, the SAGs' role extends well beyond straightforward law 
"enforcement." As with other aspects of American governance, the practical realities of 
SAG litigation demonstrate the problematic nature of neat distinctions between 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. "Enforcement" is not simply a process of 
giving force to a law in a specific circumstance, but a way to reinterpret the law in a way 
that fundamentally changes it. The SAGs have taken advantage of ambiguities in state 
and federal statutes to prosecute cases against their litigation targets based upon a 
particular reading of those enactments – readings often conflicting with how Congress 
and administrative agencies have interpreted them.  
By using their power of law enforcement to create new legal requirements, the 
SAGs have employed multistate litigation to successfully achieve several key goals. Most 
clearly, SAGs have used multistate litigation to create new national regulatory baselines 
stricter than those already required by federal law. Often this tactic involves relying 
upon vague and broad state consumer protection statutes, many of which state courts 
have interpreted only very infrequently. This was true of the case of the pharmaceutical 
marketing and advertising litigation highlighted in Chapter 9, in which SAGs relied upon 
ambiguous definitions of "deceptive trade practices" to prosecute business activity 
permitted under federal law. When this is done in the context of multistate litigation, 
the SAGs are able to press novel interpretations of state law across state lines. 
Multistate settlements then serve to incorporate new regulatory requirements 
nationally. 
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SAGs have also challenged actions of the federal government directly, frequently 
managing to restrict federal agency discretion. Chapter 6 told the story of how SAGs 
successfully challenged the decision-making process of the EPA in connection with 
climate change and the New Source Review program. In both situations, SAGs pressed 
novel interpretations of the Clean Air Act in the courts aiming to restrict the EPA's 
regulatory discretion. In Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, SAGs successfully employed 
litigation to reinterpret the words "air pollutant" in §302(g) of the Clean Air Act to 
include CO2 – contrary to the EPA's previous determination. This had a ripple effect 
across the entire federal air pollution regulatory regime, triggering further requirements 
for the EPA in other provisions of the act. The SAGs' litigation also represented a 
strategy of regulatory delay. The New Source Review litigation stymied attempts by the 
Bush Administration to reform the "inefficient" process, tying up administrative efforts 
to alter policy until a more sympathetic administration took office. Years of SAG 
litigation prevented the Bush Administration from making wholesale changes to the 
program. 
 The SAGs' air pollution and pharmaceutical litigation also had the effect of 
reversing previously reached compromises in Congress. Congress had, for example, 
explicitly rejected the inclusion of CO2 as pollutant in the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments – yet this is precisely the result SAGs successfully won in Massachusetts v. 
EPA. Congress had for years explicitly rejected major changes to the "Average Wholesale 
Price" drug pricing benchmark, yet the SAGs successfully attacked this pricing 
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mechanism as fraudulent. Congress balanced various concerns in reaching compromises 
regarding drug patents and advertising, yet SAGs employed multistate litigation to 
effectively dissolve those compromises through a series of settlements with the nation's 
largest pharmaceutical firms. 
In addition to these direct effects, multistate litigation served several other 
purposes as well. In some cases, this litigation prodded Congress to adopt the SAGs' 
regulatory solutions. The AWP litigation serves as a prime example. Following the 
multistate effort to transform a settled drug-pricing scheme into actionable fraud, 
Congress began replacing AWP with a new pricing benchmark created in multistate 
settlements. In other cases briefly described in Chapters 3 and 4, Congress used SAG 
settlements as a model for future legislation. After winning a series of multistate 
settlements concerning food labeling in the late 1980s, Congress responded with the 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 imposing new labeling requirements on 
food manufacturers. More recently, the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 
adopted many of the provisions in the Student Loan Code of Conduct developed by 
former New York SAG Andrew Cuomo and imposed on various lenders through 
multistate SAG settlements. 
Multistate litigation has also served to reform nationwide industries more subtly 
through the mere threat of potential litigation. Major settlements with individual firms 
can send "shockwaves" through the industry as a whole. Risk-averse corporations want 
to avoid litigation that can send down stock prices and lead to negative press, and often 
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voluntarily alter their practices before any investigations begin to try to avoid these 
possibilities. This dynamic occurred in the pharmaceutical context, when PhRMA 
adopted new codes of conduct to help their members ward off future drug advertising 
litigation and individual drug firms altered their practices to try to preempt future 
investigations.5 This has been true in other contexts as well. For example, Chapter 4 
noted briefly that Wells Fargo altered its lending practices in 2006 following multistate 
settlements with Ameriquest and Household in part because of heightened industry 
concerns over bad publicity and future lawsuits.6 SAGs understand the importance of 
these industry-wide effects of their litigation, which is why they often characterize their 
settlements as "sending a message" to the rest of the industry that they could be the 
next litigation target if they fail to alter their practices. 
The rise of multistate litigation has had a variety of additional indirect effects as 
well. Many of the settlements bring money back to state coffers, which helps to increase 
SAG fiscal capacity and fund future litigation campaigns. Multistate settlements and 
court judgments often help to build SAGs' legal capacity as well, as when SAGs grant 
themselves the power of regulatory oversight in settlements with pharmaceutical firms 
and win "special solicitude" expanding their standing to challenge the federal 
                                                          
5
 For example, see "PhRMA Issues Drug Advertising Guidelines, But Some Want Moratorium, Firmer 
Oversight," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, August 5, 2005, 823; "International Pharma Trade 
Group Adopts New Code Barring Some Marketing Activities," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, 
January 5, 2007, 16; "Rx Industry Group Issues New Guidelines For Companies on Direct-to-Consumer 
Ads," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, December 12, 2008, 1382; "BMS to Launch Internal Reviews 
Of Sales, Marketing, Pricing Practices," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, July 25, 2003, 812. 
6
 Michael Liedtke, "Wells Fargo to Counsel Mortgage Borrowers with Poor Credit," The Associated Press, 
December 5, 2006. 
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government. One successful settlement can serve to break open the proverbial dam and 
make subsequent settlements with other firms easier. Multistate "law enforcement" 
efforts also serve the SAGs' political interests in a variety of ways as well, such as raising 
one's profile for future runs for higher office and sending positive signals to fellow 
partisans in advance of party primaries. 
Table 12.1 below summarizes these various effects of multistate litigation. Some 
of these are "direct effects" imposing nationwide policy changes, while others work to 
alter the political landscape in ways that are more indirect. 
TABLE 12.1: DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF MULTISTATE LITIGATION 
 
 The emergence of multistate litigation must be considered in the debate about 
the efficacy of litigation in achieving significant national policy change. This activity 
suggests not only that achieving "significant social change" through the courts is far less 
rare than scholars such as Gerald Rosenberg argue, but also indicates how courts and 
litigators are subject to fewer institutional constraints than scholars often assume. 
Direct Effects of Multistate Litigation Indirect Effects of Multistate Litigation 
Effect Example Effect Example 
Restricting Agency 
Discretion 
Mass.v. EPA; 
NSR Litigation 
Prodding Congress to 
Act 
AWP Litigation 
Creating Stricter 
Regulatory 
Baselines 
Pharmaceutical 
Advertising 
Prodding Self-
Imposed Industry 
Reforms 
Pharmaceutical 
Advertising 
Reversing 
Congressional 
Compromises 
AWP Litigation; 
Challenging "Pay-
for-Delay" Patents 
Increasing Capacity 
for Future Litigation 
Campaigns 
Several Litigation 
Campaigns 
Delaying 
Regulatory 
Changes 
NSR Litigation 
Political Profile-
Raising 
Several Litigation 
Campaigns 
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b) Multistate Litigation as Social Reform Litigation 
The SAGs' multistate litigation campaigns are best viewed as one part of a 
broader struggle for policy change conducted by many policy actors and involving a 
complex mix of high-level moral claims and seemingly prosaic issues of statutory 
interpretation. All of the areas I examined involved policy change efforts not simply by 
the SAGs alone, but by a variety of other private and public actors as well. The SAGs 
worked closely with several "public interest" groups in the multistate suits including the 
Sierra Club, the Prescription Access Litigation project, and the Brady Campaign to 
Prevent Gun Violence. These groups have worked with SAGs and pressed legal claims in 
the courts as part of a larger strategy to achieve stricter regulations in Congress and 
administrative agencies.  
This litigation may only rarely include broad constitutional claims, but the 
litigation is nonetheless driven by strong moral imperatives. A look at the mission 
statements of the various interest groups involved in SAG litigation help to illustrate this 
point. The Natural Resources Defense Council views "sustainability and good 
stewardship of the Earth as central ethical imperatives of human society... [and] work[s] 
to foster the fundamental right of all people to have a voice in decisions that affect their 
environment."7 The Prescription Access Litigation group pursues action to "ensure 
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 Natural Resources Defense Council, "Mission Statement," accessed May 13, 2011, 
http://www.nrdc.org/about/mission.asp. 
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quality, affordable health care for all."8 The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence 
stresses its belief "that all Americans, especially children, have the right to live free from 
the threat of gun violence."9 All of these groups use a variety of strategies to try to 
achieve these rights-based goals. 
 Scholars risk losing sight of the many ways movements for social reform attempt 
to achieve these broader goals if they focus too strongly on constitutional litigation 
alone. Groups do not simply use the courts to press new constitutional interpretations 
to create new rights. Attempts to win the "right to a clean environment" or "the right to 
health care" under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are not the only ways to secure these broad rights-based claims. Social 
reform advocates fully understand the value of pursuing their rights-based goals using 
novel interpretations of statutory and common law, even if these sometimes lower-
profile campaigns lack the elegance of pressing broad constitutional rights under the 
fundamental law of the land. They understand that using new interpretations of 
technical statutory provisions to change corporate behavior are not merely "procedural 
victories" of interest to the community of lawyers alone. Instead, these reformers view 
these tools as powerful weapons Davids can use against large and "unscrupulous" 
Goliaths. These litigation strategies do not replace but are paired with legislative 
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 Prescription Access Litigation, "About PAL," accessed May 13, 2011, 
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lobbying, testimony at administrative hearings, and other political actions. Litigation is 
but one part – though an important part – of a broader political strategy. 
c) Bypassing Institutional Constraints Through Multistate Settlements 
The aim of much SAG litigation is not to obtain a court decision, but to use the 
lawsuits as leverage to extract concessions from their opponents. This recalls Robert 
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser's argument about "bargaining in the shadow of the 
law," in which court actions provide disputing parties throughout society various 
"endowments" and "bargaining chips" for negotiation "that flow from predictions about 
what each party would get if they went to trial."10 SAGs have skillfully used multistate 
litigation to create these endowments and bring a great many bargaining chips to the 
negotiating table. Though multistate settlements, SAGs simultaneously leverage the 
power of the courts while bypassing many of the judiciary's institutional constraints. 
Gerald Rosenberg's Hollow Hope argues that courts and litigation will only produce 
significant social change when three specific conditions are met. However, multistate 
litigation campaigns have managed to achieve significant national policy change even 
when these conditions were limited or absent altogether. 
According to Rosenberg, social reform through the courts requires "ample legal 
precedent for change" because "judges are gradualists" and "unless litigators can find 
                                                          
10
 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce," 
Yale Law Journal 88 (1979), cited in Michael W. McCann, "Reform Litigation on Trial," Law & Social Inquiry 
17 (1992): 734. 
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strong precedents on which to base their claims...cases demanding significant social 
reform will be losers."11 Many multistate litigation campaigns, however, lack any such 
precedent. Much of this litigation is based upon interpretations of statutes with very 
little precedent to support such readings or – in cases like Massachusetts v. EPA and the 
AWP litigation – involved interpretations of statutes going directly against precedents 
established by Congress. Of course, SAGs often claimed that precedent bolstered their 
litigation. As their states' "top cops," they skillfully presented their litigation as a simple 
matter of "law enforcement" rather than law creation.  These claims, however, belied 
the reality that far from "ample precedent" backing their claims, this litigation involved 
highly novel and often problematic interpretations of existing statutes. 
The second condition Rosenberg identifies as necessary for significant social 
change litigation – "support for change from substantial numbers in Congress and from 
the executive" – also requires some amendment. Many of these litigation campaigns, as 
I have shown, expressly aimed to reverse congressional compromises and challenge the 
actions of the executive. In the context of multistate litigation, it is therefore misleading 
to suggest that this represents a strong constraint on litigation's effectiveness. Yet as the 
failed firearms litigation indicated, the level of support in Congress may indeed be 
relevant to whether SAGs pursue certain claims. As I suggested in Chapter 11, multistate 
litigation is most effective when it falls within a range of not too much or too little 
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 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 2nd Ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 31. 
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congressional support. "Too much" support and Congress will simply adopt statutory 
changes itself; too little and they may preempt the litigation. 
To some degree this is a constraint on SAG multistate litigation – it suggests that 
if an argument is too far outside the political mainstream, SAGs may not be interested in 
litigating. This may be one reason why litigation concerning fatty foods and lead paint, 
for example, never flowered into multistate campaigns. From the perspective of the 
broader effort for social reform, however, this constraint is likely fairly easy to 
overcome. Litigation, far from being an isolated strategy, is coupled with efforts to gain 
support in Congress and within executive agencies. Even if these congressional and 
executive efforts had previously failed to produce new policies – as occurred in various 
campaigns explored in this dissertation – they may generate interest in the issues within 
Congress and among other actors, including the SAGs. Once these efforts spur at least 
some support in Congress – though still far from majority support – it paves the way to 
successfully employ multistate litigation. At that point, the litigation itself may help 
generate further support within Congress – as the AWP litigation did in transforming 
congressional views of settled pricing practices into fraudulent behavior. 
Finally, multistate settlements overcome limitations on the judiciary's general 
ability to implement reform. This is much less of an institutional constraint on the courts 
in this context because multistate settlements are largely self-implementing.  Unlike 
most court opinions in constitutional cases, settlements specify a number of highly 
detailed responsibilities on the part of the defendant entities. They resemble 
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administrative regulations both in terms of this regulatory detail and because they 
regulate corporate entities directly. Because the settlement is fashioned as an 
agreement between parties, they do not require the actions of other political actors to 
enforce compliance. The courts always loom in the background as potential venues for 
threatened litigation if the defendants violate the terms of a settlement, but require no 
further action by other political actors. As several of the recent pharmaceutical 
advertising cases illustrated, SAGs have even granted themselves more oversight of 
corporate compliance with settlements. Further, even as SAGs use the looming threat of 
litigation to reach agreements, settlement provisions are largely insulated from judicial 
review. Even though settlement provisions resemble administrative rules and are 
enforceable by court order, they are unreviewable by either agencies or appellate 
courts. This allows settlements to contain provisions that would be constitutionally 
problematic for other institutions, such as restrictions on commercial speech in drug 
advertising settlements. 
Even in multistate litigation against administrative agencies, which result in court 
decisions rather than settlements, the lack of judicial implementation powers is not as 
problematic as it would seem given the goals of the litigators. It is true that 
bureaucracies can delay and attempt to circumvent implementation following successful 
agency-forcing litigation. The Bush Administration's EPA, for example, delayed its 
response to Massachusetts v. EPA for much of the remainder of President Bush's term. 
However, the litigation nevertheless significantly altered the regulatory dynamic by 
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sharply reducing the discretion of the agency. By specifying which agency findings were 
unacceptable under its interpretation of the Clean Air Act, the Court reversed the Bush 
Administration's approach to CO2 and boxed the agency into a spot where its options 
were reduced to one – making an endangerment finding.  
Because the Court's decision was one of statutory interpretation, it gave 
environmental advocates a way to argue that any subsequent EPA delay meant the 
agency was flouting both the Court and Congress. This was despite the fact that 
Congress had already explicitly declined to express this intention regarding CO2 
regulation in its last overhaul of the Act. This reveals an additional advantage of 
arguments based on statutory interpretation as opposed to constitutional 
interpretation. When litigators successfully base their reform arguments on statutes 
rather than the Constitution, both litigators and courts can claim Congress as an ally 
when subsequently attempting to force compliance – even if that ally never spoke in the 
words the courts attributed to it. 
THE POLITICS OF FEDERALISM: FEDERALISM AS EXPANDING NATIONAL REGULATION 
Attorneys general have skillfully used litigation to achieve significant policy 
change, but they never would have the opportunity to do so if it was not for the 
existence of federalism. By diffusing power away from the center, federalism has not 
just limited the national government but empowered various sets of actors at the state 
level. Armed with the nearly untrammeled authority to represent their states in court, 
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SAGs have benefitted enormously from this state empowerment. As adversarial legalism 
has taken hold in recent decades, SAGs have used their position in America's federal 
regime as a new and powerful launching point to achieve stronger regulation on a 
national scale. 
The ability of the SAGs to employ multistate litigation to achieve stricter 
regulation nationally turns the common conception of federalism-as-constraint on its 
head. Instead of a story of constraining federal encroachment upon the prerogatives of 
states, it is more accurately described as a tale of the states encroaching upon the 
prerogatives of the federal government. Rather than advancing politically conservative 
goals of limited government, multistate litigation uses federalism as an opportunity 
point to expand regulation in a way with which political progressives are more 
comfortable. 
a) Multistate Litigation as Polyphonic Perversity? 
Though the view of federalism-as-restraint remains strong, a different school of 
thought has viewed federalism as enhancing government power. This goes back to 
earlier notions of "cooperative federalism" that Daniel Elazar noted has a long history in 
America. More recent defenses of a "polyphonic" conception of federalism have 
continued this tradition, including Erwin Chemerinsky and Robert Schapiro. While 
proponents of this polyphonic perspective correctly identify that federalism is not 
simply about governmental restraints, however, they miss the peculiar dynamic present 
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in multistate litigation. Much of the polyphonic literature discusses the operation of 
federalism in reference to actions of state legislatures or administrative agencies. They 
only occasionally make fleeting references to the SAGs, assuming that they too fit 
cleanly into this broader perspective. However, the SAGs' tool of multistate litigation is 
much different from the tools available to other state institutions. Instead of 
"empowering government at all levels," this litigation empowers states at the expense 
of the federal government – which is not the way we typically think of the possible 
problems of federalism. This feature complicates arguments about the benefits of 
polyphonic federalism. 
1. Regulatory "Dialogue" in Practice: Polyphony, Cacophony, or Just Phony? 
Among the purported theoretical benefits of polyphonic federalism is the way in 
which it produces "plurality, dialogue, and redundancy." The process of dialogue 
promises to "facilitate regulatory innovation" and to lead to "the optimal regulatory 
scheme" over time. To what extent do SAGs spur such "dialogue"? In a certain sense, 
one might argue, multistate litigation does produce something of a dialogue. Several 
instances exist where Congress has enacted new regulations inspired by previous 
multistate litigation. The congressional changes to the prescription drug-pricing scheme 
sparked by multistate litigation provides one such example. 
Nevertheless, the suggestion that polyphonic federalism promotes regulatory 
"dialogue" remains problematic in context of multistate litigation. Initially, it might seem 
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that the biggest problem to arise would be the potential for cacophony rather than 
dialogue. Numerous observers have broached the problem of corporations struggling to 
comply with a patchwork of state regulatory regimes in addition to federal 
requirements. Frequently, industry much prefers a single comprehensive regulatory 
regime than a patchwork of confusing regulations. As Pietro Nivola stated, companies 
believe it is "better to have one 500-pound gorilla in charge of regulating the 
industry...than to deal with 50 monkeys on steroids."12 
In the case of multistate litigation, however, the problem is rarely one of 
regulatory balkinization. More settlements in recent years involve all or nearly all of the 
nation's SAGs, reducing the specter of dozens of "monkeys on steroids" operating 
separately. Instead, the real issue of multistate litigation is not that it is balkanizing 
policy but that it is replacing one set of national regulatory choices with another. Much 
multistate litigation involves two main sets of regulators – the SAGs and federal 
regulators – proceeding with different visions of the optimal national regulatory regime. 
It is difficult to see how these instances of multistate litigation produces "dialogue" – 
instead, the litigation is simply a tool used to replace one particular regulatory vision at 
the expense of another. This replacement often comes after attempts to achieve this 
regulatory vision have already lost in Congress or in administrative agencies. Rather 
than spurring a dialogue, then, multistate litigation simply keeps one side of the 
conversation going when federal representative institutions have already rejected that 
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point of view. To continue the aural metaphor, SAGs' use of multistate litigation in a 
"polyphonic" system is the equivalent to using a bullhorn to express one's position in a 
crowded room – it threatens to drown out other voices, not add to them. 
Further, it is not clear why multistate litigation is the most appropriate tool for 
SAGs to engage in "dialogue" with their federal counterparts. Federal agencies must 
provide a public notice-and-comment period before adopting any new official rules. This 
process allows various actors to highlight potential problems with a proposed regulatory 
scheme. Congressional committees also hold hearings before reporting out proposed 
bills, frequently inviting various individuals and groups to testify. SAGs can and in fact do 
frequently provide testimony during such periods in Congress and before agencies. This 
allows for a form of potentially constructive regulatory dialogue without resort to 
litigation.  
2. Minding the "Regulatory Gaps" in Multistate Litigation 
Another claimed benefit of having multiple regulators with jurisdiction over the 
same regulatory issues is "is that if one [level of government] fails to act, another can 
step in to solve the problem."13 This fits quite well with rhetoric from the SAGs 
themselves. Eliot Spitzer, for example, frequently invoked the necessity to fill regulatory 
holes left open by federal inaction to explain his litigation against polluting power 
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plants, pharmaceutical companies, and financial firms. Other scholarly observers have 
similarly suggested that SAGs serve to fill regulatory gaps left open by federal inaction.14 
Despite the rhetoric, however, most multistate litigation occurs not in areas 
federal authorities have ignored but instead targets industries and activities that are 
already highly regulated, such as pharmaceutical firms and national advertising. Many 
multistate litigation campaigns seek policy goals already fully considered and rejected by 
federal regulators. While SAGs may often characterize Congress's or a federal agency's 
decision not to regulate as a "regulatory gap" or a "regulatory failure," a "failure to act" 
may in fact be a reasoned decision to reject the particular (stricter) approach sought by 
SAGs. The regulatory schemes established by Congress in the area of pharmaceutical 
policy intended to balance a variety of competing concerns, for example. Likewise, an 
FTC decision that a particular advertising campaign does not constitute "false and 
deceptive advertising" may reflect the view that the advertising actually enhances 
competition.  
When evaluating claims that SAGs are filling regulatory gaps via multistate 
litigation, a reasonable question becomes: filling them with what, exactly? While SAGs 
may have the regulatory ambitions of a federal agency like the FTC or FDA, multistate 
litigation frequently leaves in its wake a "glorious mess" rather than a coherent 
regulatory regime. The successful agency-forcing litigation in Massachusetts v. EPA left 
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unclear just how to apply a thirty-year old Clean Air Act to a new global problem of 
climate change. The SAGs' litigation contributing to the fall of the AWP benchmark may 
have suggested an alternative prescription drug pricing mechanism – but it did not solve 
the related problem of how to compensate Medicaid providers fairly upon adoption of 
this alternative pricing scheme. Much of this litigation, while achieving reformers' goals 
of stricter regulation, thus leaves open considerable questions about how to resolve the 
litigation's side effects. The SAGs' own regulatory solutions frequently result in a new 
round of litigation rather than a stable regulatory regime. In this way, multistate 
litigation may simply replace one regulatory regime with another riddled with several 
regulatory gaps of its own. 
3. (Over) Regulating-through-Litigation: Multistate Litigation as Trump Card 
Even when SAG litigation results in a stable and coherent regulatory regime, SAG 
settlements filling alleged federal "regulatory gaps" necessarily trump the varying 
concerns identified by Congress or agencies and may produce too strict or even 
"mindless regulation."15 The inevitable regulatory effect of legal settlements, after all, is 
to drive the regulatory floor upward toward stricter regulation. This stricter regulation 
may have a variety of unintended negative side effects. As Chapters 8 through 10 
illustrated, stricter regulation of pharmaceuticals through litigation may result in fewer 
Medicaid providers, fewer generic drugs on the market, and less information for 
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consumers. Agency-forcing litigation aimed at directing the agency's attention to 
particular regulatory issues may lead to agency resource misallocations and the agency 
overlooking more serious problems.16 If the problem of climate change is overstated, for 
example – much as acid rain was less a problem than originally believed – then over-
regulation in that area may lead to under-regulation in others. 
Providing a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of multistate litigation is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. It is frequently very difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate 
the full measure of beneficial intended consequences against the negative unintended 
consequences of any particular policy choice. Nevertheless, the possibility of over-
regulation is particularly problematic in the context of multistate litigation because SAGs 
do not have the same sort of expertise to evaluate regulatory complexities as do 
government agencies. While many SAG offices have large staffs of attorneys, they do 
not have the scientific and expert knowledge available to federal and state regulatory 
agencies. Neither do SAGS have a consistent relationship with most of the targets of 
their multistate investigations, which is commonly the case with regulatory agencies. 
When litigating a case or negotiating a regulatory settlement, SAGs also do not engage 
in the lengthy rulemaking process federal agencies do to gain additional perspective on 
a problem.  
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The approach of "regulation by litigation" is also often conducted ad hoc, with 
one industry leader negotiating a regulatory settlement with the SAGs separately from 
all the others and focused on that particular company's conduct, rather than being part 
of an administrative scheme that looks at the operation of an entire industry as a whole. 
Yet the result of these settlements is national regulation. The result is that, unlike 
federal regulators, SAGs regulate on a national basis even as they have little working 
knowledge of how industries actually operate nationally and how particular regulatory 
solutions affect the industry as a whole. These problems complicate the polyphonic view 
that multiple, overlapping sources of authority work to achieve the optimal regulatory 
regime. 
4. Regulatory Experiments Without Borders 
The polyphonic perspective suggests that "regulatory experimentation" is one of 
the great virtues of maintaining overlapping spheres of regulation. A number of SAGs 
rely on this argument as well to defend the benefits of multistate litigation. Referring to 
his involvement in multistate consumer protection and antitrust litigation, for example, 
former Maryland SAG Joseph Curran defended his involvement by arguing "[t]he states 
are good laboratories. Let us do our thing, and if it's a good solution, make it federal 
law."17 However, it is far from clear that the "states as laboratories" analogy works 
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nearly as well with multistate litigation as it might for other state regulatory actors, such 
as a state agency promulgating a consumer protection regulation.  
Erwin Chemerinsky, in his defense of "empowerment federalism," notes, 
"national action may be desirable to prevent spillovers and externalities."18 He offers 
the classic example of pollution originating in one state but ending up in another. He 
also suggests that lax state regulation resulting in a "race to the bottom" is a reason for 
national action – as in the case of one state gaining a competitive advantage by allowing 
child labor.19 What this fails to account for, however, is the way in which policy 
externalities can easily occur in the direction of stricter regulation. This is a particular 
problem with multistate litigation. It may be easier to for a state legislature or 
administrative agency to "implement [a] rule within their boundaries,"20 but multistate 
litigation implements rules that apply nationally – whether or not all of the affected 
states agree. 
This dynamic effectively shuts off different regulatory choices preferred by other 
states. Federal preemption may shut off state experiments by producing a single 
regulatory standard applying nationally – but multistate litigation often has the same 
effect. The problem becomes even clearer when recalling that the basis of a number of 
multistate lawsuits is state law, particularly state consumer law. In these cases, the state 
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laws of participating SAGs in a multistate suit are projected nationally. Because the 
resulting regulatory settlements affect more than one state, it effectively shuts off 
"experiments" in other states by replacing their preferred level of regulation with that 
negotiated by SAGs from other states. In other words, it shifts the regulatory floor 
upward. As Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey have described it in a different 
but related context, this "backdoor federalization" results in "one state encroach[ing] 
upon the decisional autonomy of another."21 
5. The Buck Stops Where? The Problem of Democratic Accountability 
This problem of extraterritoriality raises a number of additional problems, 
including the problem of democratic accountability. This problem arises for several 
reasons.  
First, it is true that nearly all SAGs are elected officials, and that these elected 
SAGs are more likely to participate in and lead multistate litigation campaigns than are 
their unelected counterparts. However, each SAG is accountable only to their own state 
electorate. If voters do not like the regulatory "experiment" pursued by their state 
legislature, then they have some recourse at the voting booth. If voters do not like the 
regulatory results of a SAG-led settlement, on the other hand, there is no similar 
recourse at the polls. Residents of Kansas, for example, have no opportunity to vote for 
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or against the Attorney General of New York, regardless of the policy effects of a 
settlement reached by that official. 
Additionally, SAGs are not the only elected officials in the state. SAGs are 
empowered to represent their state's interest in litigation, but their actions may conflict 
with these fellow officials. When a state governor and state attorney general take 
different positions on policy issues, as sometimes occurs,22 it serves to blur lines of 
accountability. As SAGs become more aggressive in their use of multistate litigation to 
achieve policy goals in the same of the state, this accountability problem grows.  
Further, because multistate litigation is not subject to the procedural 
requirements that administrative agencies must follow – rulemaking hearings, for 
example – their regulations may actually result in a lack of representativeness. 
Multistate settlement negotiations typically include only the targeted defendants and 
the SAGs themselves, and when a settlement is reached, there is little recourse to 
challenge it. Since outside groups do not have an opportunity to comment on the 
regulatory provisions of these settlements, they exclude myriad actors with interests in 
the settlements – besides those, perhaps, that the SAGs choose to invite to the 
negotiating table. 
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6. The Two Faces of Multistate Litigation 
In his description of the subject, Robert Kagan stated, "adversarial legalism is 
Janus-faced."23 Even as adversarial legalism can produce good outcomes, it presents a 
number of considerable difficulties as well.  Much the same can be said about the SAGs' 
use of multistate litigation. Indeed, the emergence of multistate litigation may present 
some real benefits. For one, much like the development of the class action device, 
multistate litigation can help states to more efficiently deal with cross-jurisdictional 
problems. Through multistate efforts, individual SAGs can efficiently share information 
regarding specific fraudulent behavior in his or her state, offering a local, "on the 
ground" perspective in the cooperative endeavor. The development of multistate 
litigation may also be a necessary consequence of the growth of multinational 
companies. Without banding together for cross-state solutions, SAGs may not be able to 
hold large corporations liable for truly wrongful conduct done to their state's citizens. 
There may be many virtues of multistate litigation as a regulatory tool. A 
complete accounting of the value of the benefits of multistate litigation versus its costs 
is probably impossible. Yet even acknowledging that multistate litigation has its 
beneficial face should not blind us to the problematic aspects of the SAGs' version of 
adversarial legalism. Understanding these downsides can help us think through when 
multistate litigation is most problematic and where it might work better. For this reason, 
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I have emphasized these downsides in this chapter even while acknowledging that the 
SAGs' place in America's "polyphonic" federalism may have some benefits as well.  
THE FUTURE OF SAGS AND MULTISTATE LITIGATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
This dissertation has helped to fill in details about the important role SAGs play 
in modern American politics and how their activities challenge assumptions about how 
litigation and federalism fit in America's separation of powers regime. I want to end with 
a few remarks about the future of SAG multistate litigation. Will this remain important 
well into the future? For a number of reasons, I think the answer is a clear "yes." 
a) The Persistent Incentives for Multistate Litigation 
As Chapter 3 illustrated, multistate litigation has grown rapidly since the 1990s 
and has become quite common over the past decade. Chapter 4 illustrated how the 
average size of the monetary recoveries of multistate has increased over time, and the 
case studies indicated that the regulatory ambitions of these settlements have also 
grown in the past few years. I would suggest that this trend towards the use of 
multistate litigation will likely increase, or at least maintain its current frequency. This is 
because at least four sets of key actors have an incentive to see multistate litigation 
continue: the SAGs themselves, their industry targets, private interest groups, and 
Congress. 
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1. SAG Incentives for Multistate Litigation 
The most obvious beneficiaries of the growth of multistate litigation have been the 
SAGs themselves. Multistate litigation allows SAGs to pool their resources and put them 
in better position to litigate against large, multinational firms. It has made them 
important policy players on a national scale, allowing them avenues to pursue their 
political agendas. In several settlements, SAGs have augmented their own power by 
granting themselves additional regulatory oversight of targeted industries. Additionally, 
portions of the monetary recoveries in many settlements help to fund future litigation 
efforts and reduce the costs of litigation for the SAGs.24 Further, as Chapter 4 noted, 
SAGs also have oversight of "cy pres" distributions of funds when distributions to 
individual consumers proves impractical. In these cases, the SAGs control the 
distribution of the money, which often goes to various charities and "public interest" 
organizations. The ability to both raise money without resort to direct taxation and to 
distribute it to charitable organizations is, for the SAGs, an excellent tale to tell in a press 
release. 
 The freedom SAGs have to choose how to focus their litigation efforts also 
provides excellent opportunities for political entrepreneurship. As noted previously, 
multistate litigation is a good way to raise one's profile for future political campaigns. 
Challenging federal agencies under the ostensible control of one's political opponents is 
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a fine way to signal to primary election voters that you are "one of them." Running on a 
record of being "tough on corporate fraud" is likely to be a political positive among most 
voters in a general election. Participating in settlements with corporate "wrongdoers" 
allows ample opportunities for credit claiming.  
 Finally, the very success of previous multistate litigation campaigns itself 
provides an incentive for future lawsuits. As public policy and organizational scholars 
have noted for some time, organizations learn from past experiences, and positive 
feedback reinforces later activity.25 Major litigation successes including the food labeling 
litigation of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and especially the tobacco litigation 
concluded in 1998, generated a "cascade" in which each successful settlement provided 
momentum for further settlements.26 This is especially true when previous litigation 
generates information the SAGs can use to assist in future campaigns. Even previous 
collaborations that do not lead to direct success in the courts – the acid rain litigation in 
the 1980s, for example – can serve as precedents for future collaboration. 
2. Industry Incentives for Multistate Litigation 
In the early days of multistate litigation, an attorney for Mobil Chemical 
predicted that while "most companies settle and go about their business...[e]ventually 
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there will be a revolt. Some companies will say they’ve had enough, and someone will 
make a vigorous defense."27 In large part, however, this prediction has not been borne 
out. This is because most companies have several incentives to reach multistate 
agreements quickly. 
It is often noted that the biggest enemy of corporate practice is uncertainty. 
Multistate settlements allow companies a way to manage this uncertainty. By placing a 
set value on payments in a settlement, the companies save on potential litigation 
expenses and eliminate the possibility of even greater losses in court. Written 
settlements serve to provide a measure of certainty to nervous investors. For other 
companies in the process of business reorganizations or acquisitions, settling SAG 
litigation allows them to make concrete their future obligations and allow them to move 
on with mergers and other business ventures.  
Multistate settlements also serve as a way for businesses to manage public 
relations. Rather than fighting "law enforcement" efforts and risking an image as an 
incorrigible law-breaker, settling a case can help a corporation avoid unwanted bad 
publicity. Most multistate settlements contain provisions denying any legal violations on 
the part of the defendant, which can serve as an additional protection against negative 
publicity. 
Targeted companies also drive larger multistate settlements by pushing for 
larger and more inclusive agreements. The more SAGs that sign on to a settlement, the 
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more protection the company has from future liability.28 This is a major reason why the 
number of SAGs involved in each multistate settlement has increased over time, and 
why more settlements involving all or nearly all SAGs is now more common. This 
dynamic is quite similar to that involved in private class-action litigation, in which 
targeted corporations seek to consolidate similar claims.29 
Of course, none of this is to say that industry "likes" being the target of 
multistate lawsuits. Through rarely successful, industry members can and do seek to 
eliminate the basis for SAG lawsuits through federal preemption. In the meantime, 
business representatives will act in the best interests of their clients and continue to 
settle cases. Ironically, however, the chief result of individual businesses acting in their 
self-interest by settling cases is to further empower and encourage future SAG litigation. 
3. Interest Group Incentives for Multistate Litigation 
Many multistate litigation campaigns are actively assisted or at least cheered on 
by a variety of interest groups sharing the same goals. The most obvious reason for this 
is that multistate litigation works as a regulatory tool. As described earlier, SAGs have 
managed to achieve a variety of direct and indirect effects on policy through their 
litigation.  
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SAGs serve as an invaluable ally to interest groups and private parties in a more 
subtle way as well. In recent years, private groups seeking to use the courts to pursue 
either monetary or policy goals have run into a variety of roadblocks. Congress has 
made private class action "venue-shopping" more difficult by forcing more of this 
litigation into federal court.30 The Supreme Court has made it more difficult for some 
public interest groups to get into court and has recently made class certification more 
problematic.31 
Even as Congress and the courts made it more difficult for interest groups and 
private class-action attorneys to get into court, however, both institutions were making 
it easier for SAGs to bring lawsuits. The very same Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 that 
purported to reduce litigation by moving more class actions into federal court allowed 
SAGs to gain easy access to information that SAGs could use to launch their own 
investigations of alleged corporate wrongdoing. The same Supreme Court that had 
previously made it more difficult for environmental groups to challenge federal agency 
regulations granted SAGs "special solicitude" to bring challenges to such regulations. 
This development has hardly gone unnoticed by private litigators. As Congress 
and the courts made private litigation more difficult while clearing the path for SAGs to 
bring additional cases, many interest groups and private class-action attorneys have 
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latched on to the SAGs to help them get into court. Private class-action attorneys groups 
would not have had standing in court to demand future changes in pharmaceutical 
advertising, but the SAG did by virtue of being state "law enforcers." The Sierra Club 
would have had a difficult time convincing the Court that the EPA's failure to regulate 
CO2 harmed them directly, but the SAGs entered the courthouse doors by virtue of 
ostensibly representing a state rather than a private group. That SAGs are able to use 
law enforcement as a way to achieve social change through court decisions and 
multistate settlements provides a key tactical advantage – and other social reform 
litigators understand this. The SAGs' multistate litigation has increasingly resembled 
private class action and interest group litigation that has paralleled the rise of 
adversarial legalism, but with the added advantage of doing so in the name of state law 
enforcement. As other institutions began pulling back on private litigation, SAGs have 
emerged as an alternative venue for these groups. 
At one time, this strategy might have seemed incompatible with the objectives 
of social reformers. The private "public interest" litigation campaigns that emerged in 
the second half of the twentieth century manifested deep distrust of government 
institutions, even as they sought to build up government power. Ralph Nader, the 
prototypical public interest litigator of the 1960s and 70s, summed this perspective up 
when he argued, "The best way to build government is to attack government."32 
Collaborating with government officials such as SAGs would have been an 
                                                          
32
 James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 324. 
607 
 
uncomfortable proposition. However, as SAGs themselves are increasingly willing to 
"attack government" as a way to build it up, this relationship has become much more 
comfortable over time. 
4. Congressional Incentives for Multistate Litigation 
Congress has bolstered SAG capacity in numerous enactments. The grants to 
state antitrust enforcement Congress provided in the Crime Control Act of 1976 
represented "the most important shot in the arm that state antitrust enforcement has 
ever received."33 The establishment of Medicaid fraud divisions in most SAG offices, 
required by federal law and funded with a combination of state and federal money, 
gave SAGs additional resources to conduct multistate litigation. Several recent 
enactments have provided additional legal capacity to bring lawsuits against corporate 
entities. Ironically, however, Congress's bolstering of SAG capacity also provides these 
actors the opportunity to unravel congressional compromises and challenge the federal 
government directly. Nevertheless, Congress continues to bolster SAG capacity because 
the emergence of SAG litigation also provides a number of benefits for Congress. 
 Most prominently, SAGs can serve to supplement federal government 
enforcement authority at relatively little cost. As Chapter 4 indicated, SAGs conduct 
many of their multistate litigation campaigns cooperatively with federal enforcement 
authorities. Part of the benefit of granting SAGs additional powers is to give federal 
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enforcers an additional partner with which to pool legal resources. Particularly during an 
era in which Congress is ostensibly concerned about the federal debt, farming out 
enforcement powers to SAG may seem a particularly good deal. If SAGs take on more 
enforcement authority, it can free budget hawks in Congress to advocate for cost 
savings in federal agency budgets. As SAGs bring in money from settlements – some of 
which, at least in Medicaid fraud cases, flows to the federal government – granting SAGs 
additional enforcement powers may bring in more revenue than it costs.  
 Nevertheless, this still might not seem like a good deal for Congress. 
Empowering the SAGs may bring in more revenue and reduce the need for stronger 
federal bureaucracies, but at the cost of creating a set of alternative regulators who 
encroach on the prerogatives of Congress. As Kenneth Shepsle reminded us, however, 
Congress is a "they," not an "it."34 Many congressional enactments, and certainly many 
compromises, face significant levels of opposition. Multistate litigation may serve to 
unravel previous congressional deals, but at least some members of Congress are likely 
to cheer on this litigation even if it contradicts what "Congress" has done. This is 
particularly true for congressional advocates of stricter business regulation, for whom 
the SAGs would appear to be a natural ally. When such regulatory progressives form a 
majority in Congress, it is then perhaps not surprising that they would seek to enact 
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legislation empowering SAGs. The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 200835 
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,36 both 
enacted during Democratic Congresses, are examples of such legislation empowering 
SAGs to bring additional lawsuits against corporations. 
 It is important not to take this last point too far, however. Increasing SAG 
capacity has very much been a bipartisan effort, as the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 attest. Republicans voted for these 
enactments, SAG-empowering provisions intact, and a Republican president signed 
them into law. Part of the lack of concern about these provisions on the part of 
Republicans is likely because of persistent conservative assumptions about federalism-
as-constraint. Shifting additional activity to the states is less problematic than bolstering 
federal power. This brings to mind the way in which even conservative Republicans 
helped to (unintentionally) spur private civil rights and tort litigation by rejecting the 
expansion of federal administrative power.37 The irony is that by bolstering the SAGs, 
both Republicans and Democrats have assisted in the development of an unusual form 
of national regulatory policymaking. Congress has in essence authorized and subsidized 
challenges to its own authority and in ways expanding national regulation. 
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b) The Future of Multistate Litigation 
The various incentives for these four sets of actors to continue pressing for 
multistate litigation strongly suggests that this peculiar form of national policymaking is 
here to stay. However, to what extent will the form multistate litigation takes change in 
the future? While prediction is always a treacherous venture, I would suggest a couple 
of possible trends. 
For one, even as multistate litigation grows in importance, there is a good 
possibility we may not again see a settlement precisely like the tobacco Master 
Settlement Agreement. This litigation involved an unusually concentrated industry, 
which facilitated the cartel-like features of the settlement.38 The settlement also 
resulted in a considerable political backlash concerning the SAGs' use of contingency-fee 
lawyers, many of whom became multi-millionaires because of the tobacco litigation. 
SAGs still employ contingency-fee attorneys in their litigation, as they did in several of 
the pharmaceutical suits, but the outcry following their use in the tobacco context 
appears to have made them more attentive to the political optics of their use. The sheer 
size of the monetary payout in the tobacco settlement is also unlikely to be replicated. 
While monetary provisions remain quite important, the SAGs are typically most 
interested in the regulatory provisions of multistate settlements. Future settlements 
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may appear smaller in scope because they do not involve $200 billion payouts, but that 
is only because the main objective of these settlements is to achieve new regulations. 
 I have noted repeatedly that regulatory settlements with firms invariably ratchet 
regulation upwards, since SAGs cannot negotiate agreements that would loosen 
business regulation below federal requirements. This fits with the regulatory goals of 
political progressives. One emerging trend in multistate litigation, however, is the 
increasing use of multistate litigation to challenge federal government policies from a 
conservative perspective. Particularly since the Obama Administration has taken office, 
a number of (mostly Republican) SAGs have banded together to bring challenges to 
federal regulatory programs. A number of SAGs have challenged various efforts by the 
Obama Administration EPA to impose stricter greenhouse gas controls, for example.39 
Most prominently of all, nearly all of the current Republican SAGs are part of the effort 
challenging the recently enacted health care bill as unconstitutional. Ironically, given its 
earlier application to regulatory expansion, this effort can draw support from the notion 
articulated by Justice Stevens's opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA that the states should 
have "special solicitude" in challenges to the federal government.40 
 This emerging trend highlights two interesting aspects of modern SAG litigation. 
First, it appears to be part of a general trend towards increasing partisanship in 
American politics. Not only do SAGs now have separate Democratic and Republican 
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Attorneys General Associations as partisan venues, but SAGs of both parties understand 
the value of litigation in challenging the priorities of a Administration of the opposite 
party. When Bill Clinton was president, multistate litigation was not quite the 
established phenomenon it is today. After a decade full of Democratic SAG challenges to 
the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration represents the first real 
opportunity for Republican SAGs to join the fray. 
 The second interesting aspect of modern SAG practice is the SAGs' increasing 
tendency to view themselves not as legal representatives of their state but rather of 
individual citizens within their state. In reaching multistate settlements, SAGs have 
recast their role as chiefly representing consumers harmed by alleged corporate conduct 
rather than representing state interests harmed by such conduct. There is also the 
seemingly odd phenomenon of SAGs taking legal positions that threaten not only the 
laws of their sister states but their own state laws as well. When several SAGs appeared 
as amici in District of Columbia v. Heller urging the Supreme Court to strike down D.C.'s 
handgun ban,41 they took a position that potentially threatened their own state laws. 
The litigation challenging the individual mandate in the federal health care legislation is 
a story of SAGs representing the interests of individual citizens rather than "the state." 
This subtle shift over time has changed the identity of the attorney general's client away 
from the state and toward the people themselves. 
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*  *  * 
 The rise of state attorneys general again reminds us not to lose sight of the many 
paths of American political development in the United States. Important policy change 
in American occurs not only in short bursts of lawmaking or through great constitutional 
arguments before the United States Supreme Court. The process of statutory 
interpretation and enforcement, seemingly prosaic shifts in procedural rules, and the 
actions of political actors and institutions outside of Washington D.C all can lead to 
significant national policy developments. The very institutions designed and assumed in 
practice to work to stymie policy development – including separation of judicial powers 
and federalism – work to create new opportunities for political development. The rise of 
the SAGs as national policymakers and their use of multistate litigation provides another 
indication of how America's separation of powers regime, while perhaps making certain 
large-scale policy changes more difficult, also creates additional opportunities for 
national policy development and a stronger regulatory state.  
Understanding multistate litigation as a new form of national policymaking has 
become critical for those interested in the operation of modern-day American 
federalism and litigation. This is likely to only grow in importance as the incentives for 
further growth of multistate litigation are firmly ensconced in various institutions. The 
use of this tool, once atypical, is rapidly becoming "politics as usual." Former Eliot 
Spitzer, the activist former New York Attorney General who perhaps best personified 
614 
 
the rise of the state attorneys general in the past decade, put it best: "We’re not going 
anywhere, we’re going to hang around – so get used to it."42 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
Explanation of Case and Settlement Searches 
 
The main resource used for compiling the original dataset of multistate litigation 
referenced throughout this dissertation was the "United States News Verdicts, 
Settlements & Decisions" database available in Lexis-Nexis. This database contains news 
stories concerning decisions and out-of-court settlements from a large number of U.S. 
newspapers, magazines, and wire services. 
My search of this database began by first adding "Attorneys General" as an index 
term. I then used the following search string in all my searches of each year from 1980 
to 2009: [(attorney! pre/2 general!) and (litigation or "settlement & compromise" or 
"suits & claims" or verdicts or "decisions & rulings" or "consent decrees & orders" or 
investigations)]. I proceeded to examine the search results for all sources relevant to 
SAG settlements, judgments, and other litigation. Most SAG litigation during this period 
had multiple news stories associated with them, so I was able to find most of the 
settlements in this way. 
However, I also supplemented this wide Lexis-Nexis search with a search of a 
number of publications issued by the National Association of Attorneys General. This 
included a thorough search of all the following relevant publications of NAAG, including: 
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AG Bulletin, Consumer Protection Report, Antitrust Report, Telemarketing Fraud Bulletin, 
Medicaid Fraud Report, and the NAAG National Environmental Enforcement Journal. In 
addition to these sources, NAAG’s compilation of antitrust litigation proved to be an 
invaluable source for finding multistate antitrust litigation. This database is available at: 
http://app3.naag.org/antitrust/search/. 
In addition to assisting in finding instances of multistate settlements and case 
judgments, these NAAG materials, along with Lexis-Nexis, were also helpful in finding 
the mode of selection and political party of each state's SAGs from 1980 to 2009. In 
general, this information was easily attainable by going to the website of each SAG. 
However, for those SAG websites not containing the required information, I relied upon 
Lexis-Nexis searches to get both the name and party affiliation of each SAG since 1980. 
In a few cases, the NAAG publications mentioned above also assisted in filling in the 
details. 
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Appendix B 
Additional Multistate Litigation Frequency Table (referenced in Chapter 3) 
TABLE B.1. FREQUENCY OF SAG MULTISTATE LITIGATION ACROSS 
FOUR MAIN POLICY AREAS, 1980-2009 
Year 
All 
Cases 
Antitrust 
Cases 
% 
Consumer 
Cases 
% 
Medicaid 
Cases 
% 
Env. 
Cases 
% 
1980 2 1 50.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 50.0% 
1981 3 1 33.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 
1982 0 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
1983 3 1 33.3% 1 33.3% 0 0.0% 1 33.3% 
1984 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 
1985 2 1 50.0% 1 50.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
1986 4 1 25.0% 1 25.0% 0 0.0% 2 50.0% 
1987 3 0 0.0% 2 66.7% 0 0.0% 1 33.3% 
1988 4 1 25.0% 1 25.0% 0 0.0% 2 50.0% 
1989 10 1 10.0% 7 70.0% 0 0.0% 2 20.0% 
1990 12 2 16.7% 7 58.3% 0 0.0% 3 25.0% 
1991 14 3 21.4% 10 71.4% 0 0.0% 1 7.1% 
1992 20 3 15.0% 12 60.0% 1 5.0% 4 20.0% 
1993 19 3 15.8% 12 63.2% 1 5.3% 3 15.8% 
1994 11 3 27.3% 7 63.6% 1 9.1% 0 0.0% 
1995 5 1 20.0% 2 40.0% 1 20.0% 1 20.0% 
1996 24 5 20.8% 17 70.8% 2 8.3% 0 0.0% 
1997 25 7 28.0% 15 60.0% 1 4.0% 2 8.0% 
1998 28 4 14.3% 19 67.9% 1 3.6% 4 14.3% 
1999 16 4 25.0% 11 68.8% 0 0.0% 1 6.3% 
2000 21 5 23.8% 14 66.7% 1 4.8% 1 4.8% 
2001 24 5 20.8% 13 54.2% 3 12.5% 3 12.5% 
2002 32 5 15.6% 21 65.6% 3 9.4% 3 9.4% 
2003 27 7 25.9% 11 40.7% 4 14.8% 5 18.5% 
2004 26 6 23.1% 12 46.2% 4 15.4% 4 15.4% 
2005 36 7 19.4% 20 55.6% 4 11.1% 5 13.9% 
2006 38 7 18.4% 24 63.2% 4 10.5% 3 7.9% 
2007 28 9 32.1% 13 46.4% 2 7.1% 4 14.3% 
2008 40 5 12.5% 24 60.0% 7 17.5% 4 10.0% 
2009 36 4 11.1% 14 38.9% 6 16.7% 12 33.3% 
SUM 511 101 19.76% 290 56.75% 45 8.81% 75 14.68% 
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Appendix C 
Additional Regression Tables (referenced in Chapter 3) 
TABLE C.1.  MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION RATES 
IN MULTISTATE LITIGATION (CASES SINCE 2000) 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t Sig. 
Mode of Selection 1.149 .623 1.843 .066 
Party of SAG .783 .442 1.773 .077 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .700 .123 5.689 .000 
Constant 10.401 .643 16.186 .000 
N = 500 
Groups (States) = 50 
Observations Per Group (Years) = 10 
R2 = .080 
 
TABLE C.2. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LEAD AND PARTICIPATION RATES 
IN MULTISTATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
Lead Rates 
 Coefficient Std. Error t Sig. 
Mode of Selection .085 .048 1.775 .076 
Party of SAG .144 .035 4.149 .000 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .192 .011 17.310 .000 
Constant -.198 .051 -3.919 .000 
Participation Rates 
Mode of Selection .584 .310 1.885 .060 
Party of SAG .232 .224 1.038 .300 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .815 .072 11.389 .000 
Constant 2.062 .325 6.344 .000 
N = 500 
Groups (States) = 50 
Observations Per Group (Years) = 10 
R2 = .181 (lead) / R2 = .085 (participation) 
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TABLE C.3. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LEAD AND PARTICIPATION RATES 
IN MULTISTATE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
Lead Rates 
 Coefficient Std. Error t Sig. 
Mode of Selection -.018 .015 -1.164 .245 
Party of SAG .031 .011 2.801 .005 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .028 .003 8.097 .000 
Constant -.011 .016 -.668 .504 
Participation Rates 
Mode of Selection -.116 .052 -2.209 .027 
Party of SAG .150 .038 3.968 .000 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .088 .012 7.302 .000 
Constant .187 .055 3.396 .001 
N = 500 
Groups (States) = 50 
Observations Per Group (Years) = 10 
R2 = .047 (lead) / R2 = .046 (participation) 
 
TABLE C.4. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LEAD AND PARTICIPATION RATES 
IN MULTISTATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
Lead Rates 
 Coefficient Std. Error t Sig. 
Mode of Selection .072 .033 2.201 .028 
Party of SAG -.008 .023 -.321 .748 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .141 .008 18.838 .000 
Constant -.109 .034 -3.202 .001 
Participation Rates 
Mode of Selection .176 .087 2.032 .042 
Party of SAG .035 .063 .552 .581 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .224 .020 11.211 .000 
Constant .729 .091 8.021 .000 
N = 500 
Groups (States) = 50 
Observations Per Group (Years) = 10 
R2 = .198 (lead) / R2 = .083 (participation) 
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TABLE C.5. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LEAD AND PARTICIPATION RATES 
IN MULTISTATE MEDICAID FRAUD LITIGATION (1980-2009) 
Lead Rates 
 Coefficient Std. Error t Sig. 
Mode of Selection .023 .029 .806 .420 
Party of SAG .023 .021 1.090 .276 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .051 .007 7.725 .000 
Constant -.025 .030 -.847 .397 
Participation Rates 
Mode of Selection -.022 .119 -.186 .853 
Party of SAG -.151 .086 -1.751 .080 
# of Attorneys (in 100s) .127 .028 4.628 .000 
Constant .892 .125 7.136 .000 
N = 500 
Groups (States) = 50 
Observations Per Group (Years) = 10 
R2 = .041 (lead) / R2 = .016 (participation) 
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Appendix D 
The Basic Anatomy of a Multistate Lawsuit 
This section provides a brief overview of the basic process involved in a typical 
multistate lawsuit.  
A number of potential sources serve as the impetus for the formation of a 
multistate suit. SAGs receive many complaints from consumers who believe that they 
are the victims of fraud, and the publicization of common and frequent cross-state 
complaints can serve as an impetus for multistate action on consumer protection issues. 
Events that gain a high media profile nationally can also trigger multistate action, such 
as problems with Bridgestone-Firestone tires resulting in a nationwide recall1 or the 
revelation that several toys made in China contained potentially harmful quantities of 
lead.2 Existing lawsuits, begun either by single SAGs, federal enforcement authorities, or 
private class action counsel, can also spur multistate SAG action. Frequent discussions 
among SAGs help to facilitate their choice of targets. As one source reports, SAGs 
"conduct bi-weekly conference calls of their various sections including consumer 
protection, antitrust, and Medicaid fraud. These calls enable the states to share 
information and to collaborate to identify subjects to investigate."3 
When one or more SAGs decide to engage an issue, the states initiating the 
                                                          
1
 Penelope Patsuris, "Bridgestone Rear-Ends Ford," Forbes, July 1, 2001. 
2
 Louise Story, "Lead Paint Prompts Mattel to Recall 967,000 Toys," New York Times, August 2, 2007. 
3
 Ashley L. Taylor, Jr., Anthony F. Troy, and Katherine W. Tanner Smith, "State Attorneys General: The 
Robust Use of Previously Ignored State Powers," The Urban Lawyer 40 (2008): 510. 
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action will often propose a multistate working group and offer to chair or co-chair the 
group. These lead states will typically play a coordinating role, including organizing 
document reviews and similar litigation tasks.4 Often, the states do so through a task 
force of the SAGs’ national organization, the National Association of Attorneys General 
("NAAG"). For example, the Antitrust Task Force is a prominent and long-standing 
working group operating under the auspices of NAAG. The purpose of this task force is 
"to improve, enhance, and coordinate state antitrust enforcement," and every year this 
task force convenes at least two national meetings, typically attracting representatives 
from most of the state offices.5 Some of the other multistate investigations and working 
groups, including those concerned with consumer protection issues, often operate on a 
more ad-hoc basis, but the working groups follow a similar structure in any given case.6 
Once a group of SAGs decides to investigate a target and form a working group, 
they have several tools to use as part of their investigation. All SAGs retain some ability 
to issue subpoenas as part of an investigation, either in single-state or multistate 
investigations. In all but four jurisdictions,7 the subpoena authority comes in the form of 
Civil Investigative Demands ("CIDs"), which SAGs use to gain relevant documents, take 
                                                          
4
 Patricia A. Conners, "Current Trends and Issues in State Antitrust Enforcement," Loyola Consumer Law 
Review 16 (2003): 57. 
5
 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, State Antitrust Practice and Statues (Third), Volume I (Chicago: American 
Bar Association, 2004), 1-11. 
6
 Stephen Paul Mahinka and Kathleen M. Sanzo, "Multistate Antitrust and Consumer Protection 
Investigations: Practical Concerns," Antitrust Law Journal 63 (1994): 215-216. 
7
 The four SAGs lacking the power to issue CIDs are Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Nevada, and 
Utah. However, all four have some pre-complaint subpoena authority. Myers and Ross, State Attorneys 
General, 2
nd
 ed., 235. 
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depositions, and issue interrogatories in advance of filing a complaint. Most states grant 
very broad investigatory authority for SAGs to employ these CIDs, with little oversight by 
state courts.8 At this stage, the SAGs do not make the details of their investigations 
public. In fact, the targets of SAG investigations are generally unable to conduct their 
own discovery regarding the SAGs’ inquiries until the SAGs actually file a lawsuit.9 The 
SAGs may shield information they gather from public view under some form of 
investigatory privilege, which subpoena recipients sometimes request.10 
In multistate cases, the issuance of CIDs and related subpoenas is coordinated 
through the relevant working group, and is typically the responsibility of the lead state 
or states. Other aspects of the litigation, including meetings with opposing counsel, 
interviews of witnesses, and drafting of legal memoranda are also coordinated through 
the group.11 Because of the close coordination between the states as part of a multistate 
suit, states increasingly deputize staff in one state to serve as assistant attorneys 
general in other states for the purposes of investigation and litigation. In some cases, 
the SAGs may hire private counsel on a contingency basis, something that has become 
more common in cases against pharmaceutical companies. The states also devise 
arrangements to share the costs of the litigation, with the bulk of the expenses 
                                                          
8
 American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Consumer Protection Law Developments (Chicago: 
ABA Publishing, 2009), 380. 
9
 Ibid., 380-381. 
10
 Ibid., 381. Also see Patricia A. Conners, "Current Trends and Issues," 57. 
11
 Conners, "Current Trends and Issues," 57. 
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associated with the lead states in the suit.12 
 Many multistate cases are resolved during the investigatory stage in an out-of-
court settlement, well before the filing of any lawsuit. The settlements, usually 
fashioned as an "Assurance of Voluntary Compliance" ("AVC"),13 typically contain a 
number of legally enforceable provisions to which the signatories must adhere in return 
for the SAGs ending the investigation. In addition to these regulatory requirements, the 
standard AVC will require the targeted company to pay fees and costs to the SAGs, as 
well as restitution to consumers, if relevant.  
Typically, the lead states will send out settlement information to the other 
states, including states not currently part of the investigation, to determine if they want 
to join a proposed settlement.14 At all times, the SAG of each state retains the sovereign 
ability to join or not join a settlement. Once all parties reach a settlement and finalize all 
the details, the SAGs file most settlements in federal or state courts. In some cases, such 
as settlements reached in antitrust cases brought in federal court, the terms do not go 
into effect until a court approves the settlement after a period in which outside parties 
have a chance to object.15 Other AVCs, including consumer protection settlements under 
                                                          
12
 ABA, State Antitrust Practice, 3
rd
 ed., 1-12. 
13
 The typical settlement may also be termed an "Assurance of Voluntary Discontinuance" or simply a 
consent decree. 
14
 "Interview with Patricia Conners," The Antitrust Source, May 2002, 5. 
15
 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Public Law 94-435, U.S. Statutes at Large 90 
(1976): 1390.  
625 
 
state law, usually do not require such a court approval process.16 
 If the parties do not reach a settlement, the lead states will typically draft a 
complaint and circulate it among the members of the working group. States deciding to 
join will add their own allegations under state-specific statutes and/or common law 
authorities.17 As noted above, multistate SAG lawsuits are sometimes filed in federal 
court, most commonly in multistate antitrust and environmental suits, and sometimes 
in a coordinated manner in separate state courts, usually in multistate consumer 
protection and Medicaid fraud cases. Once litigation begins, the states run the litigation 
through a committee structure, such as the executive committee, the discovery 
committee, the settlement committee, and so forth.18 
SAGs can generally pursue a wide variety of injunctive and monetary remedies 
depending on the case. In multistate cases brought against the federal government – 
including the air pollution cases that are the subject of chapters 5 through 7 – the 
desired outcome is a court judgment reversing the decision-making process of a federal 
agency. In the more frequent case of litigation brought against private parties, SAGs aim 
to reach settlements in which they can require various changes in business behavior, 
from injunctions to required codes of conduct binding on the defendant. Members of 
the working group agree to distribute the monetary remedies amongst themselves, with 
                                                          
16
 Whether AVCs must or can be filed with a state court depends on each individual state’s law. Often, a 
multistate settlement will contain a provision clarifying that it may be filed in court where required or 
permitted. See, for example, Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In the Matter of Blockbuster, Inc. (2005) 
(settlement agreement between several SAGs and Blockbuster). 
17
 Conners, "Current Trends and Issues," 57. 
18
 Ibid., 57-58. 
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the lead states often receiving a higher percentage of any fees and costs recovered. In 
some cases, an AVC may set up a consumer fund that distributes the proceeds of the 
settlement directly to state consumers. In others where such a distribution would be 
impractical, settlements may designate monetary recoveries for general charitable 
purposes, often at the discretion of the individual attorneys general.19 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 For example, one settlement in 2002 required several distributors of compact discs to provide five 
million CDs to non-profit and charitable groups. See Connecticut Attorney General’s Office, "Attorney 
General Announces Settlement with CD Distributors, Retailers," September 30, 2002, accessed May 6, 
2011, http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=1777&Q=283532. 
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